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1 The petition revolves around a minor child “Insiya†aged four years. Insiya is the daughter of the petitioner, who is an Indian citizen and the
respondent with dual citizenship, being a citizen of Netherlands and also a Pakistani National. The present petition is filed by the petitioner father,
being aggrieved by the order passed by the Family Court at Bandra on 29th January 2018, directing to return the custody of Insiya to the respondent,
who is directed to remain present before the Family Court on 27th March 2018.Â
2 The petition, as any other custody petition has been filed after going through an estranged legal battle between the parties fought in India as well
outside the boundaries of India in the Dutch District Court, and has travelled upto the High Court of Amsterdam and the Dutch, Supreme Court. In
order to appreciate the contention raised in the petition and to deal with the same, it is necessary to delve upon the chronology of events in a simplified
chronological manner, though the proceedings initiated by the parties against one another would make a long synopsis of events.
3 The petitioner is a Managing Director of a Multinational Steel Manufacturing and Commodities Trading Company, and has deep roots in the Indian
society. The petitioner and respondent got married on 29th April 2011 in accordance with the Islamic rituals in India. The marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent was registered under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The respondent was divorced prior to marrying the petitioner
and from the earlier marriage, she has a minor daughter Ms.Elvira Zeeshan Choudhry, whose father is a Pakistani National. Postmarriage, the
petitioner and the respondent chose Bandra (West), Mumbai, as their matrimonial home.  The daughter Insiya was born on 6th March 2014 in
Netherlands and she is a Dutch National. After the birth of Insiya, the respondent returned to India and was accompanied by her elder daughter
Elvira, who came to be admitted to an American International School in Mumbai. The respondent left India on 7th December 2014 and this is the
beginning of the tussle between the parties.  According to the petitioner, the respondent had taken Insiya and her elder daughter Elvira to
Netherlands for vaccination, whereas according to the respondent, it was mutually decided between the parties that they would relocate the family to
Amsterdam and it was decided that the respondent with the children would proceed ahead, followed by the petitioner. The respondent did not return
with the children and it is the specific case of the petitioner that in the intervening period, he visited Netherlands on 15 occasions to get in touch with
the respondent and his daughters, but he was granted a limited access, which was strictly monitored. At this point of time, the respondent made her
intention clear to continue staying in Netherlands and expressed her intention not to return to India.Â
From this point onwards, commenced the journey of the long rounds of litigation between the parties. On 23rd April 2015, the respondent instituted a
Quia Timet application for custody before the Dutch District Court and also sent a divorce notice to the petitioner. On 7th May 2015, the
respondent also instituted proceedings before the Dutch High Court seeking dissolution of marriage. At the same time, the petitioner also filed an
action before the Hague, District Court, alleging abduction and seeking return of Insiya by invoking the International Child Abduction Act of 25th
October 1980 (also referred to as “Conventionâ€). The petitioner alleged that the removal/retention of Insiyia without his permission attracted
Article 3 of the Convention and he alleged that said removal or nonÂreturn is in breach of the custody Rights under the law of the State in which the
child was happily residing immediately before her removal. The jurisdiction of the Hague District Court was invoked to decide a dispute between the
parties as to what was habitual residence of Insiya before her unlawful removal by the respondent, since the petitioner specifically asserted that
Insiya's habitual place of residence before her removal, was in India. The Hague District Court examined the issue and held that Insiya's habitual
place of residence upto 7th December 2014, was in India, and thereafter, the mother travelled to Netherlands with the children on 7th December 2014,
in order to allow Insiya to be vaccinated. The Hague, District Court concluded that Insiya's habitual place of residence during the period from 8th
December 2014 to 15th April 2015 was moved from India to Netherlands, and therefore, there was no case whatsoever of retention without
permission within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. In this background, the District Court rejected the father's application for return of
Insiya to India.Â
4 Being aggrieved by the said order of the Dutch, District Court, the petitioner preferred an Appeal to the Hague Court of Appeal, and the appellate
Court by an order dated 19th August 2015 upheld the order passed by the Court below. The Court of Appeal held that there was a case of change
of usual place of residence of Insiya due to action of the parties, and it can be assumed from those actions that the presence of Insiya in
Netherlands was not temporary or coincidental, and that the place of residence of the child expresses a certain integration in social and familial
surroundings. The Court of Appeal agreed with the finding of the Court below that there was unauthorized retention in terms of the Hague
Abduction Convention, and resultantly, it confirmed that order passed by the Dutch, District Court on 6th July 2015.
5 The respondent wife who had filed an application for custody of the daughter before the Dutch, District Court along with the petition for divorce,
resulted into an order being passed on 1st March 2016 in form of preliminary relief. By the said order, the placement order came to be passed in the
backdrop that the respondent mother had always cared for Insiya, and Insiya had lived with the mother, since they came to Netherlands from India in
December 2014 and considering her young age, the District Court held that it is in Insiya's interest that she be placed with mother Nadia Rashid.The
District Court, therefore, directed that Insiya, born in Municipality of Amsterdam on 6th March 2014, be placed with Rashid i.e. the mother, and
ordered to hand over the minor, if she is not already in the hands of the mother.
6Â The petitioner raised an issue of jurisdiction of the Dutch, District Court, in entertaining the proceedings for divorce and passing of order on 1st
March 2016 by way of an ancillary order. The objection raised was that the Dutch, District Court had no jurisdiction on the ground of Council
Regulation â€" (EC) No.2201/2003, concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matter of
parental responsibility (Brussels II Bis), since the wife had not lived in Netherlands for six months immediately prior to submitting her petition for
divorce. Further, the petitioner also claimed that it involved lis pendens because he had already instituted proceedings for divorce on 5th May 2015
to the Indian Court and they had commenced earlier than the proceedings filed by the respondent in Netherlands. On consideration of the Brussels
II Bis in relation to the usual place of residence, the Dutch District Court held that it did not have jurisdiction in law under Article 3 of Brussels II Bis
or on the ground of Article 4 Â and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.Â
The said matter was taken in appeal by the petitioner before the High Court of Amsterdam. The High Court considered the issue of jurisdiction and
the law of Brussels II Bis as well as Dutch Civil Procedure. The High Court also dealt with the contention of the wife that she is unable to attend
the proceedings going on in India, and it is impossible or unacceptable for her to attend the said proceedings, since according to her, she apprehends an
unfair trial and inequality of arms at stake. The High Court ruled against the wife and held that the Dutch Court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the woman's divorce petition and the same is applicable to ancillary reliefs requested by the wife. The order passed by the Court
below was thus set aside on the ground that the Dutch Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the wife's divorce petition with its ancillary
provisions. This order, however, came to be modified subsequently at a much later point of time on 12th January 2008, by the Dutch, Supreme
Court by holding that the Dutch Court had jurisdiction to decide ancillary matters of custody, but not divorce.
