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Judgment
The questions regarding applicability of the Law of limitation, to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya and to an application for review of the
order passed in a Public Interest Litigation [''PIL''], having arisen in this case, a Division Bench of this Court has referred the following questions
for determination by a Larger Bench of this Court:
(a) As to whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the tribal areas now comprising the State of Meghalaya; and
(b) As to whether the Law of Limitation is not applicable to the application seeking review of the order dated 05.03.2014 passed in PIL
No.2 of 2013?
The relevant background aspects
In view of the pure questions of law referred for determination by the Larger Bench, dilatation on all the factual aspects of the matter is not
necessary. Only a brief reference to the relevant background would suffice.
The petitioner herein filed the review application bearing No. 20 of 2014 on 11.12.2014, seeking review of the order dated 05.03.2014 as
passed in PIL No.3 of 2013 (old No.40 of 2007), whereby the proceedings in the said PIL were closed with the observation that no further
directions were required to be issued in view of the decision of Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Lafarge Umiam Mining Private Limited v.
Union of India and others: (2011) 7 SCC 338.
The petitioner earlier attempted to question the aforesaid order dated 05.03.2014 by way of a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.
23685 of 2014 before the Hon''ble Supreme Court but, on 27.10.2014, sought permission to withdraw, so as to file a review application in this
Court because, according to the petitioner, the issues involved in PIL No. 2 of 2013 were not similar to those involved in Lafarge Umiam Mining
Private Limited (supra). Taking note of the submissions so made, the Supreme Court dismissed the aforesaid Petition for Special Leave to Appeal
as withdrawn but while providing that in case of rejection of the review application, it would be open for the petitioner to approach the Supreme
Court again in challenge to the validity of the impugned order dated 05.03.2014.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed the review application in this Court on 11.12.2014 with an application for condonation of delay of 16 days (while
computing limitation from the date of order of the Supreme Court). The aforesaid application for condonation of delay [MC (Review Petition)
No.1 of 2015] was found carrying rather objectionable expressions and hence, was rejected by a Division Bench of this Court on 27.07.2015 but
with liberty to the petitioner for filing a fresh application. The petitioner has now filed the fresh application on 27.08.2015, again with the prayer for
condonation of delay of 16 days in filing the review application. It is noticed that a question regarding the starting point of limitation was raised
during the course of consideration of this application and the office later on reported that the review application was delayed by a period of 249
days. However, all these aspects as to the length of delay are not required to be dealt with in this order and are left at that only.
The referred questions cropped up for consideration because, while contesting the question of limitation as also while seeking condonation of
delay, learned counsel for the petitioner maintained that the Law of Limitation was not applicable as such to the State of Meghalaya and was not
applicable to this application for review of an order passed in a writ petition entertained as PIL in this Court. In support of these submissions,
learned counsel for the petitioner essentially referred to a letter dated 22.05.1989 as sent by the Secretary, Law Department, Government of
Meghalaya to the Regional Manager, State Bank of India, stating that in view of the Government of Assam''s Notification No.TAD/GA/12/64
dated 14.03.1966, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 [hereinafter also referred to as ''the Limitation Act''] do not apply to the tribal areas
now forming part of the State of Meghalaya. The learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the decision of the Gauhati High Court in the
case of State of Meghalaya v. U. William Mynsong: (1987) 2 GLR 221 in support of his submissions that the Limitation Act does not apply to the
tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya.
In response to these contentions, it was submitted on behalf of the contesting respondents that with coming into existence of the State of
Meghalaya by virtue of the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971 [hereinafter also referred to as ''the Reorganisation Act of 1971''], a
fresh judicial determination was required on the question as to whether the aforesaid notification No.TAD/GA/12/64 dated 14.03.1966 continues
to operate over the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya so as to exclude the application of the Limitation Act to these areas. Reference was also
made to the decision in the case of J. Thansiama v. State of Mizoram and others (Civil Appeal No.3536 of 2008): 2015 SCC Online SC 796
wherein, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that the Limitation Act is applicable to the State of Mizoram; and it was submitted that the ratio in
U. William Mynsong''s case, which has been doubted by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, would require reconsideration in the light of the decision
rendered in an analogous background in J. Thansiama''s case.
A Division Bench of this Court took note of the decision in Mynsong''s case (supra) wherein, the Gauhati High Court has held that the aforesaid
notification dated 14.03.1966 applies to the State of Meghalaya by virtue of the provisions contained in North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation)
Act, 1971; and the Division Bench also took note of the decision in J. Thansiama''s case (supra) wherein, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held
that once the areas within the erstwhile Mizo District of the State of Assam ceased to be so and came to comprise the territory of Mizoram from
the year 1972, the said notification dated 14.03.1966 by the Governor of Assam ceased to be applicable to such areas. It was also noticed that in
the said decision, the Hon''ble Supreme Court indicated its doubts on the ratio in U. William Mynsong''s case (supra) but did not pronounce finally
thereupon because applicability of the Limitation Act in the State of Meghalaya was not the question for consideration before it. The Division
Bench also observed that in the communication dated 22.05.1989, the Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya in Law Department had
suggested non-applicability of the Limitation Act in the State of Meghalaya only with reference to the said notification No.TAD/GA/12/64 dated
14.03.1966 as issued by the Governor of Assam but the question remained as to whether the said notification would apply and would continue to
operate for the tribal areas in the State of Meghalaya?
In the aforesaid circumstances, the Division Bench of this Court found it imperative that the question as regards applicability of the Limitation
Act to the tribal areas now comprising the State of Meghalaya be given quietus so far this Court is concerned. The Division Bench also found it
necessary to address to the other question as suggested on behalf of the petitioner that the Law of Limitation would not be applicable to the
application seeking review of an order passed in the PIL. In this background, the questions aforesaid have been referred to this Bench.
The submissions
While taking up this Larger Bench reference for consideration, we permitted the learned counsel for the parties as also the learned members of
the Bar to address the Court on the questions aforesaid. We may briefly take note of the material part of the submissions made before us.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that by virtue of Section 66 of the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969 [hereinafter
also referred to as ''the Reorganisation Act of 1969''], the existing laws continued to operate, as were applicable before the appointed day of
formation of the Autonomous State of Meghalaya; and hence, the notification dated 14.03.1966, as issued by the Governor of Assam, excluding
the Limitation Act, 1963 from its operation to the tribal areas of the then State of Assam, continues to operate in regard to the tribal areas of the
State of Meghalaya that have been carved out of the erstwhile State of Assam. The learned counsel also contended that the Limitation Act having
not been made applicable to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya by any specific notification, it would not apply to these areas; and, while
relying on the decision in Mynsong''s case (supra), the learned counsel submitted that the then jurisdictional High Court clearly held that Limitation
Act was not applicable to the tribal areas in the State of Meghalaya, as the said notification continues to operate over such areas. Learned counsel
also referred to the communication dated 22.05.1989 wherein, the Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya in its Law Department stated that
the Limitation Act does not apply to the tribal areas of Meghalaya in view of the said notification dated 14.03.1966. The learned counsel further
contended that no specific period for limitation having been prescribed for an application for review of an order passed in a PIL petition, the period
of limitation as prescribed in the Limitation Act cannot be made applicable thereto.
