High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 05 SHI CK 2741

Shiv Kumar Sharma vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Anr.

High Court Of Himachal Pradesh · Decided on 25 May 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, J
CASE NUMBER
CWPOA No. 610 of 2019

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Judgment

72 paragraphs · 8,161 words

Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge

By way of present petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following substantive reliefs:-

“A) That this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari quashing order dated 26.2.2011, Annexure P 11 passed by Respondent No.1 vide which it allowed the review petition filed by Respondent No.2 by setting aside the order passed by Appellate Authority and upholding the order of Disciplinary Authority.

B) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of Mandamus directing Respondents not to act on the basis of order dated 26.2.2011 and by holding that Order dated 7.10.2010 passed by Learned Appellate Authority is good in law and is thus upheld.”

2.

A memorandum dated 22.05.2008 (Annexure P-1) alongwith articles of charge was issued to the petitioner, who was working as Patwari, by respondent No.2, to the effect that firstly; he while working as Patwari in Patwar Circle, Chamba Town-II in the year 2001, changed Girdawari of land comprised in Khasra No.9011/2877 measuring 39.1 sq. yards, owned by Sh. Gopal Singh Son of Sh. Kahan Singh, R/o Moh. Kasakra, Chamba Town on 29.09.2001 and thereafter issued fake agriculturist certificate to him on 11.12.2002 just to provide him undue benefit of agriculturist in contravention of the provisions of the Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, which was in violation of Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct Rules) (for short “CCS (Conduct) Rules’) and secondly; during the course of Girdawari, he did not detect and report encroachment on government land measuring 60-0 Sq. Yards by Sh. Gopal Singh, son of Sh. Kahan Singh R/o Moh. Kasakra, Chamba Town, who had constructed his house, which land was adjoining to his land measuring 39.1 Sq. Yards to propose to hold an inquiry against him and asked to submit his written statement and also to state whether he wants to be heard in person.

3.

The petitioner submitted reply to the charges and denied the same. It was submitted that the charges levelled against him are false and frivolous. He had changed classification of the private land as per undisputed position found on the spot according to prevailing provision of Para No.9.9(k) of HP Land Records Manual (1992 Edition). The petitioner has not issued the alleged agriculture certificate to Gopal Singh Son of Sh. Kahan Singh and whatever report was given on 11.12.2002 was given on the basis of the entries of revenue record i.e. Khasra Girdawari. So far as second charge was concerned, it was stated that while working as Patwari Circle Chamba Town-II, there was no encroachment on Govt. land as alleged. Respondent No.2 was not satisfied with the reply and proceeded with the departmental enquiry. He appointed the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. as Enquiry Officer.

4.

The Enquiry Officer, after conducting the enquiry in respect of Charge No.1, came to the conclusion that the petitioner had changed Girdawari of land comprised in Khasra No.9011/2877 measuring 39.1 sq. yards, owned by Sh. Gopal Singh Son of Sh. Kahan Singh, R/o Moh. Kasakra, Chamba Town on 29.09.2001 and issued fake agriculturist certificate to him on 11.12.2002 just to provide him undue benefit of agriculturist. As per Khasra Girdawari of years 1998, 1999 and 2000, Khasra No. 9011/2877 belonging to Kuldeep Chand, Gopal Chand etc. measuring 39.1 Sq. Yards has been shown to be used as residential house, but in the Khasra Girdawari of the year 2001, the land measuring 30.1 Sq. Yards in this khasra number has been shown to be used for residential house and remaining 9 Sq. Yards area for the purpose of cultivation of vegetable, thus it was concluded that the area mentioned is very small and there is no possibility of any type of cultivation being carried out there.

5.

