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Judgment
T.N. Singh, J.—In this bunch of cases this Bench is seized with the duty mainly of determining the extent of reach, in other words the retroactive operation, of a social legislation�The Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 1975, for short the "Act". Two learned single Judges of this Court rightly took the view that the question is of signal significance and general importance inasmuch as large social stakes are in issue. Accordingly, they referred the question for the decision of a larger Bench. Although in some of the cases a view was taken that the case may be finally disposed of on merit as well by a Division Bench, counsel on two sides (following a tenant vs. landlord lineup) addressed us jointly and indeed mainly on the common questions of law supporting opposite or rival contentions and constructions and agreed that decision on merits in each case be left to be rendered subsequently by a Single Judge.
The moot question therefore is, how far or to what extent is Section 12 of the Act retrospective in operation in the context of the provisions of Clauses (d) and (h) of Section 2 referred in explicit terms in the order. Our attention, however is also drawn to Sub-section (4) of Section 1, the impact where of on the other provisions we have to ascertain though so mentioned in the older. Needless to stress the obvious that this exercise has to be undertaken bearing in mind the established canons of construction that context and setting of the provisions in question as also the object primarily of the enactment and indeed of the provision together provide the key to true appraisal of the language used by the Legislature in any enactment. Why ? Because, literal interpretation may be deceptive and defeat the object sought to be achieved by the legislature. The modern trends undoubtedly, is to lean on ''purposive construction''. Indeed, in our legal system the constitutional imperatives have established for the Courts the grundnorm of social justice to enforce legislative mandates by judicial power to fulfill social objectives.
First, however, let the key provisions, and indeed only the relevant portions thereof, be kept at the forefront and, therefore, be extracted:
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,�
(d) "Landlord" includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, received or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant ;
Explanation: A tenant who sub-lets shall be deemed to be landlord within the meaning of this Act in relation to the subtenant ;
(h) tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or but for a special contract would be, payable and includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy or in the event of such person''s death, such of his heirs as were ordinarily raiding with him at the time of his death but shall not include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a civil court of competent jurisdiction.
12, (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, a tenant shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
(First proviso not relevant)
Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim in bonafide and if it records a finding to that effect, the landlord shad be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court and such court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned f in this section not withstanding that such court finds that such denial does not involves forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded.
(2)(a) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Rent Control Court for a direction in that behalf.
(b) If the Rent Control Court, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against application, is satisfied that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rest due by him in respect of the building within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absences of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable and such default has continued for three months within a period of twelve months, it shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building and if it is not satisfied it shall make an order rejecting the application thereof by him:
( proviso not relevant)
(c) The order of the Rent Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building shall not be executed before the expiry of one month from the date of such order or such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its discretion allow; and if the tenant deposits the arrears of rent with interest and cost of proceedings within the said period of one mouth or such further period, as may be; it shall vacate that order.
[Emphasis Added]
Before we give a summary of the provisions contained in other clauses of Sub-section (2) of Section 12 and also is its other Sub-sections we may indicate that Section 3 envisaged ''''Rent Control Courts" to be constituted by the State Government which is also empowered there under to appoint" Accommodation Controllers" and to give defections to them for exercise of the powers and performance of their functions. Besides, the provision of Sub-section (4) of Section 1 need also to be mentioned even at this stage. It contemplates that the Act ''shall be deemed to have come into force on and from the 1st day of January, 1975", The Act received the assent of the President on 3rd September, 1975 and was published in the Tripura Gazette on 3rd November, 1975. Its long title also, we may note, in this context. It is "An Act to regulate the leasing of buildings and to control the rent of such buildings in the State of Tripura". (emphasis added)
The soul of the Act evidently embedded in Section 12(1) which must, therefore, be read as the controlling clause of the core provision of the Act. The positive mandate of Sub-section (1) is however effectuated mainly by Sub-section (2) and, indeed also by other Sub-sections thereof because they infuse life into the expression ''shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of this Act", (emphasis added), What appears plain, precipitate and indeed indisputable to us, without in any manner stretching the language of Sub-section (1) and the second proviso thereto, is that no total ban (ouster) of civil court''s jurisdiction is contemplated. What really is totally banned, however is "eviction" of a "tenant" on any ground other than those allowed by Section 12 whether by a civil court (in some cases) or by a Rent Control Court as the Act purported to extend a protective umbrella to ''existing possession'' of tenants by creating ''statutory tenancies'' in their favor, That the Act purported to do so also appear clear from its long title as well as from the definition Clause (h) by which persons us would otherwise be classed as ''ex-tenants'' at common parlance were recognized as ''statutory tenants'' inasmuch as the second proviso to Section 12(1) was, therefore, enacted to deliberately exclude operation of the ban in the case of only those persons who would not, even as ''ex-tenants'' be able to claim the protection of Section 12(1). In other words, the Act excluded from its purview persons who though occupying any premises in the notified area, on the date of commencement of the Act were doing so otherwise than on condition of paying ''rent'' to the landlord.