7 The events took a sudden turn, when the petitioner brought Insiya to India on 29th September 2016 and the respondent alleged that Insiya was
abducted by the petitioner. The respondent, therefore, initiated the proceedings resulting into the Interpol issuing a Diffusion Notice against the
petitioner and also issuing a Yellow Corner notice against Insiya. Further, amber alert  Europe was also issued for Insiya. The petitioner
instituted proceedings in the Bombay High Court, claiming a restraint order against CBI and the Bombay police from taking any coercive action
pursuant to the Diffusion Notice and Yellow Corner Notice and the interim protection was granted in favour of the petitioner, ultimately resulting
into the Interpol cancelling Diffusion notice. Attempts were also made for extraditing the petitioner from India and the Government of India
subsequently rejected the said Extradition Request by order dated 5th May 2017.
The child Insiya continued to be in custody of the petitioner from 29th September 2016.  Amsterdam, under the Hague Convention for return of
Insiya. In a petition filed by the husband under Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, before the Family Court, the respondent wife put an appearance
and raised an objection on jurisdiction of the Court to decide of custody on the ground that the child is a Dutch National and her ordinary place of
residence was at Netherlands at the time of filing of the petition.  The respondent alleged that the petitioner abducted the child from
Netherlands. The Family Court, on an application for interim custody of the child filed by the husband passed an order on 18th July 2017 continuing
the interim custody of Insiya with the petitioner till disposal of the petition.Â
8 The respondent wife moved a separate application challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to grant such a relief. The order dated 18th July 2017
came to be challenged before the High Court by filing a writ petition by the respondent wife. It was alleged that the said order was passed in
absence of petitioner and even her Advocate had withdrawn the vakalatnama. It was also pointed out to the High Court that she had moved an
application before the Family Court seeking reject/return of the petition and praying for direction to the petitioner to return custody of the minor child
Insiya to the mother. The Court considered the grievance made by the petitioner in the petition and after considering the tender age of the child
directed that it is appropriate that pending the decision in respect of a larger issue of jurisdiction and maintainability of the petition, the prayer (b) in
respect of custody of the child be decided without any delay. By consent of the parties, it was agreed that the issue of custody of the child would be
decided, pending the issue of jurisdiction of the Court. With this direction issued on 11th January 2018, the Writ Petition came to be disposed of by
this Court.
9 In the mean time, the respondent moved an application before the District Court, Amsterdam under the Hague Convention of Child Abduction,
praying for immediate return of the minor child. The claim of the mother was based on the Hague Convention of Civil aspects of International Child
Abduction on 25/10/1980(Convention). The said  application came to be decided by the District Court (Hague) on 22nd December 2017 and the
Court observed that Netherlands is a party to the Convention, whereas India is not a party to the Convention. However, by application of Article 2 of
the International Child Abduction Implementation Act, the law being applicable to the those cases of International Child Abduction that are governed
by the Treaty and in light of provisions of Articles 2 & 13 of the Child Abduction Implementation Act, the provisions of the Convention were applied
by analogy. The Court assumed the jurisdiction on the basis of Article 11 under 1 of Implementation Act and held that the Court of Hague had
jurisdiction to hear all cases regarding compulsory return of an Internationally Abducted Child to the person entitled to its custody and return of such a
child across the Dutch border. In furtherance of Article 12 under 1 of the Convention, the immediate return of a child is to be ordered if less than one
year has elapsed between the removal or retention of the child, and the date of filing of the request with the Court and since less than 1 year had
elapsed between removal of Insiya to India and the date when request was filed, the Court does not get around to the question, Whether Insiya has
integrated in India, and in principle, agreed that she must be immediately returned according to the Convention. The Court, therefore, ordered
immediate return of the minor child Insiya to Netherlands and directed the father to return the minor child to Netherlands and also to hand over the
necessary valid travel documents over to the mother.Â
10 Proceedings before the Family Court at Bandra in relation to the custody of the minor, were proceeded with as directed by the High Court, and the
issue of custody of the child was taken up for hearing, keeping aside the issue of the jurisdiction of the Family Court in Mumbai. The Family Court,
after hearing the application for custody, delved upon the entire chronology of events in the form of different proceedings filed before different
forums and also considered the balance of convenience in favour of the petitioner and respondent in the backdrop of the well accepted principle that
the child's welfare be of paramount consideration. The Family Court noted the present scenario where the child was being educated in American
School in India and proceeded to decide the question as to whether at interim stage, the child Insiya should be returned to her mother or whether she
should be retained by the father.  The Judge, Family Court, attempted to strike a balance between the claim made by the father to maintain Insiya
by showering her with all love, affection, stability, security etc on one hand, and the love and compassion of the mother on the other hand. The
Court  however, observed that the petitioner has not disclosed as to how the child was brought to India, in the back drop that she was the citizen of
Netherlands holding a passport of Kingdom of Netherlands and her visa had expired. On due  consideration of the entire matter, the Family Court,
Mumbai, by order dated 29th January 2018, directed return of minor child Insiya to the respondent and directed the respondent to remain present
before the Family Court to seek custody of the child.
