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Judgment
Regard being had to the similitude in the controversy involved in the present cases, the Misc. Petitions were analogously heard and by a common order, they are being disposed of by this Court. Facts of Misc. Petition No. 5222/2019 are narrated hereunder.
The present petition is arising out of the judgment dated 3/7/2019 passed in Original Application No. 201/01157/2016 (Jagjeevan Ram Vs. Union of India) passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, Circuit Sitting, Indore.
Facts of the case reveal that the petitioner before this Court, as stated in the Writ Petition, was employed as a casual labour w.e.f. 1991 at Military Dairy Farm Mhow, Distt. Indore and by order dated 3/10/1998 his services were terminated on account of reduction of work load. It was also stated in the order dated 29/8/1998 that re-engagement of the workman shall be done based upon seniority as and when regular vacancy occurs. The petitioner was, in fact, retrenched by paying retrenchment compensation keeping in view the Army Headquarters Policy decision dated 28/7/1998 and dated 14/8/1998 by which the manpower is reduced under the retirement scheme which came into force w.e.f. 1/9/1998. Thereafter the petitioner was engaged by a private contractor and the petitioner is no longer employed with the Military Dairy Farm, Mhow. The petitioner along with other workers have approached the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court and the Tribunal has dismissed the claim of the petitioner and identically placed persons by order dated 22/7/1999. The petitioner after a lapse of 15 - 16 years has filed an Original Application before Central Administrative Tribunal and the same has been dismissed.
This Court has carefully gone through the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal and the same reveals that the petitioner who was a casual labour was retrenched w.e.f. 31/8/1998 keeping in view the policy decision taken by the Indian Army to reduce the work force. Thereafter every year tenders are being issued and a contractor is awarded work and through contractor the petitioner has worked at Dairy Farm, as stated by the petitioner. The retrenchment of the petitioner was subjected to judicial scrutiny at the behest of the petitioner and the claim of the petitioner was dismissed on 22/7/1999. The petitioner did not challenge the order dated 22/7/1999 and woke up from slumber only in the year 2016-2017. As the petitioner was no longer employed by Military Dairy Farm and he was working with a Contractor w.e.f. 4/10/1998, the Tribunal has declined to issue a direction for regularising the petitioner. Paragraph 16 to 21 of the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal reads as under :
It is an admitted fact that after September 1998 the work of the Military Farm was entrusted to the private contractor as per policy framed by the department. As per Annexure R/1, the annual PE for the year 1998-99 at Military Farm Mhow has been given and guidelines for employment of manpower after enforcing revised PE, no causal labourers will be employed in lieu of regular staff. It is relevant to mention that Annexure A/2 has been issued in view of the said guidelines. It is also noticed that performa has been prescribed for retrenchment. Resultantly, retrenchment order Annexure A/2 has been issued on these lines. It is also clear from Annexure R/2 that some of the applicants had approached the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,Jabalpur and the Presiding Officer has rejected the application with the reason that there is no violation of Section 33 of I.D. Act. The relevant portions of the said order are as under:-
"7. Section 33 of the I.D. Act would attract where there is an agree condition between the parties and this agree condition have been changed. In the present case the condition of service was casual work. There was no condition for non termination of this employment. Further there was no condition that the applicants will be provided work everyday.
The management has stated in Para 4(F) of their return that on 31.08.98 there were 80 employees in Category D. The sanction strength is only 70 and 10 were surplus. As per orders of the Director Military Dairy Farms, the last 10 employees have been retrenched.
The procedure adopted by the management is perfectly valid and legal. There is no violation of Section 33 of I.D. Act. The present petition is rejected. Parties to bear their own costs."
So, after considering this Annexure R/2, we are of the view that the question of termination by the respondent department was under reference which was pending before the CGIT and during that period the applicants were terminated and they have moved an application under wager in the year 1989 and are seeking absorption and Section 33 of the Industrial Dispute Act. The Presiding Officer of CGIT has rejected the applicant and has held that the procedure adopted by the respondents was perfectly valid and legal and there is no violation of Section 33 of I.D.Act. Therefore the legal remedy of the applicant should have been to approach proper forum against the order of the presiding officer of CGIT Jabalpur.
In the instant Original Application, the applicants have prayed for giving benefits of absorption and regularization w.e.f.11.09.1989 till the date of retirement, it can be safely presumed that applicants were working as daily regularization with effect from initial engagement. It is pertinent to mention that as per Annexure A/2 the applicants have been terminated after due compliance of the provisions of the Act and compensation has been paid in lieu of one months' notice through cheque. The said action of the respondent-department has been held legal and valid by the Presiding Officer of CGIT vide Annexure R/2. So, it is clear that after 01.09.1998 the applicants were not the employee of the respondent-department. Moreover, the applicants have not challenged the order of the CGIT (Annexure R/2), which has attained finality.
From the pleadings it is also clear that applicants were given appointment on contractual basis w.e.f. 04.10.1998 by the contractor. The respondent- department has clearly spelt out in their reply that the service of the applicant was retrenched and was not in roll of employment with the respondent-department w.e.f. 01.09.1998. It has been clearly spelt in the reply that as the applicants have been engaged by the contractor and has denied the fact the applicants have continuously working with the respondent-department after 1. 09.1998 as the answering respondent has sublet the entire work on contractual basis. So the applicants are not employee of the respondent-department and the relation of master and servant has seized w.e.f.01.09.1998. Moreover, the respondent-department has raised the question oflimitation to the fact that the applicants have approached this Tribunal after a lapse of 15-16 years. For that there is no explanation on the part of the applicant. The only explanation given by the applicants are that the applicants are working continuously. However, from the facts itself the applicants are not in service with the respondent-department.
In view of the above, we do not find any merit in this Original Application and there is no ambiguity and illegality in the action of the respondent-department.
Since other Original Applications, as indicated in Para 1 of this order involves the same question of regularization and the facts are similar. In view of the reasons recorded above, other Original Applications are also liable to be dismissed.
Resultantly, all these Original Applications are dismissed. No costs.
This Court has carefully gone through the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner's claim against the retrenchment was turned down by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court vide order dated 22/7/1999 holding that there was no violation of Sec. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Nothing prevented the petitioner to challenge the order passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Jabalpur. The claim for regularization was made only in the year 2016-2017 and, therefore, the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the Original Application as the petitioner was not an employee of the Military Dairy Farm. This Court also does not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the Misc. Petition deserves to be dismissed.
The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is quite limited.
The Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 (8) SCC 329 in paragraph No.49 has held as under:-
"49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227.
The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.
(i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance.
Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality."
In the light of the aforesaid judgment delivered by the apex Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal does not suffers from any patent illegality nor any jurisdictional error has been committed by the Tribunal.. Accordingly, the admission is declined.
This order be retained in M.P.No. 5222/2019 and a copy each be placed in the record of the connected petitions.
Certified copy, as per Rules.