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Judgment
Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
By this common judgment, CRRFC No. 3/2026, a reference made by the trial court under section 366 of Cr.P.C. for confirmation of the sentence, and Criminal Appeal No. 5134/2026 filed by the accused/appellant against his conviction, shall be disposed of.
Heard on I.A. No.13044/2026 filed in Cr.A. No.5134/2026, which is an application seeking remand for de novo trial on the ground that the counsel who was provided to appellant was not effective and he did not cross-examine the witnesses properly.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of Aman Singh and Another Vs. State of Bihar issued on 27.04.2026 in Criminal Appeal No....../2026 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No....../2026 (Diary No.24574/2026) has held that Legal Services Committee should assign a dedicated legal team comprising one Senior Counsel and at least two advocates having a minimum of 7 years practice, but in the present case, counsel who was provided by the State Legal Service Authority was not so experienced.
However, on query by this Court it was admitted by counsel for appellant that counsel who was provided to appellant had a standing of 17 long years in the Bar. Appellant has not filed any document to suggest that counsel who was provided to appellant had no experience on criminal side. Even the appellant has not filed affidavit of counsel to substantiate the contention of appellant that he was not competent to conduct criminal trial. Further, the evidence was recorded in presence of appellant. He also never took any objection with regard to competence of the counsel.
Accordingly, no case is made out for denovo trial.
Ex consequenti I.A. No.13044/26 fails and is, hereby, dismissed.
The criminal reference as well as criminal appeal have been filed against the judgment and sentence dated 11/04/2026 passed by the Special Judge (POCSO Act, 2012), Dabra, District Gwalior, in Special S.C. No. 11/2023.
Appellant has been convicted under sections 364, 366, 376A, 376AB, 302 of IPC and sections 5(m)/6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and sentenced as under:
| Section | Sentence | Fine | Default Stipulation |
| 364 of IPC | Life Imprisonment | Rs. 2,000/- | Two years R.I. |
| 366 of IPC | Ten years R.I. | Rs. 1,000/- | One year R.I. |
| 376-A of IPC | Death Sentence | Rs. 2,000/- | Two years R.I. |
| 5(m)/6 of POCSO Act | Twenty years R.I. | Rs. 2,000/- | Two years R.I. |
Sentences to run concurrently.
The facts necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that on 07/02/2023, complainant/father of the deceased/victim lodged a report at Police Station Karhiya to the effect that on 06/02/2023 at about 8:00 p.m., his daughter/victim, aged about 7 years, had gone to the house of Janved Shakya to see the marriage procession. When she did not return back, then he and his family members tried to search out for her. They inquired from Kalu @ Hakim Shakya, who stated that he had seen the deceased with the accused/appellant. When they inquired from the accused/appellant, initially he tried to avoid answering, but later on, he disclosed that he had sent the victim along with his Sadu Kalu Jatav to Pichhore. Accordingly, it was mentioned in the FIR that the accused Sheru Jatav and his Sadu Kalu Jatav have taken away the victim forcibly with them.
On the basis of aforesaid verbal information, FIR in Crime No. 21/2023 was registered at Police Station Karhiya for offence under Sections 363, 34 of IPC against Sheru and Kalu Jatav.
The memorandum of Sheru Jatav/appellant was recorded, who confessed that he had committed murder of the victim after committing rape on her, and also informed that he has covered the dead body with dry grass in a field. Accordingly, on the disclosure made by appellant, the dead body of the deceased was recovered. The autopsy surgeon confirmed the rape and murder of the deceased. The incriminating articles of deceased as well as appellant were sent for DNA test. The DNA profile of the appellant matched with the DNA recovered from the incriminating articles of the deceased. Accordingly, the police, after completing the investigation, filed a charge sheet under sections 363, 376(2)(i), 376(2)(j), 376(2)(m), 376A, 364, 302 of IPC and under sections 5(i), 5(n) and 6 of POCSO Act, 2012. Since the police did not find any evidence with regard to the co-called co-accused Kalu Jatav, therefore, no other person was charge-sheeted.
The trial court, by order dated 07/06/2023, framed charges under sections 364, 366A, 376A, 376AB, 302 of IPC and under sections 5(i)/6, or in the alternative under section 5(m)/6 of POCSO Act, 2012.
The appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined Kalu @ Hakim Shakya (PW1), uncle of victim “B” (PW2), father of victim “A” (PW3), Akhilesh Bhargav (PW4), mother of the victim “C” (PW5), Sonpal (PW6), Janved Shakya (PW7), Ramnath Singh Parihar (PW8), Kamal Singh (PW9), Seema Jain (PW9A), Dr. Rajkishori Dandotiya (PW10), Arvind Rawat (PW11), Ram Kumar Verma (PW12), Jitendra Kashyap (PW13), Rajendra Sharma (PW14), Gaurav Singh (PW15), Rajkumar Verma (PW16), Dr. Ayush Prajapati (PW17), and Ajay Singh Sikarwar (PW18).
The appellant did not examine any witness in his defence.
The trial Court, after appreciating the evidence as well as hearing both the parties, convicted and sentenced the appellant for the offences mentioned above.
Challenging the judgment and sentence passed by the Court below, it is submitted by counsel for appellant/accused that since the dead body was recovered from an open area having an easy access for the general public, therefore, it is clear that the recovery on the disclosure made by appellant could not be proved by the prosecution. It is further submitted that, in fact, appellant was made a scapegoat to save the original culprit. It is further submitted that merely because the DNA profile of appellant was found in the nail clippings of victim, as well as undergarments, clothes, vaginal slide, and vaginal swab, as well as the hairs which were seized by the police from the spot, that by itself would not be a conclusive proof to hold that appellant was the author of the incident. It is further submitted that before awarding the death sentence, the trial Court has failed to consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in proper perspective. Merely because a minor girl aged about 7 years was raped and killed cannot be a sole factor which in fact has governed the conscience of the Court to award the death sentence. It is submitted that it is clear from the judgment that the appellant is aged about 27 years and he is the father of one minor girl, accordingly, he has a liability to look after his wife and a minor girl, which has not been considered by the trial Court, and accordingly, it is submitted that the death sentence awarded by the trial Court may be set aside.
Per contra, the appeal is vehemently opposed by counsel for the State. It is submitted that the deceased was seen for the last time in the company of the appellant. This fact is also mentioned in the FIR which was lodged at the earliest possible time. It was also submitted that initially the appellant tried to mislead the police, and whatever information was being given by him was found to be incorrect, and ultimately, only on the disclosure made by the appellant, dead body of the deceased was found in an agricultural field covered by dry grass. It is submitted that the place from where the dead body was recovered is away from the main road and it was not easily accessible for the bypassers. Even otherwise, the dead body was not easily visible. It is further submitted that people with uncontrolled lust are dangerous to society because in order to satisfy their lust, they are going to the extent of sexually assaulting and killing minor girls, especially when the appellant himself is having a minor daughter; therefore, it is a fit case which can be placed under the category of “rarest of rare cases”.
Heard the learned counsel for parties.
The first question for consideration is whether the death of victim/deceased was homicidal and whether She was subjected to rape?
Dr. Rajkishori Dandotiya (PW10), who was the member of the panel constituted for conducting the post mortem of the dead body of the victim/deceased, has stated that on 08/02/2023 the post mortem of the deceased had resumed at 10:40 a.m.. The following injuries were found on the dead body of the deceased:
(i)Lacerated wound present below right eye brow extending up to mid of right cheek of size 8x6 cm. Underneath eye ball of right eye absent. Muscles and facial bones exposed. Surrounding area pale. Margins of wound are sharp at places. Blood present around the injury, can be easily washed away.
(ii)Reddish contusion present just below injury no.1 on right cheek 4x4 cm.
(iii)Multiple reddish color abrasions present over left side of face including cheek and chin of size ranging from 1 x 1 cm to 3x1.6 cm
(iv)Reddish abrasion present on inner aspect of upper lip 2 x 1cm
(v)Reddish abrasion present over lateral aspect of right buttock of size 10x7 cm
(vi)Abrasion present 4 cm below right knee 0.8 cm x 1cm. Surrounding area is pale.
(vii)Abrasion present on anterior aspect of left knee of size 0.7cm x0.5 cm. Abrasion is pale.
(viii)Reddish abraded contusion present over anterior and left lateral aspect of neck 3 cm below chin and just below left angle of mandible of size 16x6 cm. Postmortem peeling seen at places on right and anterior aspect of neck.
