Shiv Ram vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Home, Lko

HON’BLE ZAFEER AHMAD, J.

Heard Smt. Nisha Srivastava, learned counsel for the accused-appellant, and learned A.G.A. for the State.

The present criminal appeal has been filed under Section 415(2) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding Section 374(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) against the judgment and order dated 09.03.2025 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Barabanki in Sessions Trial No. 143 of 2024 arising out of Case Crime no. 414 of 2023, Police Station Asandra, District Barabanki wherein the accused-appellant has been convicted and sentenced under Section 306 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred as IPC) for a period of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 20,000/- and in default of payment of fine additional two months imprisonment.

The prosecution case, in brief, is that the complainant, Lallu, submitted a written report on 15.09.2023 stating that, about 20 years ago, his sister Ramdasa was married to Shivram, the accused-appellant, but they had no children. He further stated that Shivram used to harass his sister on this account and would tell her to hang herself or jump into the river and die, and that he would not keep her in his house. He further stated that, due to such harassment and at the insistence of Shivram, his sister committed suicide by hanging herself on the intervening night of 09/10.09.2023. He further stated that his sister had informed him about the harassment and the threats to commit suicide, and that he had also counselled her.

On the basis of the written report, an FIR was registered on 15.09.2023 against the accused-appellant, Shivram, as case crime no. 414 of 2023, under Section 306 IPC. The Investigating Officer conducted the investigation and, after completion thereof, submitted a charge-sheet against accused-appellant, Shivram, under Section 306 of IPC. Thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial. The Sessions Court framed charges against the appellant under Section 306 IPC. The appellant denied the charges, pleaded not guilty, and claimed trial.

In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined PW-1 Lallu, PW-2 Ram Manohar, PW-3 Mithilesh Kumari , PW-4 Seema Devi, PW-5 SI Manoj Kumar Singh, PW-6 Ram Shukal, and PW-7 Dr. Swapnil Singh.

In order to prove its case, the prosecution produced and proved the following documents, which were marked as exhibits:-

The statement of the accused-appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied the allegations levelled against him. He stated that his wife had been suffering from tuberculosis for a long time and that he had got her treated, but as she did not recover, she became depressed, due to which she committed suicide.

Learned counsel for the accused-appellant submits that the prosecution has failed to establish the charge under Section 306 IPC beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, who are admittedly the close relatives of the deceased, is materially inconsistent and suffers from significant omissions, particularly with regard to the alleged acts of harassment and the alleged incident immediately preceding the occurrence. The alleged oral disclosures made by the deceased have not been supported by any independent or contemporaneous evidence, and the material circumstances emerging from the testimony of the Investigating Officer do not corroborate the prosecution version. Learned counsel further submits that the alleged delay in lodging the FIR, coupled with the material omissions in the earliest version, assumes significance in determining the reliability of the subsequent allegations of harassment. It is further contended that even if the allegations of matrimonial discord or harassment are accepted at their highest, the same do not, in law, constitute abetment of suicide. Learned counsel submits that the learned trial Court has failed to undertake this essential statutory exercise and has not recorded any specific or reasoned finding identifying the act by which the appellant allegedly abetted the suicide. Reliance has been placed upon Prakash v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2024 SC (Supp) 2300, and Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 2 SCC 427, to contend that mere harassment, matrimonial discord or even abusive conduct, without the requisite intention, positive act and proximate nexus with the suicide, cannot sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC. It is thus submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offence and that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Per contra, learned A.G.A. has opposed the appeal and submitted that the prosecution has proved the case against the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It is argued that the consistent testimony of the prosecution witnesses establishes that the deceased was subjected to harassment and humiliation by the appellant on account of her childlessness and physical condition and that, shortly before the occurrence, she had disclosed the conduct of the appellant to her family members. It is further submitted that the deceased died an unnatural death by hanging within the matrimonial home and that the medical evidence conclusively establishes the cause of death. Learned A.G.A. further submits that the delay in lodging the FIR, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is not sufficient to discredit the prosecution version and that the learned trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence on record, has rightly convicted the accused-appellant. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court warrants no interference.

