High CourtsSingle Bench(2009) 08 BOM CK 0167

Shobharam Budhaji Bhagat vs Parbatabai Bangadkar Legal representatives (Bhaskar Mayaramji Bangadkar, Rupesh Mayaram Bangadkar, Vijay Mayaram Bangadkar and Shirish Mayaram Gangadkar) and Vithoba Sakharkar

Bombay High Court · Decided on 26 August 2009 · Citation: (2010) 1 MhLj 45

HON’BLE JUDGES
C.L. Pangarkar, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Second Appeal No. 414 of 1996

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Judgment

11 paragraphs · 1,938 words

C.L. Pangarkar, J.—These three appeals can be disposed of by a common judgment since they arise out of a common judgment delivered by the Additional district judge, Bhandara. The original defendants are the appellants.

2.

The facts giving rise to the appeals are as follows Respondent No. 3 Vithoba instituted three suits against three purchasers of the plot No. 53, 54 and 55. The plaintiff purchased one acre of land from out of survey No. 83/3 from one Bhaskarrao Zinzarde by registered saledeed dated 6/5/1978. After the plaintiff purchased the said one acre of land, he applied to the revenue authority for conversion of the said agricultural land into nonagriculture. Twenty four plots were carved out of the said one acre of land. Similarly, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 i.e. respondent Nos. 1 and 2 also purchased one acre land each out of the same survey number. They had also applied for conversion of their lands into nonagriculture. Permission was granted. In the year 1991 there was, however, a dispute between respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on one hand and respondent No. 3 on the other hand. On 31/12/1981, the said dispute was resolved and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 executed a deed known as �consent deed� in favour of respondent No. 3 and they endorsed the ownership of respondent No. 3 over plot Nos. 53, 54 and 55. Inspite of such admission and endorsement on the part of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, respondent No. 1 sold the three plots to the three appellants on various dates. Respondent No. 3 i.e. the plaintiff submits that respondent No. 1 had no right to sell those plots which belonged to respondent No. 3. Hence, he filed suit for declaration that the saledeed executed in favour of the appellants in respect of these three plots be set aside and declared as void and respondent No. 3 be put in possession of those plots.

3.

The appellant and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed joint written statement. They deny that the plaintiff has purchased one acre of land out of Kh. No. 83/3. They, however, admit that they had purchased the land from Bhaskarrao Zinzarde under the saledeed. They deny that there was any dispute between them and plaintiff/respondent No. 3 over the boundaries of the plots. They deny having executed a consent deed .It is the contention of the respondent that respondent No. 1�s husband died on 12/4/1981 and she delivered of a child on 23/10/1981. While she was recuperating, respondent No. 3/plaintiff came to her house and asked her to sign the blank stamp papers and blank papers under the pretext that he wants to submit the information about death of her husband and birth of a child to the municipal council. On this pretext, she alleges that her signatures were obtained. She had never executed any consent deed.

4.

All the suits were heard together and decided by a common judgment by the learned judge of the trial court. He found that the plaintiff was not the owner of plot Nos. 53, 54 and 55. He also found that the consent deed was false document. The saledeeds were not void and the plaintiff was, therefore, not entitled to possession. Holding so, he dismissed the suits.

5.

The plaintiff, therefore, preferred an appeal before the district judge. The district judge found that on the basis of the saledeed dated 6th May, 1978, the plaintiff was the owner of the suit property. He was the owner of plot Nos. 53, 54 and 55 and the consent deed executed by defendant No. 1 was valid. Holding so, he decreed the suit. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the original defendant No. 1 in all suits have preferred these appeals.

6.

The appeals were admitted on the substantial questions of law as detailed in the appeal memo but by agreement the appeals were heard only on two substantial questions of law No. 5 and 11, which are as follows 5. Whether the consent deed is required to be compulsorily registered u/s 17 of the Registration Act, 1908? If yes, whether the alleged consent deed is of no effect and cannot affect any immovable property which it purports to affect and whether the alleged consent deed is void in absence of registration? 11. Whether the consent deed at Exh.29 can be said to have been proved when it is not proved by the plaintiff that the executant had consciously subscribed to the document after having known and understood its contents and that the executant Parbatabai intended to make and bring the consent deed into existence?

7.

I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants as well as the respondents.

8.

