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Judgment
(A.M. Kalita, J)
Heard Mr. Tabit Tapak, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant. Also heard Mr. Ninnong Ratan, the learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State respondents.
The instant writ appeal has been filed by the appellant, assailing the Judgment and Order dated 25.05.2026, passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant.
The facts leading to filing of the instant writ appeal have been summarized herein below: -
In terms of an advertisement dated 03.05.2023, vide No. APSSB-13/6/2023, issued by the Secretary-cum-CoE (APSSB), Government of Arunachal Pradesh, the appellant had applied for the post of Constable. The appellant was selected and appointed to the post of Constable, vide common appointment order No. PHQ/PER-213/2024 dated 22.04.2024. Accordingly, he served as a Constable under Arunachal Pradesh Police for five (5) months and had undergone departmental training at Banderdewa, and he received salary for five (5) months. However, during the course of such training, an objection has been raised by the respondent department to the effect that he had concealed his criminal antecedents in terms of the application form filled up by him. Whereas, at the time of filling up of the form, he was not properly aware of the language contained in the form, as he was never been convicted in any court of law. However, a technical objection has been raised by the respondent department and he had been terminated from the service illegally and arbitrarily without any departmental inquiry/proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice.
The appellant's case is that the specific allegation against the appellant was that in clause 11(a) of the application form, it has been asked, "Have you ever been arrested, prosecuted, kept under detention, or bound down/fined, convicted by a court of law for any offence, or debarred/disqualified by any Public Service Commission from appearing at its examination/selection, or debarred from taking any examination/restricted by any university or any other educational authority/institution?", as contained in the language of the form, which was a complex question, and therefore, the appellant had mistakenly filled as "No", and even if there was a mistake, it was corrigible as he was never been convicted in any court of law, and despite that fact, the respondent authority mechanically and technically raised the issue and in violation of principles of natural justice by issuing the impugned termination order dated 23.07.2024 mechanically and arbitrarily, terminated him.
The appellant's case is that though a case was registered against him, being S/Oyan P.S. Case No. 26/2019, under Sections 419/506/34 IPC, corresponding to G.R. Case No. 321/2019, and the investigation of the said case culminated in submission of a charge-sheet, but the appellant has been discharged from the case on 06.06.2024 by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pasighat, and the police has also given a report about the criminal antecedents of the appellant, in which no criminal records have been found against him in terms of the certificate dated 26.07.2024, issued by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Pasighat.
Being aggrieved, the appellant approached the Gauhati High Court by filing a writ petition praying for setting aside of the aforesaid impugned termination order dated 23.07.2024.
The writ petition was contested by the respondent authorities by filing affidavit, against which the appellant had filed affidavit-in-reply, and after the pleadings were completed, the matter was finally heard, and vide, the aforesaid order dated 23.07.2024, the learned Single Judge has come to a conclusion that the writ petition filed by the appellant did not have any merit, and therefore, the same was dismissed.
Aggrieved, the appellant has filed the instant writ appeal.
Mr. T. Tapak, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submits that the application form, especially Serial No. 11, wherein the question was put about the applicant's antecedents, is totally vague. He submits that multiple questions have been asked at Serial No. 11, which had confused the appellant. He submits that the question at clause 11(a) of the application form is of complex nature, and the appellant could not understand the same properly as he is not very much conversant with the English language. He submits that because of such lack of understanding and due to the vagueness of the questions at clause 11(a) of the application form, the applicant had written "No" against the aforesaid question. He submits that he had no intention of suppressing any fact. He further submits that since the appellant was subsequently acquitted by the learned CJM, Pasighat, vide order dated 06.06.2024, the termination order issued by the respondent authorities on 23.07.2024 is illegal and cannot be sustained. He submits that no opportunity was given to the appellant to explain his position in the instant case. He submits that such vagueness of the question has put the appellant in an uncomfortable zone, and therefore, the mistake has been committed by the appellant inadvertently. He submits that because of the same, the appellant could not be faulted with, and the appellant could not have been terminated by the respondent authorities. He submits that the appellant had already worked for five months without any issues, and he had been receiving salary regularly, though he was in the probation period, he could not have been terminated by the respondent authorities, which has put a stigma on his career, which is not allowed under the settled position of service law. He submits that the appellant had been dismissed without any inquiry or departmental inquiry conducted by the respondent authorities, and therefore, though he was in probation, he could not have been terminated by the respondent authorities in the manner he has been terminated in the instant case.
The learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the learned Single Judge has not properly discussed the case of Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2016 Supreme (SC) 578. He submits that the case of Avtar Singh (supra) has laid down certain principles where service of a person can be terminated against an allegation of non-disclosure. However, the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the principles laid down in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) in its proper perspective.
