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Judgment
The petitioner, through the medium of the present petition filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, seeks quashment of order dated 25.07.2026, passed by the court of learned Principal Sessions Judge, Kathua, (for short ‘Revisional Court’), in Revision Petition No. 38/2026, titled ‘UT of J&K V. Sham Lal Choudhary’, whereby the order dated 02.07.2026, passed by the court of learned District Judicial Mobile Magistrate (Traffic), Kathua, (for short ‘the Magistrate’) in File No.62/Release, titled ‘Sham Lal Choudhary V. UT of J&K through Motor Vehicle Department, RTO Kathua, directed release of the vehicle No. JK21G-0042, in favour of the petitioner, was set aside.
Brief facts, containing necessary details, as pleaded by the petitioner are that the petitioner is the registered owner of the vehicle No.JK21G-0042 and on 05.06.2026, the officials of Motor Vehicle Department from RTO Kathua intercepted and seized the vehicle on the ground that the vehicle was allegedly being operated without a valid permit; that the vehicle of the petitioner holds valid and lawful permit and was active at the time of alleged seizure; that the petitioner moved an application before learned District Judicial Mobile Magistrate (Traffic), Kathua seeking release of the vehicle, who called a report from the RTO Kathua who resisted the release of vehicle on the ground that at the time of seizure of vehicle, it was operated without valid AITP authorization and without payment of the prescribed AITP fee; that after considering the material placed before it, learned Magistrate vide order dated 02.07.2026 directed RTO Kathua to release the vehicle in question on interim custody in favour of the petitioner upon furnishing supurdnama and after proper identification; that the UT, being aggrieved of the aforesaid release of vehicle, preferred a revision petition before Principal Sessions Court Kathua, who vide its order dated 25.07.2026 set aside the order dated 02.07.2026 passed by learned Magistrate.
Aggrieved of impugned order dated 25.07.2026, passed by the Revisional Court, the present petition has been filed seeking its setting aside, on the following grounds:
That the learned Revisional Court has erred in law in treating Section 207(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as an absolute and complete ouster of the jurisdiction of the criminal court. Section 207(2) provides that where a motor vehicle has been seized and detained under sub-section (1), the owner or person in charge ‘may apply’ to the Transport Authority or authorized officer for release of vehicle. The learned Revisional court has converted an enabling statutory remedy into an exclusionary jurisdictional bar without examining the legislative language in its proper perspective;
ii) That the learned Revisional Court failed to consider that the question of interim custody of a seized vehicle is distinct from the question of adjudication of the alleged statutory offence;
iii) That the learned Revisional Court failed to appreciate the distinction between release of custody and grant of a permit, as the petitioner never sought from the learned trial court the grant of an AITP or any other statutory authorization which only the competent Transport Authority could issue;
iv) That the learned Revisional Court has proceeded on an overboard proposition that the Motor Vehicles Act, being a special enactment, automatically excludes every power available to a criminal court, under the procedural law;
That the learned Revisional Court has failed to appreciate a material and significant aspect of the matter, namely, the apparent inconsistency between the allegations recorded in the challan dated 05.06.2026 and the subsequent stand taken by the respondent authorities in their report dated 27.06.2026.
vi) That the learned Revisional Court has failed to consider the fact that the petitioner has already paid the AITP fee.
vii) That the learned Revisional Court failed to appreciate that Section 207(2) MV Act1988, itself contemplates release of a vehicle upon verification of documents and imposition of suitable conditions. That the impugned order, instead of examining whether those conditions were adequate, has invalidated the entire order solely on the ground of alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Revisional Court has not properly appreciated the law on the subject in its correct perspective; that the impugned order dated 25.07.2026 is contrary to law, suffers from manifest error of jurisdiction and has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice; that it is a fit case where this court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023; that the learned Magistrate has exercised the jurisdiction rightly and finally, it is prayed that the impugned order be quashed and the order passed by the learned Magistrate directing release of the vehicle in question be restored. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on decision of this court in ‘State of J&K V. Bilal Shamus’ reported in 2006 CRILJ 746.
