Shri Dashashrimali and Vanik Jain Vidyarthi Bhuvan Trust, Rajkot vs State of Gujarat and Another

The petitioner-Trust is a holder of vacant land situated within the urban agglomeration area of Rajkot. The petitioner applied under S. 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 for exemption from operation of certain provisions of the Act. The application has been rejected. Hence the petition.

Notice was ordered to be issued on Sept. 7, 1987 in view of the amendment sought by the petitioner in the petition. By amendment it was specifically averred that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of being heard before passing the impugned order under S. 20 of the Act. However, it appears from the record of the case that the petitioner had made further written submissions on June 4, 1986. As mentioned in the written submissions, the petitioner was afforded an opportunity of being heard in person on May 28, 1986. Therefore, the contention sought to be raised by way of amendment of the petition that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of being heard is based on incorrect facts. The petitioner has been afforded an opportunity of being heard in person. Therefore this contention fails.

The application under S. 20 of the Act has been rejected inter alia on the ground that the petitioner-trust cannot be permitted to use the land for commercial purposes. The object for which the trust is formed is not to carry on any commercial activity. The main object of the trust is to carry on educational activities for secondary and higher education. Thus, conversion of the trust-property for commercial use would not be in consonance with the object of the trust. Therefore, if the application is rejected on this ground, the same cannot be said to be in any way arbitrary or unreasonable.

The learned counsel for the petitioner states that certain points raised in the application under and S. 20 of the Act and certain material placed before respondent have not been considered by the respondent authorities. It may be so. While disposing of the application under S. 20 of the Act the authority is not required to consider each and every piece of evidence and entire material placed on record. All that is required by the authority exercising power under S. 20 of the Act is to pass "reasonably reasoned order" See Manilal Hiralal Doshi (by LR) and Others Vs. State of Gujarat, . The phrase ''reasonably reasoned order'' would not take into its sphere consideration of each and every piece of evidence and entire material on record. The order should indicate the reasons which have weighed with the authority while disposing of the application. Thus, the reasons should not be extraneous and arbitrary. Non-consideration of a particular piece of evidence of certain material would not render invalid the order passed under S. 20 of the Act. Again, this court, while exercising powers under Arts. 226/227 does not sit in appeal over the order of respondent authority. All that is required to be examined by this Court is as to whether the order passed is not arbitrary and/or mala fide. By applying the standard of "reasonably reasoned order", the impugned order can never be said to be arbitrary or non-speaking order.

The petition, though labelled as one under Art. 226 of the Constitution is essentially a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Even so, I have dealt with the points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner which would strictly not be within the scope of a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution. There is no error, much less error apparent on the face of the record. The impugned order passed by the respondent -authority cannot be said to be in any way arbitrary or unreasonable.

In the result the petition is rejected. Notice discharged.

Petition dismissed.