Sharad Goenka, Son of Sajjan Goenka vs The State of Bihar

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

As both the applications arise out of the same impugned

order, so they are being disposed of by this common judgment.

The petitioners are challenging order taking cognizance

dated 08.05.2013 passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial

Magistrate, Muzaffarpur in Complaint Case No. 2833 of 2012 (T.R.

No. 2202/2013-1896/14 under Sections 323 and 498A / 34 of the

Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that

petitioner in Cr. Misc. No. 29779 of 2014 is the husband and

petitioners in Cr. Misc. No. 16566 of 2014 are the father-in-law and

mother-in-law of the complainant. It is submitted that in fact the

complainant deserted her husband so he was compelled to file a

divorce suit on account of desertion prior to lodging of this complaint

case, thereafter in retaliation the present complaint case has been filed

by the wife and the allegation levelled against the petitioners are

general and omnibus in nature and the husband is still ready to keep

his wife/complainant. It is further submitted that the matter was

referred by the court to the Mediation Centre for settlement between

the parties but unfortunately it failed, so prosecution launched by the

complainant is malicious in nature. Moreover, no part of alleged

demand and torture was made at Muzaffarpur.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P. No. 2

submits that there is specific allegation against the husband and in-

laws of the complainant that after solemnization of marriage in the

year 2007, started assaulting and torturing her to realise further

demand of Rs. 15,00,000/- to purchase a flat. So the facts stated in the

complaint do constitute a prima facie case under Sections 323 and 498

of the Indian Penal Code and Sections ? of the Dowry Prohibition

Act .

The complainant''s case, in brief, is that, on 13.02.2007,

her marriage was solemnized with Sharad Goenka at Muzaffarpur.

The accused persons started making further demand of Rs.

15,00,000/- after marriage for purchasing a car and flat and used to

torture her. Initially her father assured to meet demand but after lapse

of three years, he expressed his inability, so they started again

torturing and assaulting her invariably. Father-in-law and mother-in-

law of the complainant used to make demand of dowry telephonically

from parents of the complainant and in the month of September, 2011,

accused persons assaulted her and also ousted from the matrimonial

house keeping her jewellary and belongings, so her father brought her

to Muzaffarpur.

Having considered the rival submissions and on perusal

of record, it is apparent that allegation levelled in the complaint

petition does make out a prima facie case under Sections 323 and

498A / 34 of the Indian Penal Code as well as under Sections 3 and 4

of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the petitioners. The defence of

the petitioners at pre-trial stage cannot be considered.

In the case at hand, there is specific allegation in the

complaint that the father-in-law and mother-in-law of the complainant

invariably used to make demand of further dowry from the parents of

the complainant living at Muzaffarpur and threatened to kick her out

from her matrimonial home if demand of Rs. 15,00,000/- is not

fulfilled. Ultimately, she was ousted as further demand of dowry of

Rs. 15,00,000/- was not realized.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunita

Kumari Kashyap v. State of Bihar reported in (2011)11 SCC 301,

observed as under:

It is true that Section 177 of the Code refers to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. Though the expression "cause of action" is not a stranger to criminal cases, in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code and in the light of the specific averment in the complaint of the appellant herein, we are of the view that the said decision is not applicable to the case on hand."

In this case, the Hon''ble Supreme Court further

observed as follows:

"18. We have already adverted to the details made by the appellant in the complaint. In view of the specific assertion by the appellant-wife about the ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands of the husband and his relatives at Ranchi and of the fact that because of their action, she was taken to her parental home at Gaya by her husband with a threat of dire consequences for not fulfilling their demand of dowry, we hold that in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code, the offence in this case was a continuing one having been committed in more local areas and one of the local areas being Gaya, the learned Magistrate at Gaya has jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted therein. In other words, as the offence was a continuing one and the episode at Gaya was only a

consequence of continuing offence of harassment and ill- treatment meted out to the complainant, clause (c) of Section 178 is attracted. Further, from the allegations in the complaint, it appears to us that it is a continuing offence of ill- treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant at the hands of all the accused persons and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all had taken part and on other occasions one of the accused, namely, the husband had taken part, therefore, undoubtedly clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code is clearly attracted."

Section 179 of the Cr.P.C. reads as follows:

"179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues.- When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued."

In the present case, there is specific assertion in the

complaint regarding making of demand of dowry telephonically by

father-in-law and mother-in-law from parents of the complainant

residing at Muzaffarpur in Bihar. Ultimately, as the demand of Rs. 15

lacs was not realized then complainant was kicked out of the

matrimonial home and forced to go to her parents home at

Muzaffarpur so a part of occurrence was committed at Muzaffapur,

moreover, in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Cr.P.C., it is a

continuing offence having been committed in more local areas and

one of the local areas where demand was made telephonically is at

Muzaffarpur, so the learned Magistrate at Muzaffarpur has

jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted therein. So for

the aforesaid reasons, both the petitions stand dismissed.