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Judgment
ORDER
None present for the applicants even in revised call. Shri Manoj Kumar Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondents, is present. The instant Original Application is being decided on merits taking recourse to the Central Administrative Tribunalprovision of Rule 15(1) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 and after hearing learned counsel for the respondents.
The instant Original Application has been filed by the applicants seeking following relief:
“i.Kindly allow the present Original Application filed by the applicants against the impugned order/letter i.e. Annexure-A-1.
ii.Direct the respondents to amend Annexure-A-1 and consider the names of the applicants for inter-unit transfer to 969 Railway Engineer Regiment (TA), Jamalpur.
iii.Quash and set aside the notice for discharge from Territorial Army dated 11.02.2023 served in the name of the applicants.
iv.Direct the respondents to prepare SUL list of Railway Officers instead of discharging the applicants in case the applicants are not considered under clause (ii) of the prayer.
v.Any other relief or direction which this learned Tribunal deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the applicants.”
The brief facts of the case as narrated in the OA are that the applicants were serving as commissioned officers in 970 Jhansi Unit (Railway Engineer Regiment), Railway Territorial Army. A decision was taken by the concerned authorities to disband five out of six Railway Engineer Regiments and to retain only 969 Railway Engineer Regiment at Jamalpur. It was decided that willing personnel of the regiments under disbandment would be considered for transfer against the available vacancies in the retained regiment. According to the applicants, they submitted their willingness and representations seeking inter-unit transfer to 969 Railway Engineer Regiment (TA), Jamalpur. However, their names were not included in the lists prepared by the respondents for such transfer and they were subsequently sought to be discharged from the Territorial Army. Being aggrieved by the non-consideration of their cases for inter-unit transfer and the consequential action for discharge, the applicants have filed the present Original Application.
I have heard the learned counsel for the respondents.
Referring to the counter affidavit, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the submissions of the applicant’s counsel and argued that in the similar circumstances, a case was pending before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, interim protection was granted but the writ petition pending before the Punjab and Haryana High Court was dismissed and it was observed that interference of the Tribunal in the policy decision is not permissible. It was further argued that five units have been closed and persons have been disbanded thus it is up to the competent authority of the respondents to prepare the SUL list. It is also argued that the present dispute pending between the parties pertains to Indian Army and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such a petition. Thus, prayer was made on the part of the respondents that the instant original application be dismissed.
I have considered the contentions and gone through the records.
As the facts of the case have already been stated above in detail, the same are not reiterated for the sake of brevity. An identical controversy has already been dealt with by the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in its judgment dated 10.04.2024 passed in CWP No. 5865 of 2023 titled Aditya Sharma and others Vs Union of India. The facts and circumstances of the instant case are absolutely similar to the aforesaid judgment. Hence, for the sake of clarity, the operative portion of the aforesaid judgment is quoted herein below:
“15.It is a settled proposition of law that scope of interference in the executive decisions/policy matters is very limited. The persons who are making policy are more competent to know needs of the people as well as needs of the organization. 16.
Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again adverted with scope of judicial interference in executive decisions including decisions relating to policy matters. In Union of India v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu, (2001) 5 SCC 593, Supreme Court has adverted with scope of judicial review of administrative action. The Court has held that if two views are possible, court shall not interfere by substituting its opinion for the opinion of authority. The relevant extracts of aforesaid judgment read as:
42.Exercise of power under Section 19 read with Rule 14 is open to judicial review on well-settled parameters of Central Administrative Tribunaladministrative law governing judicial review of administrative action such as when the exercise of power is shown to have been vitiated by mala fides or is found to be based wholly on extraneous and/or irrelevant grounds or is found to be a clear case of colourable exercise of/or abuse of power or what is sometimes called fraud on power i.e. where the power is exercised for achieving an oblique end. The truth or correctness or the adequacy of the material available before the authority exercising the power cannot be revalued or weighed by the court while exercising power of judicial review. Even if some of the material, on which the action is taken is found to be irrelevant, the court would still not interfere so long as there is some relevant material available on which the action can be sustained. The court would presume the validity of the exercise of power but shall not hesitate to interfere if the invalidity or unconstitutionality is clearly demonstrated. If two views are possible, the court shall not interfere by substituting its own satisfaction or opinion for the satisfaction or opinion of the authority exercising the power.
17.Recently, a Constitutional Bench in Vivek Narayan Sharma Versus Union of India; 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 1, while adverting with question of legality of demonetization of currency of denomination of Rs.500/- and Rs.1,000/- has considered scope of judicial review. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered its judicial precedents and concluded that it is not function of the Court to sit in judgment over matters of economic policy and they must necessarily be left to Government of the day to decide. The Court emphasised on its earlier decision in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651. The relevant extracts of the said judgment read as:-
“Scope of Judicial Review
215.The law with regard to scope of judicial review has been very well crystalized in the case of Tata Cellular (supra). In the said case, it has been held by this Court that the duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be whether a decision making authority exceeded its powers, committed an error of law, committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or abused its powers. The Court held that it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken.
216.After referring to various pronouncements on the scope of judicial review, the Court has summed-up thus:
“94.The principles deducible from the above are:
(1)The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action.