Learned Dy. AG, on the other hand, has supported the order passed by the Revisional Court, rightly setting aside the order, passed by the learned Magistrate for release of the seized vehicle; that the learned Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application for release of vehicle, in view of the mandate of Sub Section (2) of Section 207 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which inter alia, provides that the person in charge of a motor, which has been seized under Sub-Section (1) of Section 207 of the Act, may apply to the Transport Authority or any other Officer authorized, in that behalf, by the State Government with the relevant documents for release of the vehicle and such authority or officer, may after verification of such documents order the release of the vehicle subject to suitable conditions. In support of her submissions, she placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of High Court of Patna titled ‘Ashok Kumar V. Union of India & Ors’ (2011 Law Finder Patna 1880) and decision of High Court of Allahabad High Court in case titled ‘Deoraj Singh V. State of U.P.’ reported as 2010 (15) RCR (Criminal) 435.
Mr. Surinder Paul Sharma, ARTO Kathua is also present in person. He submits that the vehicle in question on 05.06.2026, during enforcement checking was found operating without a valid All India Tourist Permit (AITP) as required under Motor Vehicles Act 1988, and All India Tourist Vehicles (Permit) Rules 2023; that as per the new Rules, all the tourist vehicles operating as All India Tourist Vehicles have to deposit a quarterly fee of Rs.90,000/- or an annual fee of Rs.3,00,000/- without which All India Permit is invalid; that on verification, it was found that the petitioner’s vehicle was being plied without payment of this permit fee/tax, in violation of statutory provisions, governing tourist vehicles; and that seized vehicle is not liable to be released unless payment of applicable dues and penalties is made by the offender/owner.
Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the file and considered the matter.
The admitted facts of the case are that the Vehicle No.JK21G-0042 owned by the petitioner and registered as a tourist vehicle was found on 05.06.2026 being plied within the jurisdiction of ARTO Kathua, without a valid All India Tourist Permit, which was required under the MV Act, 1988 and All India Tourist Vehicles (Permit) Rules, 2023. The case of the ARTO concerned is that the vehicle was being plied without payment of the requisite permit fee, which is Rs.90,000/- quarterly and Rs. 3,00,000/- annually and that this permit fee is due against the vehicle in question pending thereof w.e.f. 19.01.2024 to 09.06.2026, as such, the petitioner is now in arrears of more than Rs. 7,00,000/- on account of payment of permit fee as well as late fee. Since the vehicle was seized and it is the case of the petitioner herein that he, as owner of the vehicle, has paid quarterly fee after the seizure of the vehicle up to the month of September of this year, however, alleged that the vehicle was not released by the ARTO, even on payment of the permit fee, whereas, the case, as projected by the ARTO concerned, is that the owner is liable to pay the whole of the outstanding amount, for the period the All India Tourist Permit had not been renewed.
The petitioner moved the court of learned District Judicial Magistrate (Traffic) Kathua, who vide, order dated 02.07.2026 ordered release of the vehicle in question in favour of the owner, however, aggrieved of that order, the respondent ARTO Kathua, moved a criminal revision petition before the Sessions Court at Kathua, who vide order dated 25.07.2026 allowed the revision petition and the order passed by the learned Magistrate was set aside holding that the jurisdiction seeking release of the vehicle, in such a case is with the Transport Authority or any officer authorized in this behalf by the Government and not the learned Magistrate.
The core issue, which falls for the consideration of this court, is as to whether a vehicle seized by the Transport Authority for the contravention of non-payment of the permit fee or tax under the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules framed thereunder can be sought to be released under the orders of court of learned Magistrate.
This court in a case titled State of J&K V. Bilal Shamus reported as 2006 CRILJ 746 had held that if the fact of seizure is brought to the notice of the Magistrate by any party interested or even by a party, who applies for delivery of the property, it would be sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Magistrate to entertain and deal with the application under Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was analogous to Section 497(1) of BNSS, relating to seizure of the vehicle wherein a challan/criminal case was to be produced to the court of learned Magistrate.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgments (supra) of the Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan, however, those also relate to criminal offences, with regard to local taxation laws regarding which criminal complaint could be filed. A Division Bench of Patna High Court in a case tilted Ashok Kumar Singh (supra) has held that Section 207(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 does not curtail the powers of the Magistrate under Section 457 of the Central CrPC 1973, as both the provisions operate in completely different fields observing ‘vehicles seized for violation of Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act can only be released by the Transport Authorities, as Criminal Courts cannot issue permits required for commercial vehicles’. A similar view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in case referred and relied upon as 2010 (15) RCR (Criminal) 435.