The learned counsel for the appellant has further referred to the case of Iswar Chand Aggarwal v. State of Punjab, reported in 1974 Supreme (SC) 257, to argue the point that though the appellant was in probation, he could not have been terminated without giving an opportunity of hearing to him.
On the other hand, Mr. N. Ratan, the learned Additional Advocate General, has submitted that the learned Single Judge has discussed about the ratio laid down in the case of Avtar Singh (Supra) in proper perspective, and after discussing and analyzing in details, the learned Single Judge has passed the impugned judgment and order. He submits that there is nothing wrong committed by the learned Single Judge in passing the judgment and order by holding that the termination of the appellant cannot be interfered with, due to the fact that the appellant has failed to disclose his criminal antecedents at the time of filing the application, in spite of his knowledge of the pendency of the criminal proceeding. In support of his argument, the learned Additional Advocate General has referred to the case of State of U.P. & Anr. vs. Dinesh Kumar, reported in 2026 Supreme (SC) 45.
The learned Additional Advocate General has also submitted that there is no vagueness in question no. 11(a) in the application form. He submits that the questions were very clear, and there is no question of misunderstanding the questions by the appellant. He submits that no other candidate has ever complained about any vagueness or non-understanding of the questions put under question no. 11(a). He has submitted that the appellant, in spite of being aware of the pendency of the case, has failed to disclose the facts in the application form. The learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that, while appointing the appellant, vide appointment letter dated 16.02.2024, under memo no. PHQ (PER)-213/2024, the appellant was directed to report at Police Training Centre on 05.03.2024, subject to the condition at Serial No. 2 of the offer of appointment that, "A comprehensive character and antecedent verification of the candidate to the fullest satisfaction of the Department, if any adverse remarks received about the character and antecedents, the service will be terminated forthwith”. He has submitted that the said condition was also mentioned in the appointment order dated 22.04.2024. He has submitted that, thereafter, the character and antecedent report has been received by the office of the respondents, which clearly reveals that the appellant was involved in one criminal case, being S/Oyan P.S. Case No. 26/2019, under Sections 384/506/34 IPC, and a charge-sheet has been submitted in the said case, and the case was pending trial at that time, and the same had been reported in the letter by the Officer-in-Charge, S/Oyan Police Station, Pasighat. Therefore, he has submitted that the appellant has been charge-sheeted in the aforesaid case and he was aware of filing of such charge-sheet against him. However, in spite of the aforesaid facts, he failed to disclose about the case in the application form. Therefore, he submits that the respondent authorities have not committed any illegality in terminating the service of the appellant. Accordingly, he prays that the appeal of the appellant should be dismissed.
As far as facts of the case are concerned, the same are not in dispute. Pursuant to an advertisement dated 03.05.2023, issued by the Secretary-cum-CoE (APSSB), Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, the appellant applied for the post of Constable. After being selected, he had undergone five (5) months departmental training and while he was undergoing training, he was served with a termination order dated 23.07.2024 on the ground that he had violated the condition, as contained in Serial No. 4 of the appointment order and also in clauses 11(a) and 11(b) of the form filled up by him for being appointed as Constable.
It is also a fact that before passing the termination order, no show-cause notice was issued to the appellant and no opportunity of being heard was also granted to him. It is also not in dispute that while the termination order was issued to the appellant, the appellant was undergoing probation period. It is also seen that at Serial No. 4 of the common appointment order, it has been stated that the comprehensive character and antecedent verification of the candidate to the fullest satisfaction of the department shall be carried out and if any adverse remarks received about the character and antecedents of the candidate, the services shall be liable to be terminated forthwith. Before the appellant was appointed and terminated, S/Oyan P.S. Case No. 26/2019 was registered against the appellant and another co-accused and the appellant has been charge-sheeted and the same was pending before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pasighat, wherein charge-sheet was filed under Sections 384/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
It is seen that subsequently, the learned CJM, vide, order dated 25.04.2024, has held that only offences under Sections 419 and 506 IPC are attracted and thereby, dropped the offence under Section 384 IPC. Vide, order dated 06.06.2024, as the informant on that day did not want to pursue the case further and accordingly, thereafter, the learned CJM had acquitted the appellant.
It is seen that the learned Single Judge has sufficiently dealt with the issue of termination if a candidate has failed to disclose his criminal antecedents in the application form when the application form itself provides for such disclosure, if any. In that regard, the learned Single Judge has done a detailed analysis and discussion of the case of Avtar Singh (supra). The learned Single Judge has also referred to the case of Devendra Kumar vs. State of Uttaranchal and others, reported in (2013) 9 SCC 363, as well as the case of Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited vs. Anil Kanwariya, reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 739.
