Shambhu Mehta vs The State Of Bihar & Ors.

(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESH CHAND MALVIYA)

Date : 17-08-2026 Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State.

The present criminal appeal under Section 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C) arises out of the judgment and its order dated 09.08.2024 passed by the Additional Session Judge-III, Supaul, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) in Session Trial No. 361 of 2022 arising out of Chhatapur P.S. Case No. 146 of 2022 by which the respondent no. 2 and 3 have been acquitted of all the charges.

The prosecution case is based on the fardbeyan of the informant Shambhu Mehta, son of the deceased Pushplal Mehta @ Kusumlal Mehta, recorded on 25.04.2022 at about 9.45 a.m., wherein he alleged that on 24.04.2022 he, along with his family members, had gone to Birpur to attend the marriage of the daughter of his wife's sister, while his father remained at home with his sister, Rani Devi. In the intervening night of 24/25.04.2022, Rani Devi heard a sound but, assuming it to be the sound of fireworks on account of the marriage, went back to sleep. On 25.04.2022 at about 5.30 a.m., his sister and uncle found his father dead in a pool of blood to the east of the cow-shed and godown, and brought him to the baramda of the house, blood continuously oozing from a hole caused by firing on the left side of his back. The informant alleged that Mina Devi, wife of his younger brother (respondent no. 2), was a lady of easy virtue whose house was frequented by unknown persons, and that when the informant and his father protested, Mina Devi and her daughters, Gudiya Kumari (aged 20 years) and Puja Kumari (aged 19 years), used to threaten them with life. He raised suspicion that Mina Devi and her two daughters, with the help of two-three unknown persons, killed his father, and that Sarpanch Nand Kishore Mehta of Rejeshwari Purvi Panchayat, who also used to visit Mina Devi's house, was involved in the killing.

On the basis of the aforesaid fardbeyan, Chhatapur P.S. Case No. 146 of 2022 was registered under Sections 302, 120(B) of 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘I.P.C.’) read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, and investigation was started.

After completion of investigation, Charge-sheet No. 321 of 2022 dated 22.07.2022 was submitted under Sections 302, 120(B)/34 of the I.P.C. read with Section 27 of the Arms Act against the respondent no. 2 and 3, keeping investigation pending against other accused persons.

Cognizance was taken on 27.08.2022 under Sections 302, 120(B)/34 of the I.P.C. read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, and charge was framed on 17.10.2022, to which the respondent no. 2 and 3 pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

In the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as seven witnesses and exhibited documentary evidence, as detailed here under:

Exhibit- 4 Signature of the Informant on Fardbeyan

Learned Trial Court examined the evidence of seven prosecution witnesses (PW-1 to PW-7) on the point of facts and also examined the documentary evidence on record.

Learned Trial Court found from the evidence of PW-1 Jay Prakash Mehta, brother-in-law of the informant, who deposed that unknown persons used to frequent the house of the deceased's daughter-in-law, Meena Devi, which was opposed by the deceased and his son, over which Meena Devi used to threaten them. In cross-examination, however, he admitted that the accused were named on the basis of suspicion and that no family member had witnessed the occurrence, rendering him an interested witness who, in his examination-in-chief, had not stated when or by whom any such threat was last extended, nor alleged the loose character attributed to Meena Devi and her daughters in the fardbeyan.

However, the learned Trial Court noted that PW-2 Rani Devi, sister of the informant, similarly deposed to unknown persons visiting Meena Devi's house and to threats extended by Meena Devi and her daughters, but admitted in cross-examination that she had not witnessed the occurrence, that no one was present at the scene when she and one Vishwanath Mehta first reached it, and that she had not seen anyone fire the shot. She too was found to be an interested witness who did not depose, in her examination-in-chief, as to the timing of any final threat or the alleged loose character of the accused.

The Court further found that PW-5 Kusheshwar Mehta, an independent witness, deposed only to village rumor that the deceased had been murdered by his granddaughter-in-law and granddaughter, without stating why or for what reason, and admitted in cross-examination that the police had never questioned him in connection with the case, showing that he had no personal knowledge of the occurrence. PW-6 Rajendra Mehta @ Rajendra Singh, also an independent witness, deposed that the deceased had complained to him about Mithilesh Kumar's visits to Meena Devi's house, but admitted in cross-examination that he had not witnessed the occurrence and did not know who had filed the case or against whom, and did not, in either his examination-in-chief or cross-examination, state when or by whom the deceased was last threatened with death. His evidence was accordingly found to be hearsay and unreliable.

On the testimony of PW-7 Shambhu Mehta, the Trial Court observed that the informant and son of the deceased, deposed to Mithilesh Kumar's visits to Meena Devi's house and to a threat allegedly extended by Mithilesh Kumar to the deceased, but admitted in cross-examination that he had not witnessed the occurrence and was at Birpur at the time. He further admitted that the deceased himself used to look after and financially support his widowed daughter-in-law, Meena Devi, and that he (the informant) had never objected to this a circumstance which the learned Trial Court held was inconsistent with any enmity between the deceased and Meena Devi, and rendered it an exaggeration to suggest that Meena Devi had murdered, or caused the murder of, her father-in-law.