(ix)Reddish contusion present on upper aspect of both thigh and genital area of size 4 x 5 cm. Recent rupture of hymen seen. Bleeding present around genital area and introitus. Perineum contused. Passage of introitus is wide open of size 2 x 2 cm.
Opinion : Cause of death in this case is asphyxia due to strangulation. Duration of death is within one to two days since post mortem examination. All injuries are antemortem except injury no. 1,6 & 7 and are caused by hard and blunt Object. Manner of death is homicidal in nature. Signs of sexual offence are evident. The Post mortem report is Ex. P.24.
After the post mortem, following articles were sealed and were handed over to the constable.
(i)Clothing‟s mentioned on page no. 3 packed in a bundle.
(ii)Stomach & intestine along with its contents in a bottle preserved in common salt saturated solution for chemical analysis
(iii)Pieces of liver, spleen & kidneys in another bottle preserved in common salt saturated solution for chemical analysis
(iv)A sample of common salt
(v)Three specimens of seal
(vi)Two vaginal slides and two swabs
(vii)Nails clippings of both hands
(viii)Articles.
Thus, according to the Post mortem report, cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. Duration of death was within one to two days since the Post mortem examination. All injuries were antemortem, except injury nos. 1, 6, and 7, and were caused by a hard and blunt object. The manner of death is homicidal in nature. Signs of sexual offence were evident.
Dr. Rajkishori Dandotiya (PW10) was cross-examined, and only few questions were put. In her cross-examination, she stated that no documents pertaining to the identification of victim were produced; however, she stated that the dead body of the victim was identified by her father. Copy of the First Information Report was received along with the dead body. She denied that Post mortem of the dead body of the victim was not conducted. She denied that she is not well accustomed with the signatures of other doctors of the panel. She denied that the injuries sustained by the victim could have been caused by a single fall. She denied that, in connivance with the police, she has prepared a false report.
Thus, it is clear that death of the victim was homicidal.
Whether deceased/ victim was subjected to rape?
Dr. Rajkishori Dandotiya (PW10) has specifically stated that a reddish contusion was present on the upper aspect of both thighs and the genital area, of size 4 x 5 cm. A recent rupture of the hymen was found. Bleeding was present around the genital area and introitus perineum was contused. The passage of introitus was wide open, of size 2 x 2 cm, and accordingly, she had stated that in view of injury no. 9, it was clear that she was subjected to rape. No cross-examination was done on this aspect.
Accordingly, it is clear that the prosecution has successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was also subjected to rape prior to her murder.
Who is the author of committing rape and murder of minor victim aged about 7 years
Before considering the evidence which has come on record, this Court would like to refer to the sequence in which the investigation was done.
FIR (Ex. P.17) was lodged by father of victim/deceased that on 6-2-2023 at about 8 in the night, his minor daughter had gone to see the marriage procession. When she did not return back, they thought that she might have gone to her grandfather who is the owner of brick kiln. This witness and his friend Palua alias Man Singh had also gone to watch the marriage procession. He came back to his house at 10:30 p.m. On his way back to his house, he met with the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav who demanded Rs.100/- for purchasing liquor. He was not having money. Sheru took a packet of liquor from his friend and consumed the same. Liquor was also offered to him, but on account of foul smell, he vomited and came back to his house. When his daughter did not return back till morning, then he started searching out for her whereabouts. His father and other relatives had also come to his house. While they were going to the house of Janved Shakya where the marriage had taken place, they met with Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1). He inquired as to whether the victim has reached to the house or not and this was also informed by Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1) that he had seen the victim along with the accused Sheru Jatav in the night. Thereafter they went to the house of Sheru Jatav along with Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1). The parents of the accused Sheru Jatav informed that Sheru has not come to the house. Another person informed that Sheru Jatav is at a particular place (Dandhe). Thereafter all the persons went to Dandhe and brought back Sheru Jatav and inquired from him about the whereabouts of the victim. Accused/appellant Sheru Jatav informed that he has left the victim with his Sadu Kalu. Thereafter they took Sheru Jatav to police station Karhiya where FIR under Section 363/34 of IPC (Ex.P/17) was lodged. Although the accused Sheru Jatav was not formally arrested, but the custody memo was prepared on 7-2-2023 at 12:40 p.m. vide custody memo (Ex.P/15). Thereafter the memorandum of Sheru Jatav was prepared on 7-2-2023 at 12:50 p.m. vide Ex.P/13 in which he informed that he has sent the victim to Pichhore along with his Sadu Kalu Jatav. The memorandum bears the signature of father of victim “A” (P.W.3).
Thereafter, the memorandum of appellant was recorded by the police on 07/02/2023 at 03:40 p.m. in Jatav Mohalla, Ganj Pichhore, P.S. Pichhore, District Gwalior, which says that as per the information given by the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav they went to Jatav Mohalla, Ganj Pichhore, where he was directed to point out the house of Kalu Jatav. It was informed by the accused Sheru Jatav that he does not know the house of Kalu Jatav. In fact, his Sadu is Bhikam Jatav, and Kalu Jatav is the brother of Bhikam Jatav. When both persons were searched in Jatav Mohalla, then it was found that there is only one person by the name of Bhikam Jatav, who at present is residing in his matrimonial house at Ajaygarh. He has three brothers namely Malkhan, Ravi, and Dwarika. Kalu Jatav is not the brother of Bhikam Jatav. When accused/appellant was further interrogated, then he became uneasy and could not give any reply. However, he stated that Bhikam Jatav, who is residing in Ajaygarh, is his Sadu and still insisted that the name of one of the brothers of Bhikam is Kalu and the girl is with him. Two persons by the name of Kalu Jatav were found in Jatav Mohalla, who were summoned, and both persons refused to identify the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav. Since the statement of Sheru Jatav was found to be doubtful, therefore, it was decided to visit Ajaygarh to verify the same. Accordingly, the panchnama, Ex. P.1 in respect of the proceedings on the basis of information given by Sheru Jatav at Jatav Mohalla was prepared.
Thereafter, the police party went to village Ajaygarh and another panchnama was prepared on 07/02/2023 at 04:25 p.m. Ex.P.2. According to this panchnama, when the police tried to verify the location of Bhikam Jatav, then it was informed that he has gone to Rewa in connection with labour work. It was informed that he does not have any brother by the name of Kalu Jatav. Bhikam Jatav was contacted on his mobile number 8269329642. He was made to talk to the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav. Bhikam Jatav also informed that the names of his brothers are Malkhan, Ravi, and Dwarika. Malkhan and Ravi are residing in Gwalior, whereas Dwarika has gone towards Dabra in connection with labour work. The photographs of Malkhan and Ravi were shown to accused/appellant Sheru, who refused to identify them as Kalu Jatav. Bhikam was again contacted and was asked as to whether any of his relatives is known as Kalu Jatav. He stated that the name of his cousin brother is Mohan Singh, who is sometimes known as Kalu, and he works in the Honda agency situated in Dabra. He further stated that his another relative Kalu Jatav is residing in village Bijakpur, P.S. Bhitarwar, and stated that except the above two persons, he has no other relative known as Kalu Jatav. Again, the information which was being given by accused/appellant Sheru Jatav was found to be suspicious, therefore, the police party prepared the panchnama, Ex P2, in village Ajaygarh.
Thereafter, the police party took the accused/appellant to Balla ka Dera, Dabra, where Dwarika, third brother of Bhikam Jatav, was found. Accused/appellant Sheru Jatav refused to identify him. Dwarika Jatav had also expressed his ignorance about the incident, and accordingly, he was allowed to go, and the search panchnama, Ex P3, was prepared.
Thereafter at 17:30 hours, the police went to Satnam Honda agency, Dabra to interrogate Kalu @ Mohan Jatav, the cousin brother of Bhikam Jatav. Accused/appellant Sheru Jatav did not identify him, and similarly, Kalu @ Mohan Jatav also stated that accused/appellant Sheru Jatav is not known to him. He further stated that for the last three to four months he is in his house and has never visited the house of any of his relatives. Accordingly, the search panchnama, Ex P4, was prepared.
Thereafter at 18:15 p.m., the police party went to village Bijakpur, P.S. Bhitarwar, in search of another cousin brother of Bhikam Jatav, namely Kalu @ Mahendra Jatav. They met with the brother-in-law of Bhikam Jatav, namely Laikram, who informed that his son Kalu @ Mahendra Jatav is in Mumbai for the last two months and he has not come to the village. The said information was also got verified from the villagers, which was found to be correct. The photo of Kalu @ Mahendra Jatav was shown to the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav but again he refused to identify him. The search panchnama, Ex P5, was prepared. Thus, again, the police was of the view that the accused/appellant is misleading the police.