11 It is in the backdrop of this factual matrix, the parties were represented by their respective counsel. I have extensively heard the learned senior
counsel Mr.Venkatesh Dhond appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Mr.Dhond would invite attention of the Court to the chronology of events and
would submit that the paramount consideration in the matter, should be the welfare of the child. He would submit that from 29th June 2016, the child
was with the petitioner and she is admitted in an International School in Mumbai. He would submit that the child has developed deep roots in India,
and the father and his family including grant parents are taking care of the child. In contrast, he would submit that the surrounding in which the
respondent mother was staying is not conducive to the healthy growth of the child, and he would specifically refer to the statement of the mother in
the pleadings reflecting that the mother is not financially sound and is dependent on the support from the State and she is residing in a house funded by
the State. His emphasis is also on the fact that the mother has a dual citizenship, being of Pakistan and Netherlands. The learned Senior counsel
would express his apprehension if the child is taken by the mother to Pakistan, he would be losing the child forever, and in such circumstances, he
would submit that the Family Court has grossly erred in granting custody to the mother by way of an interim relief. The learned counsel would also
submit that in light of the proceedings initiated by the petitioner in Netherlands, it is not possible for him to step into Netherlands to meet his daughter
and avail any access. The learned senior counsel would also submit that when the child was brought to India on 29th September 2016, she was
barely two years and was not following any language, but now she is conversant with the language spoken in the country and she do not speak or
understand Dutch language, which would make it difficult for her to settle and develop any ties in Netherlands and this would be nothing short than
uprooting a child at this age. He would heavily criticize the order passed by the Judge, Family Court, who has made the entire situation irreversible
in nature, and according to him, the interim order has virtually resulted grant of final relief, rendering his petition for custody, infructuous. He would
conclude and assert that the Family Court has fallen into a gross error in granting the relief.
He would rely upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pratik Gupta Vs. Shilpi Gupta(2018) 2 SCC 309Â dealing with somehow
similar situation, where the Hon'ble Apex Court continued the custody of the child with the father. He would submit that in the peculiar facts of the
case, the child who was approximately 5 years and spent half of his life in India, the Apex Court has held that it would be difficult for him to have
social, physical, psychological, cultural and academic environment which would be totally upturned by a transition which would result into his inherent
potential and faculties getting a set back. He would also place reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of V. Ravi Chandran
Vs.Union of India & ors (2010) 1 SCC 174 to emphasize the course to be adopted by the Courts of a recipient country.
12 As against this, the learned senior counsel Ms.Rajani Iyer appearing for the respondent would submit that the moot question is how the petitioner
has brought Insiya to India and she alleges that in breach of the judgments delivered by the Court in Netherlands, he had kidnapped the child and
brought her to India. According to the learned senior counsel, the assertion of the father has been disbelieved by the Dutch Court and it was the
conduct of the father which had disentitled him from availing access to the daughter, as in fact, according to the learned counsel, on 16th October
2015, in the divorce petition filed by the respondent, permission was granted to the petitioner to meet Insiya at a neutral venue. However, it is the
petitioner who lost this availment by his conduct. The learned counsel would question the circumstances in which little Insiya was transported into
India without any documents. The learned counsel would submit that based on this conduct of the petitioner, the state has foisted an action of
kidnapping and abduction against the petitioner, since it was an offence against the State and he is therefore, not entitled to visit Netherlands,
apprehending his arrest and stern action. As regards the contention of Mr.Dhond that the petitioner would provide a more healthy and conducive
atmosphere to India, the learned counsel would submit that the said claim is false and pretentious and she would invite attention of this Court to the
service report placed on record with the report of the bailiff and his statement reflecting that the mother of the petitioner had refused to accept the
notice on his behalf when an attempt was made to serve the notice at the address mentioned by the petitioner in the petition, by stating that he had no
connection with the son and he was not staying there. Learned counsel for the respondent would submit that mother is a natural and the preferential
guardian as far as the daughter is concerned, and in support of the said argument, she would rely upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Vivek Singh Vs. Romani Singh(2017) 3 SCC 231 . Learned counsel would also submit that the father has been declared as fugitive, and she poses a
question as to whether a daughter would be safe with such a father. The learned senior counsel would also pose a question by pointing out to the
chronology of events that if it is the case of the petitioner that the wife along with the daughter had moved to Netherlands in May 2014, but if he was
so concerned about the child and desirous of the custody, why did he wait till he filed a petition for custody in the Court in Mumbai only on 5th May
2015. According to the learned counsel, it is the specific case of the respondent and for demonstrating it, she has placed reliance on the various emails
exchanged between the petitioner and the respondent that the petitioner had an inclination to stay in Netherlands and in fact, attempts were made to
secure a job for her.  However, since he backed out, the respondent was left with no option, she being a citizen of Netherlands to select the said
country as her place of abode along with her minor daughter. In all such circumstances, the learned senior counsel would support the impugned
order passed by the Family Court and would submit that the said order is a well reasoned order and focused on the conduct of the petitioner by taking
into consideration in the circumstances in which the child was brought to India.Â
13 In the backdrop of the factual matrix involved in the matter, it is apparent that the parties have invoked the jurisdiction of the Courts situated
beyond the limits of this country and some proceedings are also instituted in India. The husband has initiated the proceedings seeking custody of the
daughter under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 by filing petition invoking provisions under Section 9, 17, and 25  of the Act. Â
In order to determine the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the issue which the petitioner has agitated in Petition No.DÂ40 of 2015, it would be
necessary to refer to the law prevailing in the country, dealing with the custody of a minor child. Section 9 of the Guardian and Wards Act which
determine the jurisdiction of the Court where the petition in relation to custody of a child can be filed, reads thus :
9Â Court having jurisdiction to entertain applicationÂÂ
(1) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place
where the minor ordinarily resides.
(2) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the property of the minor, it may be made either to the District Court having jurisdiction in
the place where the minor ordinarily resides or to a District Court having jurisdiction in a place where he has property.
(3) If an application with respect to the guardianship of the property of a minor is made to a District Court other than that having jurisdiction in the
place where the minor ordinarily resides, the Court may return the application if in its opinion the application would be disposed of more justly or
conveniently by any other District Court having jurisdiction.
14 It is evident from the statements and pleadings of the parties that after marriage, the parties have mutually started residing in India and till the
respondent wife moved to Netherlands, which according to the petitioner, is on the pretext of vaccination of the child, the parties were residing in
India. It is also not in dispute that the elder daughter came to be admitted in an International School in Mumbai. The core of dispute between the
parties lies in what circumstances, the respondentÂwife left India along with the child and both the parties have their own version. According to the
petitioner husband, the wife had travelled temporarily only for a limited purpose for vaccination, with no intention to leave the place of ordinary
residence which was in India, whereas according to the respondent wife, it was mutually agreed between the parties that they intended to shift to
Netherlands and the husband encouraged the wife to travel initially along with the children so that he could subsequently follow.
