Shivkumar Sharma vs State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed seeking the following relief (s): -

Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the petitioner was initially appointed as Shiksha Karmi Grade-II on 12.02.1999 and was thereafter absorbed in the corresponding teaching cadre. Under the Madhya Pradesh School Education (Teaching Cadre) Service Conditions and Recruitment Rules, 2018, the petitioner is presently working as Upper Division Teacher/Khelkud Shikshak and, being senior-most in the relevant cadre of Physical Training Instructors, was rightly entrusted with the additional charge of District Sports Inspector/Officer vide order dated 02.05.2025.

It is contended that the Directorate of Public Instructions had issued successive instructions dated 05.12.2001, 16.07.2008 and 26.08.2020 specifically providing that, against a vacant post of District Sports Inspector/Officer, the charge is to be entrusted to the senior-most PTI. The petitioner, being senior to respondent No.7 in the relevant cadre and having been appointed on the higher post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-II/PTI, was therefore lawfully holding the said charge.

Learned counsel for petitioner further submits that respondent No.7 has sought to rely upon a gradation list pertaining to PTIs working in the minimum/lower pay scale, in which his name appears at Serial No.135. The said gradation list is wholly inapplicable to the petitioner, as the petitioner belongs to the higher cadre/pay scale and, consequently, his name does not figure in the said list. The respondent cannot claim seniority over the petitioner by relying upon a gradation list of a different/lower cadre.

It is further submitted that the State Government, by notification dated 17.04.1998, had clarified the channel and nature of the post of Physical Training Instructor Grade-II and provided for appointment/posting against the post of Sports Director/Sports Officer/Sports Inspector. Thus, the petitioner, having initially entered service as Shiksha Karmi Grade-II (Vyayam/PTI), has throughout remained in the higher cadre and is senior to respondent No.7, whose initial appointment was on the post of Assistant Teacher and who subsequently came to be appointed/promoted as PTI in the lower scale.

Learned counsel for petitioner also submits that the impugned order dated 30.06.2026 does not constitute a genuine transfer of the petitioner, nor has the petitioner been transferred from the District. Rather, respondent No.7 has been posted/adjusted against the very post over which the petitioner was already holding charge, without first displacing or transferring the petitioner. Such an action is contrary to the departmental instructions governing the entrustment of charge of the District Sports Inspector/Officer and has adversely affected the petitioner's accrued rights.

It is further contended by learned counsel for petitioner that the Government's Transfer Policy dated 22.05.2026 imposed a ban on transfers after 16.06.2026 except in administrative exigency or exceptional circumstances. The impugned order dated 30.06.2026, whereby respondent No.7 has been accommodated against the post held by the petitioner without any corresponding transfer of the petitioner, cannot be justified merely as an administrative arrangement, particularly when the departmental instructions require the charge to be entrusted to the senior-most eligible PTI.

Learned counsel further submits that the plea of respondent No.7 that the petitioner is merely holding an informal/local additional charge is misconceived. The petitioner's entitlement to hold the district-level charge flows from the departmental instructions and the notification dated 17.04.1998, and the fact that his salary continues to be drawn from his parent institution does not extinguish his right to hold the charge lawfully entrusted to him.

It is contended that respondent No.7 has incorrectly relied upon the gradation list of lower-scale PTIs and has thereby attempted to project himself as senior to the petitioner. The service records and relevant appointment/absorption documents demonstrate that the petitioner belongs to the higher cadre and is senior to respondent No.7 in the relevant hierarchy. Therefore, respondent No.7 could not have been accommodated against the district-level charge by ignoring the petitioner's seniority and the applicable departmental instructions.

Learned counsel also submits that the subsequent proposal/recommendation dated 10.07.2026 concerning promotion of eligible Middle School Teachers (Sports) further demonstrates that the petitioner belongs to the relevant higher cadre and that his claim cannot be equated with that of respondent No.7, who belongs to the lower cadre/pay-scale.

Lastly, it is submitted that the impugned order dated 30.06.2026 has been issued merely to accommodate respondent No.7, without lawfully disturbing the petitioner's existing charge and in disregard of the applicable departmental instructions. The action of the respondents is therefore arbitrary, contrary to the governing instructions and amounts to an impermissible exercise of administrative power. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 30.06.2026 deserves to be quashed and the petitioner's right to continue on the district-level charge deserves to be protected.

Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.7 submits that the petitioner has no locus or cause of action to challenge the impugned order dated 30.06.2026, whereby respondent No.7 has been posted as In-charge District Sports and Welfare Inspector, District Bhind, as the petitioner has no substantive right to claim the said charge. It is submitted that the petitioner is working on the post of Khelkud Shikshak and was absorbed on the said post vide order dated 19.11.2019 under the Madhya Pradesh State School Education Services, Academic Cadre (Service Condition and Recruitment Rules), 2018, and his seniority is required to be reckoned in the cadre of Khelkud Shikshak w.e.f. 01.07.2018. On the other hand, respondent No.7 was appointed as Assistant Teacher on 11.02.1989 and was promoted as Physical Trained Instructor on 06.10.2009. The post of Physical Trained Instructor is distinct from the post of Khelkud Shikshak and the seniority of Physical Trained Instructors is maintained at the State level. It is further submitted that under the Madhya Pradesh Non-Gazetted Class III Academic Services (Non-Collegiate Services) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 1973, as amended vide notification dated 18.10.1984, the post of Physical Trained Instructor (Lower Pay Scale) has the promotional channel to the post of District Sports and Welfare Inspector. However, under the 2018 Rules governing the petitioner, there is no promotional channel from the post of Khelkud Shikshak to the post of District Sports and Welfare Inspector, the post of Khelkud Shikshak being a dying cadre. Learned counsel submits that the departmental orders and circulars relied upon by the petitioner themselves demonstrate that, on the vacancy of the post of District Sports and Welfare Inspector, the charge is required to be entrusted to the eligible/senior-most Physical Trained Instructor. Respondent No.7 being the senior-most Physical Trained Instructor in District Bhind, his appointment as In-charge District Sports and Welfare Inspector is in accordance with the applicable rules and departmental instructions. It is also submitted that the petitioner was not substantively posted on the post of District Sports and Welfare Inspector and was merely holding additional charge pursuant to the order dated 02.05.2025 passed by the Collector at the local level. His substantive posting continues at Government Higher Secondary School, Manepura, Block Ater, District Bhind, from where he is drawing his salary. There is no sanctioned post of PTI Block Sports Officer under the applicable rules. It is further submitted that respondent No.7 is senior to the petitioner in the relevant cadre and his pay scale as Physical Trained Instructor is higher than that of Khelkud Shikshak (B). The petitioner has deliberately not placed the relevant seniority list on record. Since the petitioner has no promotional channel to the post of District Sports and Welfare Inspector under the 2018 Rules, he cannot claim entitlement to the said post indirectly by virtue of having been entrusted with its additional charge. As regards the contention regarding the transfer ban, learned counsel submits that the School Education Department has its own policy dated 06.06.2026, under which transfers/postings were permissible up to 30.06.2026. Therefore, the general policy dated 22.05.2026 relied upon by the petitioner is not applicable to the impugned order dated 30.06.2026. Respondent No.7 duly joined pursuant to the impugned order on 01.07.2026. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order was issued by the competent authority at the State level, whereas the petitioner was holding charge only at the district/local level. The order passed by the higher competent authority, therefore, prevails. Moreover, an incumbent holding an in-charge/additional charge arrangement has no substantive right to continue on such post. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. S.M. Sharma And Others, reported in AIR 1993 SC 2273, and the judgments of this Court in WP. No.21469/2022 [Smt. Mamta Soni Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh And Others] decided on 22.09.2022 and W.P. No.16675/2026 [Dr. Sonesh Poonia Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh And Others] decided on 11.05.2026, in support of the proposition that no substantive right accrues in favour of a person merely because he has been holding charge of a post. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel submits that the petitioner has failed to establish any enforceable right or cause of action against the impugned order and, therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/State submits that the writ petition is misconceived, devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed, as the petitioner has failed to establish violation of any statutory provision or infringement of any legally enforceable right. It is submitted that the petitioner was merely entrusted with temporary additional charge of the vacant post of District Sports and Welfare Officer vide order dated 02.05.2025 as a stop-gap arrangement and was never substantively appointed or promoted to the said post. Mere entrustment of additional charge does not confer any vested or enforceable right upon the incumbent to continue on such charge. It is further submitted that the impugned order dated 30.06.2026 has been issued in accordance with the Circular dated 26.08.2020 issued by the Directorate of Public Instruction, Government of Madhya Pradesh, which provides that in the event of vacancy on the post of District Sports and Welfare Officer, the senior-most Physical Training Instructor (Vyayam Nirdeshak) of the concerned district shall be assigned the said charge. Respondent No.7, being the senior-most eligible Physical Training Instructor in District Bhind, has accordingly been assigned the charge in accordance with the aforesaid Government instructions. Thus, the impugned order is legal, valid and in conformity with the departmental policy. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner has no vested or indefeasible right to continue at a particular place or to retain an additional charge, and the competent authority is fully empowered to make appropriate administrative arrangements in the interest of administration. Transfer, posting and deployment are incidents of service and ordinarily fall within the domain of the employer. It is submitted that the allegations of mala fides and favouritism are vague, baseless and unsupported by any material particulars. The petitioner has neither pleaded nor established any personal bias or animus on the part of the competent authority. Mere bald allegations of mala fides cannot furnish a ground for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is further submitted that the contention regarding respondent No.7 being junior to the petitioner is of no consequence, as respondent No.7 has not been substantively appointed or promoted to the post in question but has merely been assigned the duties/charge pursuant to the Government Circular dated 26.08.2020 so that the functioning of the office does not suffer on account of the vacancy. As regards the alleged violation of the transfer-ban period, learned counsel submits that the impugned order is not a routine transfer but an administrative arrangement made pursuant to the departmental instructions for ensuring proper functioning of the vacant post. Consequently, the transfer policy or transfer-ban period has no application to the present arrangement. Lastly, it is submitted that executive instructions or transfer policies do not confer any enforceable legal right upon a Government employee. In the absence of violation of any statutory rule or legally protected right, no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is warranted. The writ petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.

