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Judgment
VIKAS BAHL, J. (ORAL)
In the present writ petition, the following prayers have been made in the headnote: -
“Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing order dated 26.07.2016 (Annexure P-14) passed by respondent No.4; notification u/s 4 dated 2.3.1993 (Annexure P-3); notification u/s 6 dated 1.3.1994 (Annexure P-4), award dated 29.02.1996 (Annexure P-5) and the entire acquisition proceedings qua the property of the petitioners and to release the same or deem the acquisition proceedings as having been elapsed on coming into force the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.”
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
The petitioners in para 2 of the writ petition have given the details of their ownership. The relevant portion of para 2 of the writ petition is reproduced herein below: -
“Sham Lal-Petitioner No.1 Owner of 16 marlas of land out of the land comprised of Khata No.233/317, Khasra No.24/7/2/1 (1-1) and 24//3 (2-2) total measuring 3K 3 M situated in the revenue estate of Mouza Patti Afgaan, Tehsil Panipat, District Panipat. It was purchased from Thakar Dass by way of regd. sale deed No.5925, Bahi No.1, Zilad No.454 dated 17.2.1986. Mutation No. 4161 was also sanctioned by the revenue authorities on 30.6.1988. The measurement of the plot are 32 'X 135'= 480 sq. yards.
Prem Kumar-Petitioner No.2 Owner of 15 marlas i.e. ¼ share out of the land comprised of Khata No.233./317, Khasra No.24/7/2/1 (1-1) and 24/7/1/3 (2-2) total measuring 3K 3M situated in the revenue estate of Mouza Patti Afgaan, Tehsil. Panipat, District Panipat. It was purchased from Thakar Dass by way of regd. sale deed N0.2594, Bahi No.1, Zilad No.457 dated 19.7.1986. Mutation No.4162 was also sanctioned by the revenue authorities on 30.6.88. The measurement of the plot are 30' X 135'= 450 sq. yards.)”
From the above, it is apparent that petitioner No.1 is claiming to be the owner of 16 marlas of land and petitioner No.2 is claiming to be the owner of 15 marlas of land. The respondent-authorities issued the notification dated 02.03.1993 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter to be referred to as “Act of 1894”) for acquiring land measuring 240.08 acres, which included the land of the petitioners, for the public purpose, namely, for the development and utilization of land as residential, industrial and commercial purpose for Sector 24, Panipat. The notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was issued on 01.03.1994 and the award in the present case was passed on 29.02.1996. It is the case of the respondent-authorities that the possession of the land in question was taken vide rapat roznamcha No.368 dated 28.02.1996 which fact could not be disputed before this Court. It is further the case of the respondents that the entire amount of compensation i.e. Rs.18,61,87,289/- was tendered at the time of announcement of the award and out of the said amount, Rs.17,31,30,265/- had already been disbursed and the remaining amount of compensation i.e. Rs.1,30,57,024/- is lying deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector and is available for disbursement and the remaining landowners are at liberty to receive the same. It is also the case of the respondent-authorities that, as per the approved layout plan of Sector 24, Panipat, the land of the petitioners affects the planning of 12 meter wide service road, other services and 14 marla plots and thus, is necessarily required to be acquired. The above-said aspects could not be disputed before this Court.
Admittedly, for a period of 15 years after the passing of the award dated 29.02.1996, the petitioners kept silent and did not challenge the acquisition. The first writ petition filed by the petitioners was CWP-3294-2011, as mentioned in the writ petition, however, the order passed in the said writ petition has not been annexed along with the present petition. The second writ petition filed by the petitioners along with one Tahla Ram @ Tala Ram was CWP-24095-2013, which writ petition was decided by the Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court on 31.10.2013. A copy of the said order dated 31.10.2013 has been annexed as Annexure P-9 and a perusal of the said order would show that there was no challenge made to the acquisition and rather, a prayer was made to consider the composition of unauthorized possession and to approve the building plan. Thus, the acquisition proceedings and the award which, even as per the petitioners were within their knowledge, were never challenged and thus, the petitioners are also barred under the principles of Order II Rule 2 CPC from laying any further challenge. The said aspect would be discussed hereinafter.