The test for determining the jurisdiction of the  Court under Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act is the “ordinary residence of the minorâ€
and the expression used is “where the minor ordinarily residesâ€. Whether the minor is ordinarily residing at a given place, is primarily a question
of intention of the parties and is to be tried as a question of fact. On occasions, it can be a mixed question of fact and law, but unless the jurisdictional
facts are admitted, it can never be a pure question of law capable of being answered in law in the backdrop of factual aspect of the controversy.Â
The word 'resides' definitely has a wider amplitude than the mere temporary stay or a casual stay at a particular point of time. The petitioner and
respondent have invited attention to this Court to several eÂmail communications in support of their respective contentions to determine the ordinary
place of residence of child Insiya. However, the facts reveal that after solemnization of the marriage in April 2011 till 7th December 2013, the parties
resided in Mumbai, except when the wife had been to Netherlands on a short visit for giving birth to Insiya, who was born in Netherlands on 6th
March 2014. The elder daughter of the respondent wife Elvira was admitted to an American International School in Mumbai, reflecting an
indication of the parties to settle in India. However, it is possible that the wife never intended to settle in India, as she was a citizen of Netherlands
and obviously, she had an intention to move to Netherlands and this intention was not divulged to the petitioner husband. However, once she left
along with the children and was in Netherlands, she made her intention clear, not to return back to India. In any contingency, the intention of the
parties in order to determine “ordinary place of residence†is a matter of evidence and would be dealt by the Court below during the proceedings
when the custody petition would be tried.
15 The issue involved in the petition crossed the boundaries of the country, and therefore, has to be looked at with an international perspective by
applying the principle of “Comity of Courtsâ€.  The principle of 'Comity of Courts' is derived and is deducible from the principle of 'Comity of
Nations'. According to the Blacks Law Dictionary, the jurisdictional Comity which can be understood as 'Comity of Courts' is a principle, in
accordance with which the Courts of one State or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and decisions of another, not as a matter of obligation, but out
of deference and where foreign decrees would get preference while deciding the case. The principle of Comity is an important doctrine applied in the
interest of maintaining harmonious relations among nation and it is a informal and voluntary recognition by the Courts of one jurisdiction of the law and
judicial decision of another.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ruchi Majoo Vs. Sanjeev Majoo (2011) 6 SCC 479 Â Â has held that a jurisdiction of Court is not barred in cases
involving child custody and removal of a child by a parent from a foreign country to India in contravention to the orders of the Court where the parties
had set up their matrimonial home. Just because some proceedings have been instituted, or are pending in a foreign court, or are decided, would
not be sufficient for Indian Courts to shut their jurisdiction simply because a foreign court has taken a particular view of any aspect concerning the
welfare of a child. The Courts in the country cannot shut out the independent consideration of the matter. The matter will have to be considered
objectively and the Court in the country would not merely succumb to the orders passed by the foreign courts and would not surrender their jurisdiction
in favour of the Courts outside the country deciding the issue. This however, should not be meant or construed to lead to an inference that an order
passed by a foreign court is not even a factor to be kept in mind, but it is thing to consider the foreign judgment to be conclusive and another to treat it
as a factor or consideration that would go into making of a final decision.
A Full bench of this Court was lately called upon to answer an issue as to whether conviction of an Indian by a foreign court for the offence
committed in that country can be taken notice of by the courts or authorities in India, and as to whether such conviction would be binding while
exercising judicial and quasi judicial powers. On an inÂdepth consideration of the principle of Comity of Courts, the Hon'ble  Full Bench observed
thus :
27] In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it appears to be a settled principle of law laid down by English Court that, though the decrees of penal laws
of foreign country cannot be enforced in United Kingdom, the laws of foreign countries and especially the countries with which the United Kingdom
has friendly relations, cannot only be looked into but on the principle of comity are required to be given due recognition.
34] We are of the considered view that, if we accept the argument that judgment and order of conviction and acquittal passed by the foreign Court
cannot at all be looked into by Indian Courts is accepted, it would have devastating result, of depriving a person of his right under Article 20(2)
and under Section 300 of Cr.P.C.
36] We further find that the said argument, if accepted, would also be against the public policy and principle of comity of Nations. Let us consider an
illustration.  An Indian citizen while residing in a foreign nation commits a crime involving moral turpitude and is sentenced for that offence by a
foreign court and after undergoing sentence, he returns to India and desires to contest elections, for which conviction for an offence
involving moral turpitude is a disqualification. If the argument of the Appellant that the judgment and order of conviction cannot be looked into is
to be accepted, not only it would be contrary to public policy of not permitting a person convicted for offence involving moral turpitude to contest
elections, it would also be against the breach of the comity which should exist between the countries. As observed by Lord Salmon in Oppenheimer
(cited supra), it would have an effect of embarrassing Indian Sovereign in its relations with other Sovereign States, whose independence it
recognizes and with whom it has and hoped to maintain normal friendly relations.Â
37] In any event, English Courts in the cases of Regazzoni (supra), Oppenheimer (supra) and EuroÂDiam Ltd. (supra) have consistently taken a view
that, though English Courts would not enforce a penal decree of foreign nation, they are not precluded from taking into consideration the foreign penal
laws. Not only that, it is their consistent view that, in order to avoid breach of comity, such penal laws should be given due recognition by English
Courts also.Â
In the result, the Court held that the conviction by Foreign Court for an offence punishable in that country can be taken notice of though it would not
be binding on the Courts and authorities in India and exercise its judicial and quasi judicial functions.
16 However, it is amply clear that the Comity of Courts demands consideration of any such order issued by the Foreign Courts, though it may not
necessarily call for its enforcement. In any contingency, the principle of Comity of Courts would not superimpose the interest and welfare of a minor,
which is the paramount consideration in dealing with the issues of custody of minor child. In such circumstances, the Court of competent jurisdiction
in the country is duty bound to deal with the matter, independently, in accordance with the law applicable in its country, and while doing so, it is
expected to take into account any judgment/decree/order passed by a Foreign Court. The Code of Civil Procedure in Section 13 has made it
imperative to recognize the decrees and orders passed by the Foreign Courts, though it would not bind the Courts in this country, and simply because
the Foreign Court has taken a particular view is not an enough reason to deprive the Court in this country from exercising its jurisdiction over the
issues, which fall within its territorial limits, and this Court would be at liberty to decide the said issues.