In order to appreciate the issues arising in the present appeal, it is appropriate to examine, in brief, the oral evidence adduced by the prosecution.

PW-1, Lallu, complainant and brother of the deceased Ramdasa, deposed that she had been married to the accused-appellant Shivaram for about 20 years. He further deposed that, on 09.09.2023, the accused-appellant first informed him telephonically that the deceased was missing and thereafter that she had died. He further deposed that, on 08.09.2023, the deceased had informed him over the telephone that the accused-appellant had beaten and harassed her, taunted her for being childless and told her to commit suicide by jumping into the river. He further deposed that, when she had visited him on Raksha Bandhan, she had complained of continued violence and harassment by the accused-appellant. On reaching her matrimonial house, he found her dead body under a tree outside the house and attributed her suicide to the harassment and taunts of the accused-appellant. He proved the written, which was marked as Ext. Ka-1 and deposed that the Investigating Officer recorded his statement and prepared the site plan at his pointing out.

During cross-examination, he denied that the deceased was suffering from tuberculosis or was being treated for the same, and deposed that he had neither consulted any doctor regarding her infertility nor knew whether the accused had done so. He further deposed that, about 10-12 years after marriage, the deceased had stayed at her parental home for about one year after being beaten by the accused-appellant, whereafter she was taken back by him. He further deposed that the accused-appellant had never prevented the deceased from visiting her parental home and that their family members were treated hospitably during their visits. He further clarified that, although he had stated in examination-in-chief that he found the deceased hanging from a tree, by the time he reached the spot, the police had already brought the body down and it was lying on the ground. He admitted that he had not mentioned in the written report or stated to the police that the accused-appellant had first informed him that the deceased was missing and thereafter about her death. He also admitted that, though he had stated that the deceased informed him on 08.09.2023 about being beaten by the accused-appellant, he had not disclosed this fact to the police. He further deposed that the report was prepared with the assistance of a person outside Police Station Asandra and was lodged on the same day. He denied that the deceased suffered from tuberculosis, depression or illness-related distress, or that the accused-appellant was getting her treated. He further deposed that the deceased was physically disabled in one leg. He denied that she had committed suicide on account of her illness or that the accused-appellant had not subjected her to violence. He also denied the suggestion that she had taken ornaments from his house and that, on account of a dispute regarding their return, he had falsely implicated the accused-appellant.

PW-2, Ram Manohar, deposed that the deceased belonged to village Dhanoli and that her death occurred in village Bhediya. He further deposed that the Inspector prepared the inquest report in his presence and recorded his statement.

During cross-examination, he deposed that the deceased’ s family members arrived at around 2:00 P.M., by which time the dead body had been sealed and the inquest proceedings were completed. He further deposed that the deceased was physically disabled in one leg and had been ill for several days, for which the accused was getting her treated. He further deposed that the police cut the cloth by which she had hanged herself from the tree and took into possession a slipper, lota and rope. He further deposed that his statement was not recorded by the police after completion of the inquest proceedings. He denied that no inquest proceedings had taken place or that his signatures had been obtained on blank papers.

PW-3, Seema Devi, sister-in-law (भाभी) of the deceased, deposed that the deceased had been married to the accused-appellant for about 20 years and that they had no children. She further deposed that, on account thereof and the deceased's physical disability in one leg, the accused-appellant used to taunt and beat her and tell her to die. She further deposed that the deceased used to confide in her regarding such harassment and had again complained of the same when she visited her parental home on Raksha Bandhan. She further deposed that, after returning to her matrimonial home, the deceased committed suicide about four or five days later, being distressed by the accused-appellant's conduct.