Thereafter, the accused Sheru Jatav/Appellant was brought back to village Dubahi, where his supplementary memorandum Ex. P.6 was recorded at 9:15 P.M. In this memorandum, apart from narrating the incident, he had stated that he has committed murder of the victim after committing rape on her, and the dead body is lying in a field which is covered by dry grass, and also stated that he can get the dead body recovered. Thereafter, in the light of torch, he took the police party to an agricultural field, where the dead body of the deceased was found covered with dry grass, however, her face was visible. The right eye of the face was missing. The right side of the face was in a distorted condition. Appellant disclosed that it is the dead body of the victim. The dead body was got identified from the witnesses, including relatives of the victim. Near the dead body, two slippers were found. It was stated by appellant that those slippers belong to him, and since he could not locate the slippers in the night, therefore, he had run away after leaving the same on the spot. On the next side, a blue-colored lower, probably of the deceased, was lying. Accordingly, after protecting the spot, the recovery panchnama-cum-identification panchnama, Ex P.7, was prepared.
Safina form under section 175 of Cr.P.C. was issued to the witnesses, and accordingly, the lash panchnama of the dead body of the deceased was prepared in the intervening night of 07/02/2023 and 08/02/2023. Few hairs were found in the fingers of the right hand of the dead body of the victim. Slippers of black colour of Lakhani make, were also seized from the spot. The dry grass stained with the blood of the victim was seized from the spot. Dry grass, along with earth, was also seized from the spot vide seizure memo, Ex P.11.
The Appellant was arrested on 08/02/2023 itself at 01:55 A.M. i.e., in the intervening night of 07/02/2023 and 08/02/2023, vide arrest memo, Ex P12. At the time of arrest, abrasions which could have been caused by nails were found near the right eye and the neck of appellant, which are specifically mentioned in his arrest memo, Ex P12.
Now, the next question for consideration is that whether the prosecution has proved its case against the appellant/Sheru Jatav or not?
It is not out of place to mention here that the case in hand is based on circumstantial evidence, and before considering the evidence, this Court would like to consider the law governing the field of Circumstantial evidence.
The Supreme Court in the case of Rahul v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in, (2023) 1 SCC 83 has held as under:-
“17.The law pertaining to the appreciation of circumstantial evidence is quite well settled by this Court in a catena of decisions. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487] , this Court after taking note of earlier decisions had carved out five principles : (SCC pp. 184-85, paras 152-54)
“152.Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of M.P. [Hanumant v. State of M.P., (1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091] This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail v. State of U.P. [Tufail v. State of U.P., (1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra [Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 4 SCC 625] . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case [Hanumant v. State of M.P., (1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091] : (Hanumant case [Hanumant v. State of M.P., (1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091] , SCC pp. 76-77, para 12)
„12. It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.‟
153.A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1)the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033] : (SCC p. 807, para 19)
„19. … Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between “may be” and “must be” is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.‟
(2)the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3)the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4)they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5)there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
154.These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” (emphasis in original)”
The prosecution has relied upon following circumstances which are required to be considered by this Court:
Whether the victim was seen for the last time in the company of appellant?
Whether the dead body of the victim was recovered on the disclosure made by appellant?
Whether the appellant had tried to mislead the police and such conduct of appellant is relevant under Section 8 of Evidence Act?
Whether the recovery of dead body from an open space indicates the fact that it was in the knowledge of appellant, or it was accessible and visible to the general public?
Whether medical evidence also indicates his involvement in the offence?
DNA test report?
Whether the victim/deceased was seen for the last time in the company of accused/appellant?
Kalu @ Hakim Shakya (PW1) is the witness of last seen together. He has specifically stated in his examination-in-chief that the marriage procession had come to his village for the marriage of the daughter of co-villager Janved Shakya. All the villagers along with their children had gone to see the marriage procession. The victim aged about seven years had also gone. While he was coming back, he saw that the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav was going along with the victim. When he inquired about the identity of the victim then he stated that she is the daughter of „A‟ Bhaiya. By going nearer to the accused/appellant, this witness identified that the victim was the daughter of „A‟ Bhaiya. He has further stated that he was informed by accused/appellant Sheru Jatav that he is taking the victim to her house. Thereafter he went back. On the next day at about 8:00 a.m., he found that the family members of the victim were searching for the whereabouts of the victim. When he inquired, then he was informed that the victim has not returned back. Then this witness informed the family members of the victim that, in the night he had seen the victim in the company of Sheru Jatav. Accordingly, they went to Sheru Jatav and inquired from him. Accused/appellant Sheru Jatav informed that he has left the victim with his Sadu Kalu Jatav, resident of Pichhore. Accordingly, information to Police Station Karhiya was given. This witness has further stated about the misleading information which was given by the accused and thereafter supplementary memorandum (Ex.P/6) and recovery/identification memorandum of dead body of deceased (Ex.P/7). In cross-examination, this witness has stated that while he was returning back after seeing marriage procession, it was already dark and there was no source of light. He further stated that faces of each other were not visible in dark. He further stated that it was already 9.30 PM and it was dark. He further stated that initially he could not see the face of accused/appellant Sheru Jatav, but he had identified him from his style of walking. Thereafter, this witness, on his own, stated that when he went nearer to the accused/appellant, he found that it was Sheru Jatav. He further stated that he had inquired from the accused about the identity of the girl. The accused informed him that he is taking the victim to her house. He further stated that after returning home he did not inform anybody about this incident. However, in the morning, when he found that the family members of the victim were searching for her, then he came to know that victim has not returned back to her house in the night. He further stated that since the appellant was the uncle of the victim by relationship, therefore, he did not immediately inform the family members of the victim during the night itself.
Challenging the aforesaid evidence, it is submitted by the counsel for the appellant that since it was already dark and the witness himself admitted that even faces were not visible, therefore, the identification of accused/appellant Sheru Jatav as well as the victim was impossible. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove that the victim was seen for the last time in the company of accused/appellant Sheru Jatav.
Considered the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant.
The eyes of villagers get acclimatized to see in the dark. The Supreme Court in Ramesh v. State, reported in (2010) 15 SCC 49, has held as under:
“15.As stated earlier, the appellant and these two witnesses (PWs 3 and 4) are neighbours and, therefore, knew the appellant well and their claim of identification cannot be rejected only on the ground that they have identified him in the evening, when there was less light. It has to be borne in mind that the capacity of the witnesses living in rural areas cannot be compared with that of urban people who are acclimatised to fluorescent light. Visible (sic visual) capacity of the witnesses coming from the village is conditioned and their evidence cannot be discarded on the ground that there was meagre light in the evening. There is nothing on record to show that these two witnesses are in any way interested and inimical to the appellant. Their evidence clearly shows that the deceased was last seen with the appellant and the High Court did not err in relying on their evidence.”
Thus, it is clear that since the accused/appellant was also a resident of the same village and the eyes of the villagers get acclimatized to identify co-villagers in the dark coupled with the fact that this witness had not only seen accused/appellant Sheru Jatav and the victim from a distance, but had also gone nearer to the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav and inquired about the identity of the victim as well as where he was taking her, he had every reason to correctly identify accused/appellant Sheru Jatav. Furthermore, this aspect has also been clarified by the witness by stating that he had initially identified Sheru Jatav from his style of walking and, when he went nearer, he confirmed that it was Sheru Jatav only. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that the prosecution has failed to prove that the victim was last seen in the company of Sheru Jatav is misconceived.
Father of the victim “A” (PW3) has stated that in the morning, when he and his family members were searching for the victim, then he was informed by Kalu @ Hakim Shakya that in the last night, he had seen the victim in the company of accused Sheru Jatav/Appellant. Thereafter, they went to the house of accused along with Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1). The parents of the accused Sheru Jatav informed that Sheru had not come to the house. Another person informed that Sheru Jatav is at a particular place (Dandhe). Thereafter all the persons went to Dandhe and brought back Sheru Jatav and inquired from him about the whereabouts of the victim. Accused/appellant Sheru Jatav informed that he has left the victim in the house of his Sadu Kalu. Thereafter they took Sheru Jatav to police station Karhiya where FIR under Section 363/34 of IPC (Ex.P/17) was lodged. Although the accused Sheru Jatav was not formally arrested, but the custody memo was prepared on 7-2-2023 at 12:40 p.m. vide custody memo (Ex.P/15). Thereafter the memorandum of Sheru Jatav was prepared on 7-2-2023 at 12:50 p.m. vide Ex.P/13 in which he informed that he has sent the victim to Pichhore along with his Sadu Kalu Jatav. The memorandum bears the signature of this witness.