Thereafter, the petitioners had filed a third writ petition i.e., CWP-8381-2015, in which, for the first time, a prayer for quashing of the notifications, which are also challenge in the present writ petition was made and the plea taken in the said petition was that the acquisition had lapsed. The said fact is apparent from the order dated 01.05.2015 (Annexure P-12) passed in the said writ petition. The prayer clause in the said writ petition was also a part of the order and the said writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the respondents to consider the representation of the petitioners within a period of two months and it was specifically observed that the said order was passed without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. The respondents vide order dated 26.07.2016 rejected the representation filed by the petitioners after observing that the possession of the land in question had been taken vide rapat No.368 dated 28.02.1996 and the land of the petitioners was affecting the planning of 12 meter wide service road, other services and 14 marla plots as per the approved layout plan of Sector 24, Panipat. It was further observed that 92.98% of the awarded amount had already been disbursed to the landowners.
The petitioners then filed the present writ petition challenging the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894 as well as the award passed in the year 1996 and also the order dated 26.07.2016. In para 11(i) as well as in 11(ii) of the writ petition, the plea with respect to Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as “Act of 2013”) was taken and it was pleaded that the acquisition had lapsed. The Coordinate Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 01.12.2016 had allowed the writ petition and had observed that the impugned acquisition had lapsed on the grounds mentioned in Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. It is not in dispute that against the said order, an SLP was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is also not disputed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 18.03.2025 had disposed of the said SLP by remanding the matter to the High Court after taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and others reported as (2020) 8 SCC 129. Subsequent to the remand, the matter has been placed before us for final adjudication.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that in the present case, the petitioners had filed CWP-24095-2013 for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to regularize the construction raised by the petitioners and for directing respondent No.2 to consider the composition of unauthorized construction and to approve the building plan. It is submitted that the said writ petition was disposed of without issuing notice of motion, with direction to the District Town Planner, Panipat, to consider the application submitted by the petitioners for regularisation of the unauthorized construction raised by them and to decide the same in accordance with law within a period of three months. It is submitted that the petitioners were thus, pursuing their remedy of getting the building plan sanctioned with respect to the construction and it cannot be said that the petitioners were sitting silent. It is contended that the petitioners had actually filed the objections under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 which, although has been denied by the respondents in the short reply filed on behalf of respondent Nos.1, 3 and 5, but has been admitted in the status report by way of affidavit of Rajender Kumar, Land Acquisition Collector, Urban Estate, Rohtak on behalf of respondent No.5. It is submitted that contradictory pleas have been taken by the respondents and that the petitioners cannot be non-suited on the ground that they had not filed any objections under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894. It is thus submitted that the acquisition proceedings as well as the impugned order are illegal, against law and deserve to be set aside.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS-STATE
Learned counsel for the respondents-State, on the other hand, has submitted that there is nothing annexed with the present writ petition to show that any objections under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 were filed and it is stated that the short reply filed by respondent Nos.1, 3 and 5 and the status report filed by way of affidavit of Rajender Kumar are in consonance with each other and are being misread by learned counsel for the petitioners. It is submitted that it is specifically stated in the reply on behalf of respondent Nos.1, 3 and 5 in para 5 that the petitioners did not file any objections under Section 5-A the Act of 1894 and in para 2 of the status report, there is no admission made that the petitioners had filed the objections under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 and rather a general reference was made with respect to the fact that, after issuance of the Notification under Section 4 and after considering the objections filed by the landowners under Section 5-A the Act of 1894, the Notification under Section 6 was passed. It is further submitted that once the acquisition proceedings had attained finality, no benefit could be received by the petitioners from their pursuit of the remedy with respect to regularision of their unauthorized construction. It is submitted that, rather, the petitioners are barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC from filing subsequent writ petitions. It is further stated that the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and also on the ground of acquiescence and is squarely covered against the petitioners in view of law laid down in Indore Development Authority (supra).
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and has perused the paper-book and is of the opinion that the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed for the following reasons.