We may now apply ourselves to a closer examination of Section 12 in its context and setting. Although the marginal note of Section 12 is "eviction of tenants" the apparent dichotomy in the language of different Sub-sections must first be dispensed with. While Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) speaks of landlords'' right to apply to the Rent Control Court for a direction "to evict his tenant", Clause (b) thereof as well as Sub-sections (3), (4) and (8) envisage that be may obtain a direction from the said Court against the tenant "to put the landlord in possession" of the building in question. The landlord is entitled to apply for direction to "evict" his tenant only in a case in which the tenant has not paid rent due by him in respect of the building within the prescribed period us appears clear from Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (2). However, it is to be noted that even according to Clause (b) of Sub-section (2), on the application made by landlord under Clause (a), the order albeit defensible contemplated under Clause (c) is "an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building". Therefore, the emphasis, in our opinion, is unmistakably on the ''existing possession'' of the premises in question by the person concerned, who could have the order vacated under Clause (c). Landlord can'' recover'' from him "possession" of the premises only in accordance with the provisions of Section 12, No importance, in our opinion, need be attached to the use of the terms "eviction", or "evicted" or "to evict" appearing in Sub-section (1) or even in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) because a misleading construction may emerge therefore curtailing the wide sweep of the core provision, If two hallowed maxims-nosciture a sociis and exvisceribus octus-must have any meaning then the word ''evict'' In the context mutt mean recovery by whatever means of ''existing possession'' of the premises in question from the "tenant'''' by the landlord. We may refer, therefore, to the statutory definition of the terms "landlord" and "tenant". Any person who is in "possession '' of any premises ("building" according to Act) occupying the same on the condition of paying "rent" therefore would essentially be a "tenant" under the Act irrespective of, actual payment thereof, on the date of commencement of the Act. That the only qualification which he must possess to be a "tenant" under the Act is payment of liability to pay ''Trent" in respect of the premises which is in his actual "possession" is also dear from the definition of the word "landlord"'' who is said to be a person "receiving" or "entitled to receive" the rent. It is true that the definition of the term "tenant" excludes "any person against whom any decree or order of eviction has been made by a civil court of competent Jurisdiction" but this exception, in our opinion, merely envisages cases covered by the second proviso to Section 12(1) and is relatable thereto, as already indicated above. Indeed, this conclusion is inevitable because, the primacy of the controlling provision must be maintained and also because norms of harmonious construction lead to this conclusion.
