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Judgment
Devan Ramachandran, J
Though this appeal, the appellant calls into question the correctness of the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP(C)No.13807 of 2013.
The essential facts, as are necessary for our consideration and which are expressly admitted, are that the respondents herein were working as Gramin Dak Sevak (GDS), under the Department of Posts; such persons construed to be Extra - Departmental Agents.
Concededly, the respondents were terminated from service as “GDS”, to be then offered appointment - on being selected - to certain Group D posts, through order dated 19.07.2010; and that they are so continuing.
On the assertion that the respondents were working for a long and uninterrupted period as “GDS” prior to their appointment in Group D service, they approached the 4th respondent - Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act,1972 (‘the Act for short’), seeking eligible gratuity for the period of such service; and orders were issued by the said Authority in their favour - copies of which are on record as Ext. P3(a), P5 (a) (b) and (c).
The Department of Posts challenged the above said orders through the writ petition; but the learned Single Judge concluded against them, through the impugned judgment.
The Senior Superintendent, Post offices, Aluva, is in appeal before us.
Sri.Suvin R.Menon - learned Senior Panel Counsel for the Government of India, argued that the question whether “GDS” are employees as per the Payment of Gratuity Act, has been answered finally by the Honourable Supreme Court in Sr.Superintendent of Post Offices v. Gursewak Singh and Others [2019 (15)SCC 292]. He pointed out that the said judgment declares unambiguously and affirmatively that “GDS” are not employees within the ambit of the “Act”; and contended that, by this declaration, the impugned judgment becomes untenable.
Sri.Suvin R.Menon, thereafter, explained that the “GDS”, who are Extra - Departmental Agents, had the option of being selected to group D posts; and that the respondents in this case had chosen to accept such. He added that the “GDS” are not covered by the “Act”, but by a separate Scheme of gratuity propounded in the year 1968 – a copy of which is Annexure R1 to Ext.P2(a); and that it specifies that, except in the case of termination on account of misconduct, disciplinary action or appointment in the posts under the postal department, such persons will obtain a particular and special amount, treated as an ex-gratia gratuity. He predicated that, this is in addition to the “severance amounts” that are eligible to all such persons; and maintained that all such amounts had been offered to the appellants, which they have accepted, consequent to their appointment in the Group D posts. He argued that, in such circumstances, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside; and prayed that it be so ordered.
Smt.M.A.Zohra – learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 3, conceded that the Honourable Supreme Court has declared in Gursewak Singh (supra) that “GDS” are not employees within the “Act”; but argued that, they still have rights with respect to the uninterrupted service, which they had offered to the Department of Posts in such capacity. She then submitted that the Honourable Supreme Court is still seized of the question whether, persons who have put in several years of service, even in temporary posts, are entitled to benefits; and prayed that, hence, this appeal be not entertained by this Court.
When we examine the judgment of the learned Single Judge, it becomes apparent that he has proceeded on the assumption that “GDS” are covered by the “Act”. We cannot find blame in this because, Gursewak Singh (supra) was delivered by the Honourable Supreme Court much after, on 15.03.2019. However, once such declarations have been made, obviously, we are bound by it; and can only hold the “GDS” to be not covered by “Act”.
Pertinently, the learned Single Judge, on the impression that the “Act” applies, dismissed the writ petition, saying that, as per Section 4(5) thereof, benefits under a better scheme of gratuity would be eligible to employees, if there is a contract between them and the employer. This was so concluded, adverting to the scheme of gratuity referred by Sri.Suvin R.Menon above; but again, these issues should be now irrelevant, on account of the declarations in Gursewak Singh (supra).
We are, therefore, enjoined to intervene and to set aside the judgment. However, if there is any right which is available to the respondents beyond the scope of gratuity under the “Act”, certainly such would not stand precluded by our observations.
We thus allow this appeal; and the impugned judgment is set aside.