During cross-examination, she deposed that the deceased was not ill and that she was unaware whether she had tuberculosis or had received any treatment. She further deposed that information regarding the occurrence was received at around 7:00 A.M. and that, by the time she reached the spot, the dead body was lying on the ground and had not been sealed. She further deposed that her husband thereafter went to lodge the report. She further deposed that the last rites were performed by the accused-appellant, who used to visit her house and with whom she had never had any dispute. She further deposed that a panchayat had been held about 5-6 months prior to the occurrence in her presence, attended by the village Pandit and members of her community, while the accused-appellant had attended alone. She further deposed that she had neither taken the deceased to any doctor nor knew whether the accused-appellant had done so. She denied the suggestion that the deceased was not physically disabled, that she had children, or that she had committed suicide on account of tuberculosis or that a false complaint had been lodged to extort money from the accused-appellant or that she was deposing falsely at the instance of her husband.

PW-4, Seema Devi, younger sister of the deceased, deposed that the deceased had been married to the accused-appellant about 20 years prior to the occurrence and had been residing at her matrimonial house for about one year before the incident. She further deposed that the deceased was physically disabled in one leg and had no children, on account of which the accused-appellant used to harass her and ask her to leave the matrimonial house. She further deposed that the deceased had, on several occasions, stayed at her parental home and narrated such harassment to her. She further deposed that, in September 2023, about 5-6 days after Raksha Bandhan, the deceased committed suicide by hanging herself from a chilwal tree at her matrimonial house. She also deposed that, a day prior to the occurrence, the deceased had telephonically informed her that the accused-appellant was harassing her and talking of bringing another wife, causing her mental distress.

During cross-examination, she deposed that the deceased used to frequently visit her house and that she had no ill-will towards the accused-appellant. She further deposed that the deceased walked with the aid of a stick due to disability in one leg. She further deposed that she was unaware whether the deceased was suffering from tuberculosis or whether the accused-appellant was getting her treated. She denied the suggestion that the deceased had committed suicide on account of her physical disability, tuberculosis or childlessness.

PW-5, S.I. Manoj Kumar Singh, Police Station Asandra, District Barabanki, deposed that, on 15.09.2023, while posted as office clerk, he registered the FIR on the basis of the written report submitted by complainant Lallu, as per his dictation. He further deposed that the corresponding G.D. entry was made on the same day at around 14:52 hours as Entry No. 31, which was proved and marked as Ext. Ka-2, and that the FIR was provided to the complainant after obtaining his signature. The FIR was proved and marked as Ext. Ka-3.

During cross-examination, he deposed that the complainant had come alone to the police station and that he had no prior information regarding the incident or any knowledge of the date of occurrence. He further deposed that the FIR was registered pursuant to the written order of the S.H.O. and that he was unaware when the special report was dispatched. He denied the suggestion that the FIR had been registered at an odd hour at the instance of his superior officers.

PW-6, S.I. Ram Shukla, Investigating Officer, Police Lines, Ayodhya, deposed that, on 10.09.2023, while posted at Police Station Asandra, District Barabanki, he recorded the information furnished by the accused-appellant in G.D. Entry No. 17 at around 11:21 hours and proceeded to the place of occurrence for inquest. He deposed that he found the deceased hanging from a tree and, with the help of villagers, brought the body down and laid it on the ground. He thereafter completed the inquest, sealed the body and sent it for post-mortem examination. He proved the relevant inquest documents, marked as Ext. Ka-4 to Ka-10. He further deposed that, on 15.09.2023, on the basis of the written report of complainant Lallu, Case Crime No. 414 of 2023 under Section 306 IPC was registered and on 18.09.2023, he recorded the complainant’s statement and prepared the site plan at his pointing out, which was proved and marked as Ext. Ka-11, and on 15.10.2023, arrested the accused-appellant. He proved the charge-sheet, which was marked as Ext. Ka-12.

During cross-examination, he deposed that none of the villagers, at the time of the inquest, informed him that the deceased had committed suicide on account of harassment by the accused-appellant, and that the first information regarding the incident had been given by the accused-appellant. He further deposed that the accused-appellant, his family members and the deceased’ s family members were present during the inquest. He further deposed that the deceased was hanging from a tree by a cloth, but no recovery memo regarding the cloth was prepared. He further deposed that although investigation was entrusted to him on 15.09.2023 at around 2:30-3:00 P.M., he did not commence investigation on that day. He further deposed that the place where the body was found was around 200 metres from the accused-appellant’s house. He denied the suggestion that he had submitted the charge-sheet without conducting any investigation and merely on the basis of the statements of the witnesses.