So far as second charge with respect to the fact that the petitioner did not detect and report encroachment on government land measuring 60-0 sq. yards, is concerned, it was concluded by the Enquiry Officer that though as per report of the revenue officials, Gopal Singh had encroached upon the government land upto the extent of 47.7 Sq. yards and had constructed a house over it, but as per the statement of the petitioner, during his tenure, there was no encroachment and no witness had stated anything about the encroachment except Diwan Singh, who has not produced any report regarding encroachment, hence, in the interest of justice, this charge may be dropped.

6.

On receipt of enquiry report, respondent No.2, who was the Disciplinary Authority, furnished the same to the petitioner and the petitioner made a representation on 31.05.2010 (Annexure P-4) stating therein that the Enquiry Officer has gravelly erred in proving charge No.1 against him. The Enquiry Officer has not taken into consideration provisions of Para No.9.9(k) of HP Land Records Manual concerning change of classification of private land by the Patwari according to the spot position under which the petitioner had changed the classification of Khasra No.9011/2877 measuring 39-1 Sq. Yard on 29.09.2001 as 30-1 Sq. Yard (Gair Mumkin Makan Kacha Do Manjila) and 9.0 Sq. Yard (under vegetables) as vegetables were actually found grown during Girdawari 2000-01 on above Khasra No. 9011/2877 on the side towards Khasra No.2878. On the basis of changed entries of Khasra Girdawari, report was issued on 11.12.2002 on demand of Gopal Singh stating above position of land. The petitioner had nowhere reported whether Sh. Gopal Singh is agriculturist. So far as the second charge is concerned, the same was not proved and he thus prayed for exonerating him from charge No.1. On receipt of the representation, respondent No.2, passed an office order dated 25.06.2010 (Annexure P-5) against the petitioner, whereby penalty of reduction of his initial scale of pay was ordered with immediate effect as provided under Rule 11 (vi) of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short “CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965”).

7.

The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the said order of penalty imposed upon him, preferred a statutory appeal under Rule 23 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 before the Divisional Commissioner, Kangra Division at Dharamshala, H.P. It was averred in the appeal that the Enquiry Officer has gravely erred in not affording him opportunity for adducing defence evidence, as provided in Rule 14 (17) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and further the enquiry without taking his defence in respect of Charge No.1, is wrong in the eyes of law. It was also averred that the Enquiry Officer had merely reproduced in his report the deposition of the witnesses recorded during the course of enquiry, but not assessed or analyzed the evidence. The agreement of the Disciplinary Authority with such in-conclusive and premature findings and that too without reasons thereon recorded in writing is against the principles of natural justice. So far as charge No.2 is concerned, the Enquiry Officer had not returned any findings and had requested to drop the charges.

8.

The Appellate Authority, allowed the appeal vide order dated 07.10.2010 (Annexure P-7) holding that it is not clear from a perusal of order passed by respondent No.2 that as to why representation dated 31.05.2010 submitted by the petitioner against the enquiry report had not been accepted and the reasons for rejection. Further no time limit has been prescribed in the order of penalty, which is also in violation of Government of India decision No. F.2(34)-E.III/59 dated 17th August, 1959 and 9th June, 1960 as well as No. 6/8/70-Disc I, dated 16.12.1970 below F.R.-29. Hence, the appeal was accepted and the penalty imposed upon the petitioner by respondent No.2 vide office order dated 25.06.2010 was set aside.

9.

Respondent No.2 feeling aggrieved by the order dated 07.10.2010, passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Kangra, H.P., made a request to respondent No.1 to review the order passed by the Appellate Authority stating therein the petitioner had knowingly changed the classification of Gair Mumkin Makan and further not prepared case of encroachment against the person in whose favour agriculturist certificate was issued.

10.