Further the learned Trial Court found that PW-4 Baiju Kumar, the Investigating Officer, deposed to recovery of a soiled stall/scarf and a pair of slippers from the place of occurrence, and of mobile phones and a motorcycle from the accused, but admitted in cross-examination that no test identification parade of the recovered stall and slippers was conducted, that the weapon of offence was never recovered, that no witness supported the claimed distance of firing, and that the directions of the supervising SDPO were not fully complied with leading the learned Trial Court to find the investigation scientifically deficient and unsupported by any corroborative material. PW-3 Dr. Shravan Kumar confirmed that the death was caused by a gunshot injury and that a bullet was recovered from the body, but the Investigating Officer had failed to seize any firearm from the possession of either accused.

In their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. recorded on 08.12.2023, the accused denied the charges and claimed innocence, while the defence led no oral or documentary evidence. Learned Trial Court observed that since the case rested wholly on circumstantial evidence in the absence of any eye-witness, examined the same on the touchstone of the five golden principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 (para 152) namely, that the circumstances must be fully established; must be consistent only with the guilt of the accused; must be conclusive in nature; must exclude every other hypothesis; and must form a complete, unbroken chain leaving no reasonable ground for any conclusion consistent with innocence. Applying the aforesaid principles, the learned Trial Court found that no witness had stated with certainty when the deceased was last threatened, when the accused were last seen with the deceased before his death, or by which accused and in what manner the threat of death was extended, nor was it established when the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused.

The Trial Court further observed that although PW-1, PW-2 and PW-7 spoke generally of recurring threats, the prosecution had failed to lead any circumstantial evidence capable of establishing that the accused had, by conspiracy, murdered the deceased Pushplal Mehta @ Kusumlal Mehta. Accordingly, the learned Trial Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove that unknown persons frequenting Meena Devi's house which was opposed by the deceased and the informant furnished the motive for Meena Devi, her daughters, and others to conspiratorially murder the deceased.

Learned counsel for appellant submits that the seized motorcycle and mobile set used by the respondent no. 2 in the course of the crime were not exhibited; the pellet found in the postmortem was also not exhibited; the stall of the respondent no. 2 found near the dead body was also not exhibited; and the C.D.R. report of the mobile sets of the respondent no. 2 and co-accused Puja Kumari, used in the course of, and before and after, the crime, was not exhibited. Upon examination of the materials available on the case record, the counsel submits that it is evident that the finding of the learned Trial Court is against the settled principles of law. It is submitted that although there is no eye-witness to the heinous crime of murder, there is strong circumstantial evidence against the accused persons, specially against the respondent no. . (2) and (3) and co-accused Gudiya Kumari.

Learned counsel further submits that all the prosecution witnesses have supported that the respondent no. . 3 is the widow daughter-in-law (bahu) of the deceased, and that the deceased was a retired Government teacher who did not like any outsider visiting her house, as she had two younger daughters. The respondent no. 2 and her daughters used to threaten the life of the deceased for his raising objection to persons visiting their house. He next submits that on the basis of the C.D.R. of the mobile sets bearing SIM No. 9801743341 of the respondent no. 3 and SIM No. 8092028048 of co-accused Gudiya Kumari, it has come to be known that on the alleged date of occurrence, from 8.38 p.m to 11.16 p.m., there was a long conversation, at several times, on mobile No. 9155754125 of the respondent no. 2. It is further submitted that co-accused Gudiya Kumari used four SIMs bearing Nos. (i) 8092028048, (ii) 8409430773, (iii) 7091021610 and (iv) 9155754125 in a mobile set bearing IMEI No. 353196880476710, and that SIM No. 9155754125, issued in the name of the respondent no. . (2), had talked 170 times on SIM No. 9122521312, issued in the name of the respondent no. 2. The tower location of mobile No. 9122521312 was found near the place of occurrence from 09.16 p.m.

He next submits that after the occurrence, SIM No. 9122521312 was closed by the respondent no. 2, and co-accused Gudiya Kumari also closed all her four SIMs. It is also humbly submitted that although the respondent no. 2 closed his SIM No. 9122521312, he was using SIM No. 9534470406 from the same mobile set, and on the basis of the location of SIM No. 9534470406, the respondent no. 2 was arrested along with motorcycle No. BR-50J-7447. His confessional statement was recorded, in which he accepted that he had committed the crime at the instigation of Gudiya Kumari, with whom he had been in love since February 2020. He also accepted that the stall recovered near the place of occurrence belonged to him and had been gifted to him by co-accused Gudiya Kumari. Learned counsel finally submits that under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is established that the respondent no. 2 killed the deceased at the instigation of the respondent no. 3 and co-accused Gudiya Kumari. He also submits that there is strong circumstantial evidence, and the chain of circumstances is not broken but is complete; the respondent no. (2) and (3) are not innocent persons and have committed the offence punishable under Section 302, 120(B)/34 of the I.P.C. read with Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Learned counsel submits that the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 09.08.2024 is well-reasoned, based on a correct appreciation of the evidence on record, and does not call for any interference by this Hon'ble Court. He submits that the learned Trial Court has rightly held that the present case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, there being no eye-witness to the occurrence, and that the same was correctly examined on the touchstone of the five golden principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622, none of which stood satisfied on the facts of the present case.