No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

The short question which arises for consideration is whether the petitioner has any enforceable right to continue on the post of District Sports and Welfare Inspector merely on the strength of the fact that he was earlier entrusted with the additional charge of the said post.

The record reflects that the petitioner was not substantively appointed or promoted to the post of District Sports and Welfare Inspector. The charge was entrusted to him as an additional arrangement. Such entrustment of additional charge, by itself, does not confer any substantive or vested right upon the incumbent to continue on the said post indefinitely.

It is also evident from the record that the competent authority has subsequently made an administrative arrangement by assigning the charge of the vacant post to respondent No.7. The said arrangement has been made in terms of the departmental instructions governing entrustment of charge of the post in question.

The petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any statutory provision conferring upon him a right to continue on the additional charge or restricting the competent authority from making a fresh arrangement in respect of the vacant post. The mere fact that the petitioner had earlier discharged the duties of the post cannot create an indefeasible right in his favour.

So far as the plea relating to the transfer policy is concerned, the impugned order does not amount to substantive transfer of the petitioner from his cadre or post. The order essentially concerns the arrangement of the vacant post of District Sports and Welfare Inspector. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim continuation on the additional charge merely by relying upon the provisions of the general transfer policy. The respondents have also specifically treated the impugned order as an administrative arrangement and not as a routine transfer.

It is a settled principle that an employee holding an additional or in-charge arrangement does not acquire a substantive right to continue on such post. Administrative arrangements concerning a vacant post are ordinarily within the domain of the competent authority, unless the action is shown to be contrary to a statutory provision or otherwise legally unsustainable.

The grant and taking away of additional charge does not deprive the person concerned of any substantive right so long as the service conditions attached to the post held substantively by the said person are not adversely effected. Additional charge is a temporary and adhoc arrangement made to cater to an emergent eventuality of casual vacancy etc. having no connection with the substantive post.

Law does not give any right to seek additional charge and correspondingly there is no infringement of any right when such additional charge is taken away.

The Supreme Court in the case of S.M. Sharma And Others (supra) has held has under:-

The Supreme Court in the case of Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar vs. Union of India and Others, reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 733 has held as under:-