Respondent No.1, on the revision petition filed by the Disciplinary Authority, set aside the order passed by the Appellate Authority noticing that the Disciplinary Authority had recorded that it has carefully gone through the enquiry report alongwith other documents and statements appended thereto and thereafter had recorded that he agrees with the reasons given by the Enquiry Officer. Thus, the Disciplinary Authority, having considered and accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and found the same to be in order, agreed with the reasons contained therein and proceeded to impose the penalty. It is further recorded that the present revisionist has rightly said that; firstly there was no need to again discuss the evidence and reiterate the same findings by giving reasons and the Appellate Authority’s order in finding the Disciplinary Authority‘s order to be non-speaking is not correct; secondly, the Appellate Authority’s finding that no time limit was imposed is also incorrect, as time limits are not required to be specified in cases where the penalty is that the officer’s pay will stand reduced to the initial of the pay scale, this is because the official will start earning increments immediately after reduction to the initial of the pay scale; and lastly, the Appellate Authority’s finding that the Disciplinary Authority erred in not recording reasons for rejecting the official’s representation dated 31.05.2010, is also incorrect, as paragraph 2 of the Disciplinary Authority’s order clearly states that the official’s reply was found to be not satisfactory. Now, in which manner, it was not satisfactory could have been spelt out in detail as has been done in para-4 of the order, however, not giving detailed reasons will not vitiate the order because the reason of the reply being un-satisfactory has been mentioned. Hence, the revision petition was allowed and the order of Appellate Authority dated 07.10.2010 was set aside and the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 25.06.2010 was upheld.

11.

The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the order dated 26.02.2011 (Annexure P-11) passed by the Revisional Authority has laid challenge to the same before this Court inter alia on the grounds that the Rules do not provide that in the event of Appellate Authority setting aside the order of Disciplinary Authority, the Disciplinary Authority can challenge the said order by filing a revision before the higher authority as has been done in his case by respondent No.2. Further the Disciplinary Authority had to act in quasi-judicial manner and take decision on the charges impartially. However, in the case of the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority becomes party to the lis by calling upon respondent No.1 to review the order passed by the Appellate Authority. The Revisional Authority had not assigned any independent reasons while allowing the revision petition. Even the Disciplinary Authority had not assigned any reasons while imposing penalty.

12.

The respondents filed reply to the petition and supported its decision. It has been averred in the reply that the petitioner, while working as Patwari in Patwar Circle Chamba-II had performed his duties with malafide intention and changed the Girdawari of the land comprised in Khasra No. 9011/2877, for which he was not authorized and the same was in contravention of the provisions of Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and in violation of Rule 3 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 with a view to provide undue benefit of agriculturist to Sh. Gopal Singh Son of Sh. Kahan Singh. Respondent No.2 being Disciplinary Authority had reported the matter to the Reviewing Authority, which had rightly and validly, as per the provisions of Rule 29 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, exercised the jurisdiction and passed the order. Order dated 26.02.2011 passed by respondent No.1 is pleaded to be right and valid and the petitioner was afforded with sufficient opportunity to defend his case.

13.

I have heard Mr. Sunil Mohan Goel, learned senior counsel duly assisted by Mr. Raman Jamalta, Advocate and Mr. Anup Rattan, learned Advocate General for the respondents. The record has also been perused carefully.

14.

Before adverting to the submissions made, it would be relevant to reproduce order of penalty imposed by respondent No.2 (Annexure P-5), which reads as under:

“OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER CHAMBA DISTRICT CHAMBA NO.CBA-SK-4(167)/2008-2937-40 DATED 25 JUNE, 2010

OFFICE ORDER

Whereas, Sh. Shiv Kumar Patwari, Patwar Circle Luddu while working in Tehsil office Chamba District Chamba was charge-sheeted under Rule 14 of CCS(CCA) rule 1965 vide this office order No.CBA-Acctt-1849-51 dated 22-5-2008. Subsequently, the Sub- Divisional Officer (Civil) Chamba was appointed as Inquiry Officer to enquire into the charge leveled against the above official and Sh. Devinder Kumar officiating Sadar Kanungo O/o the Deputy commissioner Chamba was appointed as the presenting officer.