Per contra, the learned GA painstakingly referred to the provisions contained in the Limitation Act, the Reorganisation Act of 1971 and
Paragraph 12-A of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India as also to the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in J. Thansiama''s case
(supra) and submitted that the Limitation Act, which extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, does apply to the State
of Meghalaya including the tribal areas therein. Learned GA submitted that after coming into force of the Reorganisation Act of 1971 and
Paragraph 12-A of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, if the Limitation Act is to be excluded in its operation over the tribal areas of the
State of Meghalaya, a notification to that effect shall have to be issued by the President of India; and, for no such notification having been issued,
the Limitation Act does apply to the entire State of Meghalaya. As regards the question of limitation for an application for review, the learned GA
submitted that no limitation is prescribed for the proceedings for writ under Article 226 but the doctrine of delay and laches is applicable thereto
and same would apply to the application for review also. The learned counsel has, inter alia, referred to the decision of the Constitution Bench of
the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Bhai Lal Bhai: AIR 1964 SC 1006.
Learned counsel Ms. A Paul strenuously supported the submissions that the Limitation Act does not apply to the tribal areas of the State of
Meghalaya. While particularly referring to Sections 77 and 79 of the Reorganisation Act of 1971, the learned counsel submitted that the decision in
J. Thansiama''s case does not apply to the State of Meghalaya and even the observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court would not be decisive of
the matter because the operation of Sections 77 and 79 of the Reorganisation Act of 1971 were not placed for consideration of the Hon''ble
Supreme Court. According to the learned counsel, the notification dated 14.03.1966, by implication, stands carried over to the State of
Meghalaya so far the Law of Limitation is concerned.
Learned counsel Shri K Khan made the submissions that though Rule 4 (2) in Chapter-III of the Rules of High Court of Meghalaya 2013
provides for limitation of 30 days for an intra-court appeal, but no such limitation has been prescribed as regards an application for review
governed by Chapter-XI of these Rules. However, according to the learned counsel, the period of limitation shall have to be read in such
provisions and it cannot be said that a review application could be filed at any time.
Another aspect has been projected before us that several procedural laws, which are in force in the State of Meghalaya, carry in-built limitation
periods for filing of appeal, revisions etc. and that there are several special laws in Central as well as State Legislations which are self-contained as
regards the period of limitation. However, these and other different submissions made and view-points projected for and against the question of
applicability of the Law of Limitation to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya are not being elaborated upon because, the question, in our
view, needs to be determined with reference to the provisions of law and the principles expounded and explained by the Hon''ble Supreme Court.
Before proceeding further, we may take note of the referred notification dated 14.03.1966 and the communication dated 22.05.1989, which
have formed the basis of the submissions about inapplicability of the Limitation Act to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya.
The Notification dated 14.03.1966 and the letter dated 22.05.1989
The referred communication dated 22.05.1989 from the Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya, Law Department to the Regional
Manager of the State Bank of India at Dhanketi, Shillong had been as under:-
GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA
LAW DEPARTMENT
No.LJ(B)116/79/89 Dated Shillong, the 22nd May, ""89
From: Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya Law Department.
To,
The Regional Manager-II,
State Bank of India (Regional Office),
Dhanketi, SHILLONG-793001
Sub: NON APPLICATION OF THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963 IN THE TRIBAL AREAS
Sir,
With reference to your letter No.RM (II) GEN/158 dated 11.2.89, I am directed to say that in view of the Government of Assam''s
notification No.TAD/GA/12/64 dated 14.3.66 the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the tribal areas now forming part
of the State of Meghalaya.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(S. Dykes)
Under Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya,
Law Department
The pivot of the submissions, the notification dated 14.03.1966, as issued by the Governor of Assam, reads as under:-
Government Of Assam
Tribal Areas And Welfare Of Backward Classes
Department
The 14th March, 1966
No. TAD/GA/12/64. - In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (b) of Sub-paragraph (1) and sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 12 of
the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the Governor of Assam is pleased to direct that the Limitation Act, 1963 (No.36 of 1963)
shall not apply to the Tribal Areas of Assam specified in Part A of the table appended to paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution of India, with effect from the 1st January 1964.
Ramesh Chandra
Secy. to the Govt. of Assam
T.A. & W.B.C. Deptt.
For dealing with different facets of the question regarding applicability of the Limitation Act to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya, we
may now take note of the relevant provisions, as contained in the applicable enactments and the Constitution of India.
The provisions of law
Indisputably, the Limitation Act of 1963 extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir by virtue of Section 1 (2)
thereof. However, its inapplicability to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya is suggested on the strength of the submissions that such tribal
areas were earlier forming the part of Assam as specified in Part-A of the table Appended to Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution of India and its applicability to such areas was specifically excluded in the aforesaid notification dated 14.03.1966, as issued by the
Governor of Assam by virtue of the powers conferred by Clause (b) of Sub-Paragraph (1) and Sub-Paragraph (2) of Paragraph 12 of the Sixth
Schedule to the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that by virtue of the provisions contained in the Reorganisation Act of 1971 as also the
Reorganisation Act of 1969, the aforesaid notification would continue to operate in relation to the tribal areas which were earlier the part of Assam
but are now comprising the State of Meghalaya. Per contra, it is contended that by virtue of Paragraph 12-A of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution
of India, the Limitation Act, being an Act of Parliament and having not been excluded from operation by any notification by the President, would
apply to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya; and the aforesaid notification dated 14.03.1966 shall have no application. We have already
taken note of the notification dated 14.03.1966. Now, the relevant provisions of law could be taken note of as under:
Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, as was existing prior to the changes brought about by the Re-organisation Act
of 1971 and describing the tribal areas within the State of Assam read as under:-
Tribal areas.- (1) The areas specified in Parts A and B of the table below shall be the tribal, areas within the State of Assam. (2) The
United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District shall comprise the territories which before the commencement of this Constitution were known as the
Khasi State and the Khasi and Jaintia Hills District, excluding any areas for the time being comprised within the cantonment and municipality
of Shillong, but including so much of the area comprised within the municipality of Shillong as formed part of the Khasi State of, Mylliem:
Provided that for the purposes of clauses(e) and (f) of sub-paragraph(1) of paragraph 3, paragraph 4, paragraph 5, paragraph 6, sub-
paragraph(2), clauses(a), (b) and (d) of sub-paragraph(3) and sub-paragraph(4) of paragraph 8 and clause(d) of sub-paragraph(2) of
paragraph 10 of this Schedule, no part of the area comprised within the municipality of Shillong shall be deemed to be within the District.
