High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 11 BOM CK 1046

Shri Avishkar vs Shri Sushil & Ors.

Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench · Decided on 2 November 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Nandesh Deshpande, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No.806 of 2026

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Judgment

46 paragraphs · 2,956 words
1.

Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties.

2.

The present petition challenges judgment and order dated 23.01.2026 by the Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 3, Nagpur, in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 02 of 2026, and thereby prays for dismissal of the said Miscellaneous Civil Appeal.

3.

Facts, as can be seen from the petition, are as under :

The petitioner herein is the original plaintiff, who filed a Special Civil Suit No.917 of 2018 for partition, possession, and damages. In the said civil suit, the present respondent No.1 was duly served, but he never appeared, and then the suit proceeded ex parte against him.

4.

On 01.07.2019, the Civil Judge Senior Division, Nagpur decreed the suit by holding that the present petitioner, the respondent No. 1, father of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 and respondent Nos. 7 and 8 are entitled for 1/5th share each in the suit property. Thereafter, a Final Decree Case No.27 of 2019 was instituted by the petitioner, therein praying for appointment of Court Commissioner to partition the suit property by metes and bounds. In the said proceedings also, notices were issued to the parties and they were duly served.

5.

On 21.08.2021, the trial Court disposed of the final decree proceedings directing that the suit property should be sold by public auction since it is impartible in nature.

6.

The petitioner filed execution proceedings bearing Special Darkhast No.49 of 2022 praying that the suit property be put in auction in accordance with the earlier order. In the said proceedings of execution, the executing Court again issued notices on two addresses, as available, of the respondent No. 1.

7.

On the same date i.e. on 05.05.2022 the petitioner also filed an application seeking permission to serve the first respondent through private mode. However, the notices issued to the respondent No. 1 could not be served, since the respondent No. 1 refused to accept service on his Nagpur address, and as far as the address at Lonavala is concerned, it was reported that the door of the said house was closed when the Officer went to serve him.

8.

In the backdrop of these facts, the petitioner preferred an application on 06.08.2022 seeking permission to serve the said respondent by way of paper publication and WhatsApp. The said application was allowed by the executing Court. On 10.11.2022, the executing Court passed an order observing that the first respondent has been served with a notice under provisions of Order V Rule 20 of CPC, and it further directed that the execution proceedings may proceed further.

9.

On 06.05.2024, the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 herein filed a joint application below Exhibit-51, praying that one Gaurav Ratankumar Dwivedi may be allowed to purchase the suit property as per the valuation report at Rs.42,51,142/-. The said application was allowed on 29.11.2024 and the said proposed purchaser was allowed to execute the sale after payment of the necessary stamp duty and subject to other compliances in that regard.

10.

In the backdrop of these facts, the first respondent on 18.09.2025 filed an application below Exhibit-95 seeking to set aside an ex parte order dated 10.11.2022.

11.

After the said application was replied to by the petitioner and other parties as well, the respondent No.1 on 23.09.2025 filed an evidence on affidavit, therein stating that he got knowledge of the ex parte order in the first week of September 2025. He also stated that the source of knowledge was a call received by his daughter from one Atul Dharmapal Dange, who informed that the suit property is being sold.

12.

On 19.12.2025, the executing Court, after hearing the parties, rejected the application below Exhibit-95.

13.

Being aggrieved by this, the first respondent filed a Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 02 of 2026, challenging the said order of the executing Court.

14.

The District Judge vide its judgment dated 23.01.2026, was pleased to partly allow the appeal by setting aside the order dated 19.12.2025, passed below Exhibit-95. It is this judgment which is impugned in the present petition on various grounds as stated in the petition.

15.

I have heard Mr. Parth Sagdeo, learned counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Archana Yesankar, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. Parth Malviya, learned counsel for respondent No. 7.

16.