And whereas, Inquiry Officer has submitted the enquiry report vide his office letter No. SDO(C)/Chamba/PA/2010-351 dt. 7-4-2010. A copy of the same was sent to the delinquent official vide this office letter No.СВА-SК-4(167)/2008-2048 dt. 1-5-2010 as required under Rule 15 1-A of CCS(CCA) Rule 1965. To this, the delinquent official was required to submit his reply within 15 days, but reply of the official is not satisfactory.

I have gone through the charge leveled against the delinquent official as well as enquiry report submitted by the inquiry officer (SDO(C) Chamba) alongwith the documents/statements appended to the enquiry report carefully and have observed that the charge No 1 have been proved against the delinquent official. I agree with the reasons given by the Inquiry Officer.

Therefore, I. Devesh Kumar, IAS, Deputy Commissioner, Chamba District Chamba hereby order reduction to the initial scale of pay, of Sh. Shiv Kumar, Patwari presently working as a patwari in patwar circle Haripur, Tehsil Chamba with immediate effect as provided under Rule 11(vi) of CCS(CCA) Rules 1965.”

Sh. Shiv Kumar Patwari, Patwar Circle Hripur, Teh. Chamba’ District Chamba Sd/-Collector-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Chamba District Chamba”

15.

Mr. Sunil Mohan Goel, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that once the petitioner had made a representation after receipt of the enquiry report, the least, which was expected of respondent No.2, was to advert to the pleas raised in the representation and in not doing so, the very purpose of making representation is frustrated. If the office order dated 25.06.2010, which is reproduced hereinabove, is perused and read in its entirety, the Disciplinary Authority has only observed that the petitioner was requested to submit his reply within 15 days and the reply submitted by him was found to be not satisfactory. Further, the Disciplinary Authority has gone through the charge leveled against the petitioner as well as enquiry report submitted by the inquiry officer [SDO(C) Chamba] along with the documents/statements appended to the enquiry report carefully and observed that the charge No.1 has been proved against the petitioner and he agrees with the reasons given by the Inquiry Officer.

16.

A perusal of the above order dated 25.06.2010 reveals that the Disciplinary Authority has reiterated the reasons given by the Enquiry Officer; and not returned his independent findings and reasons and in cursory manner imposed the penalty upon the petitioner. The very purpose of making representation is frustrated if the Disciplinary Authority without considering the points raised in the representation, imposes the penalty on the delinquent officer.

17.

At this juncture, it is relevant to quote the provision of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which reads as under:

“15. Action on the inquiry report

(1)

The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the Inquiring Authority for further inquiry and report and the Inquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 14, as far as may be.

(2)

The Disciplinary Authority shall forward or cause to be forwarded a copy of the report of the inquiry, if any, held by the Disciplinary Authority or where the Disciplinary Authority is not the inquiring authority, a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority together with its own tentative reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of Inquiring Authority on any article of charge to the Government servant who shall be required to submit, if he so desires, his written representation or submission to the Disciplinary Authority within fifteen days, irrespective of whether the report is favourable or not to the Government servant.

(2-A) The disciplinary authority shall consider the representation, if any, submitted by the Government servant and record its findings before proceeding further in the matter as specified in sub-rules (3) and (4).

(3)

If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 11 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 16, make an order imposing such penalty:

Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to the Commission for its advice and such advice shall be taken into consideration before making any order imposing any penalty on the Government servant.

(4)

If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge and on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the Government servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed.

Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to the Commission for its advice and such advice shall be taken into consideration before making an order imposing any such penalty on the Government servant.”

18.

