Shri. Lalasaheb Surwase vs The Honarary General Secretary, Shree. Jain Vidya Prasarak Mandal & Ors.

Heard learned counsel for the parties. Perused the record.

Original Petitioner has filed this petition challenging judgment and order dated 16.11.2005 passed in Appeal No. 19 of 2000 (P) by learned Presiding Officer, Pune/Shivaji University and College Tribunal, Pune University Campus, Ganeshkhind, Pune. By the said impugned order, the appeal filed by the Petitioner challenging the order of termination of services as principal of Sanghvi Kesari College of Arts, Commerce and Science at Chinchwad, Pune, was dismissed thereby confirming order of termination. The Respondent No.1 is an Educational Institute running Respondent No.2 -College.

The Petitioner was initially appointed as Professor and thereafter as acting Principal and Principal on regular basis, who was confirmed in December, 1985.

A notice dated 11.01.1996 was issued to the Petitioner calling upon him show cause and explain about various irregularities and allegations, within four days. By order dated 22.01.1996, the Petitioner was placed under suspension and was served with the charge-sheet. The Petitioner was alleged to have contravened various clauses of Statute 414 of the University of Poona Statutes.

Charge No. 1 contained allegations of non-complying with directions of the Prabandha Committee regarding P.F., discontinuation of the services of employees and filing of backlog, administrative directions and directions about accounts and audit. Charge No.2 was in respect of non-complying with the provisions of statutes and not fulfilling the responsibilities as principal and willfully disobeying the same by acting contrary. Charge No.3 was about withholding the money of the college, using the same for the purpose other than for which the same are to be used and not making the same timely available. Charge No.4 was about not replying various queries raised by Prabandha committee and statutory auditor and Local Management Committee ('LMC' for short). Charge No.5 was about non compliance with clauses (f), (g) and (p) of Statute No. 414. Charge No. 6 was relating to non-convening meeting of LMC. Charge No.7 was related to not maintaining the accounts, income and expenditure, cash books, petty cash books, pertaining to Senior and Junior wings of college since the academic year 1993-94. Charge No.8 was about remaining absent from duties without making any alternative arrangement. Charge No.9 was about purposely keeping the blank vouchers and showing receipt of payment in somebody else’s name.

The Petitioner filed his written statement before the inquiry committee and denied allegations. The management examined 5 witnesses namely Mr. Anil Motilal Kankariya who was Professor, Mr. Kanakmal Nanawal Jain, who was Boarding Superintendent, G.K. Kore, who was internal auditor, Shankarlal J. Mutha, General Secretary of the Management and Vijaykumar K. Lunawat.

On 24.04.2000, the inquiry committee submitted its report holding the Petitioner guilty of all the charges. The Respondent Management then issued second show cause notice dated 01.05.2000 proposing termination of the Petitioner, based on inquiry report. The Petitioner, by his advocate’s reply dated 24.05.2000, denied the charges contending that he had rendered 24 years of unblemished service and proposed termination was disproportionate.

Ultimately, on 05.06.2000, Respondent -Management terminated the service of the Petitioner, which was communicated vide letter dated 07.06.2000.

The Petitioner filed Appeal No. 19 of 2000 (P) before the Tribunal challenging the termination order, in which, the impugned order is passed dismissing the appeal on 16.11.2005.

In January 2013, the Petitioner filed present petition, after a period of about more than 7 years. On 07.04.2016, after hearing learned counsel for the parties including the Respondent-management, though the petition was admitted and Rule was issued, the issue of delay is kept open and no interim relief was granted.

The Petitioner reached the age of superannuation on 12.09.2009. During pendency of the petition, in July 2024, the Petitioner expired and on application by his legal heirs, by order dated 17.10.2025, the present petitioners, legal heirs and representatives were brought on record.