First ground on which the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed is delay and laches and acquiescence. It is not in dispute that the Notification under Section 4 of 1894 Act was issued on 02.03.1993 and the Notification under Section 6 was issued on 01.03.1994 and the award was passed in the present case on 29.02.1996 and as per the unrebutted stand of the respondents, the possession of the premises in question was taken vide rapat roznamcha No.368 dated 28.02.1996. The first writ petition filed by the petitioners was after a delay of 15 years in the year 2011 and the order passed in the same has not been annexed along with the present writ petition. Even the second writ petition was filed in the year 2013 in which no prayer for seeking quashing of the acquisition proceedings was sought. It is in the third petition i.e., CWP-8381-2015 that for the first time, the petitioners had laid challenge to the Notifications primarily on the plea of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Thus, it is apparent that for a period of more than 15 years, after passing of the award, the petitioners had remained silent and not challenged the acquisition proceedings.
The Coordinate Division Bench of this Court in the case titled as Desraj and others Vs. State of Haryana and others reported as 2022(4) RCR (Civil) 298 had observed that in the cases in which challenge is made to the notifications vide which land is sought to be acquired, the concept of negating the challenge on account of the doctrine of delay and laches is well recognized. It was further observed that in case the landowner chooses to remain silent and allows the State to proceed, then, apart from the fact that the case is to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches, even the doctrine of acquiescence would come into play, which is sufficient to take away that right and any such plea is required to be rejected at the threshold. It was also observed that such silence would be conclusive evidence of the waiver of interest on the part of the litigant and that the doctrine of acquiescence acts as an estoppel which bars the litigant from complaining about the violation of his right. It was further observed that dead and stale claims cannot be revived at a belated stage.
The Co-ordinate Division Bench in the abovesaid judgment had made the said observations after taking into consideration the well known facet of law that whensoever there was conflict between public interest and private interest, the private interest has to make way for the public interest. The challenge thus made by the petitioners therein to the acquisition proceedings was rejected by taking into consideration the delay in challenging the same.
The Division Bench in the abovesaid case also took into consideration the judgment of the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) in which it had been observed that the dead and stale claims cannot be revived.
The present writ petition also deserves to be dismissed in view of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority (supra). It is undisputed before this Court that after the award was passed, the rapat roznamcha No.368 dated 28.02.1996 showing that the possession was taken over by the respondent authorities was duly drawn and the entire amount of compensation i.e. Rs.18,61,87,289/- was tendered at the time of announcement of the award and out of the said amount, Rs.17,31,30,265/- had already been disbursed and the rest of the amount of compensation i.e. Rs.1,30,57,024/- is lying deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector and is available for disbursement and the landowners are at liberty to receive the same. Further, as per the approved layout plan of Sector 24, Panipat, the land of the petitioners affects the planning of 12 meter wide service road, other services and 14 marla plots and thus, it is essential for the respondents to acquire the land for the purpose of integrated plan.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) had observed that word 'or' used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as 'nor' or as 'and' and the deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under the said provision could only be in a situation where the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid and in other words, in case the possession has been taken but the compensation has not been paid there would be no lapse and similarly if compensation has been paid and possession has not been taken then also there would be no lapse. It was further observed that in case the obligation under Section 31 of the 1894 Act had not been fulfilled, then, interest under Section 34 of the said Act is to be granted and non-deposit of compensation in court does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. It was further observed that the landowners who had refused to accept compensation or sought reference for higher compensation, then, they cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had further specifically observed that the provision of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to a new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings and applies only to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014 and does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not allow the landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings. With respect to mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act, it was observed that drawing of panchnama i.e. inquest report/rapat roznamcha was valid proof of taking possession in land acquisition cases and subsequent to the same, the land would vest in the State and any re-entry or retaining the possession thereafter was unlawful and the person who continued in possession would be a trespasser. Para 363 of the said judgment is reproduced as under: -
“363.In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under:
1.Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013.
2.In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24 (1)(b) of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed.
3.The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.
4.The expression 'paid' in the main part of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the "landowners" as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894.