Sub-rule (2-A) of Rule 15 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 clearly provides that the Disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation, if any, submitted by the Govt. Servant and record its findings before proceeding further in the matter under sub-rule (3) & (4). However, in the present case, the Disciplinary Authority has not given independent findings or reasons before passing the order of imposing penalty, except that the reply of the official is not satisfactory. The legislature has consciously used the words “record its findings”. By using the phrase to record its finding in sub-rule (2-A) of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, is with a view that the delinquent official knows that his representation has been considered and the particular reasons have been weighed with the Disciplinary Authority while imposing the penalty. The Disciplinary Authority has to apply its independent mind and not to reiterate the decision and findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. If it is construed like this, then the very purpose of making the representation after receipt of the enquiry report, which is mandatory to be furnished to the delinquent official, is frustrated. The purpose of furnishing the enquiry report to the delinquent official is with a view to make a representation by him and thereafter, before imposing penalty, the Disciplinary Authority considers the points raised in the representation and records its findings and arrives at independent decision. It is true that the Disciplinary Authority is not required to give detailed reasons, but some reasons are to be given.

19.

By now, it is settled in catena of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that “the reasons are hallmark of the decision”, and the purpose to record reasons is to facilitate the statutory authority to ascertain the application of mind by the authority, whose order is under challenge. Moreover, stating that the reply is not satisfactory, is not sufficient while passing the order of penalty.

20.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its Constitution Bench judgment passed in S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594, has succinctly dealt with the issue of recording reasons and held that the reasons when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it, while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. The recording of reasons by administrative authority excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions, which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It should infer from the decision that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The party is entitled to know reasons. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of decisions is like principles of audi alterum partem. The relevant paras of the judgment read as under:-

“36.

Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.

37.

Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donoughmore Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. The committee expressed the opinion that "there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise" and that "where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity." (P 80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also ex- pressed the view that

"natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice." (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th Edn. P. 548). In Siemens Engineering Co. case (Supra) this Court has taken the same view when it observed that "the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process." This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well-known principles of natural justice, namely (i) that no man should be a Judge in his own cause and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A.K. Kraipak and Others v. Union of India and Others, [1970] 1 SCR 457, wherein it has been held:

"The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely (i) no one shall be a Judge in his own cause (nemo dabet esse judex propria causa) and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice."

38.

A similar trend is discernible m the decisions of English Courts wherein it has been held that natural justice demands that the decision should be based on some evidence of probative value. (See: R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex p. Moore Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd., [1984] A.C. 648.

39.

The object underlying the rules of natural justice

"is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair play in action." As pointed out earlier the requirement about re- cording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi- judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that affect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case.

40.

For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.”

21.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others vs. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364, has held that failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Relevant para of the said judgment reads as under:-

“15.

It needs no emphasis that when a court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union observed (All ERp.1154h) "The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration". In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree, it was observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at". Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. But as noted above, the proceedings commenced in 1981. The employee was placed under suspension from 1983 to 1988 and has superannuated in 2002. Acquittal in the criminal case is not determinative of the commission of misconduct or otherwise, and it is open to the authorities to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding acquittal in criminal case. It per se would not entitle the employee to claim immunity from the proceedings. At the most the factum of acquittal may be a circumstance to be considered while awarding punishment. It would depend upon facts of each case and even that cannot have universal application.”

22.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail vs. SPL. Director, Enforcement Directorate and another, (2007) 8 SCC 254 has reiterated the same view.

23.

In the present case, no reasons have been assigned by the Disciplinary Authority while imposing penalty and only by stating that the reply of the official is not satisfactory, it agreed with the reasons given by the Enquiry Officer. If this is sufficient, then the very purpose of making representation after receipt of the inquiry report is frustrated and it is not the intention of the Rule 15 (2-A) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, quoted above. Not only this, even the Revisional Authority had not applied its independent mind while accepting the revision preferred by respondent No.2, who had imposed the penalty upon the petitioner.