The clear purport of Section 12, therefore, according to as is that after commencement of the Act no landlord is entitled to recover possession of any premises in the notified area from a person who is in possession thereof on the date on which the landlord seeks to recover or enforce his right to recover possession thereof except on any of the grounds envisaged under Sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (8) whether or not such right accrued to him in virtus of a decree passed by a civil court otherwise than in the manner provided by the second proviso to Section 12 (1). About Sub-section (2) we have already said that for non-payment of rent a landlord may obtain an order from the Rent Control Court to be put in possession of the building. According to Sub-section (3), he may also obtain such an order if he is able to prove that "he bonafide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him". Under Sub-section (4) some other contingencies art envisaged on the happening of which a landlord may obtain a similar order to which it is not necessary to refer in detail. According to Sub-section (8), if a landlord is already occupying a part of the building he may augment his possession thereof by obtaining a similar order against the tenant "if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use". These, according to us, are the various conditions precedent which, in our opinion, are prescribed u/s 12 and unless any of these conditions are fulfilled a landlord shall not be able to recover possession of the building from the tenant. This position is clearly manifested by the non obstinate clause appearing in Sub-section (1) of Section 12. The -wide sweep of the language used therein and more particularly the expression "except in accordance with the provisions of this Act" vocally expressed legislature''s intention to protect existing "possession" of ''statutory tenants'' and the only exception made is in respect of right accrued under a decree which may be passed by civil court in a case virtually referred to it, under the second proviso to the Sub-section, by the Rent Control Court, Indeed, the other provisions and the general scheme of the Act also lend weight to this construction. To buttress the view taken by us it is also permissible to us to refer also to "surrounding circumstances" of the enactment, viz., the Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill which saw the birth of the Act, In this context, we may also recall once again the long title which, as we have already referred, itself provides intrinsic evidence in support of the view taken by us.
Why was it necessary to protect ''existing possession'' of a tenant ? Because, in our opinion, the Act Intended to create statutory tenancies'' in respect of all buildings let out or meant to be let out In the notified area so .bat the State could effectively grapple with the accommodation problem in the area Legislature''s intention clearly was not to totally destitute the landlords as it was cognisant of the position that all of them may not belong to the affluent class while some tenants on the other hand, may not always belong to the no weaker section. It, therefore, took care to ensure regular and timely payment of a reasonable or "fair rent" (fixable u/s 5) to the landlord as the provisions of Clause (b) of Section 12 itself manifest in the context indeed of Sections 5 to 9. It also took care of situations where landlord might himself need a shelter. It purported to do ''social justice'' but also solve a burning social problem to fulfill a wholesome social objective. The Act unmistakably struck at the unscrupulous and incorrigible landlord by pre-empting his right to evict a tenant and thereby it killed an anti-social object which, according to the law-makers, evidenced the twin evils of ''rack-renting and indiscriminate eviction of tenants". This is manifested in the Statement of Object and Reasons of the Bill wherein, it was stated that in Tripura with the rapid growth of population; trade and business there has been increasing demand for rented accommodation while there existed no law to remedy the twin evils'', Another object for the Bill was stated to be the necessity to provide accommodation for ''public purposes; inasmuch as the number of premises available for lease fell abort of the demand. Thus we find, therefore, a provision in the Act, as expressed in Section 4, requiring both the landlord and the tenant to notify the Accommodation Controller, the vacancy in respect of any building. This provision leaves no room for any doubt that State intervened effectively by controlling leasing of building in the notified area by pre-empting indiscriminate and ''malafide'' evictions ; and by regulating the right of landlords to induct new tenants and evict old tenants. Freedom of contract insofar as renting of buildings in the notified area was concerned was deliberately intended and interfered with. What was left to the landlord unimpaired was Lis right to recover timely and regularly a reasonable rent for his building, already in occupation of, or to be let out to, any person. The Act provided for both timely and regular payment of ''fair rent'' by tenants as well as the measure to interdict eviction by the landlords of law-abiding tenants with the object of increasing rent or inducting new tenant to achieve the purpose.
Support for this view is also to be found is the deeming provision made in Section 1(4), Legislature intended while making provisions for Rent Control Courts to mark simultaneously date line to give jurisdiction to the new forum from the prescribed date. This was necessary because, though for the new remedies envisaged under the Act the new forum could take full charge prospectively which it could also do in respect of any pending proceeding transferred to it from civil courts, in respect of pending litigation permissible under the pre-existing law there would have to be a cut off date insofar as the civil courts were concerned which the legislature in its wisdom chose to fix at 1.1.75 so that any such proceeding instituted in civil court between 1.1.75 and the date of publication of the Act could be transferred invariably to the new forum. In other words pending suits or proceedings for recovering ''possession'' of any premises from a tenant in the notified area instituted prior to 1.1.75 were allowed by the Act to be continued in the old forum giving them concurrent jurisdiction, while in respect of all similar proceedings initiated subsequent thereto the new Rent Control Courts could claim sole jurisdiction, subject, of course, to the provisions of 12(1) and its second proviso. This holding does not, therefore, derogate from the proposition that proceeding which were pending in civil courts on 1.1.75 were income manner affected because even in case of those proceedings instituted thereafter in those courts eviction of tenants through those courts could only be had on any one or more of the grounds contemplated under various Sub-sections of Section 12, according to the second proviso of Sub-section (1) thereof.