The Uncle of the victim/deceased “B” (P.W.2) has also narrated the same story.
The evidence of Kalu @ Hakim Shakya (P.W.1), is corroborated by the evidence of uncle of the victim/deceased “B” (P.W.2) and father of the victim/deceased “A” (P.W.3) to whom the incident was narrated on the next morning. The evidence of Kalu @ Hakim Shakya (P.W.1), uncle of the victim/deceased “B” (P.W.2) and father of the victim/deceased “A” (P.W.3) is corroborated by the FIR, Ex. P. 17 which was lodged on 7-2-2023 at 11:54 A.M. Thus, it is held that the prosecution has successfully proved that the victim/deceased who is a minor girl aged about 7 years was seen by Kalu @ Hakim Shakya (P.W.1) for the last time in the company of the accused/Sheru Jatav/Appellant.
It is next contended by Counsel for the appellant Sheru Jatav, that unless and until, it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant and appellant only, who has killed the deceased, it is not safe to rely on the circumstance of Last Seen Together.
Considered the submissions made by Counsel for the Appellant.
In order to prove the circumstance of last seen together, not only the prosecution is required to prove that the deceased was seen for the last time in the company of the accused, but it is also required to be proved by the prosecution that the time between the last seen together and the recovery of the dead body was so close, so as to rule out the possibility of commission of offence by somebody else.
The Supreme Court in the case of Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2019 SC 1367 has held as under :
40.The prosecution has relied upon the evidence of PW 8 to show that the accused and victims were last seen together. It is settled that the circumstance of last seen together cannot by itself form the basis of holding accused guilty of offence. If there is any credible evidence that just before or immediately prior to the death of the victims, they were last seen along with the accused at or near about the place of occurrence, the needle of suspicion would certainly point to the accused being the culprits and this would be one of the strong factors or circumstances inculpating them with the alleged crime purported on the victims. However, if the last seen evidence does not inspire the confidence or is not trustworthy, there can be no conviction. To constitute the last seen together factor as an incriminating circumstance, there must be close proximity between the time of seeing and recovery of dead body.
41.In Arjun Marik v. State of Bihar [Arjun Marik v. State of Bihar, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 372 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1551] , it has been held as under: (SCC p. 385, para 31)
“31.Thus the evidence that the appellant had gone to Sitaram in the evening of 19-7-1985 and had stayed in the night at the house of deceased Sitaram is very shaky and inconclusive. Even if it is accepted that they were there it would at best amount to be the evidence of the appellants having been seen last together with the deceased. But it is settled law that the only circumstance of last seen will not complete the chain of circumstances to record the finding that it is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and, therefore, no conviction on that basis alone can be founded.”
42.In Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan [Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 715 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 413] , the Court has reiterated that the last seen together does not by itself lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. It is held thus: (SCC p. 719, para 12)
“12.The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. Mere non-explanation on the part of the appellant, in our considered opinion, by itself cannot lead to proof of guilt against the appellant.”
The Supreme Court in the case of Nizam v. State of Rajasthan,(2016) 1 SCC 550 has held as under :
14.The courts below convicted the appellants on the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the deceased was last seen alive with the appellants on 23-1-2001. Undoubtedly, the “last seen theory” is an important link in the chain of circumstances that would point towards the guilt of the accused with some certainty. The “last seen theory” holds the courts to shift the burden of proof to the accused and the accused to offer a reasonable explanation as to the cause of death of the deceased. It is well settled by this Court that it is not prudent to base the conviction solely on “last seen theory”. “Last seen theory” should be applied taking into consideration the case of the prosecution in its entirety and keeping in mind the circumstances that precede and follow the point of being so last seen.
15.Elaborating the principle of “last seen alive” in State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram [(2006) 12 SCC 254 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 688] , this Court held as under : (SCC p. 265, para 23)
“23.It is not necessary to multiply with authorities. The principle is well settled. The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categorical in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. It lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the court can consider his failure to adduce any explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain. The principle has been succinctly stated in Naina Mohamed, In re. [1959 SCC OnLine Mad 173 : AIR 1960 Mad 218] ”
The above judgment was relied upon and reiterated in Kiriti Pal v. State of W.B. [(2015) 11 SCC 178 : (2015) 5 Scale 319
As already pointed out, the accused/Sheru Jatav/Appellant was taken into custody by the police on 7-2-2023 at 12:40 P.M. vide custody memo Ex. P.15. Thereafter, he was taken to different places in search of so-called Sadu Kalu Jatav. After visiting various places and carrying out searches vide search memos Ex. P.1 to P.5, it was found that the accused/Sheru Jatav/Appellant is misleading the police and ultimately he was brought back to village Dubahi, where he gave supplementary memorandum, Ex. P.6 at 21:15 and the dead body was recovered on his disclosure on 7-2-2023 itself at 21:40, vide recovery memo-cum-identification memo Ex. P.7. According to post mortem report, the duration of death was 1-2 days.
According to the prosecution story, the dead body was recovered just after 24 hours of last seen, and the duration of death was also the same. Thus, it is clear that there is a close proximity between the last seen together and the time of death and recovery of the dead body.
Under these circumstances, in the light of Section 106 of Evidence Act, the burden would shift to the appellant, to explain the circumstances which were in his knowledge, but the appellant has failed to discharge the said burden.
Conclusion regarding Last Seen Together
If the facts and circumstances of the present case are considered, it is clear that the accused was seen for the last time along with the victim in the intervening night of 06/07.02.2023. Thereafter, the missing person report (Ex.P/17) was lodged on 07.2.2023 at 11:54 A.M. The appellant was taken into custody by the police on 07.02.2023 at 12:40 pm vide custody memo (Ex.P/15). His memorandum was recorded on 07.02.2023 at 12:50 p.m. vide memorandum (Ex.P/13).
Thereafter, the appellant continuously misled the police party and ultimately on 07.02.2023 at 21:15, he gave a supplementary memorandum (Ex. P-6) with a disclosure statement. The dead body of the victim was recovered within 25 minutes of the disclosure statement vide recovery memo/identification memo (Ex. P/7). The memorandum of recovery and identification of dead body was prepared on 07.02.2023 at 21:40 pm. Thus it is clear that the dead body of the deceased was recovered within 24 hours from the circumstance of last seen together.
According to the Post mortem report (Ex. P/24), the duration of death was within one to two days since the Post mortem examination. Thus, it is clear that there is a close proximity between the circumstances of the last seen together, the recovery of the dead body, and the duration of death as per the Post mortem report, which also corroborates the theory of last seen together.
Further more, it is clear from the spot map Ex. P.19, the dead body of the victim/deceased was found at a place which was situated in between the house of the victim/deceased and the house of Janved Shakya in whose house, the marriage procession had come. It is the case of Kalu @ Hakim Shakya (P.W.1) that when he enquired from accused/Sheru Jatav/Appellant about the girl, then he informed that he is going to her house. Thus, the information given by accused/Sheru Jatav that he is taking the girl to her house did not raise any doubt in the mind of Kalu @ Hakim Shakya (P.W.1) because the house of the victim is situated ahead of place where her dead body was found. Thus, it is held that the prosecution has established the circumstance of last seen together and has also successfully proved that it was the appellant, and the appellant only, who committed the rape and murder of the victim.
Whether the dead body of the victim was recovered on the disclosure
made by appellant; and whether the dead body was recovered from an
open place, if yes, its effect?
So far as the question of recovery of dead body of victim on the disclosure made by appellant is concerned, it is suffice to mention here that when the police realized that the appellant is trying to mislead the police by giving a false information that he had handed over the custody of the victim to his Sadu Kalu Jatav who was found to be a fictitious personality, therefore, the appellant must have been interrogated by the Police and a supplementary memorandum was recorded on 7-2-23 at 21:15 pm (Ex.P/6). Kalu (PW1) and uncle of the victim “B” are the witnesses to the supplementary memorandum. Kalu had specifically stated about the supplementary memorandum (Ex.P/6) as well as the recovery of dead body and the identification of the dead body vide recovery/identification memo (Ex.P/7). This witness was cross-examined and no cross-examination was done with regard to the supplementary memorandum (Ex.P/6) and the recovery/identification memo of the dead body of the deceased (Ex.P/7). In paragraph 8, general questions were put to this witness to the effect which are answered by this witness by stating that he had signed multiple documents. However, he was not in a position to disclose that on how many documents he had put his signatures. He had further stated that the documents were read over by the police and only thereafter he had signed the documents. He was not in a position to disclose that which document was prepared for what purposes, but clarified that all the documents were prepared pertaining to the victim.
