Shiv Bachan vs Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal and Another

K. Kannan, J.—There is no representation for the petitioners. This order of mine shall dispose of the above mentioned two writ petitions, as similar nature of facts and law are involved therein.

The petitioners challenged the orders of the Labour Court upholding termination orders served upon them. They were proceeded under the domestic inquiry on the initiation of the charge that they had been guilty of assault on one of the staff members on 18.9.1985. The Inquiry Officer returned the finding of guilt, on the basis of which punishment of removal from service was issued on 18.5.1986. The punishment order had been subjected to reference to the Labour Court for industrial adjudication.

Before the Labour Court, the workmen had taken several objections, including that they had not been granted right of representation through authorized representative; that the person, who conducted the inquiry, was not competent to hold the inquiry; that the person that passed the order of punishment was not competent and that the inquiry was vitiated. As additional point to urge, the petitioners would also contend that there was simultaneously a criminal case instituted against them with reference to the same occurrence and they were acquitted of the charge and that should also be taken as relevant factor.

The Labour Court, on consideration of the evidence, held that the Standing Order did not permit the right of representation through a representative other than a person from the same establishment when Presenting Officer himself was not legally trained or legal practitioner. The Labour Court found that the inquiry had been properly held and the incident and the charge had been established and it was found that there was no scope for judicial intervention.

I have gone through the orders of the Labour Court with the assistance of the learned counsel appearing for the Management and also perused the judgment of the criminal court acquitting the petitioners. It must be said that as a matter of law the proceedings before the criminal court and domestic inquiry operate in distinct fields and even the standards of proof are different. The criminal court decision has been delivered subsequently on 25.7.1985 i.e. both after the order of termination by the competent authority and the award of the labour court. There was simply no need for taking note of the criminal court decision in such circumstances. There was simply no occasion for the disciplinary authority or the Labour Court to have the benefit of the judgment. I would also hold that the judgment of the criminal court is irrelevant in such circumstance and the fact that the petitioners have been acquitted by the criminal court cannot alter the course of disposition made by the disciplinary authority and the labour court. I do not find any basis for a plea that the proceedings before the Inquiry Officer were vitiated. In any ways, I do not find any legal justification for interfering with the impugned award and the punishment meted out. Indeed, the area of interference by the court itself must be confined only to any vitiating circumstances in the inquiry that could have derailed the process of decision making. If the procedure and the law laid down have been strictly followed, then interference could be only if the quantum of punishment is capricious or that would shock the judicial conscience. I do not find any such infirmity in the order for making any intervention. The impugned orders are maintained and the writ petitions are dismissed.