High CourtsSINGLE BENCH(2017) 03 P&H CK 0165

Shri Sher Singh Malik vs M/s New Shiv Ganga Timbers and another

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 1 March 2017

HON’BLE JUDGES
Jitendra Chauhan
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
A-371-MA-2014 (O&M)

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

49 paragraphs · 619 words
1.

This special leave to appeal has been filed against the judgment

dated 06.12.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Panipat

whereby, the accused-respondent was acquitted of the charges framed

against him under Section 138 / 141 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (for

short ''the Act'').

2.

It is contended that the appellant had advanced a friendly loan

amounting to Rs.2,00,000/- to the respondent and to discharge his liability

for the same, the respondent issued cheque dated 15.03.2010 in favour of

the appellant. However, on the presentation of the same, it was dishonoured

by the bank with the remarks ''Insufficient Funds''. It is asserted that the

appellant has proved all the material ingredients to constitute an offence

under Section 138 of the Act against the respondent.

3.

I have heard the learned counsel and carefully perused the

entire record on file.

4.

In State of UP Vs. Ram Sajivan and others, 2010 (1) SCC

529, Hon''ble the Supreme Court of India, observed as under:-

"In the case of Raj Narain v. State of U.P. & Others [Criminal Appeal Nos. 891-892 of 2002 decided on 18.09.2009], this Court reiterated the aforesaid view and held that even if two views are reasonably possible, one indicating conviction and other acquittal, this Court will not interfere with the order of acquittal. However, this Court will not hesitate to interfere with such order if the acquittal is perverse in the sense that no reasonable person would have come to that conclusion, or if the acquittal is manifestly illegal or grossly unjust."

5.

As per the case of the appellant, he secured the loan amount

i.e. Rs.2,00,000/- from one S.K. Chugh and handed over to the respondent.

However, there is no evidence that said S.K. Chugh had the capacity to

advance Rs.2,00,000/- or that amount allegedly given on loan to the

appellant is shown in the Income Tax Return or in any other record

maintained by said S.K. Chugh. To prove his version, the appellant has not

even examined S.K. Chugh. In his cross-examination, the appellant had

stated that he had given the loan amount to the respondent on interest.

However, it has come on record that he does not hold any licence for money

lending. Admittedly, no document was accepted by the appellant regarding

advancing of loan or that respondent has furnished any security for

repayment of amounting to Rs.2,00,000/- appears to be highly improbable.

Except self serving statement of the appellant there is no material evidence

on record to prove the factum of legally enforceable debt of the respondent

towards appellant. He has not led any oral or documentary evidence to

prove the advancement of loan.

6.

It is a settled law as has been held in C. Antony Vs. K.G.

Raghavan Nair, 2002(4) RCR (Criminal) 750 that even if a second view on

appreciation of evidence is possible, the Court will not interfere in the

acquittal of the accused. In the cases of acquittal, there is double

presumption in his favour; first the presumption of innocence, and secondly

the accused having secured an acquittal, the Court will not interfere until it

is shown conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible.

7.

Keeping in view the above, the finding of acquittal recorded by

the trial court cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on

record. In fact there is no infirmity in the reasoning assigned by the trial

court for acquitting the respondent, this Court feels that learned Judicial

Magistrate 1st Class, Panipat, has passed the impugned judgment dated

06.12.2013, after appreciating the entire facts and circumstances of the

present case and no other view is possible.

8.

Accordingly the special leave to appeal is declined.

Dismissed.