24.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem and others vs. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 3 SCC 469, has held that a duty is cast upon the Appellate Authority to give at least some reasons for rejecting the appeal preferred by the aggrieved party and a similar duty is also cast on the Revisional Authority, being the highest authority. Unfortunately, the Revisional Authority had merely indicated that the decision of the Divisional Forest Officer had been examined, wherein the charge of misappropriation was clearly proved. No doubt the Appellate or Revisional Authority is not required to give detailed reasons for agreeing and confirming an order passed by the lower forum, but the delinquent officer is entitled to know at least the mind of the Appellate or Revisional Authority in dismissing his appeal and/or revision. Relevant paras of the judgment read as under:

“19.

Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and also having regard to the detailed manner in which the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal had dealt with the matter, including the explanation given regarding the disbursement of the money received by the respondent, we see no reason to differ with the view taken by the Administrative Tribunal and endorsed by the High Court. No doubt, the Divisional Forest Officer dealt with the matter in detail, but it was also the duty of the appellate authority to give at least some reasons for rejecting the appeal preferred by the respondent. A similar duty was cast on the revisional authority being the highest authority in the Department of Forests in the State. Unfortunately, even the revisional authority has merely indicated that the decision of the Divisional Forest Officer had been examined by the Conservator of Forests, Khammam wherein the charge of misappropriation was clearly proved. He too did not consider the defence case as made out by the respondent herein and simply endorsed the punishment of dismissal though reducing it to removal from service.

20.

It is no doubt also true that an appellate or revisional authority is not required to give detailed reasons for agreeing and confirming an order passed by the lower forum but, in our view, in the interests of justice, the delinquent officer is entitled to know at least the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in dismissing his appeal and/or revision. It is true that no detailed reasons are required to be given, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order affirming the views of the lower forum.”

25.

In the present case, firstly the Disciplinary Authority has not given any reasons and independent findings while rejecting the points raised by the petitioner in his representation, while imposing the penalty. Not only this, even the Revisional Authority has not given any independent reasons except for reiterating that the Disciplinary Authority had recorded in the order that it has carefully gone through the enquiry report alongwith other documents and once it had agreed to the reasons, the Appellate Authority could not have held that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is non-speaking one.

26.

The learned Advocate General has vehemently argued that once the Disciplinary Authority had recorded in the order of penalty imposed by him that the reply of the petitioner is not satisfactory, it was not supposed to give separate reasons. He placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Fertilizers Ltd. and another vs. P.K. Khanna, (2005) 7 SCC 597, to buttress his submission. He further argued that the Disciplinary Authority was required to record reasons if it had disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Relevant paras 10 and 11 of the judgment read as under.

“10.

It is apparent from Sub-rule (2) that the disciplinary authority is not required to record its reasons if it concurs with the enquiry officer's findings in contradiction with the situation in which the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the disciplinary authority. Only in the latter case does Sub-rule (2) expressly mandate that the disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the enquiry officer record its reasons for such disagreement as well as its own findings on such charges.

11.

The respondent's reliance on the decision in M.D., ECIL v. B. Karunakar, is misplaced. That decision relates to the right of a delinquent officer to a copy of the enquiry officer's report. In the course of the judgment the Court had no doubt said that the report of the enquiry officer is required to be furnished to the employee to make proper representation to the disciplinary authority before such authority arrives at its own finding with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the employee and the punishment if any to be awarded to him. By using the phrase "its own finding" what is meant is an independent decision of the disciplinary authority. It does not require the disciplinary authority to record separate reasons from those given by the enquiry officer. The concurrence of the disciplinary authority with the reasoning and conclusion of the enquiry officer means that the disciplinary authority has adopted the conclusion and the basis of the conclusion as its own. it is not necessary for the disciplinary authority to restate the reasoning.”

27.

In the aforementioned judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider sub-rule (2) and not sub-rule (2-A) of Rule 15 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Once the sub-rule (2-A) specifically provides that the Disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation, if any, submitted by the government servant and record its findings, the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, without recording its findings, is unsustainable in law and the judgment referred above is not attracted.

28.