(2)The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
(3)The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.
(4)The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts.
(5)The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.
(6)Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. Based on these principles we will examine the facts of this case since they commend to us as the correct principles.”
18.In the case in hand, the respondent has decided to disband all the six Regiments of Territorial Army. Initially, disbandment of 5 out of 6 units was approved and during the pendency of present petition, 6th unit is also disbanded. Section 3 of 1948 Act empowers Government to constitute and disband any unit. The petitioners are not disputing power of respondents to disband any Regiment. The petitioners have failed to point out any clause of the impugned decision which is violative of their fundamental rights guaranteed by Chapter III of the Constitution of India. The petitioners are claiming that decision is bad because it was unilaterally originated by Ministry of Railways. The petitioners have failed to notice that final decision was arrived at a joint meeting of both the Ministries and has been released by Defence. It is apt to notice that the final decision was not only made with the active participation of Ministry of Defence but also issued under the signature of an officer of Ministry of Defence. Thus, contention of the petitioners that decision to disband regiment was bad on the ground that it was initiated by Railways Ministry cannot be countenanced.
19.The petitioners are admitting that no procedure for disbandment in the 1948 Act has been prescribed. The cost of TA unit was borne by Ministry of Railways, thus, it had every right to initiate process and participate in the process of disbandment. This ministry initiated process and final decision came to be arrived at joint meeting of officials of both the ministries. In the absence of procedure prescribed under the Act, the petitioners cannot claim that procedure as per their suitability or desire should be followed. It is not a tax matter where court can drop demand on the ground that there is no mechanism of assessment or collection though there is levy. In the 1948 Act, there is power to establish and disband a unit. In the absence of prescribed procedure, the petitioners cannot be heard to claim that respondent has not followed procedure. It is a pure executive decision, thus, in the absence of prescribed procedure, it cannot be declared faulty. Record discloses that matter moved from one Ministry to another and ultimately a joint meeting of officers of two Ministries and officers of Directorate General of Territorial Army took place which concluded the issue and decided to disband TA units.
20.The contention of the petitioner that Railway has not made arrangement for uninterrupted supply of communication seems to be nothing more than bald and wild averment. The petitioners have not placed on record any document or incident disclosing that there was interruption in the communication. In any case, it is Ministry of Defence which has to look at its needs and sources. Court neither can determine their needs nor identify or arrange sources to meet those needs. Both the Ministries are claiming that they are competent to meet their needs and handle with adverse situations. The petitioners even have no locus standi to raise this issue.
21.The respondents as per their requirement constituted 6 units. With the passage of time and having considered prevailing conditions, the respondent found that there is need to disband all the units. It is a pure administrative-cum-policy decision. The court cannot substitute opinion of authorities. The court cannot venture into needs of the respondent organization. It is executive which in view of available sources and need of hour has to take a final call. The respondents are experts of their field and they know better than anyone else about their needs. There is no allegation or evidence disclosing mala fide, arbitrariness or violation of statutory provisions on part of respondents. The petitioners have no fundamental or vested right to claim that regiment should be retained. There is nothing unreasonable or arbitrary which can be called as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The decision could be violative of Article 14, had it been made applicable to few petitioners whereas it is applicable to entire Regiment rather all the six regiments, thus, petitioners have no right to claim that policy is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 22.
Up till the filing of present petition, there was decision to disband 5 units. As per respondents, they have now decided to disband even 6th leftover unit, however, implementation is pending due to pendency of present petition. As pleaded by both sides, out of 5 disbanded unit, unit of Chandigarh is only operating because of interim order passed by this court. Complete disbandment of four units and decision of respondent to disband 6th unit indicates that no other unit member either has approached court or having approached, has failed to get interim protection. It would be unfair and oblivious decision if Chandigarh unit is permitted to remain in force.
23.In the light of law enunciated by Supreme Court in Vivek Narayan Sharma(supra) and Tata Cellular(supra), scope of judicial review in the impugned administrative-cum-policy decision is very limited. Setting aside of impugned decision would amount to substituting opinion of the authorities which is impermissible as per settled proposition of law. From the pleadings and arguments of both sides, this court finds no violation of procedure, arbitrariness on the part of executive and violation of fundamental rights of the petitioner.
24.In view of afore-stated facts and circumstances, this Court does not find any infirmity in the impugned decision warranting judicial interference. The present petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, dismissed.”
Thus, it is evident that in the aforesaid quoted case, the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana had meticulously discussed the scope of Central Administrative Tribunaljudicial review in the administrative-cumpolicy decisions and ruled that the same would tantamount to breach of power if the Tribunals interfere in such issues that come squarely under policy matters. The instant case of the applicant is not liable to be treated differently as the controversy prevailing herein is absolutely identical to the facts and circumstances of the aforesaid quoted case. Thus, the instant case is bound to be decided in view of the ratio already laid down by the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana in the aforesaid referred judgment as no direction can be given interfering with the policy decision of the executive. Thus, no relief whatsoever can be acceded to the applicant. Accordingly, the instant OA is dismissed for the reasons recorded above. Interim Relief, if any, granted earlier stands vacated. All associated MAs stand disposed of. No costs.