Thus the disclosure of the dead body of the deceased vide supplementary memorandum (Ex.P/6), the recovery of the dead body of the deceased and the identification thereof vide the memo (Ex.P/7) was not seriously challenged by the appellant.
Uncle of the deceased “B” (PW2) has also stated that the memorandum of the accused/appellant Ex.P/6 was prepared and on a disclosure made by the appellant, the dead body of the deceased was recovered which was duly identified and a memorandum of recovery of the identification (Ex.P/7) was prepared. No question was put to this witness with regard to the supplementary memorandum (Ex.P/6) and the recovery of dead body of the deceased and identification thereof (Ex.P/7). It appears that in paragraph seven of the cross-examination, a simple question was put, but in reply to the question, it was stated by this witness that he cannot disclose that on how many papers he had put his thumb impression. He further stated that he had put his thumb impression on a document which was requested by the police. However, he was not in a position to recollect as to whether the documents were read out by the police or not. He further stated that today he cannot disclose that what information was given by the appellant in his memorandum statement. He stated that the dead body of the deceased was found in the field. When the dead body was seen for the first time, he was accompanied by police and other villagers. Panchnama was prepared. Although this witness is slightly shaky with regard to the information which was given by appellant Sheru in his supplementary memorandum (Ex.P/6), but if the evidence of uncle of the deceased “B” (PW2) and Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1) are read together, then it is clear that on a supplementary memorandum (Ex.P/6) given by the accused Sheru Jatav, the dead body of the deceased was recovered from the agricultural field which was duly identified on the spot itself vide recovery memo as well as identification memo (Ex.P/7).
Ajay Singh Sikarwar (PW18) is the investigating officer who has stated in detail about the misleading statements/information given by the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav which were found false vide such memos Ex.P/1, Ex.P/2, Ex.P/3, Ex.P/4 and Ex.P/5. He has also stated that after the search was carried out in Village Bijakpur by search memo (Ex.P/5), the accused/appellant was brought back to village Dubahi where his supplementary memorandum (Ex.P/6) was recorded in which he had disclosed that there is no person like Kalu, and he had committed murder of the victim after committing rape on her. Her dead body is lying in a field covered by dry grass and accordingly supplementary memorandum Ex.P/6 was recorded. On the basis of the memorandum given by the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav, they reached to the spot and the place was pointed out by the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav. It was found that the dead body of the deceased was lying covered under the dry grass, however her face was visible. The recovery memo cum identification memo (Ex.P/7) was prepared. In cross-examination, a suggestion was given that no supplementary memorandum (Ex.P/6) was given by the accused/appellant Sheru which was denied by this witness. A suggestion was also given that the recovery memo of the deceased (Ex.P/7) was not prepared in the presence of witnesses Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1) and uncle of the victim “B” (PW2) respectively, which was also denied. He further stated that during the verification of information given by the accused/appellant about the handing over of custody of victim to Kalu Jatav, the residents of village Dubahi were made witnesses and the local residents were not made witnesses. However, he clarified that during the verification of the information, apart from the witnesses as well as the relatives, other villagers were also along with the police party. No other cross-examination was done on the question of disclosure made by the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav as well as the recovery of dead body and identification thereof vide supplementary memorandum (Ex.P/6) and the recovery cum identification memo of the dead body of victim (Ex.P/7). Thus it is clear that the dead body of the victim was recovered on the disclosure made by appellant.
The Supreme Court in the case of reported in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh reported in (2000) 1 SCC 471 has held as under:
“26.We too countenance three possibilities when an accused points out the place where a dead body or an incriminating material was concealed without stating that it was concealed by himself. One is that he himself would have concealed it. Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities the criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself. This is because the accused is the only person who can offer the explanation as to how else he came to know of such concealment and if he chooses to refrain from telling the court as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption is a well-justified course to be adopted by the criminal court that the concealment was made by himself. Such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the principle embodied in Section 27 of the Evidence Act.”
Whether the recovery of dead body from an open space indicates the
fact that it was in the knowledge of appellant, or it was accessible and
visible to the general public?
According to the prosecution case, the dead body was recovered from an agricultural field on 07.02.2023 at 21:40 vide recovery memo/identification memo (Ex. P/7). Undisputedly the place from where the dead body was recovered is an open place.
Before considering the facts of the case, this Court would like to consider the law pertaining to recovery from an open place.
The Supreme Court in the case of Gurjinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in 2011(3) SCC 530 has held that since pistol was hidden by digging earth and hence though a public place, it cannot be said to be a recovery from place which could have been easily accessible to anyone.
The Supreme Court in the case of Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1 has held as under :
1708. In view of the above, it cannot be accepted that a recovery made from an open space or a public place which was accessible to everyone, should not be taken into consideration for any reason. The reasoning behind it, is that, it will be the accused alone who will be having knowledge of the place, where a thing is hidden. The other persons who had access to the place would not be aware of the fact that an accused, after the commission of an offence, had concealed contraband material beneath the earth, or in the garbage.
1709. In Durga Prasad Gupta v. State of Rajasthan [Durga Prasad Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 12 SCC 257 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 385] , this Court explained the meaning of possession as : (SCC p. 266, paras 26 & 27)
“26.The word „possession‟ means the legal right to possession (see Heath v. Drown [1973 AC 498 : (1972) 2 WLR 1306 : (1972) 2 All ER 561 (HL)] ). In an interesting case it was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his mother's flat which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [1976 QB 966 : (1976) 2 WLR 361 : (1976) 1 All ER 844 (DC)] .)
27.Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it, because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge.”
1710. In Sanjay Dutt v. State [Sanjay Dutt v. State, (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] this Court considered the statutory provisions of Section 5 TADA and in this regard held : (SCC pp. 430 & 432, paras 19, 25 & 27)
“19.The meaning of the first ingredient of „possession‟ of any such arms, etc. is not disputed. Even though the word „possession‟ is not preceded by any adjective like „knowingly‟, yet it is common ground that in the context the word „possession‟ must mean possession with the requisite mental element, that is, conscious possession and not mere custody without the awareness of the nature of such possession. There is a mental element in the concept of possession. Accordingly, the ingredient of „possession‟ in Section 5 of the TADA Act means conscious possession. This is how the ingredient of possession in similar context of a statutory offence importing strict liability on account of mere possession of an unauthorised substance has been understood. …
***
25.The significance of unauthorised possession of any such arms and ammunition, etc. in a notified area is that a statutory presumption arises that the weapon was meant to be used for a terrorist or disruptive act. This is so, because of the proneness of the area to terrorist and disruptive activities, the lethal and hazardous nature of the weapon and its unauthorised possession with this awareness, within a notified area. This statutory presumption is the essence of the third ingredient of the offence created by Section 5 of the TADA Act. The question now is about the nature of this statutory presumption.
***
27.There is no controversy about the facts necessary to constitute the first two ingredients. For proving the non-existence of facts constituting the third ingredient of the offence, the accused would be entitled to rebut the above statutory presumption and prove that his unauthorised possession of any such arms and ammunition, etc. was wholly unrelated to any terrorist or disruptive activity and the same was neither used nor available in that area for any such use and its availability in a „notified area‟ was innocuous. Whatever be the extent of burden on the accused to prove the non-existence of the third ingredient, as a matter of law he has such a right which flows from the basic right of the accused in every prosecution to prove the non-existence of a fact essential to constitute an ingredient of the offence for which he is being tried. If the accused succeeds in proving non-existence of the facts necessary to constitute the third ingredient alone after his unauthorised possession of any such arms and ammunition, etc. in a notified area is proved by the prosecution, then he cannot be convicted under Section 5 of the TADA Act and would be dealt with and punished under the general law. It is obviously to meet situations of this kind that Section 12 was incorporated in the TADA Act.”
