High CourtsDivision Bench(1951) 04 GUJ CK 0001

Sheth Ababhai Salemamad Javeri, Muslim Barding House vs Narotam Vrajlal

Gujarat High Court · Decided on 27 April 1951 · Citation: AIR 1951 Guj 76

HON’BLE JUDGES
G.B. Shah, C.J · S.J. Chhatpar, J
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision Applns. No''s. 129, 130, 161 and 165 of 1950

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

11 paragraphs · 2,456 words

Shah, C.J.—These revision applications are filed against the judgments and decrees of the District; Judge, Halar Division, confirming the decrees of the civil Judge, Senior Division, Jam-nagar, by which standard rent was fixed and awarded to the landlords u/s 5, Sub-section (10), Clause (a), Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, as applied to the Saurashtra State. In the former Nawanagar State there was a Bent Control Act of Samvat 2003 (corresponding to 1947 A.D) and by Section 4, Clause (4), thereof standard rent was defined as meaning rent that was charged on 31-12 1946, or, which is not material for the present purpose, if the premises were not let on that day the rent charged for the month in which they were last let. It was urged before the civil Judge on behalf of the landlords that the standard rent was the rent which was charged for the premises on 31-12-1946, and that the game should be taken to have been the rent fixed under the Nawanagar State Bent Control Act. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the tenants that standard rent had not been fixed by any Court or authority duly authorised under the Nawanagar State Rent Control Act; that the case was not governed by Section 5 Sub-section (10) Clause (a), Bombay Rent Control Act, as applied to the Saurashtra State, but fell under Clause (b), Sub-section (10) of Section 5, and that standard rent was to be fixed by the Court in accordance with the provisions of the latter clause. The learned civil Judge upheld the contention of the tenants and fixed the standard rent in accordance with the provisions of Section 5(10)(b) of the Act, and passed a decree in accordance with it in all the four suits. The District Judge upheld the trial Court''s finding on the point and dismissed the appeals, and the landlords havo now come in revision.

2.

By Section 5, Sub-section (10) Clause (a), Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 as applied to the Saurashtra State, hereinafter referred to. as the Act, standard rent in rotation to any premises is defined as meaning where the standard rent is fixed by any Court or authority authorised to do so by any law in force in any of the Covenanting State, Estate, or Taluka immediately before the corning in be force of this Act, such rent. Mr. Joshi the learned Counsel for the applicants has urged that as Section 4, Clause (4), Nawanagar State Rent Control Act, defines standard rent as the rent that was payable on 31-12-1946 and that, as the said rent was considered to be the standard rent, it should be taken as having been fixed by an authority authorised to do so by the law in force in the former Nawanagar State within the meaning of Section 5, Sub-section (10), Clause (a), Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947. The contention is fallacious for two reasons, first, that it takes the definition of standard rent in Section 4, Clause (4), Nawanagar State Rent Control Act, as meaning the fixation of the standard rent, and secondly that, in case the contention were to be accepted, the Nawanagar State itself will have to be taken as the authority authorised by the Nawanagar State Rent Control Act. Section 4(4), Nawanagar Act, merely defines what standard rent is and furnishes the basis for determining the standard rent in a given case, viz., that it is to be reckoned on the basis of the rent obtaining on 31-12-1946, but that does not mean that the standard rent itself has been fixed. For else, the defining of the expression standard rent would itself amount to the fixing thereof. This latter is a distinct process and is to be gone through separately. Besides, and assuming for the purpose of discussion that it was fixed, it is not fixed by any Court or authority authorised under the Nawanagar State Rent Control Act, and the Nawanagar State itself cannot be taken to be that authority under the said Act itself. The language of Section 5(10)(a) of the Act is clear and it prescribes that in order that the rent can be taken as the standard rent, under the Act, it must have been fixed by a Court, in this case a Court of the former Nawanagar State, or authority, meaning in the present context, an authority authorised to fix it under the Nawamagar State Rent Control Act. Evidently that authority could not be] the authority which enacted the law itself.