(3) Any reference in the table below to any district (other than the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District) or administrative area shall be
construed as a reference to that district or area at the commencement of this Constitution
Provided that the tribal Areas specified in Part B of the table below shall not include any such areas in the plains as may, with the previous
approval of, the President, be notified by the Governor of Assam in that behalf.
TABLE
PART A
The United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District
The Garo Hills District.
The Lushai Hills District.
The Naga Hills District.
The North Cachar Hills.
The Mikhir Hills
PART B
North East Frontier Tract including Balipara Frontier. Tract Tirap Frontier Tract, Abor Hills District and Misimi Hills District.
The Naga Tribal Area.
This Paragraph 20 has gone through a sea change, commencing from the substitution by Section 71 (i) and Eighth Schedule to the
Reorganisation Act of 1971 and by the later constitutional amendments. In the present form, Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution of India reads as under:-
Tribal areas.- (1) The areas specified in Parts I, II, II-A and III of the table below shall respectively be the areas within the State of
Assam, the State of Meghalaya, the State of Tripura and the State of Mizoram.
(2) Any reference in Part I, Part II or Part III of the table below to any district shall be construed as a reference to the territories comprised
within the autonomous district of that name existing immediately before the day appointed under clause (b) of section 2 of the North-Eastern
Areas(Reorganization) Act, 1971:
Provided that for the purposes of clauses(e) and (f) of sub-paragraph(1) of paragraph 3, paragraph 4, paragraph 5, paragraph 6, sub-
paragraph(2), clauses(a), (b) and (d) of sub-paragraph(3) and sub-paragraph(4) of paragraph 8 and clause(d) of sub-paragraph(2) of
paragraph 10 of this Schedule, no part of the area comprised within the municipality of Shillong shall be deemed to be within the Khasi Hills
District.
(3) The reference in Part II-A in the table below to the ""Tripura Tribal Areas District"" shall be construed as a reference to the territory
comprising the tribal areas specified in the First Schedule to the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council Act, 1979.
TABLE
PART I
The North Cachar Hills District.
The Karbi Anglong District.
PART II
Khasi Hills District.
Jaintia Hills District.
The Garo Hills District.
PART II-A
Tripura Tribal Areas District.
PART III
The Chakma District.
The Mara District.
The Lai District.
We may also take note of Paragraph 19 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India carrying the transitional provisions as under:-
Transitional provisions.- (1) As soon as possible after the commencement of this constitution the Governor shall take steps for the
constitution of a District Council for each autonomous district in the State under this Schedule and, until a District Council is so constituted
for an autonomous district, the administration of such district shall be vested in the Governor and the following provisions shall apply to the
administration of the areas within such district instead of the foregoing provisions of this Schedule, namely:-
(a) no act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State shall apply to any such area unless the Governor by public notification so directs;
and the Governor in giving such a direction with respect to any Act may direct that the Act shall, in its application to the area or to any
specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as he thinks fit;
(b) the governor may make regulations for the peace and good government of any such area and any regulations so made may repeal or
amend any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State or any existing law which is for the time being applicable to such area.
(2) Any direction given by the Governor under clause (a) of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph may be given so as to have retrospective
effect.
(3) All regulations made under clause(b) of sub-paragraph(1) of this paragraph shall be submitted forthwith to the President and, until
assented to by him, shall have no effect.
It may also be noticed that Paragraph 12 of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, as originally enacted and as existing on the date of
issuance of the notification dated 14.03.1966, had been as under:-
Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the state to autonomous districts and autonomous regions.- (1)
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution-
(a) no Act of the Legislature of the State in respect of any of the matters specified in paragraph 3 of this Schedule as matters with respect to
which a District Council or a Regional Council may make laws, and no Act of the Legislature of the State prohibiting or restricting the
consumption of any non-distilled alcoholic liquor shall apply to any autonomous district or autonomous region unless in either case the
District Council for such district or having jurisdiction over such region by public notification so directs, and the District Council in giving
such direction with respect of any Act may direct that the Act shall in its application to such district or region or any part thereof have effect
subject to such exceptions or modifications as it thinks fit;
(b) the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State to which the provisions of
clause(a) of this sub-paragraph do not apply shall not apply to an autonomous district or an autonomous region or shall apply to such district
or region or any part thereof subject to such exceptions or modifications as he may specify in the notification.
(2) Any direction given under sub-paragraph(1) of this paragraph may be given so as to have retrospective effect.
The above-quoted Paragraph 12 was first amended by the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971 whereby, its application was
confined to the State of Assam. Several other changes have also been made in its applicability to the State of Assam, which are not required to be
noticed for the present purposes. However, this Paragraph 12, as now existing in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, is as under:-
Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of Assam to autonomous districts and autonomous regions in the
State of Assam.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution-
(a) no Act of the Legislature of the State of Assam in respect of any of the matters specified in paragraph 3 of this Schedule as matters with
respect to which a District Council or a Regional Council may make laws, and no Act of the Legislature of the State of Assam prohibiting or
restricting the consumption of any non-distilled alcoholic liquor shall apply to any autonomous district or autonomous region in that State
unless in either case the District Council for such district or having jurisdiction over such region by public notification so directs, and the
District Council in giving such direction with respect of any Act may direct that the Act shall in its application to such district or region or any
part thereof have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as it thinks fit;
(b) the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State of Assam to which the
provisions of clause(a) of this sub-paragraph do not apply shall not apply to an autonomous district or an autonomous region [in that State],
or shall apply to such district or region or any part thereof subject to such exceptions or modifications as he may specify in the notification.
(2) Any direction given under sub-paragraph(1) of this paragraph may be given so as to have retrospective effect.
The relevant aspect of the matter for the present purpose is that when the Autonomous State of Meghalaya within the State of Assam was
formed under the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969, Paragraph 12-A was inserted in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India,
which was, thereafter, substituted by the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971. This Paragraph 12-A, in its present form, reads as
under:-
12-A. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya to autonomous districts and autonomous regions
in the State of Meghalaya.- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,-
(a) if any provision of a law made by a District or Regional Council in the State of Meghalaya with respect to any matter specified in sub-
paragraph(1) of paragraph 3 of this Schedule or if any provision of any regulation made by a District Council or a Regional Council in that
State under paragraph 8 or paragraph 10 of this Schedule, is repugnant to any provision of a law made by the Legislature of the State of
Meghalaya with respect to that matter, then, the law or regulation made by the District Council or, as the case may be, the Regional Council
whether made before or after the law made by the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya, shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be void and the
law made by the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya shall prevail;
(b) the President may, with respect to any Act of Parliament, by notification, direct that it shall not apply to an autonomous district or an
autonomous region in the State of Meghalaya, or shall apply to such district or region or any part thereof subject to such exceptions or
modifications as he may specify in the notification and any such direction may be given so as to have retrospective effect.