PW-7, Dr. Swapnil Singh, Medical Officer, C.H.C. Ramnagar, District Barabanki, deposed that, on 10.09.2023, he was posted as Medical Officer at the said hospital and was assigned duty at the mortuary, Barabanki. He further deposed that, on 10.09.2023, while posted at the said hospital and assigned duty at the mortuary, Barabanki, he conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased along with Dr. Sadanand, commencing at around 4:05 P.M. and concluding at around 4:40 P.M. The dead body had been brought by police personnel at around 12:30 P.M. He further deposed that rigor mortis had passed off from both extremities, post-mortem staining was present over the back and the nails were bluish. He further deposed that the following ante-mortem injury was found on the body:

During cross-examination, he deposed that he was unaware that the deceased was physically disabled in one leg. He further deposed that rigor mortis usually commences about 5-6 hours after death, progresses from the upper to the lower limbs over about 12 hours and thereafter subsides. He further deposed that no injury, except the ligature mark around the neck, was found on the body of the deceased. He further deposed that the deceased must have consumed food about two hours prior to her death.

The allegation of harassment constitutes the principal factual foundation of the prosecution case. The prosecution seeks to attribute the suicide of the deceased to the conduct of the accused-appellant, alleging that, on account of the couple having no children, the deceased was repeatedly taunted, beaten and subjected to mental cruelty and was even exhorted to end her life. On a careful and critical appraisal of the evidence, however, this allegation does not attain the degree of certainty required in a criminal trial. The material on record does not disclose a consistent, contemporaneous and independently corroborated account of such harassment, rather, the prosecution version has developed substantially through statements of the deceased's close relatives, who admittedly were not present in the matrimonial home at the time of the alleged acts of harassment. The Court is, therefore, required to examine not merely whether the witnesses have made allegations of cruelty, but whether their testimony, viewed in its entirety and tested against the surrounding circumstances, furnishes a trustworthy basis for concluding that the accused-appellant subjected the deceased to the alleged harassment.

The most significant circumstance is that the allegation of continuous harassment is not supported by any contemporaneous conduct or circumstance emanating from the deceased during her lifetime. The evidence shows that the deceased had been married to the appellant for approximately twenty years. PW-1 stated that she used to visit her parental home and that the accused-appellant himself also visited the parental house. He further admitted that he and his family members used to visit the matrimonial home and, on family occasions, would stay there and were treated with due hospitality. These circumstances are not by themselves sufficient to rule out matrimonial cruelty, but they assume considerable significance when the prosecution alleges a continuing course of grave harassment extending over a long period. If the allegation is that the deceased was being continuously subjected to violence and was repeatedly being told to leave the matrimonial home or to end her life, the absence of any contemporaneous complaint, letter, report, medical record or other independent circumstance supporting such a continuing course of conduct becomes a material factor in assessing the reliability of the subsequent allegations.

Moreover, the prosecution has not presented a consistent account even as to the immediate circumstances preceding the suicide. PW-1 alleged that the deceased had spoken to him on 08.09.2023 regarding beating and exhortation by the appellant to commit suicide. Yet, in cross-examination, he admitted that this material fact had not been disclosed by him to the police. This omission assumes importance because the alleged telephone conversation was not a remote or incidental circumstance, according to the prosecution itself, it was the immediate complaint made by the deceased shortly before the occurrence and is relied upon to establish the appellant's conduct proximate to the suicide. The subsequent introduction of such a material allegation, without its disclosure during the investigation, necessarily affects the weight to be attached to the testimony.