3.

Mr. Joshi for the applicants next contended that as standard rent has been defined under the Nawanagar Act, the authority, viz., the Rent Controller of the State would have fixed the standard rent as it obtained on 31-12-1946 and that the standard rent thus fixed would have been the same. However, that has. not been done, and the question as to what standard rent might have been fixed by the Controller had he been approached is altogether beside the point. The fact does remain that standard rent has not been fixed by a Court or authority as required u/s 5(10)(a) of the Act. Another contention made by Mr. Joshi was that under the Nawanagar Act no authority had been authorised to fix the standard rent, evidently because, according to him the standard rent was already defined and fixed under the Act itself. This is not true and in actual fact a Rent Controller had been appointed to function under the Nawanagar Act. Section 3 Clause (a), Nawanagar Act originally provided that suits or appeals which might be pending in the Courts, or suits or appeals the cause of action for which might have arisen before the coming into force of the Act, will be decided under this Act. Section 3 Clause (2) was amended on 30-9-1947, only 12 days after the date of the Act, and by the amendment, among other things, suits pending in the civil Courts were ordered to be transferred to the Rent Controller; which obviously means that a Rent Controller was appointed under the Act. On this being pointed out to Mr. Joshi he conceded that, the ''authority'' viz., the Rent Controller, had been appointed and that disputes relating to the fixation of the standard rent and other disputes were to be determined by the Rent Controller. We are informed that the Rent Controller under the Nawanagar State Rent Control Act has in fact entertained disputes regarding the fixation of standard rent, and has fixed it in several cases. Admittedly the said authority has not fixed the standard rent in the present cases and it is not the landlords'' case that any Court (of the former Nawanagar State) has fixed it. It follows, therefore, that the standard rent in the matters before us has not been fixed as required u/s 5, Sub-section (10), Clause (a) & that these cases are covered by Section 5(10)(b) of the Act, with the result that the standard rent was required to be fixed by the trial Court in accordance with the provisions contained therein.

4.

Mr. Joshi has referred us to a decision of Jhala J. in Bhatt Vishvanath Kanji v. Mochi Odhavji Savji 3 Guj L.R. 89, where the learned Judge has taken a view contrary to the above.

That was a case arising from the former Gondal State & by a Notification of the Gondal State dated 26-8-1946, it was provided that rent was not to be charged in excess of the one that was being received on Bhadirapada Sud 1 of Sanxvat 2002. The learned Judge held that this prohibition against charging rent in excess of that payable on the above said date "practically defined the standard rent." He observed:

Legislation in Covenanting States was not perfect nor was it premeditated & we have to construe its provisions in a reasonable way. The provision that rent payable on a particular day is not to be exceeded means that rent payable on that date is the standard rent.

With respect, we are unable to agree with the learned Judge''s dictum that Clause (1) of the Notification, referred to above, fixed the standard rent. The provision only contains a direction that the rent was not to be charged in excess of the one payable on the said date, & at the highest it can be said that the standard rent was defined, though there is much to be said for the view that it did not prohibit a reduction in the rent. But for the present purpose, we would assume that the standard rent was defined. Even making due concession for imperfections in legislation in the Covenanting States, it cannot be inferred, by any stretch of reasoning, that a direction prohibiting the charging of rent in excess of the one payable on a certain date amounts to the fixation of the standard rent. That fixation is to be done in each case, may be, by reference to the rent payable on the above said date, & adopting that as the basis. Nevertheless it has to be fixed. The learned Judge has not referred to the provisions of Section 5(10)(a), Bombay Bent Act, as applied to Saurashtra & has not considered the notification of the Gondal State in juxtaposition with the said provisions. He has not considered whether, even on the assumption that the notification fixed the standard rent, that fixation had been made by a Court or an authority authorised to do so under the law in force in the Gondal State, & has come to a decision merely on an interpretation of the Gondal State Notification.