At this juncture, Paragraph 12-B, as inserted in the Sixth Schedule by the same Reorganisation Act of 1971, may also be noticed. This
Paragraph 12-B had been the subject of interpretation by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in J. Thansiama''s case (supra). Paragraph 12-B, in relation
to the State of Mizoram and the Autonomous District in the State of Mizoram, in its present form reads as under:-
12-B. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of Mizoram to autonomous districts and autonomous regions in
the State of Mizoram.- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,-
(a) no Act of the Legislature of the State of Mizoram in respect of any of the matters specified in paragraph 3 of this Schedule as matters
with respect to which a District Council or a Regional Council may make laws, and no Act of the Legislature of the State of Mizoram
prohibiting or restricting the consumption of any non-distilled alcoholic liquor shall apply to any autonomous district or autonomous region in
that State unless, in either case, the District Council for such district or having jurisdiction over such region, by public notification, so directs,
and the District Council, in giving such direction with respect to any Act, may direct that the Act shall, in its application to such district or
region or any part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as it thinks fit;
(b) the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any Act of the Legislature of the State of Mizoram to which the provisions of
clause(a) of this sub-paragraph do not apply, shall not apply to an autonomous district or an autonomous region in that State, or shall apply
to such district or region, or any part thereof, subject to such exceptions or modifications, as he may specify in the notification;
(c) the President may, with respect to any Act of Parliament, by notification, direct that it shall not apply to an autonomous district or an
autonomous region in the State of Mizoram, or shall apply to such district or region or any part thereof, subject to such exceptions or
modifications as he may specify in the notification and any such direction may be given so as to have retrospective effect.
Apart from the above, we may also take note of the relevant provisions of the Re-organisation Acts of 1969 and 1971. Initially, the
Autonomous State to be known as Meghalaya within the State of Assam was formed by virtue of Section 3 (1) of the Assam Reorganisation
(Meghalaya) Act, 1969, that reads as under:-
Formation of Meghalaya.-(1) On and from the appointed day there shall be formed within the state of Assam an autonomous State to be
known as Meghalaya which shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section(2) comprise the following tribal areas, namely :
(i) The United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District as described in sub-paragraph(2) of paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution(exclusive of the proviso thereto) but excluding the areas transferred to the Mikir Hills autonomous district by the notification of
the Government of Assam No.TAD/R/31/50/149, dated the 13th April, 1951, and
(ii) The Garo Hills District specified in Part A of the table appended to paragraph 20 aforesaid. ....
.... ....
In this Reorganisation Act of 1969, the Autonomous State was conferred with the status of a State for certain purposes and certain provisions
of the Constitution of India, as enumerated in Section 67 thereof. However, for the present purpose, Section 66 of this enactment providing for
continuance of existing laws and their adaptations, could be noticed as under:-
66- Continuance of existing laws and their adaptations.- (1) all law in force immediately before the appointed day in the autonomous State
shall continue to be in force therein until altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority.
(2) For the purpose of facilitating the application in relation to the autonomous State of any law made before the appointed day, the
appropriate Government may, within two years from that day, by order, make such adaptations or modifications of the law, whether by way
of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient and there upon every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and
modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority.
Explanation- In this section, the expression ""appropriate Government"" means as respects any law relating to a matter enumerated in the
Union List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the Central Government, as respects any law relating to a matter in the Second
Schedule, the Government of Meghalaya, and, as respects any other law, the Government of Assam.
The relevant and material development after the aforesaid Reorganization Act of 1969 had been that by the North-Eastern Areas
(Reorganisation) Act, 1971, the States of Manipur and Tripura were established and the State of Meghalaya was formed apart from the Union
Territories of Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh. For the present purpose, suffice it to notice that by virtue of Section 5 thereof, the State of
Meghalaya was formed in the following manner:-
Formation of the State of Meghalaya. On and from the appointed day there shall be formed a new State, to be known as the State of
Meghalaya, comprising-
(a) the territories which immediately before that day were comprised in the autonomous State of Meghalaya formed under Section 3 of the
Assam Re-organisation ( Meghalaya ) Act, 1969 (55 of 1969); and
(b) so much of the territories comprised within the cantonment and municipality of Shillong as did not form part of that autonomous State;
and thereupon the said territories shall cease to form part of the existing State of Assam.
Thus, by virtue of the Reorganisation Act of 1971, the State of Meghalaya was formed with the territories that were comprised in the
Autonomous State of Meghalaya under the Reorganisation Act of 1969; and with other territories of the cantonment and municipality of Shillong.
This full-fledged State of Meghalaya came into being on 21.01.1972. Sections 77 and 79 of the Reorganisation Act of 1971, which have been
referred to and relied upon in support of the contention that the aforesaid notification dated 14.03.1966 continues to apply, could also be taken
note of as under:-
Territorial extent of laws. The provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law
in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies, and the territorial references in any such law to the existing State of
Assam or the autonomous State of Meghalaya or the Union territory of Manipur or the Union territory of Tripura or the North-East Frontier
Agency shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories
within that State or autonomous State or Union territory or Agency immediately before the appointed day.
Power to adapt laws. For the purpose of facilitating the application of any law in relation to any of the States or Union territories formed
or established by the provisions of Part II, the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of two years from the appointed day, by
order, make such adaptations of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon every
such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent
Legislature or other competent authority.
Explanation. In this section, the expression ""the appropriate Government"" means-
(a) as respects any law relating to matter enumerated in the Union List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the Central Government;
and
(b) As respects any other law,-
(i) in its application to a State, the State Government, and
(ii) in its application to a Union territory, the Central Government.