A few undisputed facts may be narrated here. Field Survey No. 83/3 belonged to one Bhaskarrao Zinzarde. The plaintiff purchased one acre of land out of S. No. 83/3 on 6/5/1978. Defendant No. 2 purchased 0.87 acre of land out of survey No. 83/3 and 0.17 acres of land out of survey No. 82/3 from Bhaskarrao Zinzarde on 6/5/1978. Defendant No. 3 also purchased one acre of land from Bhaskarrao Zinzarde on the same day. All three applied for conversion of the agricultural land into nonagricultural use. A common lay out was sanctioned by the Subdivisional Officer.

9.

The contention of the plaintiff is that a dispute arose between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 over the boundaries of the plots in sanctioned lay out and there was a settlement between the plaintiff and the defendants No. 2 and 3 on 31/12/1981 and inspite of that defendant No. 2 sold plots Nos. 53 to 55 to defendant No. 1 i.e. the appellant. There was a written consent deed between the parties. It is on the basis of this, that the plaintiff claims to be the exclusive owner of these three plots and claims that defendant No. 2 had no right to sell them. It is this settlement-cum-consent deed that is the subject matter of the substantial questions of law.

10.

The appellate court has held that the saledeed Exh.29 is valid and is not brought about by misrepresentation as alleged. We have seen that the case of defendant No. 2 is that her signatures on the consent deed were obtained under the pretext that the entry of birth of child and death of her husband is to be taken in the municipal record. The evidence in this regard has been considered by both the courts below. It is not shown how appreciation is 10 perverse. I have myself gone through the document. The document does not go to show that signature was obtained on blank paper. Defendant No. 2 Parvatabai has signed for herself as well as for her husband. The signature is put on the typed line itself, therefore the theory of same having been obtained on blank paper does not appear to be correct. Secondly, if the intimation of death and birth was to be given, there was no reason to sign separately for the deceased husband. These two reasons are enough to uphold the finding of the first appellate court. 11, This takes me to consider the question as to whether document requires registration and if it requires what is the effect. Section 17 of the Registration Act speaks as to which document requires registration. Section 17 reads as follows 17. Documents of which registration is compulsory � (1) The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force, namely, ( a) Instruments of gift of immovable property; (b) other nontestamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in Immovable property. (c) nontestamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or interest; and (d) leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent; (e) nontestamentary instrument transferring or assigning any decree or order of Court or any award when such decree or order or award purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property:] Provided that the [State Government) may, by order published in the [Official �Gazette], exempt from the operation of this subsection any leases executed in any district, or part of a district, the terms granted by which do not exceed five years and the annual rents reserved by which do not exceed fifty rupees. The document is not a gift. It is not an acknowledgment of receipt of consideration of an amount of creation of any interest or extinguishment thereof. It is not a lease and it is not a transfer. It is also not an award or a decree. It does not, therefore, fall either in Clause (a), (c), (d) or (e). We have, therefore, to see if it falls in Clause (b). Clause (b) speaks of a nontestamentary instrument which operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right whether in present or in future. The contents of document Exh.29 do not seem to fall under the Clause. It has to be read in the context of the fact that entire survey No. 83/3 was purchased by the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 and 3 by separate saledeed and they purchased the separate portion and they purchased them on the same day. Due to the fact that they purchased separate portion of same survey No., each of their portion was abutting to the other. The S.D.O. has admittedly sanctioned a common lay out for all three separate portions purchased by the plaintiff and the defendant. Naturally, there was some confusion over the boundaries of plots sanctioned. That is what the consent deed recites. What is recited therein is that 24 plots and 15 ft. wide road mentioned in the consent deed falls within one acre purchased by the plaintiff. It gives out the boundaries of the plots that fall within one acre of land purchased by the plaintiff. It is only if there is a transfer or relinquishment of right, title or interest in the property that it would require registration. The document does not purport to create or extinguish or declare or assign any interest in the property for the first time. The plaintiff already had a title to one acre of land. This document only purports to show or demarcate which are those plots which fall within one acre. It is not that defendant Nos. 2 and 3 have given up their rights in favour of plaintiff and assigning their interest or transferring their interest in the property. In the circumstances, I do not find that the document � consent deed requires no registration. Both the question of law are answered accordingly. There is no substance in the appeals. They are dismissed. No order as to costs.

The counsel for the appellant makes a request to stay the execution of decree for a period of one month. The request is granted.