(emphasis in original)
***
1793. The submission made by Mr Mushtaq Ahmad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the recovery was made from a public place and, therefore, could not be relied upon and cannot be accepted, as it is the accused alone on whose disclosure statement the recovery was made and it is he alone, who is aware of the place he has hidden the same. It cannot be presumed that the other persons having access to the place would be aware that some accused after the commission of an offence has concealed the contraband material beneath the earth or in the garbage.
1794. In State of H.P. v. Jeet Singh [(1999) 4 SCC 370 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 539] , this Court held : (SCC p. 378, para 26)
“26.There is nothing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act which renders the statement of the accused inadmissible if recovery of the articles was made from any place which is „open or accessible to others‟. It is a fallacious notion that when recovery of any incriminating article was made from a place which is open or accessible to others, it would vitiate the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Any object can be concealed in places which are open or accessible to others.”
1795. Similarly, in Gurjinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(2011) 3 SCC 530 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1199] , this Court held that if a weapon was hidden by digging the earth and could be recovered only be removing the earth, it is not desirable to entertain the argument that recovery had been made from a public place which could have been easily accessible to anyone. The Court further held : (SCC p. 536, paras 28 & 29)
“28.… In our opinion, such trivial mistakes should not give any benefit of doubt or any sort of benefit to the accused. In fact, the recovery was made in the presence of Ajaib Singh, Assistant Sub-Inspector and Balbir Singh, Head Constable. It is also not correct that the memo of recovery was not produced before the Court.
29.Ext. P-46, which reveals the fact about the statement made by the accused in relation to pistol incorporates the entire statement made by the accused. Therefore, the said document itself incorporates the statement made by the accused. Moreover, simply because the recovery was made in the presence of policemen would not adversely affect the prosecution case.”
1796. In State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [(2001) 1 SCC 652 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 248] this Court held : (SCC pp. 661-62, paras 19-21)
“19.In this context we may point out that there is no requirement either under Section 27 of the Evidence Act or under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to obtain signature of independent witnesses on the record in which statement of an accused is written. The legal obligation to call independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality to attend and witness the exercise made by the police is cast on the police officer when searches are made under Chapter VII of the Code. …
20.Hence it is a fallacious impression that when recovery is effected pursuant to any statement made by the accused the document prepared by the investigating officer contemporaneous with such recovery must necessarily be attested by the independent witnesses. … The court has to consider the evidence of the investigating officer who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth.
21.We feel that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. We are aware that such a notion was lavishly entertained during the British period and policemen also knew about it. Its hangover persisted during post-independent years but it is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature. Hence when a police officer gives evidence in court that a certain article was recovered by him on the strength of the statement made by the accused it is open to the court to believe the version to be correct if it is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. It is for the accused, through cross-examination of witnesses or through any other materials, to show that the evidence of the police officer is either unreliable or at least unsafe to be acted upon in a particular case. If the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such records of the police the court could certainly take into account the fact that no other independent person was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions.”
1797. In view of the above, merely because the contraband was recovered from a public place i.e. a place accessible to the public at large, the same does not mean that the recovery is to be discarded. In case, the articles had been hidden by digging up the earth, covering the same up with garbage or other material, the public may not have taken note of it. The same remained in the specific knowledge of the accused i.e. where and also the manner in which the said articles were hidden. Moreover, the recovery cannot be discarded for want of signature of the accused on the recovery memo.
***
1844. On the issue of recovery, this Court in State of H.P. v. Jeet Singh [(1999) 4 SCC 370 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 539] , held : (SCC p. 378, para 26)
“26.There is nothing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act which renders the statement of the accused inadmissible if recovery of the articles was made from any place which is „open or accessible to others‟. It is a fallacious notion that when recovery of any incriminating article was made from a place which is open or accessible to others, it would vitiate the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Any object can be concealed in places which are open or accessible to others. For example, if the article is buried in the main roadside or if it is concealed beneath dry leaves lying on public places or kept hidden in a public office, the article would remain out of the visibility of others in normal circumstances. Until such article is disinterred, its hidden state would remain unhampered. The person who hid it alone knows where it is until he discloses that fact to any other person. Hence, the crucial question is not whether the place was accessible to others or not but whether it was ordinarily visible to others. If it is not, then it is immaterial that the concealed place is accessible to others.”
1845. In State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar [(2002) 1 SCC 622 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 217] , this Court also dealt with this issue.
1846. Thus, in view of the above, the submission made by Mr Mushtaq Ahmed, stating that as the recovery had been made from an open place to which all persons had access, cannot be relied upon and is not worth acceptance.
1847. Undoubtedly, the appellant's disclosure statement had been made before the police, as well as the panch witness. The fact that he did not disclose the place where the contraband had been hidden remains entirely insignificant, for the reason that he had led the police party to the said place, and that the said recovery had been made at his behest. The open space from where the recovery had been made though was accessible to anybody, it must be remembered that the contraband had been hidden, and that it was only after digging was done at the place shown by the appellant, that such recovery was made. Hence, it would have been impossible for a normal person having access to the said place, to know where the contraband goods were hidden.
The Supreme Court in the case John Pandian v. State, (2010) 14 SCC 129 has held as under :
We do appreciate the argument that the statement of Paramasivam (PW 15) was recorded after about 15 days, however, his evidence appears to be creditworthy. He was frank enough in admitting that he left the place and never came back for 15 days to run the auto. If he avoided the police for 15 days, there is nothing unusual about it. When we test this fact as against the quality of his evidence, it might be stated that the witness appears to be truthful and was rightly relied upon by the courts below, ignoring the time taken for recording his statement. Insofar as Ramalingam (PW 16) is concerned, his evidence remained unshaken and like the earlier two witnesses, there was hardly any cross-examination.
Thus, it is clear that if the weapon, dead body, or incriminating articles have been kept in a hidden condition which is/are not easily noticeable or accessible to the general public, then such a recovery cannot be discarded merely because it was made from an open place.
This Court would now consider the evidence led by the prosecution in the light of law laid down by Supreme Court in the above mentioned cases. The recovery memo of dead body/identification memo (Ex. P/7) which was prepared on 07.02.2023 at 21:40 pm mentions that the accused Sheru Jatav by walking ahead of the police party took them to the place of occurrence in the light of the torch and pointed out the dead body of the victim covered by dry grass. On the spot, only the face of dead body was visible, the right eye was missing and right side of the face was mutilated ( क्षत -विक्षत ). The accused claimed that the said dead body is that of the victim. The dead body of the victim was also identified by the witnesses. Two slippers of black color of the appellant were also lying beside the dead body. The accused/appellant claimed that the slippers belonged to him and since he could not locate the slippers in the night, therefore, he had ran away from the place of occurrence after leaving his slippers. On the left side of the dead body, one blue color lower probably of deceased was also lying. The place of occurrence was protected and the proceedings were initiated. Thus, it is clear that the dead body of the deceased was lying covered with dry grass. The photographs of the dead body of the deceased are also marked as MO 1 to MO 18. The crime details form (Ex.P-10) containing the spot map was prepared by Ajay Singh Sikarwar (PW-18). From the spot map, it is clear that the field from where the dead body was recovered is at a distance from the main road. The height of the crop which was standing in the field was approximately 2 ½ feet. Thus, it is clear that not only the place where the dead body was found was away from the main road, but it was in a field where crop of 2 ½ feet was standing. The dead body was covered by dry grass. From the crime detail form/spot map (Ex. P/10), it is clear that only the agriculturist having adjoining fields would have used the earthen boundary to reach out to their field, otherwise it was not a public place or a public road.
Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that although the dead body was found covered by dry grass in an agricultural field but since that place was away from the main road and was surrounded by the crop of 2 ½ feet height, therefore, the open place was not easily noticeable and accessible by the general public. Therefore, it was within the exclusive knowledge of the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav as to the place where the dead body of the deceased was kept. Under these circumstances, the trial Court did not commit any mistake by holding that the dead body of the deceased was recovered on the disclosure made by the appellant.
Whether the appellant had tried to mislead the police and such conduct of appellant is a relevant fact under Section 8 of Evidence Act?
We have already narrated the fact that earlier, the accused/Sheru Jatav/Appellant tried to mislead the witnesses and the police that he had given the victim to his Sadu Kalu Jatav and accordingly, in search of Kalu Jatav, the police party took the accused/Sheru Jatav/Appellant to various places and ultimately, supplementary memorandum dated 07/02/2023 was recorded by the police at 09:15 p.m., in which it was disclosed by the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav that after committing rape on the victim, he had killed her and has hidden her dead body in a field by covering it with dry grass. The recovery and identification of the dead body of have already been found proved.