Counsel appearing on behalf of landlords in these matters advanced arguments mainly on the footing that as the Act affects not only procedural rights of litigants by creating new forums (original, appellate as well as revisional) but also affects vested substantive right of the landlords inasmuch as their right to evict the tenants under pre-existing law is affected, retrospective operation of the Act must be ruled out to protect their vested rights. We propose to examine and analyze the argument advanced referring indeed to the authorities cited by counsel but we must first state that acceptance of their arguments will lead to disastrous result defeating the object of the enactment and frustrating the legislative intent and the social purpose underlying the legislative measure now placed at the judicial anvil before this Bench.
The main plank of counsels'' argument against open retroactivity is that the legislative having expressly limited the activity to 1.1.75 vide Section 1(4) we cannot push it further back. This limb of argument, however, does not, counsel submit, negate the established norm of statutory construction that there can be no vested right in matters of procedure, Indeed it is firmly settled that the question of change of forums appertains the field of procedural and not substantive law and such a change of law operates retrospectively and a person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of actions accrued prior to the change of forum. It was bold in New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Shanti Misra, Adult, that the jurisdiction of civil court was ousted as soon as the Claims Tribunals were constituted pursuant to enactment of Section 110A Of the Motor Vehicles Act. The mere fact that the accident occurred pride to the constitution of the alleged Tribunal would not take the matter out of Tribunal''s jurisdiction. Even the bar of limitations erected in the new provisions itself in Sub-section (3) WOULD not indent this jurisdiction, We have already indicated what, according to us, is the reason for the legislative date line projected in Section 1(4). Because, procedural law concerning changes of forum even operates retrospectively the legislature fixed date line to demarcate the jurisdictional competence of new created Rent Control Court in terms of time� dimension. w(Sic) is patent is that Section 1(4) was not meant to control provisions of Section 12 which in fact, as observed, was may to be the core provision with its controlling clause posited in Sub-section (1). Conceding that the Act does not impair vested night of landlord only insofar as forums is concerned, we cannot overlook that Section 12 superimposes new obligations supporting of old rights deliberately interfering with the pro-existing rights the landlord insofar as the grounds on which a landlord could evict his tenant are concerned. It is to be noted that even under preexisting law there was no question of any bar of limitation insofar as right to evict a tenant was concerned as the cause of the action was a continuing one and dependent only on service of a notice u/s 106 of T.P. Act. Therefore, by the deeming provision of Section 1(4) the legislature merely curtailed the effect of the rule concerning retrospective operation of new procedural law. Beyond that we do not and cannot obviously read anything more in Section 1(4), Because any other view would defeat the main object of the enactment which meant to protect, at alluded, the ''existing possession'' of a tenant on the date of commencement of the Act.