In aforesaid all three cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in principle that suppression of criminal antecedents as required in the form by a candidate can be a potential ground for termination of the service of the candidate subsequently, when the same is found out by the appointing authorities.
In the case of Avtar Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph nos. 20, 24 & 30 has observed as follows: -
“20.When we take stock of aforesaid decisions of this Court in nutshell it emerges that in Ramashanker Raghuvanshi (supra), this Court has opined that activities in Jan Sangh and RSS could not be made a ground to deprive employment. In democratic set up 'McCarthyism' is not healthy. Some leniency to young people cannot be ruled out. In T.S. Vasudavan Nair (supra), a three Judges' Co-ordinate Bench of this Court held that due to non-disclosure of conviction in a case of violation of Defence of India Rules by shouting slogans, the cancellation of appointment was illegal. In Dhaval Singh (supra), though pendency of case was suppressed when verification form was filed, however, the information about it was furnished before cancellation of appointment order on the ground of suppression was passed. This Court set aside the order on the ground of non-consideration of effect of disclosure made before order of cancellation of appointment was passed. In Sandeep Kumar (supra), this Court in the backdrop fact of the case that offence suppressed was committed under section 325/34 IPC at the time when incumbent was 20 years of age. This Court held that young people to be dealt with leniency. They should not be deprived of appointment as suppression did not relate to involvement in a serious case. In Ram Kumar (supra), this Court considered a case when pending criminal case under sections 324, 323, 504 IPC in which subsequently acquittal had been recorded, no overt act was attributed by sole witness to incumbent and moreover Government instructions dated 28.4.1958 requiring authority to consider suitability as such was not complied with, denying back wages to incumbent, his appointment was ordered. In Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda (supra), this Court declined to interfere under Art.136 in view of subsequent acquittal in a case under section 307 IPC. The decision of Labour Court was not interfered with. Passage of time was taken into consideration. However, this Court clarified that decision will not be treated as precedent. In Kamal Nayan Mishra (supra), action was taken when employee was not on probation. He had been confirmed in service and was holding civil post, attestation was filled after 14 years of service and then after 7 years of that, action was taken. It was held that Confirmed employee could not have been removed in view of protection under Art. 311(2) without enquiry. Removal was held to be void. In M. Bhaskaran (supra), it was held that when the employment was taken on bogus and forged casual labourer service card no estoppel was created against employer by appointment and such appointment was voidable. In Sushil Kumar (supra), on consideration of background facts of the pending case which was suppressed under sections 304, 324/34 and 324 IPC, it was held not desirable to appoint incumbent notwithstanding his subsequent acquittal. In Ram Ratan Yadav (supra), this Court held that suppression of pending criminal case under sections 323, 341, 294, 5068/34 IPC on the date of filing attestation form coupled with impact of it on students, nature of employment, the discretion exercised to terminate the services was upheld. In R. Radhakrishnan (supra) in which pendency of criminal case under section 294(b) IPC was suppressed relying on Sushil Kumar (supra), it was held that removal was legal. In Bipad Bhanjan Gayen (supra), there was suppression of two pending cases on the date of filing verification form under sections 376 IPC and 417 IPC relating to rape and cheating. It was observed that since antecedents were not good incumbent could not claim equity for appointment. In Daya Shankar Yadav (supra), this Court has laid down course of action to be taken in such cases, and that suppression by itself can be a ground to remove person from service or cancel an appointment, notwithstanding acquittal in the criminal case. In SK Nazrul Islam (supra), due to suppression of pending case on the date of filing of form under sections 148, 323, 380, 427, 596 IPC incumbent was adjudged to be unsuitable for appointment. This Court has also opined that before a person is held guilty of suppression of a fact it has to be considered whether verification form is precise and is not vague, and what it required to disclose. In Daya Shankar (supra) was held that in case verification form is vague no fault can be found on the ground of suppression. However, facts which have come to knowledge it has to be determined by employer whether antecedents of incumbent are good for service, to hold someone guilty of suppression, query in the form has to be specific. Similarly, in B. Chinnam Naidu (supra) when column in verification form required to disclose detention or conviction, it did not require to disclose a pending criminal case or fact of arrest, removal on the ground of material suppression of pending case and arrest was set aside as that was not required to be disclosed.
24.No doubt about it that once verification form requires certain information to be furnished, declarant is duty bound to furnish it correctly and any suppression of material facts or submitting false information, may by itself lead to termination of his services or cancellation of candidature in an appropriate case. However, in a criminal case incumbent has not been acquitted and case is pending trial, employer may well be justified in not appointing such an incumbent or in terminating the services as conviction ultimately may render him unsuitable for job and employer is not supposed to wait till outcome of criminal case. In such a case non disclosure or submitting false information would assume significance and that by itself may be ground for employer to cancel candidature or to terminate services.