The prosecution case is further weakened by the conduct of the parties immediately after the occurrence. The Investigating Officer has categorically stated that the information regarding the incident was first given to the police by the accused-appellant himself. He further stated that, at the time of the inquest proceedings, none of the villagers informed him that the deceased had committed suicide on account of harassment caused by the appellant. This is not being treated as substantive proof of innocence, nevertheless, it is a relevant surrounding circumstance while assessing whether the allegation of harassment was an established fact existing from the inception or was subsequently brought forward after the occurrence. The absence of any such allegation at the earliest stage, despite the presence of the appellant, his family members and the deceased's family members at the time of the inquest, creates a significant gap in the prosecution narrative.

The evidence of the prosecution witnesses also does not disclose any clear and consistent course of conduct which can safely be attributed to the appellant. The allegations principally concern taunts on account of childlessness, physical assault and threats to drive the deceased out of the matrimonial home. Yet the witnesses do not furnish a consistent account of any particular incident of assault, its date or circumstances, or any independent occasion on which such conduct was observed by them. Their evidence substantially proceeds on the basis that the deceased had narrated such incidents to them. Such evidence cannot be discarded merely because the witnesses are relatives, nevertheless, where the allegation of cruelty is sought to be established substantially through statements allegedly made by the deceased to her relatives, the Court must examine whether those statements are consistent with the surrounding circumstances and whether the witnesses' subsequent conduct and earlier statements lend assurance to their testimony. In the present case, the material omissions and inconsistencies do not furnish such assurance.

The allegation of physical violence is also not corroborated by the medical evidence. The post-mortem examination establishes that the deceased died due to ante-mortem hanging, but no injury, except the ligature mark around the neck, was found on her body. Thus, the medical evidence establishes the cause and manner of death but does not support the allegation that the deceased had been subjected to physical assault immediately preceding the occurrence. Medical evidence is not invariably necessary to establish cruelty or assault, but where the prosecution specifically relies upon repeated beating as an important component of the alleged harassment, the absence of any physical injury assumes relevance in the overall assessment of the prosecution case.

Another circumstance which cannot be overlooked is the evidence concerning the deceased's physical and medical condition. PW-2 stated that the deceased had been ill for several days and that the accused-appellant was getting her treated. PW-3 and PW-4, however, stated that they were unaware of any such illness or treatment. The accused-appellant, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., furnished a specific explanation that the deceased had been suffering from tuberculosis for a considerable period, that he had been getting her treated, and that, on account of her illness and resultant depression, she had committed suicide. It is true that the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not substantive evidence of the defence version. Nevertheless, where the prosecution evidence itself leaves the medical and mental condition of the deceased unexplained and contains inconsistent accounts regarding the same, the defence explanation cannot simply be brushed aside while determining whether the prosecution has proved its own theory beyond reasonable doubt.

The learned Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence, appears to have placed considerable reliance upon the statements of the deceased's relatives regarding the alleged taunts, beating and mental harassment. In my considered view, however, the evidence was required to be examined cumulatively and not merely by counting the number of witnesses who supported the prosecution version. The fact that more than one relative has repeated the allegation does not, by itself, make the allegation reliable where the source of their knowledge is substantially the deceased herself, the material allegation of immediate harassment suffers from omission, no contemporaneous complaint is forthcoming, the Investigating Officer found no such allegation at the time of inquest, and the medical evidence does not corroborate the allegation of physical assault.

It is also material that the deceased had admittedly been married for about twenty years and had no children. The prosecution witnesses themselves attribute the alleged harassment substantially to this circumstance. Yet, the evidence does not satisfactorily establish what specific act or acts of the appellant, immediately preceding the occurrence, converted the alleged matrimonial dissatisfaction into such grave harassment as would reasonably explain the extreme step taken by the deceased. General allegations of taunting or discord, without reliable evidence of the nature, continuity and proximity of the alleged conduct, cannot be elevated into proof of criminal harassment merely because the deceased subsequently committed suicide. The Court must guard against drawing an inference of culpability retrospectively from the tragic consequence of suicide.