17 A this stage, it would be useful to refer to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court deciding with the principle of Comity of law in relation to
custody matter.
18 The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of V. Ravi Chandran Vs.Union of India & ors (2010) 1 SCC 174, while dealing with a Habeas Corpus
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for production of the minor child on a petition filed by the husband of Indian origin and a citizen of
United States of America and dealing with the allegations that the wife had taken the minor child, dealt with the issue about the Comity of Courts.Â
Their Lordships of the Apex Court observed thus in paragraph 29 and 30.
29 While dealing with a case of custody of a child removed by a parent from one country to another in contravention to the orders of the court where
the parties had set up their matrimonial home, the court in the country to which child has been removed must first consider the question whether the
court could conduct an elaborate enquiry on the question of custody or by dealing with the matter summarily order a parent to return custody of the
child to the country from which the child was removed and all aspects relating to child's welfare be investigated in a court in his own country. Should
the court take a view that an elaborate enquiry is necessary, obviously the court is bound to consider the welfare and happiness of the child as the
paramount consideration and go into all relevant aspects of welfare of child including stability and security, loving and understanding care and guidance
and full development of the child's character, personality and talents. While doing so, the order of a foreign court as to his custody may be given due
weight; the weight and persuasive effect of a foreign judgment must depend on the circumstances of each case.
30 However, in a case where the court decides to exercise its jurisdiction summarily to return the child to his own country, keeping in view the
jurisdiction of the Court in the native country which has the closest concern and the most intimate contact with the issues arising in the case, the court
may leave the aspects relating to the welfare of the child to be investigated by the court in his own native country as that could be in the best interest
of the child. The indication given in McKee v. McKee2 that there may be cases in which it is proper for a court in one jurisdiction to make an order
directing that a child be returned to a foreign jurisdiction without investigating the merits of the dispute relating to the care of the child on the ground
that such an order is in the best interest of the child has been explained in re. L (minors)6 and the said view has been approved by this Court in
Dhanwanti Joshi. Similar view taken by the Court of Appeal in re. H5 has been approved by this Court in Elizabeth Dinshaw.
19 The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ruchi  Majoo Vs. Sanjeev Majoo(2011) 6 SCC 479, while dealing with such a conflict operating in the
international scenario has observed thus :
We do not propose to burden this judgment by referring to a long line of other decisions which have been delivered on the subject, for they do not in
our opinion state the law differently from what has been stated in the decisions already referred to by us. What, however, needs to be stated for the
sake of a clear understanding of the legal position is that the cases to which we have drawn attention, as indeed any other case raising the question of
jurisdiction of the court to determine mutual rights and obligation of the parties, including the question whether a court otherwise competent to entertain
the proceedings concerning the custody of the minor, ought to hold a summary or a detailed enquiry into the matter and whether it ought to decline
jurisdiction on the principle of comity of nations or the test of the closest contact evolved by this Court in Smt. Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh
Sandhu and Anr. (1984) 3 SCC 698 have arisen either out of writ proceedings filed by the aggrieved party in the High Court or this Court or out of
proceedings under the Guardian & Wards Act. Decisions rendered by this Court in . (1987) 1 Mrs. Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw and
Anr SCC 42, Sarita Sharma's case (supra), V. Ravi Chandran's case (supra), Shilpa Aggarwal's case (supra) arose out of proceedings in the nature of
habeas corpus. The rest had their origin in custody proceedings launched under the Guardian & Wards Act.
The said judgment was delivered in a petition where proceedings were instituted in the nature of Habeas Corpus.  In the peculiar facts of the
case, the Court observed that though the Habeas Corpus proceedings are summary in nature, where the legality of detention is the alleged detriment,
is examined on the basis of the affidavits placed by the parties, nothing prevents the High Court from embarking upon a detailed inquiry in cases
where welfare of a minor is in question, which is the paramount consideration of the Court while exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction.  The
Hon'ble Apex Court also held that under the Guardians and Wards Act, it is open to hold a summary inquiry into the matter and pass an appropriate
order if it is otherwise competent to entertain the petition for custody of minor under Rule 9(1) of the Act. Their Lordships observed further as
under :Â
“Having said that we must make it clear that no matter a Court is exercising powers under the Guardian & Wards Act it can choose to hold a
summary enquiry into the matter and pass appropriate orders provided it is otherwise competent to entertain a petition for custody of the minor under
Section 9 (1) of the Act. This is clear from the decision of this Court in Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde (1998) 1 SCC 112, which arose out of
proceedings under the Guardian & Wards Act. The following passage is in this regard apposite:
We may here state that this Court in Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw (1987) 1 SCC 42 while dealing with a child removed by the father
from USA contrary to the custody orders of the US Court directed that the child be sent back to USA to the mother not only because of the principle
of comity but also because, on facts, -- which were independently considered -- it was in the interests of the child to be sent back to the native State.
There the removal of the child by the father and the mother's application in India 46 were within six months. In that context, this Court referred to H.
(infants), Re (1966) 1 ALL ER 886 which case, as pointed out by us above has been explained in L. Re (1974) 1 All ER 913, CA as a case where the
Court thought it fit to exercise its summary jurisdiction in the interests of the child. Be that as it may, the general principles laid down in McKee v.
McKee (1951) 1 All ER 942 and J v. C (1969) 1 All ER 788 and the distinction between summary and elaborate inquiries as stated in L. (infants), Re
(1974) 1 All ER 913, CA are today well settled in UK, Canada, Australia and the USA. The same principles apply in our country. Therefore nothing
precludes the Indian courts from considering the question on merits, having regard to the delay from 1984 -- even assuming that the earlier orders
passed in India do not operate as constructive res judicata.
20 Subsequently in a judgment delivered by the Apex Court in case of Nithya Anand Raghavan Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr (2017) 8 SCC 454 ,
the Hon'ble Apex Court reÂiterated its earlier view and observed that High Court should undertake elaborate inquiry by considering the question on
merits, bearing in mind the welfare of a child as of a paramount importance and reckoning order of Foreign Court only as a factor to be taken into
consideration, unless it thinks it fit to exercise summary jurisdiction. Their Lordships on consideration of the earlier law laid down on the said point
observed thus :
“The Court has noted that India is not yet a signatory to the Hague Convention of 1980 on “Civil Aspects of International Child Abductionâ€.