5.

The same point also arises directly before us in revision applications Nos. 144 & 148 of 1950 in which the properties are situated in the limits of the former Gondal State. Mr. Joshi, who also appeared for the landlords in the said applications, has urged that there was no need to get the standard rent fixed because it had been already fixed by the Notification. As we pointed out, this contention is incorrect. u/s 5(10)(a) of the Act, the standard rent would be the rent which might have been fixed by a Court or authority, as for instance a Bent Controller, authorised and or the law in force in the former Gondal State; & even though no authority might have bean appointed under the Notification, there were civil Courts in the Gondal State which could have fixed the standard rent. That has not been done & it must follow therefore that the case is not covered by Section 5(10)(a) but falls u/s 5(10)(b) of the Act. For these reasons we differ from the decision of Jhala J. above referred to & the decision will be taken as overruled.

6.

Mr. Joshi has also referred us to a judgment of Shroff J. in Civil Revn. Appln. No. 82 of 1949, where the learned Judge has taken the view that standard rent was defined in the Bhavnagar Rent Control Orders as meaning the rent charged as on 1-12-1946, & this meant that the standard rent was fixed by the Bhavnagar State authorities, & that as the same had been fixed ''authoritatively'', it was not necessary to get it fixed again by any other authority or Court of law. With respect, that is not a correct view because defining, the expression standard rent is not the same thing as fixing the standard rent. Nor could it be said that it was fixed by an authority authorised to do so by the law in force in the Bhavnagar State. That authority would be the Bent Controller or other similar authority appointed under the Bhavnagar Bent Control Orders. In any event, there were the civil Courts of the Bhavnagar State & unless the standard rent was fixed either by the civil Court or the authority above referred to the requirements of Section 5(10)(a) of the Act cannot be said to have been complied with, with the result that the case would be governed by Section 5(10)(b) of the Act & not by Clause (a) thereof. The above said ruling of Shroff J. cannot therefore be taken as good law, & will be treated as overruled.

7.

Mr. Joshi has pointed out to us that our interpretation of Section 5(10)(a) of the Act, as applied to Saurashtra State, would lead to anomalous results, viz., that those tenants who were viligant & got the standard rent fixed would suffer., because in their case it would be fixed on the basis of rent obtaining on 81-12-1946, or similar later dates, which evidently would be comparatively higher, & that those who were indolent & slept over their rights would be benefited because the standard rent in their case will be fixed by reference to the rents obtaining in 1941 plus the ten per cent. The anomaly is no doubt there but we have to interpret Clause (a) of Section 5(10) as it is & to attach to the language its plain meaning; & that meaning is that if the standard rent has been fixed by a Court or authority, such as a Bent Controller or similar other authority authorised under the law of the former integrating States, then that will be taken as the standard rent & not otherwise. Where the language is unambiguous the section must be interpreted by the plain meaning of the words used, & no, extraneous considerations such as the intention of the legislature can be taken into account. If the legislature had intended that any dates specified in the law of any Covenanting State, Estate or Taluka were to be adopted for the purpose of determining the standard rent, that could have been done by using suitable phraseology or by adding a proviso to the section. Or, if the legislature intended that the Kent Control Laws of the Covenanting States, Estates or Talukas should continue to remain in force in the territories of such States, Estates or Talukas now merged into State of Saurashtra, it should have so provided in specific terms although that would have defeated the scheme of the Act & one of the objects of the formation of the State of Saurashtra to have a unitary system of law & its administration throughout the State. To the limited extent, Clause (a) of Section 5(10) introduces standard rents already fixed by any Court or authority under the prior laws, it has led to anomalies pointed above. It is for the legislature to consider the anomalous position referred to above & to amend the section suitably.

8.

No other point, is urged. The decision of the learned Dist. J. is correct & is confirmed, & these revision applications are dismissed with costs.