Sharda And Anr vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors

The petitioners have assailed the order dated 02.11.2020, whereby the petitioners, having been selected for training course for armors have been sent back from the training.

Facts appertain for the present purposes are that by way of communication dated 18.02.2020, the Deputy Inspector General, Training, requested Superintendent of Police of various districts to nominate and send name of one Constable from each unit for basic armors course, as per the vacancy position of 01.04.2020.

The petitioners' names were suggested by their respective units and in furtherance whereof they were nominated for the 'Basic Armor Course' vide order dated 09.10.2020.

Petitioners joined the training on 19.10.2020 and continued until impugned order dated 02.11.2020 came to be passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police - respondent No.5. By way of said order, petitioners were sent back from the training, as their service in the Police Department was of more than five years. The order cited order No.654 dated 23.03.2020 of the Inspector General, Rajasthan, which stipulated that a candidate will be eligible for technical course only during first five years of service.

The petitioners have not only challenged the order dated 02.11.2020, issued by the respondent No.5, whereby their nomination for 'Basic Armors Training' have been recalled, but also the order dated 23.03.2020, issued by the Director General of Police - respondent No.2, being the basis for revocation of their nomination.

Calling the order dated 02.11.2020 in question, Mr. Devasi, learned counsel for the petitioner firstly urged that the petitioners were duly selected by their units and the respondents with wide eyes open considered their candidature and nominated them for the concerned training. According to him, once the respondents have selected the petitioners for training, they have waived the eligibility criteria of having less than five years of service and, hence, they are bound by the decision they have taken, on the principles of estopple.

He contended that the respondents have changed the rules of the game after the selection was over, as second limb of his argument. Developing his argument, learned counsel submitted that since the process of selection began with issuance of communication dated 18.02.2020, according to which candidate's names were to be sent before 15.03.2020, the order of the respondent No.2 dated 23.03.2020 cannot be made applicable, as the process had already been set in motion.

Thirdly, impugning the very order of the Inspector General (dated 23.03.2020), whereby condition of having served for less than five years service, for being eligible for technical course, has been prescribed, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that such condition has no rationale or nexus with the object sought to be achieved. He vehemently submitted that order dated 23.03.2020 deserves to be quashed.

Learned counsel relied upon the judgment of Division Bench dated 04.04.2016, RPSC & Ors. Vs. Manju Chhaba & Ors.; D.B. SAW No.127/2016 and submitted that the impugned order dated 02.11.2020 so also the order dated 23.03.2020 deserves to be quashed and set aside on the principles of acquiescence.

Heard.

Dealing with the first argument first, this Court would like to highlight that process began with communication dated 18.02.2020 - Annex.1, sent by the respondent No.5 to all concerned. The said communication unequivocally provided that names for 'Basic Armors Training' be sent as per the vacancy position of 01.04.2020. The Cut-off date for eligibility was, therefore, 01.04.2020 and before such date the order of Inspector General dated 23.03.2020 has already come into being. As such eligibility of a candidate has to be determined as on 01.04.2020.

That the order dated 23.03.2020 had been issued by the Inspector General of Police, much thereafter the select list dated 09.10.2020 came to be issued. Merely, because the petitioners' names were sent by their respective units prior to issuance of order dated 23.03.2020, it cannot be said that the rules have been applied retrospectively or the rules of the game have been changed subsequently.

That apart, training acquiring 'Armors Basic Course' or training in a particular area is not a recruitment and it is internal process that too available for a very limited number of candidates based on nomination, the principles, which govern the selection process, cannot be used or applied for the present purposes.

Besides above, by 23.03.2020, even no step for nomination of the candidates had been taken. Only the names were suggested. The petitioners came to be nominated for the course, as late as on 09.10.2020. As a matter of fact, in the teeth of order dated 23.03.2020, issued by the Director General of Police, the petitioners names could not have been recommended and if recommended, they could not have been nominated.

Since, their names have been wrongly selected for training, this Court does not find any error in the action under consideration by which petitioners candidature/nomination as trainees has been set at naught.

This Court does not find any substance in the petitioners' challenge to order dated 23.03.2020, as well, because it is purely a policy matter of the State to decide as to which candidate should be nominated for technical course including their length of service and age.

If the respondents think that a person having served more than five years is not fit to be sent for technical course (including 'Armor Training'), this Court hardly having any expertise in such field, would hesitate to venture into such exercise.

So far as Division Bench judgment in Manju Chhaba (supra) is concerned, the same deals with recruitment of a candidate, who was permitted to take part in the examination, despite not having educational qualification on that date. Indisputably, the candidate concerned in the case of Manju Chhaba (supra), had acquired educational qualification, at the time of document verification etc., hence, facts involved in Manju Chhaba's case are entirely different and does not govern the facts at hand.

As an upshot of the discussion aforesaid, this Court does not find any merit or substance in the present writ petition.

The same is, therefore, dismissed in limine.

Stay petition also stands dismissed accordingly.