Thus, from the narration of the entire facts, it is clear that in the wee hours of the intervening night of 06/02/2023 and 07/02/2023, Kalu @ Hakim Jatav (P.W.1) had seen the victim in the company of appellant. Thereafter, when the police interrogated the accused/appellant, then initially he tried to mislead the police. The police went to various places to verify the information, and ultimately, every time it was found that the accused/appellant is misleading them. Ultimately, he made a disclosure statement on 07/02/2023 at 09:15 p.m., and the dead body was recovered at 09:40 p.m. Therefore, it is clear that the dead body of the victim was recovered on the disclosure made by accused/appellant Sheru Jatav.
Aforesaid facts have been proved by Kalu @ Hakim Shakya (PW1) and Sonpal (PW6).
Challenging the credibility and reliability of evidence of Kalu alias Hakim Shah (PW1) and Sonpal (PW6) with regard to misleading information which was given by the appellant, it is submitted by counsel for appellant that it is clear from the record that both the witnesses were the pocket witnesses of Police. Kalu alias Hakim Shah (PW1) and Sonpal (PW6) are the residents of Dubahi, but it is clear from search Panchanama (Ex.P/1) which was prepared in Jatav Mohalla, Ganj Pichhore, P.S.Pichhore, District Gwalior, search Panchnama (Ex.P/2) which was prepared in Village Ajaygarh, P.S. Pichhore, District Gwalior, search Panchnama (Ex.P/3) which was prepared near Balla Ka Dera, Main Road, Dabra, District Gwalior, search Panchnama (Ex.P/4) which was prepared at Satnam Honda Agency, Dabra, District Gwalior and search Panchnama (Ex.P/5) which was prepared at Village Bijakpur, P.S. Bhitarwar, District Gwalior that they were the witnesses of the police. It is submitted that although both the witnesses are residents of Dubahi but all the time they were accompanying the police party. Why the Police Party did not prepare the search Panchnama in presence of local residents has not been explained.
Considered the submissions made by counsel for appellant.
As already pointed out, police was trying to verify information given by the appellant that he had handed over the custody of the victim to Kalu Jatav. By the time of searching out for Kalu Jatav, Police had not arrested the accused/appellant although he was in custody. If the residents of Village Dubahi were accompanying the Police Party to search out for Kalu Jatav, then it cannot be said that they were pocket witnesses of Police. The appellant has not pointed out the number of cases in which Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1) and Sonpal (PW6) had stood as a witness for the police. Both the witnesses were cross-examined by the counsel. None of the witnesses was asked as to whether they had ever appeared as a witness for the police in other cases also or not. Furthermore, this Court cannot lose sight of one fact i.e. a minor girl was reported missing and everybody including police was searching out for her whereabouts. Under these circumstances, merely because Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1) and Sonpal (PW6) also accompanied the police party in search of the victim and Kalu Jatav (who proved to be a fictitious character), then it cannot be said that they were the pocket witnesses of the police.
Furthermore, counsel for appellant has relied upon a statement made by Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1) in paragraph 8 of his cross-examination. In paragraph 8, Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1) had stated that the accused was taken to police station Karhiya and thereafter this witness stayed in police station Karhiya. It is submitted by counsel for appellant that since the accused was taken by Police from Police Station Karhiya to different places in search of the victim and in view of the categorical admission by Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1) that after the accused appellant was taken to police station Karhiya, this witness remained/stayed in police station Karhiya, therefore it is clear that he did not go to different places in respect of which search memos Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/5 were prepared.
However, this Court is of considered opinion that the interpretation of evidence done by the counsel for the appellant does not appear to be correct. From memorandum (Ex.P/6) which was prepared on 7-2-2023 at 21:15, it is clear that it was prepared at village Dubahi, police station Karhiya, district Gwalior. From the sequence of investigation done by the police, it is clear that from police station Karhiya, the appellant was taken to Jatav Mohalla where search panchnama (Ex.P/1) was prepared at 3:40 pm. Thereafter, he was taken to village Ajaygarh where search memorandum (Ex.P/2) was prepared at 16:25 pm. Thereafter, he was taken to a place near Balla Ka Dera, main road Dabra where search panchnama (Ex.P/3) was prepared at 17:05. Thereafter, appellant was taken to Satnam Honda Agency, Dabra, where search panchnama (Ex.P/4) was prepared at 17:30, and thereafter, the accused/appellant was taken to village Bijakpur, PS Bhitarwar, where search panchnama (Ex.P/5) was prepared at 18:15. Since the police was of the view that the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav is misleading the police, therefore it appears that he was brought back to village Dubahi, PS Karhiya where his supplementary memorandum (Ex.P/6) was recorded at 21:15, that is after three hours of the last search memo (Ex.P/5) which was prepared at 18:15 at village Bijakpur. From the recovery as well as identification memo of dead body of deceased, it is clear that it was done at 21.40 pm on 7/2/2023 vide recovery/identification memo (Ex.P/7). Therefore, if the evidence of Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1) is read in continuity, then it is clear that he was referring to the fact that after search panchnama was prepared and dead body was recovered, thereafter accused was taken to police station Karhiya where this witness also stayed back in police station Karhiya. Even assuming that the interpretation to the aforesaid sentence given by counsel for appellant is accepted, then it is suffice to mention here that the evidence of the witnesses are to be read in its entirety and cannot be discarded on the basis of a single and a stray statement. The Supreme Court in the case of Mustak Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2020) 7 SCC 237 has held as under:-
“34.With the greatest of respect, the evidence of the witnesses have to be read as a whole. Words and sentences cannot be truncated and read in isolation. The witness has categorically stated that he would be able to identify and actually identified the driver of the motorcycle as the appellant. PW 11 being the Judicial Magistrate has corroborated identification of the appellant by the complainant in the test identification parade.”
Under these circumstances, it is clear that in the FIR it was specifically pointed out that when the family members of the victim were searching out for her whereabouts, then they were informed by Kalu alias Hakim Shakya (PW1) that he had seen the victim in the company of the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav in the night, and thereafter, when the family members of the victim inquired from accused/appellant Sheru Jatav, then he informed that he had handed over the custody of the victim to his Sadu Kalu Jatav. The information regarding handing over of custody of victim to Kalu Jatav was false and Kalu Jatav was a fictitious figure created by the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav in order to mislead the witnesses.
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the appellant had tried to mislead the police and this conduct of the accused/Sheru Jatav/Appellant is a relevant fact.
Section 8 of Evidence Act reads as under :
8. Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct. -
Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact.
The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding, in reference to such suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto.
Explanation 1. - The word "conduct" in this section does not include statements; unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements; but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other section of this Act.
Explanation 2. - When the conduct of any person is relevant, any statement made to him or in his presence and hearing, which affects such conduct, is relevant.
Thus, the conduct of the accused prior to and post offence is also a relevant fact. However, it is made clear that the conduct of the accused by itself cannot be a solitary ground to record his conviction, but the same can always be considered along with other circumstances which have been found proved against the accused.
Whether medical evidence of accused and D.N.A. Test report indicates the involvement of the accused/Sheru Jatav/Appellant
The accused/appellant Sheru Jatav was arrested on 08.02.2023 at 1:55 am vide arrest memo (Ex. P12). From the arrest memo, it is clear that nail marks were found near the right eye and neck of the appellant. When the dead body was recovered, the hairs entangled in the finger of right hand of the deceased victim, a black slippers of appellant of lakhani company, the blood stained dry grass with earth and dry grass were seized vide seizure memo Ex. P-11. Kalu (PW-1) and Sonpal (PW-6) had signed the seizure memo as witnesses.
After Post mortem was completed, the doctors sealed cloths of the victim, stomach and intestine along with its content in a bottle preserved in common salt saturated solution for chemical analysis, pieces of liver, spleen and kidney in another bottle preserved in common salt saturated solution for chemical analysis, a sample of common salt, three specimen of seal, two vaginal slides and two swabs, nail clippings of both hands and articles were sealed and handed over to concerning police Constable. The Post mortem report (Ex. P24) has been proved by Dr. Rajkishori Dandotiya (PW-10). The aforesaid articles which were handed over to the Constable were brought by the Constable Jitendra (PW-13) to Police Station Karhiya and handed over to Ram Kumar Verma (PW-12), who was posted as ASI at police station Karhiya District Datia. The articles were seized vide seizure memo Ex.P.27. Ram Kumar Verma (PW-12) has also stated that the articles were brought in sealed condition.