We may, however, pertinently note that the Tripura Act is modeled generally in the cast of the parallel West Bengal enactment of 1956. The retrospective operation of latter came up for consideration, and that too in the constitutional perspective raising a challenge to the vires to the enactment, in the decision reported in B. Banerjee Vs. Smt. Anita Pan, (B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan). The challenge grounded on considerations of "hardship" was rejected by their Lordships. It was held that the enactment impaired pending litigations not only suits but also appeals pending at the commencement of the Act, and the court was bound to give effect to the legislative intent "regardless of isolated anomalies and individual hardship". The hardship could be remedied otherwise but the legislative intent could not be defeated that is the message of the decision. In a case in which the suit had been instituted at the time when the landlord could not have foreseen the subsequent enactment saddling him with new conditions he would be allowed to amend pleadings or to put in fresh pleadings in a suit or in an appeal or second appeal when protection of the Act is claimed by the tenant, Because as far as possible courts must avoid multiplicity of litigation. in Niranjan Modak Vs. Lakshmi Narayan Guin and Others, a decree for ejectment was passed by the trial court against the tenant under T.P. Act. During pendency of first appeal the 1956 Act was extended to the area wherein the suit premises stood, It was held that the appellate court ought to act aside the decree and dismiss the suit. This decision has been affirmed, (In appeal) Lakshimi Narayan ( AIR 1985 SC 3). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that Section 13(1) of West Bengal Act had the prime object of protecting "possession" of the tenant subject to the exceptions specified in the Sub-section and the Court must give effect to the change in law during pendency of the appeal. It was held that there was an inherent legislative command in Section 13(1) which deprived the court of its unqualified jurisdiction to make an order or decree to deprive a tenant of his possession of any premises in the area in which the Act was in force.
Much argument was advanced at the Ban, before us, to press home verbal difference in the language used in Section 12(1) of the Tripura Act and Section 13(1) of the West Bengal Act. This argument apparently misses the message and ratio of Lakshmi Narayan (supra). Their Lordships, in construing therein Section 13(l) of West Bengal Act drew inspiration from no earlier decision of the court in Shah Bhojraj Kuverjl Oil Mills, v. Subhash, Chandra (AIR 1961 SC 1595 ) wherein Section 12(1) of Bombay Rent Control Act was construed and this was done despite similar lack of resemblance in language. Apparently what appealed to their Lordships was the similarity in the objects of the two provisions which required the language to be so construed as would achieve the object, The question in such cases was protecting "possession'''' of tenant and interdicting landlord''s rights to recover possession from the tenant except otherwise than in accordance with the enactment in question. This propositions has indeed been more vocally stated in Mani Subrat Jain Vs. Raja Ram Vohra, wherein their Lordships observed that the essence of rent control jurisprudence was that the benefit of interpretative double belonged to the potential evict unless the language is plain and provides for eviction". Therein Section 13(1) of East Punjab Rent Control Act was construed whose language agreed verbatim albeit concerning its essential Matures, with that of Section 13(1) of West Bengal Act. In Mani Subrat (supra), their Lordship held that the tenant who was protected was "whose nexus (sic) the property is continuance in possession''''. Therefore, even the persons against whom decree for eviction bad already been passed though they might have become "ex-tents" were entitled to protection of the provision. Indeed, in that case claim for protection of the provision was made by the tenant in possession of the property only in execution proceeding and the claim was upheld holding that the execution proceedings must fail "because the statutory road-block cannot be removed". The same view appear to be taken by another Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in K. Balakrishna Rao and Others Vs. Haji Abdulla Sait and Others, For eviction of a ''statutory tenant'' recourse only can be had to the provisions of the statutory enactment and procedure prescribed there under must be followed. This is the message of Balakrishna Rao, A tenant did not become a trespasser even when a suit abated by operation of law as he bad become a ''statutory tenant'', no it was held by their Lordship. We have stressed this holding for the reason that in some cases an argument was advanced that long before the commencement of the Act lease having terminated by efflux of time as also because forfeiture of tenancy was incurred in various ways, the tenant had become a trespasser. The Act could not, therefore, revive the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Reliance was placed in support of this argument on the provisions of Section 111 and Clauses (c). (m) and (q) of Section 103 of the Transfer of Property Act. In our view, however, his argument merits no consideration at all because it overlooks the basic fact that on the date of commencement of the Act by operation of law the tenant, because a his continuance in possession of the premises in question, became a statuary tenant - a concept common to almost all Rent Control Acts as held by their Lordships in V. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Ammal, wherein the question not only of notice u/s 106 but also of forfeiture u/s 108 TP. Act was duly consider and it was held that a case for eviction of such a tenant must be made cue under the special Act and not under T.P. Act, Indeed, the definition of the term ''''tenant" in Clause(h) of Section 2 of the Act in the instant case itself postulates the case of a person who is "continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy". That apart more importantly, the language of Tripura Act�of Section 12(1) itself possesses a sweep wider than its counterpart of West Bengal Act or even of Bombay and East Punjab Acts. It interdicts "eviction" in any manner (as none is specified, unlike East Punjab Act or West Bengal Act) of "tenants" (as defined in the Act)�"except in accordance with the provisions of Act,"'' the only qualification to this condition being provided in the second proviso of the Sub-section.