The relevant case law
Having extensively taken note of the relevant provisions having bearing on the issue, we may now take note of the ratio of the decisions relied
upon. In support of the view-points that the said notification dated 14.03.1966 continues to operate and is in force in the tribal areas forming the
State of Meghalaya, the decision of the Gauhati High Court in U. William Mynsong''s case (supra) has been strongly relied upon. In the said
decision, the High Court dealt with the question as to whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to the criminal revision filed against an order
of discharge of an accused person. The Court took note of the said notification dated 14.03.1966 and, while observing that there was no dispute
as to its applicability to the State of Meghalaya, proceeded to hold that it remained operative by virtue of the provisions contained in the
Reorganisation Act of 1971. The Court said,-
In the aforesaid notification dated 14.3.66, the Governor of Assam directed that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall not apply to the Tribal
Areas of Assam specified in part A of the table appended to paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The above
notification dated 14.3.66 came into force from the 1st day of January, 1964. However, there is no dispute as to the applicability of the said
notification to the State of Meghalaya. After coming into force of the North East Areas Re-organisation Act, 1971, the notification remained
in force by virtue of Section 7 read with 79 of the said Act. Therefore, our conclusion is that the notification referred to above issued which
came into force on and from 1.1.64 is still in force. Therefore, in view of the notification dated 14.3.66 which came into force on and from
1.1.64 we cannot adopt the spirit of Limitation Act in the present nature of a case. We therefore, hold that the provisions of the Limitation
Act, 1963 have no application to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya. We make it clear that our answer to the reference is relating to
the applicability of Limitation Act of 1963 in the present nature of the case and on no other laws which are in force in the State of
Meghalaya. The reason being that the reference was sought for relating to the applicability of the Indian Limitation Act in tribal areas.
(Underlining supplied for emphasis)
On the other hand, the decision of the Supreme Court in J. Thansiama''s case has been referred in support of the contention that the Limitation
Act does apply to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya and that the said notification dated 14.03.1966 has ceased to operate over these
areas.
The aforesaid decision in J. Thansiama was rendered by the Supreme Court in an appeal arising out of an order of the Gauhati High Court
dated 01.08.2005 wherein, the Limitation Act was held applicable to the State of Mizoram. The Hon''ble Supreme Court took note of the said
notification dated 14.03.1966 and traced the relevant aspects of the history of enactment of the Re-organisation Act of 1971 and its relevant
provisions, including Sections 77 and 79 thereof. In the context of the State of Mizoram, the Hon''ble Supreme Court also took note of Paragraph
12-B of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and thereafter, pointedly held that the notification dated 14.03.1966 issued by the
Governor of Assam ceased to be applicable to the Mizo District once the area therein no longer formed a part of the tribal areas of Assam. The
Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under:-
What, however, would require a pointed notice is that the Notification dated 14.03.1966 issued by the Governor of Assam excluding
the operation of the Limitation Act from the tribal areas of the State of Assam ceased to be applicable to the Mizo District once the areas
therein no long formed a part of the tribal areas of Assam and, instead, became a part of the tribal areas of the Union Territory of Mizoram
with effect from 21.1.1972. The further developments (historical, geographical and constitutional), namely, the exclusion/omission of the
Mizo district even from the tribal areas of the Union Territory of Mizoram; the dissolution of the Mizo District Council and the addition of
Pawai, Lakher and Chakma Districts to part III of Para 20 of the Sixth Schedule as the tribal areas of the Union Territory of Mizoram, of
which all developments had occurred subsequent to the creation of the Union Territory of Mizoram, would further fortify the above position.
The aforesaid facts would demonstrate that the Notification dated 14.03.1966 ex facie would not apply to the areas within the erstwhile
Mizo District of the State of Assam once the said areas ceased to be so and came to comprise the Union Territory of Mizoram with effect
from 21.1.1972 by virtue of Section 6 of the Reorganisation Act.
(Underlining supplied for emphasis)
In the aforesaid decision in J. Thansiama, though the Supreme Court expressed doubts on the reasoning of Gauhati High Court in U. William
Mynsong''s case but left the matter at that only for the reason that the correctness thereof was not in challenge and the case at hand did not relate
to the applicability of the Limitation Act to the State of Meghalaya. The Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
Indeed it is correct that the Gauhati High Court in The State of Meghalaya v. U. William Mynsong has held that in view of the
notification dated 14.3.1966, the Limitation Act 1963 will not apply to the State of Meghalaya. The reasoning of the High Court in the said
case has been pressed into service for our acceptance in the present case also on account of the parity of the facts of the two cases. Having
gone through the said judgment we are unable to accept the reasoning contained therein. However, we say no more as the correctness of
view expressed in the State of Meghalaya v. U. William Mynsong (supra) is not under challenge before us; neither is the question involved
therein, namely, the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the State of Meghalaya the issue arising in the present case.
(Underlining supplied for emphasis)
Thereafter, the Hon''ble Supreme Court referred to its previous decision in the case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Shillong City
Bus Syndicate: (1996) 8 SCC 741 whereby the Employees'' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 was held applicable to the
Khasi Hills District in the State of Meghalaya after holding that the transitional provisions of Paragraph 19 of the Sixth Schedule ceased to operate
with the constitution of the District Council; and that the application of laws in the State of Meghalaya is governed by the provisions of Paragraph
12-A; and further that until publication of a notification by the President, all Acts of Parliament, which are not occupied by the provisions contained
in Paragraph 3, shall be operative in the areas of the Autonomous Regions or Districts in the State of Meghalaya. The Supreme Court particularly
referred to paragraph 16 of the said decision in Shillong City Bus Syndicate on the interpretation of Paragraph 12-A of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution of India; and applied the same principles to Paragraph 12-B of the Sixth Schedule. The Hon''ble Supreme Court, while reproducing
paragraph 16 in Shillong City Bus Syndicate (supra), observed and held as under:-
The eventual conclusion of this Court are to be found in Para 16 which is quoted below with the clarification that Para 12A referred to
therein pertains to the autonomous Districts or Regional Councils in the State of Meghalaya whereas in the instant case the relevant
provisions of the Sixth Schedule would be Paragraph 12B as initially applicable to the Union Territory of Mizoram and thereafter to the
State of Mizoram.
It would, thus, be clear that, on constitution of the District or Regional Council, paragraph 19 ceases to operate and power of the
Governor becomes coterminous and ceases to exist. Simultaneously, the power of the District or Regional Council becomes operational to
make laws on subjects covered in paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule. Proprio vigore, paragraph 12-A comes into force. By operation of
paragraph 12-A(b), the President has been empowered to direct by a notification that any Act of Parliament should not be made applicable
or made applicable with such modifications and exceptions, as may be specified in the said notification. In other words, until such notification
is published by the President, all Acts of Parliament which are not occupied by the provisions contained in paragraph 3 shall proprio vigore
become operative in the area of the Autonomous Regions or Districts in the State of Meghalaya.
(Underlining is ours)
We also do not find any substance in the arguments advanced on behalf of the Appellant that the Notification dated 14.3.1966 would
continue to be applicable to the Union Territory and the successor State of Mizoram by virtue of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act.
We do not see how the said provisions of the General Clauses Act can have any application to the present case.
Consequently, we dismiss the present appeal and affirm the view taken by the High Court.