A three-judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently in Boloram Bordoloi vs. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank and others, (2021) 3 SCC 806, has held that if the Disciplinary Authority accepts the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and passes an order, no detailed reasons are required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment. It does not mean that no reasons are required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment. Furthermore, in this judgment too, the sub-rule (2-A) of Rule 15 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which was in existence when the penalty was imposed upon the petitioner has not been considered. Once the legislature had specifically mentioned that the Disciplinary Authority will consider the representation and record its findings, it is mandatory on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to record its finding before proceeding further and in case, the view is taken to not record its findings separately, the provision would be negatory. It is settled law that the Courts have to give literal meaning to the words in the statute. The relevant paragraph 11 of the judgment reads as under:-

“11.

We are of the view that the judgment of this Court in ECIL is not helpful to the case of the appellant. Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary authority accepts the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and passes an order, no detailed reasons are required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment. The punishment is imposed based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report, as such, no further elaborate reasons are required to be given by the disciplinary authority. As the departmental appeal was considered by the Board of Directors in the meeting held on 10-12-2005, the Board’s decision is communicated vide order dated 21-12-2005 in Ref.No.LGB/I&V/Appeal/31/02/2005-06. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that orders impugned are devoid of reasons.”

29.

As already held above, in the present case, no independent reasons and findings have been recorded by the Disciplinary Authority while imposing the penalty, except that charge No.1 has been proved against the petitioner as per the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer along with documents/statements and it agrees with the reasons given by the Enquiry Officer. The Disciplinary Authority is required to record its findings once the representation has been received from the delinquent officer. No doubt, the Disciplinary Authority is not required to give detailed reasons, but the Disciplinary Authority is expected to consider the points raised in the representation and in case the same are rejected, some reasons are required to be given. Simply stating that the reply is not satisfactory does not meet the requirement of law. If the points raised in the representation are not to be considered and the Disciplinary Authority has to only concur with the findings recorded in the enquiry report submitted the Enquiry Officer, then the very purpose of furnishing a copy of enquiry report to the delinquent officer and ask him to make representation, is frustrated and it is a mere formality. It is not even the intent of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad and others vs. B. Karunakar and others, (1993) 4 SCC 727. As per judgment referred above, the Disciplinary Authority is not required to record its elaborate reasons, but the authority at least has to record some reasons for rejecting the points raised in the representation. However, in the present case, if the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is perused, it does not meet the requirements of law.

30.

As already mentioned above, the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles and further held that the reasons are required to be recorded to show that the authority had applied its independent mind and further the Appellate or Revisional Authority can peruse the same to find out that the authority had not passed the order in a mechanical manner and the same was passed after application of mind.

31.

Learned Advocate General has vehemently argued that as per the judgment in Boloram’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has come to a categorical conclusion that once the Disciplinary Authority accepts the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and passes an order, no reasons are required to be recorded in the order imposing the punishment. In the present case, the Disciplinary Authority once recorded that the reply of the official is not satisfactory, the mandate of law, as propounded in the aforementioned judgments, has been fully met. However, if the judgment is read in its entirety, the only thing, which can be culled out, is that no detailed reasons are required to be recorded in the order while imposing punishment, but that does not mean that the Disciplinary Authority was not bound to give independent reasons and findings, as required under sub-rule (2-A) of Rule 15 of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965, while passing the order of penalty, that too, to bring the petitioner to the initial scale of pay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was not informed about the provisions of sub-rule (2-A) of Rule 15 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965, prevalent at that time, which was subsequently deleted.

32.

The learned senior counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that once the Appellate Authority had exercised jurisdiction vested in it and had come to the conclusion that no reasons had been assigned by the Disciplinary Authority, the Revisional Authority ought not to have interfered with the said well reasoned order and further respondent No.2, who had passed the order himself, filed the revision petition before the Revisional Authority, which could not have been done by him. In this regard, it is relevant to mention that once the Disciplinary Authority has not applied its independent mind and not given any independent reasons and findings and this Court quashes the order of penalty imposed upon the petitioner, the order passed by the Revisional Authority will also go.