Great stress was laid by counsel for the landlords on a single consideration on which they unnecessarily labored bard citing several decisions. The proposition canvassed was, an enactment must not be so construed as to affect vested substantive rights; the legislative intendment to give retrospective operation must appear clear on the face of the provision. Reliance was placed on another enactment produced by the same Legislature, namely the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reform Act, 1960, whereof Section 46B(2) was "reffered to us. It was submitted that by an express statement the legislature by enacting Section 46B(2), gave retrospective operation to the enactment taking away the jurisdiction of civil courts, However, in our opinion, not only the fact that bare perusal of Section 46 B does not appear to support the contention the relevance of the provision as well as the contention bear no scrutiny at all. Such an exercise would be extremely hazardous as the two enactments have different objects. On the general principles of interpretation as respects retroactivity of a statutory provision we were referred to certain passages from Maxwell (Twelfth Edition, pp. 215-216). Stress was laid on the following dictum, of Wright J. in Re Athlumney, quoted by Maxwell:
Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.
To be fair to counsel who labored hard to convince us that the principles enunciated in several decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court on retrospective operation of statutory provision must be borne in mind, we consider it necessary to refer briefly to few because the proposition projected in Maxwell, which merely bus been reiterated, is unexceptionable. In Sri Vijayalakshmi Rice Mills, New Contractors Co. and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, the court was sized with the interpretation of provisions of Andhra Pradesh Rice Control Order. The question was, whether the amendment Order had retrospective operation, It was held that there was no deeming clause or any other provision in the Order to indicate that it was intended to have retrospective effect. It really baffled us to understand counsel''s ingenuity in pressing this decision in service because a contrary situation is clearly manifested in Section 1(4) in the instant case. The next case cited was, K.E. Chako ( AIR 1976 SC 2610), wherein the general principle, of which Maxwell speaks and is extracted above, was reiterated. At para 38 of the judgment, the Court observed that the relevant section came into effect on 1st January, 1970, and, there fort, obviously they could not be given retrospective operation. Some other cam wore cited and realied on with great gusto and vehemence to which even reference, it unnecessary become some of them are totally irrelevant while other lead little assistance at nil to the question before us. We have, therefore, on hesitation to dismiss this limb of argument of the counsel appearing for the landlords as we have interpreted the relevant provisions at the very outset, without any external aid, giving them their natural meaning la their context end setting without doing violence to the language in any manner. Indeed, we merely referred to, for the purpose only of buttressing out conclusion, a single statement from the Objects end Reasons of the Bill to which no exception can be takes, We hive also drawn inspiration from the relevant decision of the Apex Court which state the law of the land and in doing so we merely discharged a legitimate and constitutional duty.