30.We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus:
(1)Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information.
(2)While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information.
(3)The employer shall take into consideration the orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision.
(4)In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourse appropriate to the case may be adopted :-
(a)In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse.
(b)Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee.
(c)If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.
(5)In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.
(6)In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case.
(7)In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper.
(8)If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.
(9)In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding Departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false Information in verification form.
(20)For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such Information which was required to be Information not asked for but is specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, In such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for.
(11)Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.
We answer the reference accordingly. Let the matters be placed before an appropriate Bench for consideration on merits.”
In the case of Avtar Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly laid down the principles to be followed in case of suppression or non-disclosure of material criminal antecedents by a candidate while filling up the application form, wherein the same were required. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once the verification form requires certain information to be furnished, the candidate is duty-bound to furnish it correctly and any suppression of material facts or submitting false information may, by itself, lead to termination of his services or cancellation of candidature in an appropriate case.
In the case of Dinesh Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: -
“9.In urging this Court to look at circumstances in his favour in accordance with Avtar Singh v Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471 and Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P, (2024) 5 SCC 264 he points out inter-alia his age which is approximately 45, the fact that he gave the affidavit prior to initiation of cancellation of appointment proceedings, the District Magistrate has placed on record his fitness for appointment. We are of the considered view that none of these factors would justify overlooking the fact that at the relevant point in time he concealed the information. There is a maxim in law to the effect that 'juda lex sed lex' which means the law may be harsh, but the law is law. The factum that he said 'no' to pending proceedings against him not once but twice, shows demonstrated mal-intent and is in direct contravention of the disclaimer(s) given in the forms. Subsequent acquittal or the fact that he attempted to come clean about the suppression of facts cannot accrue to his benefit.”
Taking into account the ratios laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Avtar Singh (supra) and Dinesh Kumar (supra), it is seen that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly observed the fact that non-disclosure of criminal antecedents, if it is required in the application form, demonstrates the ill intent of the candidate. When a candidate is aware that a criminal case is pending against him, and in spite of such knowledge, the candidate does not disclose such fact, which is a requirement in the application form, a safe inference can be made that the candidate had intentionally did not disclose the required information. The knowledge of pendency of the criminal proceeding against the candidate is a material fact in deciding the issue whether the non-disclosure goes to the root of the matter and thereby making his appointment liable for termination.
In this connection, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shatrughan Yadav vs. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Limited (FACT), reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1537, has held that knowledge of a fact is a necessary prerequisite for its non-disclosure. Lack of awareness of existence of a criminal antecedent is a factor that is required to be considered. However, such lack of knowledge has to be proved by the candidate. And in such cases, wherein a candidate can prove that he did not have any knowledge of any criminal cases pending against him, the situation can be different and the appointing authority is required to take care of that very aspect before issuing any termination letter to the candidate.
However, in the instant case, it is a fact that the appellant was very much aware of the pending case as he appeared before the trial court and subsequently he got acquitted. However, during his filling up of the application form wherein he had stated in negative about pendency of any criminal cases, the aforesaid case against the appellant was very much pending. However, the appellant had chosen not to disclose the same, which clearly shows his ill intent to procure the job without disclosing the required criminal antecedents.
This Court has also perused and carefully examined the questions at Clause 11(a) and 11(b) of the application form, as well as the condition at Serial No. 4 of the appointment letter dated 22.04. 2024.
It is seen from the application form at Clause 11(a) and (b), the language of the questions cannot be termed as vague. The questions are pretty clear and, in our opinion, are understandable by a person with reasonable knowledge of English language. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the argument forwarded by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the language in Clause 11(a) and 11(b) are vague cannot be accepted.
Coming back to the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the termination order of the appellant is stigmatic in nature and the same could not have been passed by the respondent authorities without any opportunity of being heard or any inquiry, it is a fact that the appellant was in probation, and the appellant has not been terminated for any other reason but the ground that he has failed to disclose his criminal antecedents as required to do so in the application form. Therefore, in our considered view, the termination order of the appellant in the instant case cannot be faulted with.
The case referred by the learned counsel in that regard, i.e., Ishwar Chandra Agarwal (supra), will not help the appellant in the instant case, as the same is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the instant case.
We have duly considered the factual aspect as well as the law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as well as the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in the instant case.
Having considered and discussed the relevant facts and issues, we are of the view that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 25.05.2026 does not require any interference.
Accordingly, the instant writ appeal, having been found without merit, is hereby dismissed.