Thus, the issue is not whether some matrimonial differences or unhappiness may have existed between the deceased and the accused-appellant. The question is whether the prosecution has proved, through reliable and cogent evidence, the particular harassment attributed to the accused-appellant and whether such evidence is sufficiently trustworthy to constitute a safe foundation for a criminal conviction. On that touchstone, the prosecution evidence falls short. The material omissions, the absence of contemporaneous corroboration, the evidence of the Investigating Officer regarding the absence of any allegation of harassment at the stage of inquest, the lack of medical corroboration of the alleged beating, and the inconsistent evidence concerning the surrounding circumstances collectively create a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution allegation.

In a criminal trial, the Court is not required to determine whether the prosecution version is merely possible; it must be satisfied that the version is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Where two views are reasonably possible and the evidence does not permit the Court to safely distinguish between them, the view favourable to the accused must prevail. In the present case, the evidence regarding harassment is not of such sterling and consistent quality as could safely sustain a finding that the deceased was subjected to the alleged cruelty by the appellant. The allegation, therefore, remains unproved beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant is entitled to the benefit of such doubt.

The delay in lodging the FIR assumes significance in the present case not merely because the report was lodged five days after the occurrence, but because of the conduct of the informant in the intervening period. According to the prosecution itself, PW-1 had spoken to the deceased on 08.09.2023, i.e. immediately before her death, and was allegedly informed by her that the appellant had beaten her, taunted her regarding childlessness and told her to die. If the deceased had indeed made such a specific and immediate disclosure of cruelty to her brother, the natural course would have been for the said circumstance to find place in the earliest information furnished to the police after her death. Instead, PW-1 admitted that he had not disclosed this alleged incident of beating to the Investigating Officer.

The conduct of PW-1 becomes still more significant in another respect. He admitted that on 09.09.2023 the appellant himself had telephoned him and informed him that the deceased was missing, yet this circumstance was also not mentioned by him in the written report or disclosed to the Investigating Officer. Thus, the person who subsequently came forward as the informant had, according to his own testimony, received information from both sides at or immediately before the occurrence, but neither the alleged complaint of cruelty made by the deceased nor the appellant's communication regarding her disappearance was incorporated in the earliest version.

This assumes importance because the FIR was ultimately lodged only on 15.09.2023, whereas the occurrence had taken place on the intervening night of 09/10.09.2023. The issue, therefore, is not whether every delay in lodging an FIR must necessarily lead to rejection of the prosecution case. The question is whether, in the facts of the present case, the prosecution has satisfactorily explained why allegations which are now projected as the immediate cause of the deceased taking her life were not brought before the police at the earliest opportunity. The evidence does not furnish a convincing explanation for this intervening period.

Moreover, the omission cannot be viewed as an isolated defect in the FIR. The alleged conversation of 08.09.2023 is sought to be relied upon as a circumstance immediately preceding the suicide and, therefore, carries considerable weight in the prosecution theory of abetment. Its absence from the earliest version, despite PW-1 being the person who allegedly received the disclosure, substantially diminishes its evidentiary value. The subsequent introduction of such a specific allegation, after the lapse of several days, therefore requires the Court to examine it with greater caution.

The cumulative effect is that the prosecution has failed to satisfactorily account for the transformation of an alleged domestic grievance known to the informant before the occurrence into a specific criminal allegation after the death. In a case under Section 306 IPC, where the prosecution is required to establish a proximate and reliable nexus between the conduct attributed to the accused and the suicide, such unexplained delay, coupled with the material omissions in the earliest version, becomes a relevant circumstance creating doubt about the prosecution's subsequent reconstruction of the events immediately preceding the death.

The conviction of the appellant under Section 306 IPC cannot be sustained merely upon proof that the deceased committed suicide. The statutory offence is not one of causing or being responsible for a suicide in a general or moral sense; the prosecution must establish the legally defined element of abetment. Section 306 IPC is, therefore, necessarily required to be read conjointly with Section 107 IPC. The existence of suicide is only the first foundational fact. The second and indispensable requirement is that the accused abetted the commission of such suicide, and such abetment must fall within one of the three statutory modes contemplated by Section 107 IPC.