The interpretation of the relevant provisions with their inter-play and enunciation of law by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Shillong City Bus
Syndicate case (supra) may be noticed in a little more detail for being relevant to the present case. In Shillong City Bus Syndicate, the Hon''ble
Supreme Court examined and analysed the scheme of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution; and, after dealing with Paragraph 12-A and Paragraph
19 of the Sixth Schedule, pointed out, inter alia, as under:-
After the formation of State of Meghalaya, by operation of paragraph 12-A(a) with a non obstante clause engrafted therein, that if any
provision of a law made by a District or Regional Council in the State of Meghalaya, with respect to any matter specified in sub-
paragraph(1) of paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule or if any provision or any regulation made in paragraph 8 or paragraph 10, is repugnant
to any of the provisions of a law made by the Meghalaya State Legislature with respect to that matter, then, the law or regulation made by
the District Council or Regional Council whether made before or after the law made by the Meghalaya State Legislature, shall, to the extent
of repugnancy, be void and the law made by the Legislature of Meghalaya State shall prevail.
Clause(b) of paragraph 12-A provides that the President may with respect to any Act of Parliament, by notification, direct that it shall not
apply to any Autonomous District or Region in the State of Meghalaya, or shall apply subject to such exceptions or modifications as may be
specified therein.
Paragraph 19 is a transitory provision pending constitution of the District or Regional Council in the State. Therein, the Act of Parliament
or of the State Legislature shall not apply to any such area unless the Governor by public notification, so directs and makes it applicable with
such exceptions or modifications as he may specify in the public notification. Equally, the Governor has the power to make regulations or
power to repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or of the State Legislature or any existing law which for the time being is applicable to such
area. He has got power also to make such direction with retrospective effect. They shall be submitted forthwith to the President and until
they are assented to by the President, they shall have no effect, as envisaged in paragraph 19(3).
It would, thus, be seen that the operation of paragraph 19 is transitory pending constitution of the Autonomous District Councils.
Therefore, till the Council is so constituted and until the Governor, by a public notification makes an Act of Parliament applicable to the area
proprio vigore, it has no application. He is also empowered by a public notification, to make an Act of Parliament applicable with such
modifications or exceptions as he may specify. As soon as the District or Regional Council is constituted, the power under paragraph 19
ceases to operate and as a corollary paragraph 12 begins to operate in relation to Autonomous District Council or Regional Council in the
State of Assam and paragraph 12-A begins to operate in respect of the District or Regional Council in the State of Meghalaya. By
operation of paragraph 12(1)(b) or paragraph 12-A(b), the Governor or the President, as the case may be, by notification, may direct that
with respect to the area over which the Regional or District Council respectively has jurisdiction, any Act of Parliament shall not apply to
such Autonomous District or Region or shall apply with such modifications or exceptions, as may be specified in the notification.
The principles relating to the limited operation of transitional provisions contained in Paragraph 19 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution and
applicability of Acts of Parliament to the tribal areas were also explained in no uncertain terms by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in paras 16 and 17
of this decision. Para 16 of this decision in Shillong City Bus Syndicate has already been noticed herein above, as reproduced in the decision in J.
Thansiama. The relevant part of para 17, however, may also be noticed as follows:-
........... The law made by Parliament, becomes operational, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, for the whole or any part of
the territory of India. No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extraterritorial operation.
Therefore, as soon as the Governor ceases to have power under paragraph 19, the Act became operative in the area or region over which
Khasi Hills District Council had assumed power under paragraph 12-A(a). Soon thereafter, paragraph 19 ceased to operate. Proprio
vigore, the Act of Parliament came into operation for the area of Khasi Hills District until the President, by a notification, excluded its
application to that area or made it applicable with such modifications and exceptions as may be specified in a notification published in this
behalf in the Gazette of India. Admittedly, no such notification was published by the President. Resultantly, the Act came into operation
throughout the country except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. But earlier, by operation of paragraph 19(1)(b) of the Sixth Schedule, due
to a non obstante clause engrafted therein, its application stood excluded since no notification was issued by the Governor making the same
applicable under paragraph 19(1)(b) to that autonomous District which ceased to be operative from 26-6-1952.
(Underlining supplied for emphasis)
Having thus taken note of the law applicable to the case, we may now take up for determination the questions referred to this Bench.
Question No. 1.
Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the tribal areas now comprising the State of Meghalaya?
In comprehension of the scheme of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and the relevant provisions of law with the principles expounded
and explained by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, we have no hesitation in holding that the Limitation Act indeed applies to the entire State of
Meghalaya including the tribal areas.
The line of arguments suggesting inapplicability of the Limitation Act to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya has its foundation in the
aforesaid notification dated 14.03.1966, as issued by the Governor of Assam coupled with the provisions contained in Section 66 of the
Reorganisation Act of 1969 and Sections 77 and 79 of the Reorganisation Act of 1971; and the support to this contention is taken from the
decision of the Gauhati High Court in Mynsong''s case (supra). The contention sans merit and, with respect, we find it difficult to accept the view
taken by the Gauhati High Court in U. William Mynsong''s case as that of correct proposition of law.
Indisputably, while framing the Constitution of India, a separate scheme was evolved for administration of several of the areas described as
schedule and tribal areas; and, the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India in its original form made the provisions for administration of tribal
areas in the State of Assam. As noticed, the areas specified in Part A and B of the table Appended to the original Paragraph 20 of the Sixth
Schedule were declared as tribal areas within the State of Assam.
In the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, in the beginning it was provided that there shall be Autonomous District Councils or Regional
Councils for the specified areas in the State of Assam; and such Councils were vested with legislative authority on the specified subject/s and were,
inter alia, given the power to set up and administer their own system of justice and welfare services in respect of the subjects enumerated in
Paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule. As regards the applicability of the Act of Parliament and Legislature of the State to such Autonomous Districts
and Autonomous Regions, over-riding provisions were made in Paragraph 12 of the Sixth Schedule; and by virtue of Clause (a) of Paragraph
12(1), no Act of the State Legislature, in respect of any of the matters specified in Paragraph 3 for which a District Council or a Regional Council
could make laws; and no Act of the State Legislature prohibiting or restricting the consumption of any non-distilled alcoholic liquor, were to apply
to the Autonomous Districts/Autonomous Regions unless the jurisdictional District Council would so direct by way of a public notification with or
without modification. However, Clause (b) of Paragraph 12(1) provided that the Governor could by public notification direct that any Act of
Parliament or of the State Legislature of Assam, to which the provisions of Paragraph 12 (1) were not applicable, would not apply to an
Autonomous District or an Autonomous Region in that State. The Governor was also empowered to direct by way of public notification that such
an Act shall apply to such Autonomous District or Region or any part thereof subject to such exception or modification as specified by him in the
notification.