As regards the nonÂconvention countries, the law is that the Court in the country to which the child has been removed must consider the question on
merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and reckon the order of the Foreign Court as only a factor to be taken into
consideration, unless the Court thinks it fit to exercise summary jurisdiction in the interests of the child and its prompt return is for its welfare. In
exercise of summary jurisdiction, the Court must be satisfied and of the opinion that the proceeding instituted before it was in close proximity and filed
promptly after the child was removed from his/her native state and brought within its territorial jurisdiction, the child has not gained roots here and
further that it will be in the child’s welfare to return to his native state because of the difference in language spoken or social customs and
contacts to which he/she has been accustomed or such other tangible reasons. In such a case the Court need not resort to an elaborate inquiry into
the merits of the paramount welfare of the child but leave that inquiry to the foreign Court by directing return of the child. Be it noted that in
exceptional cases the Court can still refuse to issue direction to return the child to the native state and more particularly inspite of a preÂexisting order
of the foreign Court in that behalf, if it is satisfied that the child’s return may expose him to a grave risk of harm. This means that the Courts in
India, within whose jurisdiction the minor has been brought must “ordinarily†consider the question on merits, bearing in mind the welfare of the
child as of paramount importance whilst reckoning the preÂexisting order of the foreign Court if any as only one of the factors and not get fixated
therewith. In either situation â€" be it a summary inquiry or an elaborate inquiry  the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration. Thus, while
examining the issue the Courts in India are free to decline the relief of return of the child brought within its jurisdiction, if it is satisfied that the child is
now settled in its new environment or if it would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
position or if the child is quite mature and objects to its return. We are in respectful agreement with the aforementioned exposition.
21 In the light of the aforesaid judgment and the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court therein, it is clear that while determining the issue of
custody of a child, the option with the Court exercising the jurisdiction is either to conduct a summary adjudication or to proceed with an elaborate
inquiry, the situations in which either of the option can be exercised, being distinct in nature. While deciding the question of transmitting the custody
to either of the parents forthwith, the Court should take an immediate decision by conducting a summary inquiry, but if in view of the lapse of
considerable time gap, if the Court is considering the issue as to the entitlement of either parent for custody of the child, it can be done in form of
elaborate inquiry, keeping in mind that the welfare of the child. While doing so, the Court will also have to take into consideration the affiliation
which the child has developed to the new environment and whether removing a child from such environment would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm. There is no denial to the fact that the act of the parents unilaterally uprooting a child from a habitual residence and thereby
preventing access to the parent can prove to be traumatic experience for the child with potential deleterious effects on his/her psychological and
sociological well being. In any contingency, the matter will have to be decided by the Court on the sole and predominant criteria of what would be
the best interest of the child and what arrangement would subserve such an interest.  The elaborate inquiry would also take into account the
relevant factors including the stability and security of the child and arranging for an atmosphere/environment conducive to his development of
character, personality, talent.  In contrast to this, in a summary manner. the Court may deem it fit to return the child to a country from where the
child was removed, but that is the stage which has to be undertaken immediately and by a summary inquiry. The Court may refuse a relief of returning
a child to the country from where the child was removed, irrespective of a preÂexisting order of return of child by a Foreign Court.
This mechanism in either form is recognized as a well known mode to deal with the custody matters which are falling within the jurisdiction of the
Courts in India. Whenever the jurisdiction of the competent court in the country is invoked, by filing proceedings, it is open for the Court in the country
to which the child has been brought to first determine as to whether it would conduct an elaborate inquiry on the question of custody of the child, or
it would deal with the matter summarily to return the child to the country from which the child was removed, and let the Court of the country from
which the child was removed, investigate the various aspects of the child's welfare according to its own law. When once the Court decides to
exercise a jurisdiction in a summary manner, the Court would leave the aspects relating to the welfare to be investigated by the Court in his own
native country which would best subÂserve the interest of the child. However, when the Court decides to conduct elaborate inquiry, then it would
be required to go into the relevant aspects of the welfare of the child, including his security, his developing bonds with the environment in which the
child is presently to be found, and the possibility of the child developing as a good human being, by recognizing that, the child has developed roots in the
country in which he has been removed and his ties with the country from which he was removed, has been severed. It is to be noted that under the
Indian Law, a removal of a child from the matrimonial home by one of its parents without consent of another, in absence of an order of the Court, is
not an offence. India is not even a signatory to the Hague Convention of Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (October 25, 1980)
(Convention) which has come into effect from 1983 and 87 countries have contracted to the same. However, India being not a signatory to the said
convention, and since procuring the custody of a child by a natural father is not a crime, Courts in India are duty bound to decide the issue of custody
of the child by invoking the doctrine of parens partiae.
22 If this test has to be applied, then the chronology of events in the present litigation are of great relevance. The child was born in Netherlands on
6th March 2014, but the child along with the mother continued to stay in India from 20th April 2014 to 7th December 2014. It is from this date that
the child resided in Netherlands along with his mother. Amidst the proceedings which were instituted in the Dutch Court by the wife and the
proceedings for custody instituted by the husband in the Family Court in Mumbai, on 29th September 2016, the child was brought to India and since
then, the child is in India which is approximately a period of about 18 months.  When the child was taken by the mother on 7th February 2014, the
child was barely 8 months old and was not even a toddler. The child was brought to India by the father when she was 1 year 5 months old, and now
the child is approximately 4 years. Â
Perusal of the impugned order passed by the Family Court, would reveal that the order came to be passed on an application preferred by the wife,
praying that the Court should reject/return the petition filed by the husband, and the Court be pleased to direct the husband to return the custody of the
minor child Insiya to the mother. A specific case was put up before the Court by the respondent wife that the child Insiya was abducted by the
petitioner from Netherlands, and removed illegally from the custody of the mother, and the child was transported illegally without any travel
documents. The Court noted that the petition was filed on 5th May 2015 and after more than a year, the respondent had filed a written statement,
and thereafter, she did not appear in the matter. The Family Court took note of the fact that on 10th November 2016, the father had moved the
Court vide ExhibitÂ18 to retain the custody of the minor child Insiya, on the basis that Insiya was in his custody from 29th  September 2016, and the
Court passed an order on 18th July 2017, retaining the custody of the child with the petitioner. The Judge, Family Court proceeded to decide the
application filed by the wife, seeking return of custody of child Insiya, in terms of the directions issued by the Hon'ble High Court on 11th January
2018, by which the Court had directed the Family Court to decide the interim custody of the minor child within a period of two weeks from the date of
the order. This is how the Court proceeded to deal with the issue of custody of the minor.