At the outset, it would be apposite to notice the statutory scheme of Section 306 and Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code, which is as follows:

Thus, the statutory scheme itself makes it necessary for the Court to identify the particular act or conduct of the accused which constitutes either instigation, participation in a conspiracy accompanied by an act or illegal omission in pursuance thereof, or intentional aid. Section 306 cannot be invoked by simply establishing that the deceased was subjected to some form of harassment or that there existed matrimonial discord. There must be a further judicial determination as to whether the proved conduct answers the statutory definition of abetment under Section 107 IPC. The counsel for the accused-appellant relied on Prakash and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Another, AIR 2024 SC (Supp) 2300 wherein it has been reiterated that Section 306 has two basic ingredients - suicide and abetment thereof - and that the latter must be established by proof of a direct or indirect act falling within one of the three modes recognised by Section 107 IPC.

The expression “ instigation” occurring in Section 107 has received authoritative consideration in a long line of decisions. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act. At the same time, the Court made it clear that a mere utterance, particularly one made in anger or emotion, cannot automatically be treated as instigation unless, from the circumstances, a reasonable certainty of incitement to the consequence can be spelt out. The relevant consideration is whether the accused, by his act, omission or continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. This principle has subsequently been consistently applied by the Supreme Court.

Similarly, in S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised that abetment involves a mental process of instigating or intentionally aiding another person. A conviction under Section 306 IPC, therefore, requires a positive act, coupled with the requisite mens rea, and an active or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide, seeing no other option. The requirement of mens rea is not a matter which can simply be presumed from the factum of suicide or from the existence of strained relations between the accused and the deceased.

The requirement of proximity is equally fundamental. The act relied upon as constituting instigation must have a proximate nexus with the suicide; otherwise, the causal connection between the alleged conduct and the ultimate act of suicide becomes too remote. In Prakash (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after considering the earlier authorities, reiterated that the alleged instigation or incitement must be in close proximity to the commission of suicide, must disclose a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide and must be of such a nature as to place the victim in a situation where he or she perceives no other option but to commit suicide. The Court further emphasised that an active, direct or indirect act on the part of the accused is necessary.

The principle has particular relevance in the present case because the prosecution seeks to derive abetment from allegations of matrimonial harassment and certain alleged utterances of the appellant. The Court is, therefore, required to go one step beyond asking whether there was matrimonial discord or whether the deceased was at some point subjected to unpleasant treatment. The real question is whether the prosecution has proved, beyond reasonable doubt, what precise act of the appellant constituted instigation or intentional aid; whether that act was accompanied by the requisite mens rea, whether it was proximate to the suicide; and whether it had the character of an act which could reasonably be said to have driven the deceased to the point of suicide leaving her with no other option. Unless these questions are answered affirmatively on the evidence, the statutory ingredients of Section 306 remain unfulfilled.

The distinction between harassment and abetment of suicide is not merely semantic. Matrimonial life may involve discord, disagreements, allegations of ill-treatment and even conduct which may be blameworthy in a social or domestic sense. Such conduct does not automatically become abetment of suicide. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73, the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned that the Court must carefully assess whether the cruelty or conduct attributed to the accused actually induced the victim to end her life, and that ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life cannot, without more, furnish the foundation for a conviction under Section 306 IPC.

In the present case, when the evidence is tested against these statutory and judicial requirements, a fundamental deficiency becomes apparent. The prosecution evidence may be read as alleging that the accused-appellant taunted the deceased on account of childlessness, subjected her to harassment and, on certain occasions, told her to die. But the mere existence of these allegations does not answer the statutory question of abetment. The prosecution was required to establish the nature, context, immediacy and purpose of the alleged acts and, more importantly, to establish that the accused-appellant possessed the requisite intention to instigate or intentionally aid the deceased in committing suicide. The evidence must disclose the transition from alleged matrimonial harassment to legally cognisable abetment. That essential link cannot be supplied merely by the fact that the deceased ultimately committed suicide.