In the Sixth Schedule, transitional provisions were also made in Paragraph 19 that as soon as possible, after commencement of the
Constitution, the Governor would take steps for constitution of a District Council for each Autonomous District; and until such constitution of
District Council, the administration of such District was to vest in the Governor. Paragraph 19 further provided that the Act of Parliament or State
Legislature would not apply to such Autonomous District areas, unless the Governor by way of public notification would so direct and make it
applicable with such exception or modification as may be specified. Significantly, the Governor was also entrusted with the power to make
regulations for the peace and good governance of any such area and by such regulations, the Governor could have repealed or amended any Act
of Parliament or of the State Legislature or any existing law applicable to such areas. However, such regulations were subject to the assent of the
President.
We have referred to the aforementioned originally enacted provisions in Paragraphs 20, 12 and 19 of the Sixth Schedule for the reason that
these and some other provisions of the Sixth Schedule have gone through a substantial transformation with the enactment of Re-organisation Act of
1969 and the Re-organisation Act of 1971; and such changes are of direct bearing on the issue at hand. Relevant it is to notice that the said
notification dated 14.03.1966 was issued much before promulgation of the Re-organisation Acts of 1969 and 1971; and was issued under the
powers of the Governor of the State of Assam, as were available at the relevant time in Paragraphs 12 (1) (b) and 12 (2) of the Sixth Schedule.
The development of law after the aforesaid notification dated 14.03.1966 had been that by the Constitution (Twenty-second Amendment) Act of
1969, Article 244-A was inserted to the Constitution of India, enabling the Parliament to enact a law to give effect to the scheme for
Reorganisation of Assam by forming within the State of Assam an Autonomous State comprising wholly or in part any of the tribal areas specified
in Part A of the table Appended to Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule. This reorganisation scheme led to the enactment of the Assam
Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969 and as noticed, from the appointed day therein, an Autonomous State within the State of Assam was to be
formed, comprising the tribal areas of United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District and the Garo Hills District. In Section 66 of this Reorganisation Act of
1969, the provisions were made that, all law in force immediately before the appointed day would continue to be in force, until altered, repealed or
amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority. It was also provided that for the purpose of facilitating the application in relation
to the Autonomous State of any law made before the appointed day, the appropriate Government could make adaptations or modifications of law
within two years, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary. However, thereafter, full-fledged State of Meghalaya was
formed under the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971 comprising: (i) the Autonomous State of Meghalaya formed under Section 3 of
the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969; and (ii) so much of the territories comprised within the cantonment and municipality of Shillong,
which did not form the part of that Autonomous State. By the same enactment i.e., North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971, the States of
Manipur and Tripura were also established and the Union Territories of Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh were also formed. Extensive provisions
were made in this enactment for all such States and Union Territories and extensive amendments were also made in the related provisions in the
Constitution of India including those in the Sixth Schedule.
By the Eighth Schedule to the Re-organisation Act of 1971, the above noted changes were made in Paragraphs 12 and 20 of the Sixth
Schedule to the Constitution; and amongst others, Paragraphs 12-A and 12-B were also inserted. By virtue of Paragraph 12-A, specific and
distinct provisions were made as regards the application of the Act of Parliament and the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya to the Autonomous
District and Autonomous Region in the State of Meghalaya.
The question in the present reference relates to the Limitation Act, which is an Act of Parliament and in that relation, the relevant Clause (b) of
Paragraph 12-A could be re-read as under:-
12-A. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya to autonomous districts and autonomous regions
in the State of Meghalaya.- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,-
..... ..... .....
(b) the President may, with respect to any Act of Parliament, by notification, direct that it shall not apply to an autonomous district or an
autonomous region in the State of Meghalaya, or shall apply to such district or region or any part thereof subject to such exceptions or
modifications as he may specify in the notification and any such direction may be given so as to have retrospective effect.
In fact, similar provisions were made in the newly inserted Paragraph 12-B as regards the application of the Act of Parliament to the
Autonomous District or Autonomous Region in the Union Territory of Mizoram. The sum and substance of these provisions, as contained in
Paragraphs 12-A and 12-B, is that in relation to the Act of Parliament, the President may, by notification, direct that it would not apply to an
Autonomous District or an Autonomous Region or would apply to such District or Region or part thereof subject to the specific exceptions or
modifications; and such directions could be given retrospective effect too. Section 79 of the Re-organisation Act of 1971 provides that to facilitate
the application of any law in the State or Union Territory formed under the provisions of Part-II of the enactment, the appropriate Government
may, before expiration of two years from the appointed day, make such adaptations or modifications of the law as may be necessary or expedient.
It is further provided that once such adaptation or modification is made, the law shall have effect subject to such adaptation or modification,
until the same is altered or repealed by the competent legislature or the competent authority.
It is at once clear that the notification dated 14.03.1966, as issued by the Governor of Assam, whereby the Limitation Act was excluded from
its operation in the tribal areas of the State of Assam, ceased to be applicable to such tribal areas that ceased to be tribal areas of Assam and
became part of the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya w.e.f. 21.01.1972. The same position, with its contextual variation, has been declared by
the Hon''ble Supreme Court in relation to the tribal areas forming part of the then Union Territory of Mizoram and now forming part of the State of
Mizoram in J. Thansiama''s case after interpretation of the aforesaid provisions of the Reorganisation Act of 1971 and with particular reference to
Paragraph 12-B of the Sixth Schedule, as applicable to that case. In the very same decision, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has indicated its
disagreement with the reasoning in U. William Mynsong''s case but did not finally pronounce on the same, essentially for the reason that the
application of the Limitation Act to the State of Meghalaya was not the issue involved. However, on a comprehension of the entire matter, we are
left with no doubt that the very same principles, as enunciated by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in J. Thansiama''s case, apply for the purpose of the
present case too because, on all the material aspects, the provisions contained in Paragraphs 12-A and 12-B of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution are in pari materia and operate in the same field and are of same purport and effect. Further, it was clearly laid down by the Supreme
Court in Shillong City Bus Syndicate (supra), while holding the Employees'' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 applicable to
the Khasi Hills Autonomous District in the State of Meghalaya, that the transitional provisions of Paragraph 19 of the Sixth Schedule ceased to
operate with the constitution of the District Council; and until publication of a notification by the President, all Acts of Parliament, which are not
occupied by the provisions contained in Paragraph 3, shall be operative in the areas of the Autonomous Regions or Districts in the State of
Meghalaya too.
Obviously, the decision of Hon''ble Gauhati High Court in U. William Mynsong''s (supra) does not stand in conformity with the law declared
by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases in J. Thansiama and Shillong City Bus Syndicate; and in view of these decisions of the Hon''ble
Supreme Court, there remains little scope for any suggestion that the Limitation Act would not apply to the State of Meghalaya because of the
notification issued on 14.03.1966 by the Governor of Assam. The said notification, as held by the Supreme Court, ceased to operate as soon as
the areas to which it was applicable no longer formed the part of the tribal areas of Assam. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that once the
tribal areas in question within the State of Assam ceased to be so and came to comprise the territory of Meghalaya, the said notification dated
14.03.1966 by the Governor of Assam ceased to be applicable to such areas.