Mr. Parth Sagdeo, learned counsel for the petitioner by pointing out to me the entire narration of facts as stated supra, submits that the District Judge has committed a grave error of law in allowing the application filed by the respondent No. 1 herein. He would submit that the Court failed to appreciate that the application for setting aside an ex parte order in execution proceeding has to be filed within 30 days of the order. In the present case, however, since the application was filed beyond that period, the District Judge ought not to have interfered with the well-reasoned order of the executing Court. He would submit that the order of the District Judge suffers from a patent jurisdictional error, since it fails to appreciate the mandatory provisions of Order XXI Rule 106(3) of CPC, which mandates that such application should be moved within 30 days.

17.

He also submits that the plea regarding date of knowledge cannot be put into service to defeat the express limitation as prescribed by the statute. In his submission nothing was placed or pleaded in the application seeking setting aside of the ex parte order, and the affidavit filed was clearly an improvement and by way of an afterthought. In totality, he would submit that the judgment of the District Judge is untenable in law. He places following judgments :

(i)

My Palace Mutually aided Co-operative Society Vs. B. Mahesh and others, reported in (2022) 19 SCC 806.

(ii)

Nikhila Divyang Mehta and another Vs. Hitesh P. Sanghvi and Others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 779.

(iii)

R. Nagaraj (dead) through LRs. And another Vs. Rajmani and others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 762;

(iv)

Vidyadhar Sitaram Mokal and others Vs. Barkatullah Allhasan Shaikh and others, reported in 2013(4) Mh.L.J. 505.

(v)

Dharmin Bai Kashyap Vs. Babli sahu and others, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 461.

(vi)

Damodaran Pillai and others. Vs. South Indian Bank, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 300.

18.

Per contra, Ms. Archana Yesankar, learned counsel for respondent No. 1, by taking me through the reply filed by the said respondent would point out that the judgment of the Appellate Court is perfectly legal and valid. She would point out that the entire matter has been proceeded with in an undue haste without complying with the mandatory provisions of Order V Rule 20 of CPC. She draws my attention to the fact that notice was issued in the execution on 05.05.2022. However, on the same day, an application was filed seeking issuance of notice by RPAD and WhatsApp. Thereafter, on 13.07.2022, again an application was filed for issuance of notice by RPAD and by WhatsApp, wherein it was admitted that the respondent is residing at Pune.

19.

However, the executing Court, without verifying the fact whether the notices were in fact served or not, proceeded to pass the ex parte order. She would also submit that thereafter no fresh notice by regular mode was ever issued to the answering respondent. It is, therefore, her submission that the ex parte order came to be passed without proper service of notice, and therefore the Appellate Court was correct in setting aside the said order.

20.

It is her further submission that the petitioner, in collusion with the other respondents, is trying to deprive respondent No.1 of his legitimate share of the property by selling out the property at a much lower price. She would also point out that even though the property is valued at Rs.61,30,000/-, but the same is tried to be sold to said Gaurav Trivedi for a mere Rs.42,51,142/-. She would therefore submit that the judgment of the Appellate Court is perfectly legal and valid.

21.

In the backdrop of these facts, I have perused the order of the executing Court, as also the judgment of the Appellate Court, along with the record of the matter.

22.

As can be seen from the order of the executing Court rejecting the application, the said Court has proceeded to reject the application since, according to it, the summonses were duly served. The reasoning is found in para 6,7 and 8 of the impugned order. As per the said reasoning, if a party alleges that it was not served properly, the burden is upon the party who states accordingly. The executing Court has further recorded a finding that, time and again, the notices of the civil suit and the execution proceedings were served, and therefore, there is no case made out for setting aside the ex parte order.

23.

After going through the judgment of the Appellate Court, which is impugned in the present petition, it can be seen that the Appellate Court has taken into consideration the various objections raised by the petitioner herein on maintainability as also on merits. As far as maintainability is concerned, it has recorded that the appeal is filed under the provisions of Order XLIII Rule 1(ja), and therefore, even though it may be titled as an appeal under Rule 1(r), the same would not be fatal.

24.

