Shiva Chaturvedi vs State Of Mp And Anr

This petition under Section 482 of CrPC has been filed for quashing the criminal proceedings pending in the Court of JMFC, Shivpuri in Criminal Case

No.229/2017 as well as for quashing the order dated 18/01/2018, by which the application filed by the applicant under Section 239 of CrPC has been

rejected.

The necessary facts for the disposal of the present petition in short are that the respondent No.2 had filed a complaint against the applicant, her

husband Abhinav Chaturvedi and her sister-in-law Ku. Manupriya Chaturvedi for offence under Section 498-A of IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry

Prohibition Act. In the complaint, it was alleged by the respondent No.2 that she was married to Abhinav Chaturvedi on 28/02/2012 as per Hindu

rites and rituals. In the marriage, the parents of the respondent No.2 had given a Tata Safari Car, 9 tolas of gold jewellery and an amount of Rs.5 lacs

for purchasing the household articles. At the time of marriage, her husband was working in GP Rewa Cement Company, Rewa, whereas the

respondent No.2 was working in MacDonald Company, Noida and after her marriage, she left her job. After the marriage, the respondent No.2 had

stayed with her in-laws at different places like Rewa, Sultanpur, Noida, etc. However, her husband Abhinav Chaturvedi, the applicant and her sister-

in-law Ku. Manupripya Chaturved started demanding Rs.10 lacs and because of nonfulfillment of their demand of dowry, they started harassing her

physically and mentally. They were demanding this money for the purposes of bearing educational expenses of her sister-in-law Ku. Manupriya

Chaturvedi as well as to complete under-construction house at Lucknow. For fulfilling the demand of her in-laws, the respondent No.2 was forced to

join her job after eight months of her marriage. All the three accused persons were constantly demanding Rs.10 lacs and harassing her physically and

mentally. While they were staying at Noida in the flat, her husband Abhinav Chaturvedi had also taken Rs.3 lacs from her father for going to Dubai.

In the month of November, 2015 her husband came to Shivpuri and again demanded Rs.10 lacs for meeting the marriage expenses of her sister-in-law

Ku. Manupriya Chaturvedi and extended a threat that otherwise he would not keep any relations with the respondent No.2 and he would not take the

respondent No.2 with him. The applicant and her mother-in-law had also talked to her on the mobile of her husband Abhinav Chaturvedi and they

also extended a threat that the amount of Rs.10 lacs should be given otherwise they would perform the second marriage of her husband and since

demand of Rs.10 lacs was not fulfilled, therefore, her husband has not taken her with him and that is why, her husband is not giving any information

with regard to his place of posting and his present place of residence.

On this complaint, the police registered a FIR against Abhinav Chaturvedi, the applicant and Ku. Manupriya Chaturvedi, the sister-inlaw of the

respondent No.2. The police after concluding the investigation, filed the charge sheet against Abhinav Chaturvedi and the applicant but did not file

charge sheet against Ku. Manupriya Chaturvedi.

The applicant filed an application under Section 239 of CrPC before the trial Court. By order dated 18/01/2018, the trial Court rejected the application

and fixed the case for framing of charges.

Challenging the order passed by the trial Court, it is submitted by the counsel for the applicant that the trial Court has committed a glaring mistake in

holding that the offence under Section 498-A of IPC is a continuous offence and entire allegations which have been made against the applicant cannot

be looked into by the trial Court because they have become barred by time. It is further submitted that no offence has been made out against the

applicant and Shivpuri Court has no jurisdiction to try the offence. It is further submitted that the offence under Section 498-A of IPC is not a

continuous offence. It is further submitted that there are no specific allegations or over act alleged against the applicant and, therefore, the trial Court

should have accepted the application filed under Section 239 of CrPC and should have discharged the applicant.

Per contra, it is submitted by the counsel for the State that in the FIR as well as in the statement recorded under Section 161 of CrPC, the respondent

No.2 has specifically stated that the applicant was demanding Rs.10 lacs and because of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry, the respondent No.2

was harassed physically and mentally. It is further submitted that the allegations made against the applicant cannot be bifurcated and the period of

limitation cannot be calculated on the basis of each and every incident. It is further submitted that there are specific allegations against the applicant

and a specific overt act has been assigned to the applicant by mentioning that the respondent No.2 was beaten because of non-fulfillment of their

demand of Rs.10 lacs. It is further submitted that at the time of framing of charges the trial Court is not required to conduct a roving enquiry and the

meticulous appreciation of evidence is not permissible and accordingly, it is submitted that the trial Court did not commit any mistake in rejecting the

application filed under Section 239 of CrPC.