33.

The another submission made by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that respondent No.2 could not have filed revision application is concerned, the same is without any merit for the reasons that the Disciplinary Authority, if aggrieved by the order passed by the Appellate Authority, could have filed the revision and thus, the said plea is rejected.

34.

This Court, after quashing the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority could have remanded back the matter to the said authority to pass appropriate orders after considering the representation made by the petitioner, but keeping in view the fact that the petitioner has now retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation, it would be harsh to remand back the matter to decide the same afresh after considering the representation. It would practically deny any relief to the petitioner. Further there is no evidence to show that by the act of the petitioner, the respondents have been caused and suffered any financial loss. In similar facts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had quashed the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority and the reference of the judgment is Allahabad Bank vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC,

308.

The relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as under:-

“8.

There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient either procedurally or otherwise the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the concerned authority to redo the same afresh. That course could have been followed even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the disciplinary authority or to the enquiry officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course may not have been the only course open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long time-lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely what the High Court has done in the case at hand.

9.

The High Court has taken note of the fact that the respondent had been placed under suspension in the year 2004 and dismissed in the year 2005. The dismissal order was challenged in the High Court in the year 2006 but the writ petition remained pending in the High Court for nearly seven years till 2013. During the intervening period the respondent superannuated on 30th November, 2011. Not only that he had suffered a heart attack and a stroke that has rendered him physically disabled and confined to bed. The respondent may by now have turned 65 years of age. Any remand either to the Enquiry Officer for a fresh enquiry or to the Disciplinary Authority for a fresh order or even to the Appellate Authority would thus be very harsh and would practically deny to the respondent any relief whatsoever. Superadded to all this is the fact that the High Court has found, that there was no allegation nor any evidence to show the extent of loss, if any, suffered by the bank on account of the alleged misconduct of the respondent. The discretion vested in the High Court in not remanding the matter back was, therefore, properly exercised.

10.

The next question is whether the respondent would be entitled to claim arrears of salary as part of service/retiral benefits in full or part. The High Court has been rather ambivalent in that regard. We say so because while the High Court has directed release of service/retiral benefits, it is not clear whether the same would include salary for the period between the date of removal and the date of superannuation. Taking a liberal view of the matter, we assume that the High Court’s direction for release of service benefits would include the release of his salaries also for the period mentioned above. We are, however, of the opinion that while proceedings need not be remanded for a fresh start from the beginning, grant of full salary for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of superannuation would not also be justified. We, therefore, allow this appeal but only in part and to the extent that while orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority shall stand quashed, and the respondent entitled to continuity of service till the date of his superannuation with all service benefits on that basis, he shall be entitled to only 50% of the salary for the period between the date of his removal from service till the date of superannuation. Retiral benefits shall also be released in his favour. The order passed by the High Court shall, to the extent indicated above, stand modified. The parties shall bear their own costs.”

35.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in recent judgment in State of Uttar Pradesh versus Ram Prakash Singh, 2025(4) SLR 931 (SC) has held that since the employee had retired from service, no fruitful purpose will be solved in remitting the case and the issue must be given quietus. In the present case, since the petitioner has retired from service, he can be denied the promotion, but he is entitled to other benefits.

36.

Consequently, the present petition is allowed and the order dated 26.02.2011, passed by respondent No.1, affirming the order dated 25.06.2010, passed by respondent No.2, is quashed and set aside with a direction to the respondents to grant the petitioner same pay scale, as was received by him before passing of the impugned order dated 25.06.2010 alongwith enhancement in the pay scale from time to time, but he shall not be entitled to promotion etc. The arrears of salary and pension be paid to the petitioner within three months from today and in case, the petitioner is not paid the arrears within three months, he shall be entitled to interest @6% per annum from today till its payment to him. However, there shall be no orders to cost. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.