Shri Gita Ram Kalsy, Advocate, Ludhiana vs Shri Bhagwan Dass

M.R. Sharma, J.—This is a petition u/s 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. It arises out of the following facts. The petitioner is the owner of the shop in dispute which had been let out to the respondent. The petitioner filed a petition for ejectment before the learned Rent Controller, Ludhiana, which was allowed on 10-11-1979. The learned Appellate Authority also affirmed that judgment on 1.4.1980. The respondent filed Civil revision No. 854 of 1980 Bhagwan Dass v. Gita Ram Kalsy, Advocate, which was disposed of by me on May 29, 1980 with the following order :--

This matter has been settled by a compromise. The respondent is an Advocate by profession and at my suggestion he has agreed that the petitioner should retain the possession of the premises of the shop in dispute for a period of two years On the agreed rent whereafter he shall deliver vacant possession of the shop in dispute to the respondent. The respondent is present in Court and has been identified by Mr. Bhagirath Dass. He also agrees to this compromise.

In view of the compromise between the parties, this petition is partly allowed, whereas the order of ejectment passed against the petitioner is affirmed but it is ordered that he shall not be dispossessed from the shop in dispute for a period of two years from today. All other litigation regarding this shop pending between the parties is quashed. This order is subject to the conditions that the petitioner shall pay arrears of rent within three months from today and also pay in advance the rent due for the last three months. Curing this period, the petitioner shall not sublet the shop in dispute.

The petitioner contends that the respondent has not only not handed over the vacant possession of the shop to him but has subsequent to the order passed by me handed over the possession of the shop to some members of his family and as such he has put the judicial process of the Court in disrepute.

In response to the notice issued in this case, the respondent appeared in person. I have heard Shri M.S. Jain, the learned counsel for the respondent on this point. He has brought to my notice a judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Babu Ram Gupta Vs. Sudhir Bhasin and Another, for the proposition that there can be no contempt of Court if the litigant does not comply with a compromise decree. Therein it was observed as under :--

......In fact, the reason why a breach of clear undertaking given to the Court amounts to contempt of Court is that the contemner by making a false representation to the Court obtains a benefit for himself and if he fails to honour the undertaking, he plays a serious fraud on the Court itself and thereby obstructs the Course of justice and brings into disrepute the judicial institution. The same cannot, however, be said of a consent order or a compromise decree where the fraud, if any, is practised by the person concerned not on the court but on one of the parties. Thus the offence committed by the person concerned is qua the party not qua the court, and, therefore, the very foundation for proceedings for contempt of Court is completely absent in such cases. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that unless there is an express undertaking given in writing before the court by the contemner or incorporated by the court in its order, there can be no question of wilful disobedience of such an undertaking. In the instance case, we have already held that there is neither any written undertaking filed by the appellant nor was any such undertaking impliedly or expressly incorporated in the order impugned. Thus, there being no undertaking at all the question of breach of such an undertaking does not arise.

Herein the tenant had lost in two Courts. The landlord who was an Advocate by profession was persuaded by me to show some indulgence to him. He being an officer of the Court accepted my suggestion that the tenant be allowed to remain in possession of the premises for a period of two years so that in the meantime he may take steps to acquire alternate accommodation. It was brought to my notice that some other litigation between the parties was pending. In order to facilitate the compromise between the parties, I ordered that all other litigations regarding this shop pending between the parties be quashed. Had I known at that time that the tenant after getting time would go back on his undertaking, I would never have taken the rather unusual step to persuade a member of the bar to forgo his right and to quash the litigation between the parties. Mr. Sarin has brought to my notice statement dated July 27, 1982 made by the tenant in the Court of the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Ludhiana, wherein he had mentioned that his brother Shanker Lal and his mother Jamna Devi were in possession of the shop in dispute. He also admitted in that statement that he himself gave the possession of this shop to them in May, 1982.

What really emerges from the aforementioned facts is that the I compromise was brought about between the parties by the active involvement of Court. The tenant reaped benefit under the compromise and contrary to the undertaking given by him that he would not sublet the shop during the meanwhile, handed ever the possession of the shop to his close relations. It is thus obvious that he obtained the benefit for himself after making a false representation to the Court that he would abide by the undertaking given by him. The observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, if I may say so with respect help the petitioner-landlord instead of being of any use to the respondent tenant.

For the reasons aforementioned, I hold the respondent guilty u/s 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act and order that he be kept in Civil prison for a period of three months. At the request of the learned counsel for the respondent, I further directed that the operation of this order shall remain in abeyance for a period of 15 days to enable the respondent to file appeal, if he so desires.