After making a reference to the proceedings instituted between the parties, and the various orders passed therein, the Court noted that the matter has
not reached the stage of evidence and the petitioner husband had filed a compilation of documents reflecting how Insiya is happily leading a life of a
settled childhood in India, and he attempted to demonstrate that she would be deprived of good education in Netherlands, since in view of the poor
financial condition, the child would be required to put in a Free Government School for underprivileged children. Further, the father also attempted to
demonstrate that English language is a medium of education in India, and now, Insiya will suffer disabilities to communicate in Dutch language as she
has not learnt the said language. In reference to the said submissions advanced, the Judge, Family Court observed that these are the factors which
would be taken into consideration at the time of evidence and the limited question before the Court was “whether the custody of the child Insiya
should be returned to her mother or it should be retained with the petitioner?â€
The Court then observed that Insiya is a Dutch citizen and holding a Dutch passport and her visa had expired on 6th April 2015. By making
reference to certain orders passed by the District Court, Northern Holland on 16th October 2015, the Court proceeds to observe that the petitioner is
silent as to how the child was brought in India, and that he cannot benefit from his wrongful deed. The Court then also observed that the husband
had no order of any competent court to travel to India with Baby Insiya. In this backdrop, the Court observed that Insiya is Dutch National by birth
and Indian National by descent, and no doubt, the father is a natural guardian of Insiya. The Court then proceeds to observe that the welfare of the
child is to be considered at an interim stage and therefore, was of the opinion that the custody of the minor child be directed to be handed over to the
mother by way of an interim direction.
23 In the result, by the impugned order, the prayer as regards the jurisdiction issued raised by the wife in her application was kept pending.Â
However, prayer clause (b) granting custody came to be allowed, and the child is directed to be handed over to the mother on 27th March 2018 who
was directed to remain present to receive the child.
The approach of the Family Court, in light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court and in light of the principle of parens patriae appears to be totally
erroneous. The Family Court appears to have been influenced by the manner in which the child was brought to India in ignorance of the orders passed
by the Court of Hague in case C/09/539394 dated 22nd December 2017 and also the order  passed by the District Court, Northern Holland on 16th
October 2015 where the Courts had directed and permitted the wife to retain the custody of Insiya and also release the passport of Insiya to the
lawyer of the woman. The impugned order is therefore, based on the conduct of the petitioner, and the Court has made it clear that his conduct will
not benefit him in retaining the custody, and that the respondent wife was having a legal custody of baby Insiya.Â
24 The learned Family Court has erred in not considering that the application which was being decided was an interim application moved by the wife,
pending the issue of jurisdiction of the Family Court to grant relief. The Court has failed to take into consideration that the child Insiya was removed
away from the legal custody of the father under the alleged pretext of vaccination and ultimately, while deciding the petition for custody, the Family
Court would be dealing with the manner in which the child was removed from India to Netherlands and as to what was the intention of the
parties.  The matter has not yet reached the stage of evidence and it is in the proceedings filed before the Family Court claiming custody of the
minor child, all these issues would be gone into by adducing evidence. The Family Court, on an application filed by the husband (ExhibitÂ19), had
passed an order on 18th July 2017 permitting him to retain the custody of the child. While issuing the said order, no doubt the wife was not
represented, but while passing impugned order, the Court took note of the earlier order where the Family Court had observed that the petitioner being
father and natural guardian of the minor child, could not be charged with offence of kidnapping. However, on directions from the High Court by
order dated 11th January 2018 and on reconsideration of the issue, the Court by an interim order, directed the child Insiya to be handed over to the
mother.
25 The impugned order completely ignores the fact that the child Insiya is in India for last 1 ½ years and is admitted in a school. The father had
tendered on record the photographs of the child in the company of his grandÂmother, and have also tendered on record the progress of the child in the
school. The Court failed to take into consideration that if the child at this stage is to be settled in the new environment, she would be exposed to the
physical or psychological harm, since the child has gained roots in India. The child is not conversant with Dutch language and would feel
completely uprooted if transferred to Netherlands and is made to live in an atmosphere where the child is left only to the mother, whereas in India, the
child is in the company of the grandparents with lot of love and affection being showered on the child. The Judge, Family Court has failed to take
into consideration that by an interim order, if an attempt is made to uproot the child and transfer the child into a new environment, and if on final
decision on a custody petition, the court arrives at a conclusion, on consideration of the evidence adduced before it, that the father is entitled to the
custody of the child, the child will have to be again uprooted from Netherlands and to be placed back in an environment with which she wouldÂ
totally alienate herself during the intervening period. In the peculiar circumstances, since the Family Court is required to deal with the matter of
custody, by conduct of an elaborate inquiry, in order to work out the welfare of the child and then, to determine whether the father is entitled for
custody of Insiya, by way of an interim order, the relief of repatriation of the child to the father is not in the interest of the child and would rather
affect the physical, psychological, emotional and sociological well being and growth of the child at this stage.