5.In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). Land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
6.The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1)(b).
7.The mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/ memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).
8.The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the Act of 2013 came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.
9.Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition. Let the matters be placed before appropriate Bench for consideration on merits.”
It was also observed that when the State Government acquires land and draws up a memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to taking physical possession of the land and that on the property which is acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other person or the police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired nor the Government is supposed to start residing or to physically occupy it once possession has been taken by drawing the inquest proceedings/rapat roznamcha.
With respect to interpretation of the word 'paid' used in Section 24(2) and 'deposited' used in the proviso to Section 24(2) detailed observations were made and it was observed that the deposit in treasury in place of deposit in court causes no prejudice to the landowner or any other stakeholder as their interest is adequately safeguarded by the provisions contained in Section 34 of the 1894 Act, which ensures higher rate of interest than any other Government securities and the said money is safe and can be made available for disbursement to the landowners. In para 228, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had even taken into consideration the standing Order No.28 which was issued in 1909 by the State of Punjab, which provided five modes of payment and it was further observed that the said rules and the standing orders are binding on the concerned Authorities. Paras 228 and 230 of the said judgment is reproduced herein below: -
“228.Standing Order No.28 was issued in 1909 by the State of Punjab and was applicable to Delhi also, which provided five modes of payment in para 74 and 75 thus:
“74.Methods of making payments.—There are five methods of making payments:
(1)By direct payments, see Para 75(I) infra
(2)By order on treasury, see Para 75(II) infra
(3)By money order, see Para 75(III) infra
(4)By cheque, see Para 75(IV) infra
(5)By deposit in a treasury, see Para 75(V) infra
xxx xxx xxx xxx
230.Deposit in treasury in place of deposit in court causes no prejudice to the landowner or any other stakeholder as their interest is adequately safeguarded by the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Act of 1894, as it ensures higher rate of interest than any other Government securities. Their money is safe and credited in the earmarked quantified amount and can be made available for disbursement to him/them. There is no prejudice caused and every infraction of law would not vitiate the act.”
It is thus apparent that the entire law with respect to possession, payment of compensation, vesting and non-revival of stale and time barred claims had been crystallized in the above-said judgment.
In the present case, as has been detailed above, the respondents have met the said parameters and thus, the present writ petition also deserves to be dismissed on the said ground and the petitioners cannot be permitted to raise dead pleas after several years.
Additionally, it would be relevant to mention that the petitioners, as per their own case, had filed a writ petition i.e., CWP-3294-2011 after a period of 15 years from the date of passing of the award and that the order passed in the said writ petition has also not been annexed. The second writ petition filed by the petitioners which was also filed after passing of the award, in the year 2013 by which time the cause of action to challenge the acquisition had already arisen, however the petitioners never chose to challenge the acquisition and only filed the said writ petition seeking a direction to the respondents to regularize the unauthorized construction raised by the petitioners.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the order dated 31.10.2013 passed in CWP-24095-2013 to raise an argument in favour of the petitioners, whereas, a perusal of the said order dated 31.10.2013 (Annexure P-9), more so, the prayers made in the said petition would show that, in spite of having a cause of action to challenge the acquisition, the petitioners never chose to challenge the acquisition and thus, are barred under the provision of Order II Rule 2 CPC and also under the principle of constructive res judicata, to challenge the said Notifications in the subsequent writ petitions.
The provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC specifically provide that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the litigant is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Court and further specifically provides that omissions to claim any relief would then bar the said litigant from filing fresh proceedings to claim the said relief. The coordinate Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mithan Lal Gupta (supra) by relying upon Rule 32 of the Writ Jurisdiction (Punjab and Haryana) Rules, 1976 has held that said principle would also apply to writ proceedings. The relevant portion of said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“11.Thirdly, any cause of action available to the appellant prior to institution of CWP-21603-2016 but not urged in the said writ petition, was also barred by the principle enshrined in Order 2 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as applicable mutatis mutandis to writ proceedings vide Rule 32, Writ Jurisdiction (Punjab & Haryana) Rules, 1976. Said Rule reads as under:
“32.In all matters for which no provision is made by these rules, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, shall apply mutatis mutandis, in so far as they are not inconsistent with these rules.”