The alleged utterances attributed to the appellant also require examination in their factual setting rather than in isolation. An expression such as “die” or “go and die”, even if proved to have been uttered, cannot invariably be treated as an act of instigation. The Court must examine the surrounding circumstances, the manner in which the words were uttered, the occasion, the conduct preceding and following the utterance, its proximity to the suicide, and whether the utterance, viewed objectively, was intended to provoke or encourage the deceased to take her own life. Criminal law makes it clear that the law does not treat every angry, abusive or emotionally charged utterance as instigation within Section 107 IPC.

The Court is conscious that the mental state of a person who commits suicide is complex and that no rigid formula can be prescribed for every case. Nevertheless, this does not dilute the prosecution's burden to establish the statutory ingredients of the offence. The question is not whether the deceased may have been unhappy, distressed or aggrieved by her matrimonial circumstances, the question is whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant, by a positive and intentional act falling within Section 107 IPC, instigated or intentionally aided the commission of suicide. On the evidence available, that essential requirement has not been established.

Furthermore, the learned trial Court was required to determine not merely whether the deceased had committed suicide or whether there were allegations of harassment against the appellant, but whether the prosecution had established the foundational ingredient of abetment as contemplated by Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC. The judgment, however, does not undertake the necessary exercise of identifying the precise act of the appellant which, in the opinion of the trial Court, constituted instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, nor does it record a reasoned finding regarding the requisite mens rea or the proximate nexus between the alleged conduct and the suicide.

The omission is particularly material here because suicide is not synonymous with abetment of suicide. The former establishes the occurrence, the latter requires proof of the accused's legally culpable participation in bringing about that occurrence. The trial Court, therefore, could not legitimately stop at the fact that the deceased had died by suicide and that witnesses had alleged harassment by the appellant. It was incumbent upon it to determine whether the evidence established a positive act of instigation or intentional aid, the necessary mens rea and the proximate nexus required by the law. In the absence of such an exercise, the finding of guilt under Section 306 IPC remains without the necessary legal foundation.

Accordingly, once the evidence is examined not merely for the existence of matrimonial discord but for the specific statutory ingredients of abetment, the prosecution case falls short of the standard required for sustaining a conviction under Section 306 IPC. The learned trial Court, having failed to separately examine these foundational requirements and having not recorded a reasoned finding as to the particular act constituting instigation, the requisite mens rea, the proximate nexus and the applicability of any of the three modes of abetment under Section 107 IPC, committed a fundamental error in law. The conviction, therefore, cannot be sustained merely on the basis of the conclusion that the deceased was subjected to harassment and thereafter committed suicide.

Having considered the entire evidence on record in its totality, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant subjected the deceased to such conduct as would constitute abetment of suicide within the meaning of Sections 306 and 107 IPC. The allegations of harassment, when tested against the material omissions, contradictions, unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and the absence of any reliable evidence demonstrating a positive act of instigation, intentional aid, requisite mens rea or a proximate nexus between the alleged conduct and the suicide, do not satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence. The learned trial Court has also failed to undertake the necessary statutory examination of abetment and has not recorded a reasoned finding identifying the particular act of the appellant which constituted instigation or intentional aid. Consequently, the conviction of the appellant under Section 306 IPC cannot be sustained and he is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, I find that the present appeal is liable to be allowed and the judgment and order of the trial court, convicting and sentencing the accused-appellant, Shivram, under Section 306 IPC, is liable to be set aside.

Consequently, the present appeal is allowed. The accused-appellant, Shivram, is hereby acquitted of all the charges levelled against him.

The appellant is stated to be in jail. He shall be released forthwith, if not required to be detained in any other case, upon furnishing bonds in terms of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. for his appearance before the higher court, as and when required, which shall remain in force for the period prescribed by law.

Pending applications, if any, stands disposed of.

Let the lower court record, along with a copy of this judgment, be transmitted to the court concerned forthwith for necessary compliance.