High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 10 P&H CK 5173

Secy. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam & Ors. vs Sat Narain Saroha

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 31 October 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Harkesh Manuja, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
FAO-2418-2007 (O&M)

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

14 paragraphs · 1,129 words

HARKESH MANUJA, J. (ORAL)

1.

By way of present appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, challenge has been laid to the order dated 06.04.2007 passed by the learned Commissioner under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, Sonepat (for short, ‘the Commissioner’), whereby the claim application filed by the respondent seeking compensation for permanent disablement suffered during the course of his employment was allowed.

2.

Briefly stated, the case set up by the respondent was that he was working as a Regular Work Mate with the appellant-Nigam since 14.05.1993. On 10.08.1995, at about 10.00 a.m., while repairing a fuse on a transformer in village Rajlu Garhi during duty hours, he suffered an electric shock, resulting in burn injuries to his right arm. He was initially taken to Civil Hospital, Sonepat, and thereafter referred to PGIMS, Rohtak, where his right hand was amputated near the elbow. The Medical Board assessed his permanent disability at 70%. It was further pleaded that despite repeated requests, the appellants failed to pay compensation and that he was subsequently accommodated on a light-duty post pursuant to an order dated 02.02.2000 passed by this Court.

3.

The appellants contested the claim, pleading that the accident occurred due to the respondent's own negligence, as he failed to disconnect the G.O. switch before repairing the fuse. Reliance was placed upon the investigation report dated 01.03.2000 of the Chief Electrical Inspector. It was further contended that the claim was time-barred, having been filed after approximately ten years, and that the respondent was already accommodated against a light-duty post of Peon with effect from 15.03.2000.

4.

The respondent examined himself as AW-1 and Dr. H.R. Singhal as AW-2, besides producing the police report, medical board report, disability certificate and relevant correspondence. The appellants examined Daya Nand, Assistant Foreman, as RW-1 and Tara Chand, Junior Engineer, as RW-2, besides producing the departmental investigation reports and site plan.

5.

The Commissioner decided issues No.1 to 5 against the appellants and held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the respondent's employment. The plea of negligence was rejected, inter alia, on the ground that RW-1 was not present at the time of the accident and his testimony regarding non-disconnection of the G.O. switch was hearsay. As regards compensation, although the Medical Board assessed 70% permanent disability, the Commissioner assessed loss of earning capacity at 100%, observing that the respondent was unable to perform his previous job. Taking his age as 42 years and monthly wages as Rs.3,000/-, compensation of Rs.3,21,282/- was awarded along with interest @9% per annum from the date of accident. The delay in filing the claim application was also condoned. Aggrieved thereof, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellants.

6.

Learned counsel for the appellants reiterated the grounds of appeal and contended that the accident occurred due to the respondent's own negligence; that the claim was barred by limitation; that the matter being sub judice before this Court in the writ petition filed by the respondent, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction; and that loss of earning capacity could not have been assessed at 100% when the Medical Board certified 70% permanent disability.

7.

I have heard learned counsel for the appellants and perused the record.

8.

Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 makes the employer liable where personal injury is caused to a workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Contributory negligence is not a defence. The employer is absolved only in the cases specified in the proviso to Section 3(1), namely, where the injury is attributable to intoxication, wilful disobedience of an express order or rule, or wilful removal or disregard of a safety device. No such case was pleaded or proved. That the respondent was an employee of the appellant-Nigam and that the accident occurred during duty hours is not disputed. RW-1 was admittedly not present at the time of the accident, and RW-2 merely stated that on verification the G.O. switch was found in operation, without any evidence that the respondent disregarded any express order or rule. The finding of the Commissioner on this aspect is a finding of fact, based on evidence, and is neither perverse nor vitiated by misreading of evidence.

9.

As regards limitation, the proviso to Section 10(1) of the Act empowers the Commissioner to entertain a claim after the expiry of two years if satisfied that there was sufficient cause. The Act being a beneficial piece of social legislation, the Commissioner condoned the delay, noticing that the cause of action was recurring and that the appellants themselves were aware of the accident, conducted their own inquiry, and accommodated the respondent on a light-duty post. The discretion so exercised was not shown to be arbitrary or perverse and no substantial question of law arises therefrom.

10.

The plea of sub judice is equally untenable. The writ petition, as pleaded by the respondent, related to the termination of his services on account of disablement, whereas the claim for compensation lies exclusively before the Commissioner under the Act. No material has been placed on record to show that compensation under the Act was in issue before this Court, and pendency of a writ petition does not oust the jurisdiction of the Commissioner. Providing alternative light work to the respondent likewise does not absolve the appellants of their statutory liability.

11.

The last contention relates to the assessment of loss of earning capacity. The respondent was working as a Regular Work Mate whose duties involved climbing transformer structures and repairing live fuses, which require the use of both hands. His right arm having been amputated near the elbow, the Commissioner found him unfit to perform the work he was performing at the time of the accident and, in fact, his services were dispensed with on that account in 1998. Where an injury permanently incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident, it amounts to total disablement within Section 2(1)(l) of the Act, irrespective of the percentage of physical disability certified by the Medical Board Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata, (1976) 1 SCC 289. Assessment of loss of earning capacity being essentially a question of fact, and the Commissioner having correctly applied the wages and the relevant factor under Schedule IV, no substantial question of law, as required under Section 30 of the Act, arises for consideration.

12.

In view of the above, finding no illegality or perversity in the order dated 06.04.2007 passed by the Commissioner, the appeal is dismissed. The amount, if any, deposited by the appellants along with accrued interest be released to the respondent.

13.

Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.