Shankar Lal vs Sohal Lal and Another

Arun Tandon, J.—Heard Sri Rahul Sripat learned Counsel for the Appellant.

Shankar Lal, Plaintiff-Appellant filed Original Suit No. 179 of 1986 against one Sohan Lal and Ors. (since deceased and substituted by legal heirs) for cancellation of the registered sale-deed dated 23rd May, 1984. In the suit, by means of the amendment, a further prayer was added for declaring Hebaynama dated 13th July, 1987 executed by the purchaser of the property under the aforesaid sale-deed as null and void. The purchaser of the property in his individual capacity filed Original Suit No. 186 of 1986 for permanent injunction restraining the Appellant, Shanker Lal from interfering in his possession over the disputed property subject matter of aforesaid sale-deed. Both the suits were clubbed together and were finally decided under the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 29th July, 2008. The Court dismissed the suit insofar as it pertained to the relief of declaring the sale-deed dated 23rd May, 1984 as null and void. However, the suit for declaration of the Hebaynama executed by the purchaser of the property dated 13th July, 1987 as null and void, was decreed. The suit filed by the purchaser of the property, namely, Sohan Lal/legal heirs was decreed and the Appellant, Shankar was restrained from interfering in his possession over the property in dispute. Shanker filed two appeals being Civil Appeal Nos. 217 and 218 of 2008. Both the appeals have been decided and dismissed under a common judgment dated 24th November, 2010. Hence the present two second appeals.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant contends before the Court that against part of the judgment and decree of the trial court, whereby Hebaynama was declared as null and void, no appeal was filed by Sohan Lal/legal heirs and therefore, that part of the judgment and decree became final. Despite there being no challenge to the aforesaid part of the judgment and decree, the appellate court under the impugned judgment dated 24th November, 2010 has proceeded to hold that part of the judgment and decree of the trial court whereby the Hebaynama was declared as null and void as not in accordance with law and therefore, it has proceeded to not only to dismiss the appeal but also to dismiss the suit filed by the present Appellant in its entirety, this according to the learned Counsel for the Appellant was legally not permissible.

This Court may record that once the relief of the Plaintiff-Appellant qua the sale-deed being declared as null and void had been rejected by the trial court, the Plaintiff ceased to have any locus to challenge the Hebaynama executed by the purchaser of the property, inasmuch as title in the property with the dismissal of the suit for cancellation of the sale-deed, stood affirmed in favour of the purchaser of the property and therefore, he had every right to deal with the property in the manner he so chose. The Plaintiff-Appellant had no interest or right in the property subject matter of Hebaynama and therefore, no decree in respect thereof could be granted in his favour, whatever may have the illegality in the execution of the Hebaynama (if any).

It is settled law that all Courts of law are established for furtherance of interest of substantial justice and not to obstruct the same on technicalities. Reference- Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal Vs. National Building Material Supply Gurgaon, wherein it has been held that if substantial justice and technicalities are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice should not be defeated on technicalities. No procedure in a Court of law should be allowed to defeat the cause of substantial justice on some technicalities. Reference- Ghanshyam Dass and Others Vs. Dominion of India and Others,

In the facts of the case, this Court has no hesitation to record that the Additional District Judge/appellate authority has rightly declared the Hebaynama as null and void. The part of the decree of trial court, whereby the Hebaynama was declared as illegal even after refusing to grant the relief for cancellation of the sale-deed was wholly unsustainable. Such orders do not warrant any interference.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant then contended that the findings recorded by the trial court as well as by the appellate court that no oral evidence contrary to the documentary evidence could be pleaded, is legally not correct.

The contention so raised on behalf of the Appellant is misconceived. It is settled law that no oral evidence can be led for disputing the correctness of the facts recorded in the registered sale-deed. No question of law much less any substantial question of law arises in both the appeals.

Both the appeals are therefore, dismissed under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.