It is also useful to refer to the law laid down by this Court in the cases relating to appointment of In-charge Chief Municipal Officers. In Sanjay Soni v. State of M.P., W.P. No.5135/2012, decided on 03.10.2013, this Court held that an in-charge arrangement cannot be made de hors the Rules and that, where a regular incumbent is not available, the charge should be given only to a person holding a substantive post in the feeder cadre for regular promotion. The same principle was followed in Mahesh Prasad Dixit v. State of M.P., W.P. No.15111/2020, decided on 09.10.2020, wherein this Court held that a person has no right to continue on an in-charge post merely because he was earlier given such charge. The Supreme Court, in S.M. Sharma And Others (supra), has also held that a person holding only the current duty charge of a post does not acquire any right to continue on that post when the competent authority makes another posting. Applying the same principle to the present case, the petitioner cannot claim continuation merely because he was earlier entrusted with the charge of District Sports and Welfare Inspector. If a regular incumbent is not available, the charge can be entrusted by the competent authority to an eligible person belonging to the feeder cadre and falling within the zone of consideration. The petitioner has not established any right under the applicable rules to insist that the charge must continue with him. Therefore, the subsequent assignment of charge to respondent No.7, who is stated to be an eligible person from the relevant feeder cadre, does not call for interference. Order dated 19.11.2019 issued by Joint Director, Public Instructions Division, Gwalior, M.P. is quoted below for ready reference and convenience:

It is also relevant to notice the order dated 19.11.2019 issued by the Joint Director, Public Instruction, Gwalior, whereby the petitioner was appointed/placed as Khelkud Shikshak (श्रेणी-ब) under the Madhya Pradesh State School Education Service (Academic Cadre), Service Conditions and Recruitment Rules, 2018, and was posted at Government Higher Secondary School, Manepura, District Bhind. The said document clearly shows that the petitioner's substantive post is that of Khelkud Shikshak under the 2018 Rules. Therefore, merely because the petitioner was subsequently given additional charge of District Sports and Welfare Inspector, his substantive cadre cannot be treated as that of Physical Training Instructor. The distinction assumes significance because the post of District Sports and Welfare Inspector is to be manned, in the absence of a regular incumbent, by an eligible person from the prescribed feeder cadre and within the zone of consideration. The petitioner has not demonstrated from the 2018 Rules any promotional channel from the post of Khelkud Shikshak to the post of District Sports and Welfare Inspector. Consequently, his earlier entrustment with additional charge cannot create a right in his favour to continue on the said post.

The order dated 06.10.2023 issued by the Directorate of Public Instruction also assumes significance. The said order, issued with reference to the Madhya Pradesh Non-Gazetted Class III Academic Services (Non-Collegiate Services) Recruitment Rules, 1973, concerns the arrangement of persons holding the post of Vyayam Nirdeshak against higher-level posts carrying the higher pay scale. This document indicates that the department has treated the cadre of Vyayam Nirdeshak as the relevant cadre for such higher posts. In contrast, the petitioner, as is evident from the order dated 19.11.2019, is substantively holding the post of Khelkud Shikshak under the 2018 Rules. Therefore, the petitioner's claim cannot be decided merely on the basis of his earlier date of appointment or his having once held additional charge. The relevant consideration is whether he belongs to the feeder cadre prescribed for the post in question. Where a regular incumbent is not available, the charge can be entrusted to an eligible person belonging to the feeder cadre and falling within the zone of consideration. Mere earlier entrustment of charge to the petitioner cannot confer upon him a right to continue against a post for which he has not established the requisite cadre-based entitlement. Schedule IV of amended Madhya Pradesh Non-Gazetted Class III Academic Services (Non-Collegiate Services) Recruitment Rules, 1973 goes as under:

The contention of the petitioner that he belongs to a different and higher cadre and, therefore, respondent No. 7 cannot be assigned the charge of District Sports and Welfare Inspector is not acceptable. The notification dated 18.10.1984, amending the Madhya Pradesh Non-Gazetted Class III Academic Services (Non-Collegiate Services) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 1973, prescribes the service structure for the posts of Physical Training Instructor and District Sports and Welfare Inspector. The said notification, read with the departmental circular dated 26.08.2020, supports the contention of respondent No.7 that the charge of District Sports and Welfare Inspector is to be entrusted to the senior-most eligible PTI of the concerned district. Merely because the petitioner was earlier entrusted with the additional charge of the said post, he cannot claim precedence over respondent No.7, particularly when the petitioner is working as Khelkud Shikshak under the 2018 Rules and has not established his entitlement to the said charge under the applicable instructions. Thus, the petitioner's claim based on his alleged seniority in a different cadre does not, by itself, confer any enforceable right to retain the additional charge in preference to respondent No.7.

In the present case, no violation of any statutory rule has been established. The petitioner has also failed to establish any legally enforceable right in his favour which could warrant interference with the impugned order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Consequently, no ground for interference is made out. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.