Considered the submissions made by the counsel for the parties.

The submissions made by the counsel for the applicant are that the respondent No.2 has not specifically narrated the date and place where the

demand was made and where she was physically and mentally harassed. The last incident took place in the month of November, 2015 and the

allegations are that her husband Abhinav Chaturvedi had come to Shivpuri and if any offence was committed by her husband in the month of

November, 2015 at Shivpuri, then the applicant cannot be made responsible for the same and, therefore, the complaint is barred by limitation so far as

the applicant is concerned.

The submissions made by the counsel for the applicant cannot be accepted for the simple reason that while considering the allegations of harassment

or cruelty each and every incident cannot be separated and the offence under Section 498-A of IPC would be a continuous offence in that regard.

Undisputedly, the last incident alleged against the accused persons is of November, 2015 and the complaint was filed on 20/08/2016. Thus, it is clear

that the complaint was filed within a period of three years from the date of last incident of harassment. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said

that the complaint lodged by the respondent No.2 was barred by limitation.

It is the next contention of the applicant that since the specific allegations have not been made against the applicant and it has not been specified that

on what date and at what place, the applicant had demanded Rs.10 lacs or the applicant had beaten the respondent No.2, therefore, it cannot be said

that the allegations against the applicant are specific. It is well-established principle of law that a relative of the husband of the complainant cannot be

prosecuted on the basis of vague and omnibus allegations. The submissions made by the counsel for the applicant are misconceived and cannot be

accepted. The respondent No.2 has specifically stated that the applicant had demanded Rs.10 lacs and because of non-fulfillment of said demand, she

was beaten and harassed. The allegation of harassment by the mother-in-law is sufficient to frame charge under Section 498- Aof IPC.

The Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others reported in (2015) 11 SCC 260, has held as under:-

''11. Referring to earlier decisions, in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460, it was observed (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27):

“27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution

is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of

the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted

therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever

reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in

conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might

be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in

exercise of its inherent powers.

27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution

and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.

27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the

offender.

27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.

27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a

“civil wrong†with no “element of criminality†and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in

quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to

determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the

allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating

agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a

criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into

consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his

acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be

more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a

view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report

under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.

27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice

favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of

which alone, the courts exist. (Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha [(1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283 : AIR 1982 SC 949]; Madhavrao

Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 :

1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892]; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059]; G. Sagar Suri v.

State of U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [(2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 703]; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v.

Special Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400 : AIR 1998 SC 128]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996

SCC (Cri) 497]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa [(1995) 4 SCC 41 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 634]; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd.

Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]; Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000

SCC (Cri) 615 : AIR 2000 SC 1869]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala [(2009) 14 SCC 466 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1412]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma v.

State of U.P. [(2009) 7 SCC 234 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 356]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu [(2009) 11 SCC 203 : (2009) 3

SCC (Cri) 1297]; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 82]; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC

222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 : AIR 1991 SC 1260]; Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [(2001) 2 SCC 17 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 275]; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh

[(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19]; Savita v. State of Rajasthan [(2005) 12 SCC 338 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 571] and S.M. Datta v. State of

Gujarat [(2001) 7 SCC 659 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1361 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1201]).

27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of

extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has

been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have

not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.â€​

In Kailash Chandra Agrawal & Anr. vs. State of U.P. (2014) 16 SCC 51, it was observed: (SCC p. 553, paras 8-9):

“8. We have gone through the FIR and the criminal complaint. In the FIR, the appellants have not been named and in the criminal complaint they

have been named without attributing any specific role to them. The relationship of the appellants with the husband of the complainant is distant. In

Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207], it was observed:(SCC p.217, para 5)

“5. … A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if

not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for

maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of

the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case.†The Court has, thus, to be careful in summoning

distant relatives without there being specific material. Only the husband, his parents or at best close family members may be expected to demand

dowry or to harass the wife but not distant relations, unless there is tangible material to support allegations made against such distant relations. Mere

naming of distant relations is not enough to summon them in absence of any specific role and material to support such role.

