S.Baldev Singh vs Life Insurance Corporation & Ors.

This application raises a very interesting point: Whether this court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, can direct defendants to deposit

the suit amount to meet the claim of the plaintiff?

It arises out of a suit filed by applicant for recovery of Rs. 2.70 lacs consequent upon repudiation of his claim by the defendants. His wife, Smt.

Jasbir Kour, was insured by the defendantCompany after completion of necessary formalities, The company also accepted premium paid by her till

her death on May 3.1988. It, however, repudiated the claim on the ground that the insured bad suppressed vital information and resorted to

misrepresentation at the time of entering into contract of insurance,

The suit was filed on March 27,1989 and is pending adjudication ever since. Presently, patties have been directed to lead evidence and

meanwhile this C.M.P. has momentarily derailed the proceedings.

The plaintiff's short case is that since defendants have admitted the factum of insurance and have been instrumental in delaying the adjudication of

the suit, they should be directed to deposit the suit money in the court.

In their objections, defendants have resisted the application. They have denied that plaintiff's claim was ever admitted or its adjudication

deylayed by them. They say that the defendantCorporation is Public Undertaking and it has no plans to defeat the claim or run away from it or the

decree as and when it may be passed in favour of plaintiff It is also pleaded that this court is incompetent to grant the relief as there is no provision

in Civil Procedure Code empowering to ask the defendant to deposit the suit money before passing of the decree.

C.L. counsel for plaintiff, Mr. Gupta, contends that a Civil Court by reason of its creation, comes to possess inherent and unfettered power to

pass any order as it may deem appropriate to meet the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. He submits"" that since

defendants were dragging feet in contesting the suit causing inordinate delay in its final disposal, the only way to keep them in leash was to make

them to deposit the suit money and that alone would satisfy the ends justice in the present case.

Mr. Bhargwa, on the other hand, argues that the relief prayed for is incapable of being granted by this court. According to him, inherent power

of the court cannot be invoked in the face of provisions of the CPC. For this, be derives suppost from AIR 1986 Madras: 17 and AIR 1974

Mysore : 51.

The short question involved is whether this court has the requisite inherent power to grant the relief and whether it is liable to be granted in the

circumstances of the case.

It is true every court has inherent in its Constitution all such powers as may be necessary to do the right and undo the wrong. As observed by

the Supreme court in Manohar Lal Vs Seth Hira Lal (1962 ASC 527) inherent power is not conferred on the court. It possesses it by virtue of its

doing Justice Section 151 CPC is only an enabling provision which saves it and enables a party to have proceedings of a pending suit conducted in

a manner consistent with equity and Justine, it is a common misconception that this section confers inherent power on the court. It only indicates

such powers and proclaims that nothing shall limit or effect its exercise to meet ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of court.

But at the same time it is to be remembered that this power is not unbridled and , unfettered. It has its own limitations and cannot be exercised

recklessly, indiscriminately and at sweet will. It cannot be exercised in cases prohibited by the Code or in matters excluded from the cognizance of

the court. Similarly it can't be invoked in cases where the Code contains specific provisions which would meet the necessities of a Case or to

coerce a defendant to terms. In support it would be appropriate to refer to what Supreme court said in Arjun Singh Vs Mohinder Kour

(AIR 1964 SC: 993):

It is sufficient if we proceed on the accepted and admitted limitation on the existence of such jurisdiction. If there are express provisions of the

Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the court, or the jurisdiction

that may be exercised in relation to the matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked to cut across the power conferred by the Code.

The test, therefore, is to see whether the matter falls within or without the provisions of the statute, in the former case"", the court cannot

obviously exercise any inherent power because it has none.

Morever, a defendant becomes liable only after a decree is passed against him. He is bound to satisfy the claim on its execution, and not

before it. He cannot be held liable or forced to meet a claim before that for it would amount to decreeing a suit before the judgment. Where he

intends to delay and obstruct the passing of the decree, the court has the power under order XXXVIII CPC to pin him down and secure the claim

of the plaintiff,

Applying all this to the present case, it is mainfest that present controversy is covered by the express provisions of Order 38. If plaintiff feels

that defendants are delaying the adjudication of the suit and arc intending to defeat and obstruct the decree to be passed, his remedy lies in

approaching the court under 0.38 and to satisfy the requirements prescribed therein. A cursory application like the present one is no substitute for

that any wav. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that the necessities of the case can squarely be met under the provisions of 0.38 CPC in the

face of which inherent power of the court can't be invoked.

Even on facts, plaintiff has no case. His assertion that defendants have admitted his claim is belied by the record. His other complaint that

defendants are resorting to dilatory tactics to delay the disposal of the suit may not be wholly without substance. But the present application is no

remedy for that. Above all the defendant Company is a public under taking and given regard to its commercial status and sound financial position, it

cannot be Primafacie concluded that it is incapable of satisfying the claim or has any intention to defeat and frustate it. I, therefore, hold that in a

money suit a civil court has no inherent power to order a defendant to deposit the suit money before judgment. The only power it can exercise is

under 0.38 CPC, subject to the conditions laid down in the provision. Moreover, there is no question of exercising any inherent power where the

case is covered by the express provisions of the statute.

In the premises, I find no merit in this application, which is dismissed. This shall, however, leave the plaintiff free to move the court and to seek

redressal of his grievance by way of an appropriate remedy, If so advised.