The issue as to in what manner Insiya was brought to India, is of no significance since the parties in the petition before Family Court have
independently instituted proceedings in furtherance of the Hague Convention of 1980 “Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. As noted
above, India is not yet a signatory of the said Convention and as regards the nonÂconvention countries, the Court in that country to which the child has
been brought must consider the question on merits, wherein the welfare of the child and dealing with the order of the Foreign Courts only as a fact, to
be taken into consideration. The Family Court is duty bound to consider the issue of Insiya's custody by adopting an elaborate procedure, bearing in
mind her welfare and being not bound by the orders of the Foreign courts, the Family Court which is a Court of competent jurisdiction in India to
decide the custody of the child, and is at liberty to decide the said issue on its merits. No doubt, the Court would be duty bound to note the
judgments of the Court in Amsterdam and the Dutch Court, though it is not duty bound to enforce the said judgments. Insiya has been admitted in a
school in India and is blossoming from a toddler to a sensible child, and is standing at an age where she is capable of reacting to environment around
her, and it is not the case of the respondent that the father is not taking care of the child, except the term used by the learned Senior counsel Ms.Iyer,
that the father is a fugitive. From perusal of the proceedings, it is clear that both the mother and father have instituted proceedings against one
another, and which are being dealt internationally and even the Embassies and Consulates of the countries are involved. However, at this stage, the
righteousness of either party is not of any relevance except to the extent as to what would better subÂserve the welfare of the child.Â
Though the Comity of Courts is a principle of International acceptance, it would not partake the guiding principle in the custody matters being the
welfare of the child to be of paramount importance. The Family Court has completely lost sight of the said fact and was more influenced by the
custody orders passed by the Courts abroad and without either interviewing the child, or taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances
produced by the father on record, and without balancing the said circumstances, by way of an interim order, has chosen to pass the custody to the
mother. The said order is completely passed in ignorance of the principle of welfare and interest of the minor child and the consequences of shifting
the custody after a period of eighteen months when the child has gained roots in the Indian scenario. The Court ought to have taken into
consideration the existence of special circumstances in not repatriating the child to the jurisdiction of the Foreign Courts, which, in view of her bonding
with the father and his family and with the country for last 18 months, would cause tremendous mental and psychological harm to the child, who is
at the age of receiving love and affection and reciprocating the same.
26 The aforesaid view is fortified by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pratik Gupta Vs. Shilpi Gupta (Criminal Appeal No.968 of
2017)Â where the Hon'ble Apex Court dealt with the factual matrix of the matter somehow similar to the present case where a writ in the nature of
habeas corpus was issued by the Delhi High Court, directing the father to hand over the custody of a child, aged 5 years, to the mother. The parties
in the said petition had shifted to the United States of America and the child was residing in United States. However, in the backdrop of the marital
issues, the child was brought in India without any prior permission of the mother. Proceedings came to be filed in the Court in United States of
America in form of “Emergency Motion for return of minor child as established temporary custody†resulting into an order directing the father to
return the custody of the child to the mother. At the same time, the appellant husband instituted the proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights
under the Hindu Marriage Act before the Family Court at Delhi, seeking a decree for restitution of conjugal rights and a declaration that he was a sole
and permanent guardian of the child. He also filed proceedings in the High Court of Delhi, seeking a peculiar declaration that the proceedings filed
by the wife in the Court of U.S, are nullis juris.
Their Lordships, on consideration of the whole  gamet of facts involve, and a specific refusal of the wife to return back to India observed thus :
The gravamen of the judicial enunciation on the issue of repatriation of a child removed from its native country is clearly founded on the
predominant imperative of its overall wellÂbeing, the principle of comity of courts, and the doctrines of intimate contact and closest concern
notwithstanding. Though the principle of comity of courts and the aforementioned doctrines qua a foreign court from the territory of which a child is
removed are factors which deserve notice in deciding the issue of custody and repatriation of the child, it is no longer res integra that the ever
overriding determinant would be the welfare and interest of the child. In other words, the invocation of these principles/doctrines has to be judged on
the touchstone of myriad attendant facts and circumstances of each case, the ultimate live concern being the welfare of the child, other factors being
acknowledgeably subservient thereto. Though in the process of adjudication of the issue of repatriation, a court can elect to adopt a summary enquiry
and order immediate restoration of the child to its native country, if the applicant/parent is prompt and alert in his/her initiative and the existing
circumstances ex facie justify such course again in the overwhelming exigency of the welfare of the child, such a course could be approvable in law, if
an effortless discernment of the relevant factors testify irreversible, adverse and prejudicial impact on its physical, mental, psychological, social,
cultural existence, thus exposing it to visible, continuing and irreparable detrimental and nihilistic attentuations. On the other hand, if the
applicant/parent is slack and there is a considerable time lag between the removal of the child from the native country and the steps taken for its
repatriation thereto, the court would prefer an elaborate enquiry into all relevant aspects bearing on the child, as meanwhile with the passage of time, it
expectedly had grown roots in the country and its characteristic milieu, thus casting its influence on the process of its grooming in its fold.
The doctrines of intimate contact and closest concern are of persuasive relevance, only when the child is uprooted from its native country and
taken to a place to encounter alien environment, language, custom etc., with the portent of mutilative bearing on the process of its overall growth and
grooming.
It has been consistently held that there is no forum convenience in wardship jurisdiction and the peremptory mandate that underlines the
adjudicative mission is the obligation to secure the unreserved welfare of the child as the paramount consideration.
27 With the aforesaid observations, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the stay of the infant in United States was too little for the required
inclination of his social, physical, psychological, cultural and academic environment of United States, and the Court observed that it is not the case of
upturning the transitions, unless he was immediately repatriated and his inherent potentials and faculties would suffer an immature set back. The
Hon'ble Apex Court observed that there is no convincing material on record that the continuation of the child in the company of the father in India,
would be irreparably prejudicial to him. It was also observed that immediate restoration of a child is called for only on an unmistakable discernment
of the possibility of immediate and irremediable harm to it and not otherwise. In this background, the Apex Court concluded that on being the
biological father of the child, his custody by no means in law can be construed as illegal or unlawful and no writ of of habeas corpus could be issued.
 In the result, the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble High Court was quashed and set aside.Â
28 In light of the facts and circumstances and discussions above, the impugned order dated 29th January 2018 passed by the Family Court, cannot be
sustained, and is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside.
Though by the impugned order the mother was directed to remain present in the Court on 27th March 2018 to take over the custody of child Insiya,
the learned counsel for  the respondent wife had informed, during the course of hearing of the petition, that the mother is not in a position to remain
present on the said date and the date is required to be postponed.
However, considering the expediency of the situation, the Family Court, Bandra is directed to decide the custody petition filed by the petitioner
husband and also deal with the objection raised by the wife in respect of the jurisdiction of the Family Court to deal with the custody petition and the
proceedings are directed to be completed within a period of one year from today.Â
Writ Petition is allowed.
Rule is made absolute accordingly.