The parameters for quashing proceedings in a criminal complaint are well known. If there are triable issues, the Court is not expected to go into the

veracity of the rival versions but where on the face of it, the criminal proceedings are abuse of Court’s process, quashing jurisdiction can be

exercised. Reference may be made to K.Ramakrsihna and Ors. vs. State of Bihar [(2000) 8 SCC 547], Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate

[(1998) 5 SCC 749], State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335] and Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P.[(2011) 11 SCC 259].â€​

In the present case, the complaint is as follows:

“Sir, it is submitted that I was married on 18.11.09 with Sidharath Parakh s/o Manak Chand Parak, r/o Sarafa Bazar in front of Radha Krishna

Market, Gwalior according to the Hindu rites and customs. In the marriage my father had given gold and silver ornaments, cash amount and household

goods according to his capacity. After the marriage when I went to my matrimonial home, I was treated nicely by the members of the family. When

on the second occasion I went to my matrimonial, my husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law started harassing me for not bringing the dowry and

started saying that I should bring from my father 25-30 tolas of gold and Rs.2,00,000/- in cash and only then they would keep me in the house

otherwise not. On account of this my husband also used to beat me and my father-in-law and my mother-in-law used to torture me by giving the

taunts. In this connection I used to tell my father Kundanmal Oswal, my mother Smt. Prem Lata Oswal, uncle Ashok Rai Sharma and uncle Ved

Prakash Mishra from time to time. On 2.4.2010 the members of the family of my matrimonial home forcibly sent me to the house of my parents in

Ganj Basoda along with my brother Deepak. They snatched my clothes and ornaments and kept with them. Since then till today my husband has been

harassing me on the telephone and has not come to take me back. Being compelled, I have been moving this application before you. Sir, it is prayed

that action be taken against husband Sidharath Parakh, my father-in-law Manak Chand Parakh and my mother-in-law Smt. Indira Parakh for torturing

me on account of demanding the dowry.''

From reading of the complaint, it cannot be held that even if the allegations are taken as proved no case is made out. There are allegations against

Respondent No.2 and his parents for harassing the complainant which forced her to leave the matrimonial home. Even now she continues to be

separated from the matrimonial home as she apprehends lack of security and safety and proper environment in the matrimonial home. The question

whether the appellant has infact been harassed and treated with cruelty is a matter of trial but at this stage, it cannot be said that no case is made out.

Thus, quashing of proceedings before the trial is not permissible.

The decisions referred to in the judgment of the High Court are distinguishable. In Neelu Chopra, parents of the husband were too old. The

husband Rajesh had died and main allegations were only against him. This Court found no cogent material against other accused. In Manoj Mahavir,

the appellant before this Court was the brother of the daughter-in- law of the accused who lodged the case against the accused for theft of jewellery

during pendency of earlier 498A case. This Court found the said case to be absurd. In Geeta Mehrotra, case was against brother and sister of the

husband. Divorce had taken place between the parties. The said cases neither purport to nor can be read as laying down any inflexible rule beyond the

principles of quashing which have been mentioned above and applied to the facts of the cases therein which are distinguishable. In the present case

the factual matrix is different from the said cases. Applying the settled principles, it cannot be held that there is no triable case against the accused.''

Thus, in the light of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the

allegations which have been made against the applicant are sufficient for warranting her prosecution under Section 498-A of IPC.

It is next contended by the counsel for the applicant that Shivpuri Court has no jurisdiction to try the offence because if a person had talked to the

complainant on telephone, then that would not give rise to cause of action in that particular area. The submission made by the counsel for the applicant

is misconceived and is hereby rejected for the simple reason that it is the allegation that the husband of the respondent No.2 came to Shivpuri in the

month of November, 2015 and again demanded an amount of Rs.10 lacs for bearing the marriage expenses of her sister-in-law Ku. Manupriya

Chaturvedi.

Sections 177 and 178 of CrPC read as under :-

''177. Ordinary Place of enquiry or trial- Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was

committed. ''

Place of inquiry or trial â€" (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas,

it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.''

From the plain reading of Sections 178 of CrPC, it is clear that whether an offence is a continuing one and continues to be committed in more local

areas than one, then it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local area. Thus, it is clear that according to the

complaint, a demand of dowry of Rs.10 lacs was made by the husband of the respondent No.2 at Shivpuri in the month of November, 2015. Thus, a

part of cause of action had also arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial Court. Accordingly, the trial Court has jurisdiction to try the offence

under Section 498-A of IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

After considering the submissions made by the counsel for the applicant, this Court is of the considered opinion that the trial Court did not commit any

mistake in rejecting the application filed by the applicant under Section 239 of CrPC and accordingly, the order dated 18/01/2018 passed by JMFC,

Shivpuri in Criminal Case No.229/2017 is hereby affirmed.

This petition fails and is hereby dismissed.