As far as limitation and absence of delay condonation application is concerned, it has given a sound and cogent reasoning that the date of knowledge in such matters assumes significance. It has rightly recorded a finding that the objection regarding limitation cannot be decided mechanically, and in such cases where service of notice is doubtful, the plea of the applicant regarding date of knowledge assumes significance. He has also discussed the scope and ambit of service under the provisions of Order V Rule 20 of CPC and has recorded a finding of fact that prima facie it seems that the service is defective.

25.

After perusal of the entire record of the matter, the District Judge, in my opinion, has rightly stated that the service of summons or notice does not inspire confidence, since it fails to establish that there was a strict compliance of Order V Rule 20 of CPC. It has rightly found that the notice was not affixed at the last known or correct address in the manner mandated by law, and the record does not show a confirmed visit at the last known of the correct address, proper affixture at a conspicuous part, and complete endorsement with independent witness verification. It has therefore concluded that the finding of the executing Court that the respondent No. 1 was duly served is not correct.

26.

By elaborating the provisions of Order V Rule 20 in para 27 of the judgment, the District Judge has categorically stated that the Court has to record a satisfaction that the defendant is deliberately avoiding service and that the summons cannot be served in ordinary manner despite due diligence. Thereafter, it records that an order passed under said provision must reflect judicial satisfaction and cannot be a mechanical endorsement.

27.

After going through the orders proceeding ex parte against respondent No. 1, it can very well be seen that no such satisfaction is recorded by the trial Court or by the executing Court. Thus, the District Judge has found that the order proceeding ex parte against respondent No. 1 is vitiated and has therefore proceeded to allow the appeal.

28.

After careful perusal of the judgment of the Appellate Court various findings of facts are recorded which are based on material available on record, and more particularly, the service reports. As has been observed by the District Court, and also in my opinion, the provisions of Order V Rule 20 are to be strictly complied with and cannot be a substitute for ordinary service. The Court has to record a satisfaction that the concerned person is deliberately avoiding service.

29.

The phraseology of Rule 20 itself contemplates that the Court should be satisfied that there is a reason to believe that the defendant is keeping out of way for the purpose of avoiding service, and that for any other reason the summons cannot be served, then only the Court would order the summons to be served by affixing a copy thereof in some conspicuous place, and also in some conspicuous place in the part of the house in which the defendant is known to have last resided or carried on business.

30.

No such exercise seems to be carried out in the present case, admittedly. The executing Court therefore committed a grave error in mechanically accepting the plea of the present petitioner.

31.

As far as the judgment of ‘My Palace’ referred supra is concerned speaks about the scope and ambit of Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. It states that the well settled proposition of law that inherent powers are supplementary and cannot be exercised contrary to any procedure of the Code. However, such is not the present case.

32.

As far as judgment of R. Nagaraj referred supra is concerned it lays down that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. There cannot be any dispute about this proposition. But the judgment of Nikhila Divyang Mehta referred supra only states that there is no destination between ‘having knowledge’ and ‘full knowledge’ judgment of Dharmin Bai Kashyap referred supra reiterates the principle that when a statue prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner then that has to be done in that matter only. All these cases, do not take the case of petitioner any further. As far judgment of Damodaran Pillai supra is concerned, the same pertains to dismissal of execution petition in default of Rule 105(2) of C.P.C. order 21 Rule 106 of CPC provides that application for setting aside can be made within 30 days from the date of knowledge of ex parte order. This ratio of Damodaran Pillai would not be of any help to the petitioner.

33.

It is settled principle of law that petition under Article 227 is not an appeal is disguise. In this regard reliance can be placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court cited in the case of Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand Goel, reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181, para 15 and 16 reproduced as under :

“15………………………. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.3 The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.

16.

Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. has observed: (SCC pp. 101-102, para 6)

"6.

The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.”

34.

The same has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. And another Vs. B. Gurappa Naidu and others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 745.

35.

Thus, taking overall view of the matter there is no perversity in the judgment of the Appellate Court. The said judgment essentially records finding of facts which are based on material placed on record.

36.

The petition is, therefore, liable to be rejected. It is rejected accordingly. Rule is discharged. No costs.