So far the letter dated 22.05.1989 is concerned, nothing much is required to be discussed about the same. Suffice it to notice that the said
letter was issued by the Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya while suggesting to the Regional Manager of the State Bank of India that
Limitation Act was not applicable to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya because of the said notification dated 14.03.1966. As already held,
the said notification had ceased to operate qua the tribal areas of Meghalaya; and the Limitation Act does apply to the entire State of Meghalaya.
The said letter, obviously proceeding on a wrong assumption of law, could only be considered redundant and ineffective.
It was sought to be suggested before us that Section 66 of the Re-organisation Act of 1969 and Sections 77 and 79 of the Re-organisation
Act of 1971 were not brought to the notice of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the decisions aforesaid; and the Limitation Act would not be
applicable in view of the said provisions. This submission remains entirely baseless for the simple reason that when the Hon''ble Supreme Court has
enunciated the law in relation to any particular issue, it is not open to suggest that any particular provision was not considered by the Hon''ble
Supreme Court. Moreover, it is distinctly noticed that in the case of Shillong City Bus Syndicate, the entire scheme of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution of India on all the relevant aspects relating applicability of the Act of Parliament to the area of an Autonomous District came up for
fuller exposition; and the Supreme Court expounded the principles in no uncertain terms, as noticed above. Moreover, in J. Thansiama''s case, the
Hon''ble Supreme Court, apart from the relevant reference to the provisions contained in the Sixth Schedule, has also distinctly taken note of the
Sections 77 and 79 of the Re-organisation Act of 1971; and, as noticed, the principles of J. Thansiama directly apply to the present case.
For what has been noticed and discussed herein above, we are clearly of the view that the Limitation Act, being an Act of Parliament and
having not been excluded in its operation by any notification issued by the President, applies to the entire State of Meghalaya including the tribal
areas.
Question No. 2
Whether the Law of Limitation is not applicable to the application seeking review of the order dated 05.03.2014 passed in PIL No.2 of
2013?
Even when we have held that the Limitation Act is applicable to the entire State of Meghalaya, the question still remains about the limitation in
relation to the application seeking review of an order passed in a Public Interest Litigation by this Court. Indisputably, a petition in the nature of
Public Interest Litigation is essentially a petition for issuance of writ/direction and is that of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. No limitation as such has been prescribed in the Limitation Act for such proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution; and review of an
order passed in such proceedings would also be essentially in the exercise of the plenary jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, even if the Limitation
Act applies to the State of Meghalaya, it is difficult to directly apply Article 124 thereof, prescribing the period of limitation of 30 days for an
application for review of an order passed by a Court other than the Supreme Court, to an application for review of an order passed in the
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, it cannot follow as a necessary corollary that an application for review of an
order passed in the proceedings under Article 226 could be maintained at any time, as desired by the applicant.
It cannot be gainsaid that the law of limitation is essentially based on public policy so as to ensure that there is an outer limit of bringing a lis for
seeking relief in the Court. In the case of the State of M.P. and others v. Bhai Lal Bhai: AIR 1964 SC 1006, the Constitution Bench indicated that
the reasonable standard for measuring the delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could be with reference to the
period of limitation prescribed for such an action in the Civil Court. The Hon''ble Court, inter alia, observed as under:-
....... It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil
Court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be
measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the
remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable. .......
The very same question as regards the reasonable period for filing an application for review of an order passed in a PIL was considered by the
Gauhati High Court in the case of Mori Riba and others v. Yomkar Riba and others: AIR 2011 Gauhati 181. Therein, while noticing that no period
of limitation was as such prescribed for such review application in the High Court Rules but with reference to the aforesaid decision in Bhai Lal
Bhai, the Hon''ble Court observed and held as under:-
In the face of the decision in Bhai Lal Bhai (supra), there can be no escape from the conclusion that the High Court''s jurisdiction is not
barred in considering an application for review of an order passed by it under Article 226 even if the application, seeking review of the
order, is made beyond the prescribed period of 30 days from the date of making of the order. When the High Court entertains an
application for review even after expiry of a period of 30 days, the High Court, as a measure of public policy, must be satisfied that there
were reasons preventing the applicant from making an application for review for reasons beyond his control.
It is, therefore, imperative that an application, seeking review of an order made under Article 226, discloses adequate reasons if the
application is not made expeditiously. If an application for review is found by the High Court to be suffering from negligence or latches, the
High Court may not entertain such an application for review in respect of an order passed by it even under Article 226. Though the Gauhati
High Court Rules, as correctly indicated in Sri Kanak Chandra Sarma, (AIR 1995 Gauh 82) (supra), do not prescribe any period of
limitation for making an application for review of order passed in a writ proceeding, the High Court may, in a given case, decline to entertain
an application for review of an order passed under Article 226 if the application for review is, inordinately, delayed and in the meanwhile,
the lis becomes stale. There can be no doubt that the High Court, as a Court of plenary jurisdiction, can review is own order passed under
Article 226 at any given period of time, the High Court would nevertheless, ordinarily, govern itself by the established standards.
Because of what has been discussed and pointed out above, while we agree with the observation, made in the case of Sri Kanak
Chandra Sarma (supra), that the Article 124 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would not apply to an application for review of an order passed
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we clarify that the High Court would not, ordinarily, entertain an application for review if the
same is made beyond the period of 30 days as prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, on the ground that the public policy is not to,
ordinarily, entertain an application for review beyond the period of 30 days from the date of making of the order. It would, however, remain
open to the High Court to entertain, in a given case, an application for review even if such an application is filed beyond the period of 30
days provided that the High Court is satisfied that the applicant has sufficient reasons for not being able to apply for review earlier.
In our view, the aforesaid decision of the Gauhati High Court aptly expounds and clarifies the law to be applied to the question of limitation in
relation to an application for review of an order passed in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and we find no reason to
take any different view of the matter. Hence, while respectfully agreeing with the aforesaid decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Mori
Riba, we are inclined to hold accordingly.
Conclusion
In view of the above, the answers to the referred questions are as under:
The Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the entire State of Meghalaya including the tribal areas of Autonomous Districts or Regions.
An application for review of an order passed by this Court in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should
ordinarily be filed within a period of 30 days from the date of making of the order but it would always remain open for the Court to entertain
the review application filed beyond this period of 30 days if the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the
application within such period.
With the aforesaid answer to the reference, the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the review application shall now be placed
before a Division Bench of this Court for consideration.
While concluding, we would, of course, put on record our appreciation that several learned members of the Bar indeed put across different
viewpoints and rendered valuable assistance to this Court in determination of the referred questions.