Shri Basavant @ Basappa vs The State Of Karnataka & Anr.

Heard Smt. Niveditha Y. Dixit, learned counsel appearing for Sri Abhishek A. Nuli, learned counsel for the petitioner/ de facto complainant, Sri Jairam Siddi, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1-State, and Sri Kiran Angadi, learned counsel appearing for Sri Sangamesh S. Ghulappanavar, learned counsel for respondent No.2/accused.

The petitioner/de facto complainant has filed this petition under Section 483(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking cancellation of the bail granted to respondent No.2/accused by the learned XII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Belagavi, Sitting at Gokak, vide order dated 13.02.2026 in Criminal Miscellaneous No.8020 of 2026.

The brief facts of the prosecution case, in a nutshell, are that on 30.12.2024, owing to a pre-existing land dispute, respondent No.2/accused, along with his father, allegedly obstructed the flow of water to the land of the petitioner/ de facto complainant and thereafter brutally assaulted the petitioner and his son, Ramachandra, with a sugarcane-cutting sickle, resulting in the death of the petitioner's son and causing grievous injuries to the de facto complainant. Hence, the accused was arrested by the respondent-Police and remanded to judicial custody. Initially, the learned Sessions Judge rejected the bail application filed by the accused. Thereafter, the accused preferred Criminal Petition No.103964 of 2025 before this Court, which came to be withdrawn by the accused on 12.01.2026. After filing of the charge-sheet, the accused filed another bail application in Criminal Miscellaneous No.8020/2026, which came to be allowed by the XII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Belagavi, Sitting at Gokak, vide order dated 13.02.2026. Being aggrieved by the said order, the de facto complainant has preferred the present petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner/de facto complainant has vehemently contended that the accused filed a subsequent bail application before the learned Sessions Judge on similar grounds. In the instant case, there was absolutely no change in circumstances between the dismissal of the earlier bail application and the filing of the subsequent application before the trial Court. However, the trial Court has committed an error in allowing the subsequent bail application despite there being no change in circumstances. Hence, learned counsel for petitioner prays that the petition be allowed.

Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent No.2/accused has vehemently contended that the learned Sessions Judge has analysed the facts and grounds urged in the bail application and, upon appreciating the facts and law, has granted bail in favour of the accused. Hence, no interference is called for. Further, subsequent to the grant of bail, the accused has not violated any of the bail conditions. Hence, learned HCGP prayed for dismissal of the petition.

Upon perusal of the material available on record, more particularly the impugned order dated 13.02.2026, it is noticed that the learned Sessions Judge, while allowing the application, has assigned reasons in paragraph Nos.12 to 16, which read as follows:

Admittedly, the earlier bail application filed by respondent No.2/accused was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge upon perusal of the entire charge-sheet. However, while considering the subsequent bail application, the learned Sessions Judge assigned reasons that twenty-four charge-sheet witnesses were yet to be examined, the Court is vacant, the accused had been in custody for a considerable period, and no criminal antecedents were reported against the accused. Hence, the learned Sessions Judge proceeded to grant bail. The learned Sessions Judge has also recorded that the reasons were assigned after perusing the records.

Merely recording 'having perused the record' and 'on the facts and circumstances of the case' does not sub-serve the purpose of a reasoned judicial order. It is a fundamental premise of open justice, to which our judicial system is committed, that factors which have weighed in the mind of the Judge in the rejection or the grant of bail are recorded in the order passed. Open justice is premised on the notion that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The duty of Judges to give reasoned decisions lies at the heart of this commitment. Questions of the grant of bail concern both liberty of individuals undergoing criminal prosecution as well as the interests of the criminal justice system in ensuring that those who commit crimes are not afforded the opportunity to obstruct justice. Judges are duty bound to explain the basis on which they have arrived at a conclusion. Where an order refusing or granting bail does not furnish the reasons that inform the decision, there is a presumption of the non-application of mind which may require the intervention of this Court. Where an earlier application for bail has been rejected, there is a higher burden on the Court to furnish specific reasons as to why bail should be granted.

Admittedly, the accused has a right to make a subsequent application for grant of bail. However, the Court entertaining such a subsequent application has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the Court is also required to record the fresh grounds that persuade it to take a view different from the one taken while considering the earlier application.

In the impugned order, I do not find any such fresh grounds recorded by the learned Sessions Judge while granting bail. It has also failed to take into consideration that, on earlier occasions, the bail applications had been rejected. The bail application filed before the trial Court during the investigation stage was rejected, and the accused had also approached this Court, but the petition was withdrawn. From the impugned order, I do not find any indication that the learned Sessions Judge took note of the grounds that persuaded the Court to reject the earlier bail applications. Such an approach, in my opinion, is contrary to the binding nature of the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in a lis between the same parties and, in effect, tends to ignore and thereby render ineffective the principles enunciated therein, which have a binding character.

For the reasons stated above, I am of the considered opinion that the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in granting bail to respondent No.2/accused on the ground that he had been in custody for a period of thirteen months, that there was no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, or that the Court was vacant, without taking into consideration the other factors emerging from the charge-sheet. Accordingly, I pass the following