Learned counsel for the Petitioners, Mr. Walawalkar submitted as under:

That Petitioner had rendered nearly 29 years of unblemished service rising from lecturer to principal. When show cause notice was issued, the Petitioner was on medical leave. That when chargesheet was served it did not contain separate submission of allegations and this is clear violation of Statute 433-A(3)(A)(ii). This objection was raised at the earliest. The inquiry is void ab initio and it is conducted in breach of statutory safeguards. That subsistence allowance was not paid during the period of suspension. That it was admitted that the internal auditor did not carry his appointment letter and therefore he was not shown the documents. That despite holding that only 3 charges out of 9 were proved, the Tribunal upheld disproportionate penalty of termination. That only four days’ show-cause notice was given. That in respect of removal of other employees, as directed by the management, it has come on record that those employees were not removed ultimately. That this is a case of Petitioner being singled out. That lesser punishment ought to have been considered. That the impugned order of the Tribunal is perverse and deserves to be quashed and set aside. He pointed out cross-examination of internal Auditor as well as Secretary and submitted that statute did not require convening of LMC. That siphoning of funds has not been proved.

On the other hand, learned counsel Mr. Sawant supported the impugned order, strongly contending that writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised when the petition suffers from huge delay and latches of more than 7 years, for which no explanation is given. He submitted that even while admitting the petition, the issue of delay and latches are kept open and therefore Petitioner cannot claim benefit of pendency of petition. He submitted that charges confirmed by the tribunal included direct disobedience and insubordination. That the Petitioner did not co-operate with the internal auditor despite there being written direction by the management. That the Tribunal has considered everything in detail and by a well reasoned judgment, the termination has been confirmed. He submitted that punishment is proportionate considering the charges proved. He submitted that the Petitioner could not have taken a call about whether particular employee can be terminated legally or not and Petitioner has clearly overreached by entering into such aspect, resorting to direct disobedience. He submitted that not convening meeting of LMC is also serious misconduct and therefore the termination is justified. He contended that this Court cannot sit in appeal over decision in departmental inquiry matters and unless it is found that principle of natural justice was violated, no interference is required. Lastly, he submitted that even one serious proved charge is enough for punishment. He relied on following judgments in support of his case :

ii) Vijay Malhan Vs. UOI & Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3392.

I have considered rival submissions and perused the record.

At the outset, it is important to note that the present petition suffers from long delay and latches because the impugned order is dated 16.11.2005 and it is challenged in January, 2013, which is after a period of more than 7 years. As already noted above, while admitting the petition, the issue of delay is kept open, and interim relief was refused. Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent-management is fully justified in raising objection that when Petitioner has slept over his rights and approached the Court belatedly, relief under extra-ordinary jurisdiction should not be granted. The only explanation offered by the Petitioner is found in Paragraph No. 6 of the petition, where he has stated that delay is due to great financial constraint in engaging advocate and spending on litigation. He has stated that when one of the advocates showed inclination to file petition, the petition is filed and therefore there is delay. Such an omnibus and self suiting plea about great financial constraint and willingness shown by the advocate can not be held as sufficient explanation for long delay of more than 7 years. Since, the objection about delay and latches is kept open, the Petitioner cannot claim any advantage of the pendency of the petition. The judgment relied upon by the Respondent in the case of Mrinmoy Maity (supra) clearly supports the case of the Management.

It is important to note that even if four days’ show cause notice dated 11.01.1996 was given and the charges served upon the Petitioner did not contain statement of allegations, it has come on record that the charge-sheet contained all details regarding charges. The Petitioner, as a principal of the college has given detailed reply on 19.01.1996 and thereafter, order of suspension was issued on 22.01.1996 along with detailed charge-sheet and thereafter, the inquiry committee proceeding appears to have taken place from February, 1996 till February, 2000. The inquiry report was issued in April, 2000. It is also important to note that the inquiry was conducted in detail. As many as 5 witnesses were examined and were cross-examined at length, by Petitioner in person and/or his lawyer. Written submissions were submitted and considered. Petitioner’s case in respect of all the charges was heard. Considering the voluminous record produced before me and on perusal of various statements of witnesses and their cross-examinations, it can be seen that the Petitioner was given full and sufficient opportunity to present his case. Therefore, considering the overall facts and circumstances, it has to be noted that the Petitioner has been given sufficient opportunity to participate in the inquiry proceedings and put up his case. Therefore, this is not a case where principles of natural justice are violated.