We are, however, left to deal with one substantial objection raised by landlords'' counsel. Because the question, which this Bench is called upon to answer, also came up for consideration before a learned Single Judge of this Court in S.A. No. 5 of 1974 decided on 7.9.79 (Smti. Suradhani Bhowmick v. Shri Harendra Kishore Roy Barman ). Counsel placed reliance on the said decision from which indisputably they derive assistance. However, counsel for tenants submitted that the decision has lost its force and efficacy after the verdict of their Lordships of the Supreme Court was pronounced in Lakshmi Narayan Guin and Others Vs. Niranjan Modak, upholding ( in appeal ) the judgment of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1967 Cal. (supra). Because, counsel rightly insist, the learned Judge took the view that Niranjan Malak (supra) had been overruled by another Division Bench of that Court in Aswini Kumar Chatterjee Vs. Sukhendu Nath Guin, and relied n the later decision. We have perused the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge. It appears that his Lordship did accept the view expressed in Aswini Kumar (supra) but referred also to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rafiquennessa Vs. Lal Bahadur Chetri (Dead) through his Representatives and Others, and Subhas Chandra (supra), What appears to have appealed seriously to his Lordship is reflected in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his judgment because, in para 14 it was observed that but for what was stated in the said paragraphs his Lordship "felt inclined to take the view that Tripura Act applied to pending matters". In para 12, it was observed that if the provisions of the Act were to be held applicable to pending matters at various levels starting from suits in the court of Munsiffs to second appeals before this Court, the result would be that all these courts may lose jurisdiction to deal with the matters. With due respect, this reasoning-argumento inconvenient-does not appeal to un as a sound proposition and indeed the same and similar arguments were rejected by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in B. Banerjee (supra) as also in Mani Subrat (supra), That apart, the reasoning conflicts directly with the settled proposition that no person can have a vested right o procedure foe which New India Insurance Co. (supra) is a strong authority. Besides, we have already demonstrated that the extent and effect of the "loss" WES not total. Another view which impressed his Lordship was the argument that the pending proceeding in various courts would abate inasmuch as there was no provision for transfer thereof to the new forum. This apprehension also, in our opinion, was wholly unfounded and the argument ought to have been rejected of the threshold. We do not see any warrant for the proposition that the Act killed any right�whether adjective or substantive. No right was killed rights of both types were merely regulated. The mere absence of provision for transfer in the Act did not render courts powerless to save them inasmuch as proceedings which were pending in civil courts prior to enactment of the Act were governed by CPC which contains ample provision in Section 24 et al to meet such a situation. Indeed, in all cases necessity for transfer would not arise as observed in B. Banerjee (supra). We are informed at the bar that many pending proceedings have actually been transferred to Rent Control Courts overlooking what was held in B. Banerjee. This is insofar as the procedural right is concerned.
16(a). About the substantive right to evict a tenant, we have no doubt at all, as observed earlier, that the Act deliberately impaired (but did not kill) the vested right by limiting merely landlord''s right to evict a tenant, limiting the right only to the grounds envisaged u/s 12. In para 13 of the judgment, the learned Judge also observed that absence of any revision to deal with jurisdiction etc. of pending matters in context of setting up a new forum meant that legislature did not at all have pending matters in mind. With due respect, we find ourselves unable to agree with this proposition also because of all that we have already stated above. In our opinion, there was no necessity at all for legislature to adumbrate provisions of the nature of "translational previsions" as the legislature did not have in its mind any transitional period. Legislative intent is writ large on the face of its several provisions discussed above indicating that all tenancies on and from the commencement of the Act become ''statutory tenancies'' and therefore, for eviction of any tenant compliance with the provisions of Section 12 of the Act was mandatory, This also answers the doubt expressed by the learned Judge in para 15 observing that retrospective operation of the enactment was confined to 1.1.75. One last word, Reliance on, and relevance of Refiquennessa and Subhas were denied on the ground that the language of Section 12 of Tripura Act was not as wide as of Assam Act (discussed in Refiquennessa) or Bombay Act (discussed in Subhas). But, in our view, language of Section 12 has a wides sweep as already stated above. For all these reasons, we are constrained to hold that the decision rendered in S.A. No. 5 of 1974 on 7.9.79 that "the Act did not apply to pending proceedings'' does not state the law correctly and we accordingly over-rule it.
The submissions made to us on the common and general contours of several factual aspects of different cases may also briefly noted before we sum-up our conclusions on the questions of low. In some cases, as already indicated, not only suits were filed prior to the commencement of the Act but, it is submitted, tenants in those suits denied relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. In some cases, the Act into force during pendency of appeals either in to court below or in this Court. Io other caw, protection under the Act is claimed in pending execution proceedings. Thues one factual element common to all cases which prominently stands out indisputably is that persons claiming protection against eviction (under the provisions of the Act) are those who are in uninterrupted "possession" of "buildings" situated, in an area to which the Act applies.