The SLP No.12574-12757 of 2020 filed against the said judgment has been dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 08.08.2022. The abovesaid provision as well as the law laid down in the abovesaid judgment would apply on all fours in the present case.
Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported as (1990) 2 Supreme Court Cases 715 by relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Forward Construction Company and others Versus Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) Andheri and others reported as 1986 (1) SCC 100 had observed that an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but also as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action. It was further observed that the principle of constructive res judicata is also applicable to writ petitions.
Even the plea raised on behalf of the petitioners to the effect that contradictory stand has been taken by the respondents in their short reply filed by way of an affidavit and in the status report, with respect to the objections filed under Section 5-A, is apparently a misreading of the short reply as well as the status report. A perusal of the short reply filed by respondent Nos.1, 3 and 5 dated 13.04.2026 would show that, in para 5 of the said reply, a specific stand has been taken that the petitioners did not file any objections under Section 5-A and the land was vacant at the time of issuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act. Para 5 of the said reply is reproduced hereinbelow:-
5.That it is respectfully submitted that the petitioners are seeking aforesaid relief with respect to the land measuring Khasra No 24//7/2/1(1K-1M), 7/1/3(2K-2M) Total (3K-3M) having 1/2 share i.e 1K-11.5M village Taraf Afgan Distt. Panipat, which was acquired vide the notifications dated 02.03.1993 and 01.03.1994 issued under section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 respectively followed by the Award dated 28.02.1996 for land for a Residential, commercial and Industrial purpose for the development of Sector 24, Panipat. The Petitioner did not file objection under section 5A of the act and the land was vacate at the time of issuance of notification under section 4 of the act.”
Even in para 2 of the status report dated 28.11.2016, it is no where admitted by the respondents that the petitioners had filed the objections under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894. Reliance placed upon para 2 of the said affidavit is misconceived, inasmuch as, in the said para, the respondents, as has been argued before this Court, were only giving the details of the land which was sought to be acquired under Section 4 and also the fact that after objections had been filed by the landowners (not said by the petitioners), under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act, the declaration under Section 6 was issued with respect to the land measuring 231.90 acres vide declaration dated 01.03.1994.
In the subsequent part of the said para 2, it has been stated that the LAC had announced the award of land measuring 222.76 acres on 28.02.1996. Para No.2 on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioners is reproduced herein below: -
“2.That the State of Haryana issued notification dated 02.03.1993 under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 for acquiring land measuring 240.08 acres land for a public purpose, namely, for the development of Residential/Industrial/Commercial Sectors 24, Panipat by Haryana Urban Development Authority. After considering the report of the Land Acquisition Collector (hereinafter referred to as the LAC), on the objections filed by the land owners under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894, the State Govt. notified 231.90 acres of land vide declaration dated 01.03.1994. Subsequently, the LAC announced the award of land measuring 222.76 acres on 28.02.1996 and the possession of land was handed over to Estate Office HUDA on the same day. Entry to this effect has been made in the Rapat Rojnamacha vide no. 368 dt. 28.02.1996 of village Taraf Afgan, rapat no. 339 dt. 28.02.1996 of village Ugra Kheri & rapat no. 338 dt. 28.02.1996 of village Malik Ugra Kheri.”
From the above-said averments, it cannot be stated that the respondents have admitted the fact that the petitioners had filed the objections under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 and rather, it is apparent that the respondents are giving entire background of the case. Moreover, no document has been annexed along with the present writ petition to show that any objections were filed by the petitioners under Section 5-A the Act of 1894.
At any rate, in view of the reasons which have been detailed hereinabove, more so, the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence as well as the case being covered against the petitioners in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority (supra) and also in view of the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC and constructive res-judicata, the question as to whether the objections under Section 5-A the Act of 1894 were filed or not pale into insignificance.
Keeping in view the above-said facts and circumstances, the writ petition filed by the petitioners is meritless and is accordingly dismissed.