The Tribunal has discarded and set aside the charges which were found vague and unsubstantiated. However, in respect of part of charges viz. about disobedience with direction to discontinue services of certain employees, not convening LMC and also the charge of non co-operation with internal Auditor, the Tribunal has considered the documents on record in detail and found the said charges as proved.

The Tribunal has recorded that the Petitioner was asked to terminate the services of 3 employees since they were on probation. It has come on record that Petitioner received the communication in that behalf from the Respondent- management which is at Exhibit-M-83. The Petitioner was directed to relieve Mr. P. Vasudevan, Smt. P. Radha and P.V. Dandvate as their probation was to end and services were temporary. Despite receiving such clear communication / direction from the management and also on receiving reminder in that behalf, the Petitioner did not comply with the directions. It has also come on record that those employees continued and salaries were drawn by them. The stand taken by the Petitioner that ‘these employees were regularly appointed and therefore termination would have been illegal’ has been rightly rejected by the Tribunal. Legality or otherwise of the termination of services of employees on probation, could not have been decided by the Petitioner directly. Assuming that termination was illegal, the management would have suffered the consequences. The Petitioner, as a Principal was bound to comply with the directions of the management. Therefore, this serious charge of disobedience and insubordination has been rightly confirmed by the Tribunal.

So far as the charge of non co-operation with internal auditor is concerned, it is argued that the appointment of internal auditor was approved on 15.10.1995 and he had visited 3 days earlier and that these dates are crucial. It must be noted that by letter dated 09.10.1995, it was clearly informed by the Management that Internal Auditor Mr. Kore would visit on 12.10.1995 and necessary record be made available. The relevant documents in that behalf Exhibit-M-52, M-53 and M-54 are considered by the Tribunal. Letter Exhibit M-53 dated 09.10.1995 was addressed to the Petitioner regarding appointment of Internal Auditor and his proposed visit on 12.10.1995. In view of the clear instructions by the management, Exhibit-M-53 dated 09.10.1995, informing the Petitioner about appointment of Internal Auditor and his proposed visit, the Petitioner was not justified in not co-operating with the auditor and insisting to see his appointment letter. The argument that Internal Auditor, Mr. Kore, has admitted in cross-examination that when he met the Petitioner, he was not having copy of appointment and that non-co-operation happened only once has no merit. It is important to note that the said witness had stated in cross-examination that inspite of identification by the management staff, he was not allowed to work by the Petitioner.

Mr. Walawalkar has contended that under Statute 414, only reference to LMC is about responsibility for receipt expenditure and maintenance of account and submission of quarterly statement to management and to the LMC and Petitioner was not responsible for convening meeting of LMC, while Mr. Sawant pointed out that under clause (j) of Statute 414, the Petitioner was responsible for observance of the Act, Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations, Rules which included convening meeting of LMC. The Tribunal has noted under applicable Statute, the Principal is the Secretary of LMC. As a Secretary, it is his duty to convene the meeting. The charge against the Petitioner was that he never convened any such meeting and therefore the Secretary of the management had to convene such meeting, which the Petitioner has failed to attend. The explanation of the Petitioner was that he had some work and he could not attend the LMC meeting. The Tribunal has also clearly observed that the Petitioner has not shown that during his tenure he had convened any such LMC meeting. In such circumstances, the said charge is held as proved.

In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the arguments about violation of principles of natural justice, lack of opportunity and non co-operation due to internal auditor not carrying appointment letter, is without merit.

The stand of the management that even on one charge, the punishment can be sustained is duly supported by the judgment of Principal B.M. Ruia Mahila Mahavidyalaya, Mumbai (supra).

This Court, in writ jurisdiction, is not expected to sit as a Court of appeal over Tribunal’s order or findings of inquiry committee for review of evidence. No case of violation of principles of natural justice is found. The judgment of Vijay Malhan (supra) supports the case of the Respondent / Management.

In the aforesaid circumstances and for reasons indicated above, no perversity is found in the impugned order of the tribunal. The Tribunal has taken most probable view on the basis of material available on record. There is no reason to interfere in the findings of the tribunal confirming some of the charges held as proved by the inquiry committee.

Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. No costs.

In view of the dismissal of the petition, the interim application seeking direction about service benefits, is also rejected.

All concerned to act on duly authenticated or digitally signed copy of this order.