We have exhausted ratiocination on all aspects of the) matter presented to us and have examined different view points. Now we may recapitulate and reiterate briefly the summary of our conclusions on the question referred to this Beneh for determination.
(a) The Act protests ''existing possession'' of a person who claims protection of Section 12(1) and as such the protection can be claimed in any proceeding whether instituted before or after the commencement of the Act. This conclusion is based, inter alia, on a consideration of Section 12(1) in the context of Clauses (d) and (h) of Section 2 and Section 1(4) of the Act.
(b) Even if such person bad denied tenancy in any earlier stage of any proceeding instituted before the commencement of the Act, if he continued to be in uninterrupted possession of the premises on the date on which he claimed protection of the Act in any pending proceeding, the court or forum where such protection is claimed shall be bound to entertain and decide the claim in the manner prescribed in the Act. This, according to us, is the mandate of the second proviso to Section 12(1) which explicitly vests jurisdiction only in Rent Control Courts to virtually ''refer'' such cases to civil courts for trial and disposal but only after deciding if toe "denial" (of landlords'' title ) or the claim (of right of permanent tenancy) was "bonafide".
Following the lead of B. Banerjee supra) we feel disposed to add further, as a guide-line mainly for subordinate courts lest, ends of justice suffer though proliferated or protracted litigation that it shall be open to landlords to amend pleadings or otherwise make out their case for eviction of tenants under the Act. It is also necessary at the same time to observe, following Mani Subrat (supra), that in some cases the course may not be appropriate or efficacious and the remedy of the landlords may be a fresh suit as und when the grounds on which eviction can be sought u/s 12 become available. More than this we would not say to curtail or restrict the choice of action of parties and of courts below.
Let the matters be now placed for bearing and disposal before a Single Judge This should, however, be done with utmost expedition as these cases have awaited, for too long, decision of this Bench.
Manisana J.
I respectfully agree with the view expressed by my learned brother. In the circumstances of the case, I am inclined to add the following observation to support the conclusion reached in the leading judgment.
The T.P. Act was applied in the State of Tripura before the ''''Act" came into force on 1.1.75. The fights and the liabilities of the lessor and the lessee of any building were governed by the T.P. Act before 1.1.75. However, there are persons or tenants who remain in possession although the lease granted to them had been determined or terminated before 1.1.75. u/s 106 or 115 or any other provisions of the T.P. Act. The aforesaid persons or tenants bad already incurred liability to be evicted before the enforcement of the "Act". As such, civil suits for eviction had been brought against them in civil courts. Some of those cases are pending in the original courts. and some of them are pending in the appellate courts. The question which arises for consideration is whether a person or tenant who continues to possess any building or premises after the termination of tenancy before the "Act" came in to force under the provisions of the T.P. Act will be included within the meaning of the word "tenant" u/s 2 (h) and 12 of the "Act". I am in agreement with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother that such a tenant or person is included within the meaning of "tenant" under the extended definition of the word "tenant" under the "Act" and has become "a statutory tenant". In Ramratan and Others Vs. The State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court also observed:
A person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly though in law not accurately, called "a statutory tenant''. Such a person it not a tenant at all: he has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as be pays the standard rent und permitted increase, if any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual1 tenancy is personal: ....
As the tenant or person who continues to possess any building after determination or termination of the tenancy before the ''Act'' came into force under the provision of the T.P. Act comes within the meaning of ''tenant" under Sections 2(h) and 12 of the ''Act�, no such tenant can be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the ''Act''. In other words, a ''tenant can only be evicted by the ''Rent Control Court'', The ''Act'' has simply changed the forum and procedure for eviction of a tenant.
In the instant case, the point of time provided under the ''Act'' is the date on which a tenant is to be physically evicted, and not the date of passing order or decree of eviction save as provided u/s 2(b) of the ''Act''. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, no civil court has jurisdiction to pass any decree or order for eviction of a ''tenant'' in a pending suit, appeal or proceeding after the enforcement of the ''Act''. Therefore, Sections 2(d), 2(h) and 12 of the ''Act'' are retrospective to the extent arrived at by my learned brother.