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Judgment
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 194 of 2024, dated 26.11.2024, registered at Police Station, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act).
It has been asserted that as per the prosecution, the police intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. DL-5CJ-3249, being driven by Dhan Raj, in which the petitioner and co-accused Khim Kumari were travelling. The police recovered a black bag containing 11 packets of cannabis/charas weighing 6.805 kg. No recovery was effected from the exclusive and conscious possession of the present petitioner. The police had filed the charge-sheet before the learned Trial Court on 24.02.2025. The investigation is complete, and the petitioner's custodial interrogation is not required. The prosecution has cited 17 witnesses, and the conclusion of trial is likely to take some time. The petitioner had filed a bail petition before this Court, which was registered as Cr. M.P.(M) No. 1595 of 2025 and was dismissed on 22.09.2025. The petitioner is a Nepali citizen who had visited India for her medical treatment. She is the sole caretaker of her five minor children. The petitioner is entitled to special consideration as a woman. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on 26.11.2024. They were checking the vehicles near Malyavar Link Road. A car bearing registration No. DL-5CJ-3249 came to the spot at 10:45 am. The driver appeared to be frightened after seeing the police. The passenger in the rear seat tried to conceal the bag beneath her feet. The police joined Chaman Chandel and Het Ram as witnesses. The driver identified himself as Dhan Raj. The passenger on the front seat identified herself as Sanu Maya Taamad (the present petitioner), and the passenger on the rear seat identified herself as Khim Kumari. The police checked the backpack kept near Khim Kumari’s feet and recovered 6 kg 805 grams of cannabis kept in 11 packets. The police seized the cannabis and arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The cannabis was sent to the SFSL, Junga, for analysis, and as per the result of the analysis, it was found to be a sample of charas. The prosecution has cited 17 witnesses, out of whom the statements of 9 witnesses have been recorded. The statements of 8 witnesses are to be recorded, and the matter is listed on 26.09.2026 for recording the statements of the prosecution witnesses. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of her release on bail, and she would abscond to Nepal. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
I have heard Ms Rajni Gandhi, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
Ms Rajni Gandhi, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and she was falsely implicated. No charas was recovered from the petitioner's conscious possession. She was merely travelling in the vehicle to get herself medically treated. The police have failed to complete the evidence despite the lapse of more than one year from the date of the petitioner's arrest, which violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. The police have filed the charge-sheet before the Court, and no useful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was found travelling in the vehicle from which the police had recovered a commercial quantity of charas. The rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case, and the petitioner has not satisfied the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The statements of 09 witnesses have been recorded, and the trial is progressing at a normal pace. The petitioner would abscond in case of her release on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the Bar and have gone through the record carefully.
It is undisputed that the petitioner had filed a bail petition, which was registered as Cr. M.P.(M) No. 1595 of 2025 and was dismissed on 22.09.2025. The petitioner filed an SLP (Criminal) Diary no. 22148/2026 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, which was dismissed on 15.05.2026. It was held in the State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.
Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held:
“11.In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.”
A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
9.When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.
This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra(2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed:
30.Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.
It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed:
7.It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances, settled by law, is a change in the factual situation or law that requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstances has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail applications need to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking, resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue, and there would be wastage of the Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstances as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.”
Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered based on the change in the circumstances, and it is impermissible to review the order passed by the Court.
The Court had earlier found, while deciding the earlier bail petition, that the petitioner was prima facie found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas. She had not satisfied the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and she was not entitled to bail. These considerations have not changed.
It was submitted that the prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. This submission cannot be accepted. The status report mentions that the prosecution has cited 17 witnesses, out of whom the statements of 9 witnesses have been recorded, and the statements of 08 witnesses are yet to be recorded. The recording of statements of 09 witnesses does not show any delay in the progress of the trial. Further, the petitioner has not filed the copies of the order-sheets to demonstrate that the delay is attributable to the prosecution or the Court and not to the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail because of the violation of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial.
The petitioner was prima facie found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas, and she has not satisfied the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, she cannot be held entitled to bail.
No other point was urged.
In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.