Reverting to the facts of the case, the Transport Authority has seized the vehicle owned by the petitioner herein for not having the requisite All India Tourist Permit for plying a tourist vehicle. On this development, it was incumbent upon the petitioner herein to produce the requisite documents/receipts of the payment of the permit fee, if any, in his possession to substantiate that the vehicle was not plied in contravention of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, in particular, Section 66 of it and the All India Tourist Permit (Rules) 2023. The petitioner seems to have rushed to the court of Magistrate in absence of there being any complaint/challan or charge sheet formulated either submitted or proposed to be submitted.
The learned Magistrate, in the considered opinion of this court, had no jurisdiction to deal with the release of the seized vehicle under the provisions of the BNSS for contravention of provision of a requisite Permit; and in absence of any complaint filed or proposed to be filed. Chapter XXXVI of BNSS deals with disposal of property pending trial or on conclusion of trial. Section 497 BNSS deal with disposal of property pending trial, whereas Section 498 BNSS deals with disposal with property on conclusion of trial. At the most, as projected by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Section 497 of BNSS was the provision under which the matter was dealt with by the learned Magistrate. Section 497 BNSS for the purpose of convenience is extracted as under:-
“497.Order for custody and disposal of property pending trial in certain cases.
(1)When any property is produced before any Criminal Court or the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance or commit the case for trial during any investigation, inquiry or trial, the Court or the Magistrate may make such order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the investigation, inquiry or trial, and, if the property is subject to speedy and natural decay, or if it is otherwise expedient so to do, the Court or the Magistrate may, after recording such evidence as it thinks necessary, order it to be sold or otherwise disposed of.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "property" includes
(a)property of any kind or document which is produced before the Court or which is in its custody;
(b)any property regarding which an offence appears to have been committed or which appears to have been used for the commission of any offence.
2)The Court or the Magistrate shall, within a period of fourteen days from the production of the property referred to in sub-section (1) before it, prepare a statement of such property containing its description in such form and manner as the State Government may, by rules, provide.
(3)The Court or the Magistrate shall cause to be taken the photograph and if necessary, videograph on mobile phone or any electronic media, of the property referred to in sub-section (1).
(4)The statement prepared under sub-section (2) and the photograph or the videography taken under sub-section (3) shall be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Sanhita.
(5)The Court or the Magistrate shall, within a period of thirty days after the statement has been prepared under sub-section (2) and the photograph or the videography has been taken under sub-section (3), order the disposal, destruction, confiscation or delivery of the property in the manner specified hereinafter.”
On a keen perusal of the provisions under Section 497 BNSS, it appears that the Criminal Court or the Magistrate can deal with such a matter with regard to disposal of property pending trial, in which, it/he be empowered to take cognizance or commit the case for trial during any investigation/enquiry or trial. In the case on hand, there was no such complaint moved by the Transport Authority which had seized the vehicle to be laid before a Criminal Court or before a learned Magistrate. In such a situation, the learned Magistrate, in my considered opinion, had no jurisdiction to entertain the application or pass any order thereon for release of the vehicle. Otherwise also, the learned Magistrate, in absence of such a complaint filed or proposed to be filed, could not deal with the issuance of any transport permit or to receive any permit fee/tax, as it was only the Transport Authority, who had the jurisdiction to look into all these aspects of the case and the petitioner should have approached the Transport Authority seeking the release of the vehicle, instead of approaching the court of learned Magistrate, who lacked jurisdiction.
The Revisional Court, in the considered opinion of this court, has passed the impugned order in accordance with law, which does not suffer from any infirmity much less an illegality, so as to warrant any interference by this court, invoking inherent jurisdiction.
Having regard to the discussion made hereinabove and the reasons assigned, it is held that when a vehicle is seized by a Transport Authority for the contravention of any of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or Rules framed thereunder and no complaint is laid or proposed to be laid before any court or a Magistrate, the jurisdiction for release of the seized vehicle cannot be exercised by the learned Magistrate and it is only the Transport Authority or any officer authorized, in this behalf, by the Government, who had the jurisdiction to consider release of vehicle or any such property. The petition is, thus, found to be bereft of any merit and substance and is liable to be rejected.
Viewed thus, the petition is dismissed, alongwith connected application(s).