He further submits that PW-1, PW-2 and PW-7, though claiming to support the prosecution case in their examination-in-chief, categorically admitted in cross-examination that they had not witnessed the occurrence and had named the respondents only on the basis of suspicion, and were therefore rightly held to be interested witnesses whose testimony could not be relied upon to sustain a conviction. He next submits that PW-5 and PW-6 admitted in cross-examination that they had no personal knowledge of the occurrence and had merely deposed on the basis of village rumor, without stating how, why, or by whom the deceased was killed, and their evidence was therefore rightly discarded as hearsay and unreliable. It is submitted that not a single prosecution witness was able to state when, where, or by whom the deceased was last threatened, or when the respondents were last seen in the company of the deceased, which are essential links required to complete the chain of circumstances in a case based on circumstantial evidence, and their absence is fatal to the prosecution case.

Learned counsel submits that the alleged weapon of offence was never recovered from the possession of either respondent, no test identification parade of the recovered stall and slippers was conducted, and the confessional statement of the respondent Mithilesh Kumar was never exhibited, and therefore the learned Trial Court rightly declined to place any reliance on such infirm and unproved material. It is submitted that the Investigating Officer himself admitted in cross-examination that the directions of the supervising SDPO were not fully complied with and that the investigation suffered from material lapses, and the benefit of such deficient and unscientific investigation must necessarily ensure to the respondents.

Learned counsel for the respondents submits that PW-7, the informant himself, admitted that the deceased used to look after and financially support his widowed daughter-in-law, respondent Meena Devi, and that he had never objected to the same, which circumstance is wholly inconsistent with the existence of any motive or enmity between the deceased and the respondent Meena Devi, as rightly appreciated by the learned Trial Court. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that mere suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof, and the prosecution having failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances pointing unerringly to the guilt of the respondents and excluding every hypothesis of innocence, the learned Trial Court rightly extended the benefit of doubt to the respondents.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the Trial Court records along with the impugned judgment and the material available on the Trial Court record.

The law on this point is well settled: oral evidence, to be relevant and admissible, must be direct, and must be given by a person who has himself seen, heard, or otherwise perceived the fact deposed to. Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’) reads as follows:

Applying this well-settled principle, this Court finds that not a single witness examined by the prosecution, including PW-1, PW-2 and PW-7, claims to have seen the actual occurrence of the firing upon the deceased; all of them, on their own showing in cross-examination, arrived at the scene only after the deceased had already been found dead, and their knowledge of the identity of the assailants is founded purely on suspicion and not on any direct, first-hand perception as contemplated under Section 60 of the Evidence Act.

This Court further finds that the evidence of PW-5 and PW-6, being based admittedly on village rumour and hearsay, also falls foul of the mandate of Section 60 of the Evidence Act, inasmuch as neither of them witnessed the occurrence nor derived their knowledge from any source that would render their testimony direct evidence within the meaning of that provision. Such hearsay testimony, however consistent it may appear, cannot be pressed into service to fasten criminal liability upon the respondents.

The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence has very well been crystallized in the judgment of this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sharda v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 wherein the Apex Court held:

Further in the case of Vishwajeet Kerba Masalkar v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2024 INSC 788) it was held that:

Bearing these principles in mind, we have examined the reasoning of the learned Trial Court, which we find to be sound and well-founded on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record. This Court concurs with the finding of the learned Trial Court that the prosecution failed to establish, with any degree of certainty, as to when the deceased was last threatened, when the respondents were last seen with the deceased, or the precise time, place and manner in which the alleged conspiracy was hatched and executed. The chain of circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, being interspersed with gaps on these vital links, cannot be said to be complete or to exclude every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the respondents.

This Court also finds no infirmity in the finding of the learned Trial Court that the non-recovery of the weapon of offence, the non-exhibition of the confessional statement and the admitted lapses in investigation, further weaken the case of the prosecution and extend the benefit of doubt in favour of the respondents. This Court is further in agreement with the finding that the informant's own admission that the deceased used to look after and financially support the respondent Meena Devi, his widowed daughter-in-law, without any objection from the informant is a circumstance wholly inconsistent with the existence of motive or enmity attributed to the respondents.

It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an appeal against acquittal, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused stands reinforced, and unless the findings recorded by the Trial Court are shown to be perverse, illegal, or based on no evidence, the appellate court ought not to disturb a well-reasoned order of acquittal merely because another view is possible. In the present case, having examined the reasoning of the learned Trial Court and the evidence on record, this Court does not find the impugned judgment to be perverse or unsustainable in law.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no merit in the present appeal. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, being based on a correct appreciation of the evidence and the settled principles of law, including Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act pertaining to direct evidence and the golden principles governing cases based on circumstantial evidence, do not warrant any interference.

The present criminal appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Let the Trial Court records be sent back forthwith, along with a copy of this judgment.