Ram Kumar Verma (PW-12) has also stated that Rajkumar Verma (PW-16) had brought the ten sealed samples and DNA identification form which were seized by seizure memo (Ex. P-28)
Dr. Ayush Prajapati (PW-17) had collected the blood samples of the accused appellant and after taking his due consent Ex. P.31, he had also medically examined the accused Sheru Jatav and had found the following injuries :
person brought for H/E, potently test & sealing of sample
O/E – Person fully conscious and oriented with time, place, and person. Chest – B/L clear. CVS – S1, S2. CNS – WNL. P/A – Soft, BS+.
L/E – Abrasion (scratch) 1 × .1 cm below the medial canthus of the right eye by H & B object. Duration within 48 hours. Simple in nature.
Bruises, 2 in number: (1 cm × .1 cm) and (1 cm × .1 cm) below the left eye.
Person has thin built. All secondary sexual characters are well developed. Penis, scrotum, and testes are well developed in shape and size. Both testes present in the scrotal sac. No smegma find over glans penis. Axillary hair & Pubic hair are present.
Note – No apparently visible external injury seen over the neck or any other part of the body. The MLC report is Ex. P-31.
The seized articles including the nail clippings as well as vaginal slide and swab of victim along with the blood samples of accused/appellant Sheru Jatav were sent for DNA test vide requisition dated 10.02.2023. The DNA test report is Ex.P-43. According to the DNA test report, a common Y-Chromosome STR DNA profile was found in the cloths, vaginal slide, vaginal swab and nail clippings of deceased/victim. Similarly, Y-Chromosome STR DNA profile was recovered from the hairs. However, no Y-Chromosome STR DNA profile was found on the seized grass. According to the Scientific Officer, the DNA profile of accused/appellant Sheru Jatav was found in the cloths, vaginal slide, vaginal swab and nail clippings of the deceased/victim. Similarly, the DNA profile detected from the hairs and the DNA profile of the accused detected from his blood sample were found to be common, therefore, it is clear that scientifically also, the DNA test report shows that the DNA profile of the accused/appellant Sheru Jatav was found in all the incriminating articles including nail clippings as well as vaginal slide, vaginal swab and cloths of deceased/victim. Even the hairs which were seized from the place of occurrence were containing the same DNA profile which was recovered from the blood samples of appellant. Apart from that, two abrasions were found near the right eye and the neck of accused/appellant Sheru Jatav.
Under these circumstances, it is held that the forensic/scientific evidence as well as injuries found on the body of accused/appellant Sheru Jatav, also proves that the appellant Sheru Jatav was the author of the offence of rape and murder of the victim.
No other argument was advanced by the Counsel for the appellant.
Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is held that the prosecution has proved all the circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and the chain of circumstances is complete which proves beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant only who had committed murder of the victim/deceased after committing rape on her. Accordingly the conviction of the accused/Sheru Jatav/Appellant for offence under Sections 364, 366, 376-A, 376-AB, 302 of IPC and 5(m)/6 of POCSO Act is hereby upheld.
So far as the question of sentence is concerned, it is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant that the appellant has no criminal history and he has one wife and one minor daughter in his family. There is nothing on record to suggest that the appellant is dangerous to the society. It is submitted that the case in hand does not fall within the category of “rarest of rare” case.
Per contra, it is submitted by Counsel for the State that although the appellant is also a father of a minor daughter but he did not hesitate in committing rape and murder of a minor girl aged about 7 years. Therefore, it is clear that he is dangerous to the Civil Society. The State Counsel has also submitted the report as directed by Supreme Court in the case of
Considered the submissions made by Counsel for parties on the question of sentence.
This Court in the light of direction given by the Supreme Court in the case of Aman Singh (Supra) had directed the State to place aggravating and mitigating circumstances on record. Accordingly, document No.5641/2026 has been filed on 01.07.2026 pointing out the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
It is the case of the State that offence committed by accused/appellant Sheru Jatav is an example of extreme brutality and diabolical nature of crime. Heinous offence of sexual assault on minor was committed with calculated and premeditated manner and, thereafter the murder was committed in order to eliminate the sole witness. The appellant has not shown any remorse because in his examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C., he took a stand of complete denial and false implication. It is the case of the State that act of appellant has profound societal impact and betrayal of trust. It is further stated by the State that appellant was also convicted in Crime No. 91/2016 for offence under sections 294, 323, 325 and 506 read with 34 of IPC and, therefore, the possibility of reform and rehabilitation are remote.
However, pointing out the mitigating circumstances, it has been submitted by State that age of appellant was approximately 27 years at the time of commission of offence. Appellant belongs to poor and marginalized socio-economic background. His father has passed away; he does not own any agricultural land; his house was constructed under the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna; he holds a Below Poverty Line ration card and his family members earn their liveilhood through manual labour. Before his imprisonment, appellant was working as truck driver.
Similarly, State has filed a report from Jail vide Document No.5910/26. In this report, it is mentioned that appellant has informed that he has a younger brother who is mentally retarded. His mother is an old and infirm person, whereas the wife of appellant works as a labourer in agricultural fields of other persons. He has further stated that he is an illiterate person and his parents were also illiterate, but his wife has studied upto Class 8th. He further disclosed that his family has religious beliefs and attends all the religious functions. It was further disclosed by him that none of his family members were ever tried and convicted. It is further mentioned that behaviour of appellant towards other inmates is normal and he is co-operative with jail administration. He always follows the instructions given by Jail Authorities and maintains discipline. It was also opined that behaviour of appellant in Jail appears to be reformative. It is also informed by the Jail Authorities that there is no complaint against the appellant in Jail.
Thus, it is clear that although appellant has killed a minor girl after committing rape on her, but looking to his socio-economic background and his conduct in jail, it appears that the mitigating circumstances are in favour of appellant. It is true that the offence committed by appellant is brutal and shocking to the conscience of Civil Society, but that by itself cannot be a ground to award capital sentence.
Now, the only question for consideration is that in case if capital sentence awarded to appellant is not affirmed, then what alternative sentence has to be awarded to the appellant.
Although appellant has also been convicted under section 302 & 376A, IPC but he has been sentenced under section 376A of IPC only. Similarly, although he has been convicted under section 376AB of IPC and 5(m)/6 of the POCSO Act, but he has been sentenced under section 5(m)/6 POCSO Act only.
The minimum sentence for offence under section 376A of IPC is 20 years which may extend to imprisonment for life which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, or with death.
Even otherwise, it is well established principle of law that constitutional Courts can award life imprisonment for remainder of life in place of death penalty, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Gauri Shankar v. State of Punjab reported in (2021) 3 SCC 380 in paragraph 11 as under:-
“11.The learned counsel for the appellant at this stage submitted that while convicting the appellant-accused for offence under Section 302 IPC, he has been sentenced with imprisonment for life which would mean a remainder of natural life which was not in the domain of the trial court, and this could have been exercised only by the High Court or by this Court. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on paras 105 and 106 of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Union of India v. V. Sriharan [Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 695] , which is extracted hereunder : (SCC p. 102)
“105.We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other court in this country. To put it differently, the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict's life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior court.
106.Viewed in that respect, we state that the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (2) [Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113] that a special category of sentence; instead of death; for a term exceeding 14 years and put that category beyond application of remission is well founded and we answer the said question in the affirmative. We are, therefore, not in agreement with the opinion expressed by this Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana [Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611] that the deprival of remission power of the appropriate Government by awarding sentences of 20 or 25 years or without any remission as not permissible is not in consonance with the law and we specifically overrule the same.””
Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that the case in hand does not fall within the category of rarest of rare cases. Accordingly, the death sentence awarded by the trial Court to the appellant under section 376A of the IPC is hereby set aside and in place of the same life imprisonment, which shall mean imprisonment for remainder of natural life of appellant, is awarded. The fine sentence, as awarded by the trial Court, is affirmed.
So far as the conviction and sentence of appellant for other offences are concerned, they do not call for any interference.
With aforesaid modification, judgment and sentence dated 11/4/2026 passed by Special Judge (under the POCSO Act, 2012), Dabra, District Gwalior in Special S.C. No.11/2023 is hereby affirmed. Appellant is in jail. He shall undergo the remaining jail sentence.
Copy of this judgment along with record of the trial Court be sent to the trial Court immediately for information and compliance.
CRRFC No.3/2026 is answered accordingly and Cr.A. No.5134/2026 is dismissed with aforesaid modification in sentence.
