Saurabh Tiwari vs Union Of India & Ors.

The applicant has approached this Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking quashing of the impugned office order dated 17.07.2026 and relieving order dated 17.07.2026, whereby he has been transferred from his present place of posting, and for a direction to the respondents to permit him to continue at his present place of posting. The reliefs prayed for by the applicant are as under:-

The brief facts of the case are that the applicant, Shri Saurabh Tiwari, is working as Senior Social Security Assistant (SSSA) in the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO), Regional Office, Kanpur. The applicant has challenged the impugned Office Order dated 17.07.2026, whereby he has been temporarily transferred from Regional Office, Kanpur to Regional Office, Gorakhpur for a period of 120 days, along with the consequential relieving order issued on the same day. It is the case of the applicant that the transfer is punitive in nature and has been made on the basis of certain allegations against him, without any genuine administrative exigency or public interest. The applicant had earlier also been transferred from Kanpur to Gorakhpur vide order dated 03.03.2023, which was challenged before this Tribunal in OA No. 250 of 2023; during its pendency, the said transfer order was withdrawn by the respondents vide order dated 23.11.2023 and the applicant was permitted to join at Kanpur. The applicant further states that a major penalty charge-sheet dated 04.06.2026 was issued against him, to which he submitted his reply dated 15.06.2026, and thereafter, on the basis of a report dated 24.06.2026, the impugned transfer order dated 17.07.2026 came to be issued. The applicant has also relied upon the fact that his wife is working as an Assistant Teacher at Kanpur Dehat and that he seeks retention at Kanpur on spouse grounds. He has further alleged that the impugned transfer was issued without recommendation of the Placement Committee and in disregard of the applicable transfer policy, and that the same has been passed with mala fide intention and with a view to punish and harass him.

Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the impugned transfer order dated 17.07.2026 is not a routine administrative transfer but is punitive in nature, having been issued on the basis of allegations levelled against the applicant and while disciplinary proceedings are pending against him. He submits that the order has neither been issued in genuine administrative interest nor supported by any sufficient reason or public interest, and has been passed without following the prescribed procedure, including recommendation of the Placement Committee. Learned counsel further submits that the applicant had earlier challenged his transfer from Kanpur to Gorakhpur in OA No. 250 of 2023, pursuant to which the earlier transfer order was withdrawn by the respondents themselves on 23.11.2023. He further submits that the applicant's wife is posted as an Assistant Teacher at Kanpur Dehat and, therefore, the applicant's request for retention at Kanpur on spouse grounds deserves consideration in terms of the applicable Government instructions. It is also submitted that the applicant is the General Secretary of the EPF Staff Union and that his transfer, in the midst of disciplinary proceedings and without any demonstrated administrative exigency, would adversely affect his ability to participate in the said proceedings and union activities. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the impugned transfer and relieving orders deserve to be quashed and the respondents be directed to permit the applicant to continue at his present place of posting.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the claim of the applicant and submitted that the impugned transfer order has been passed by the competent authority in administrative and public interest and is purely temporary in nature for a period of 120 days, which neither alters the applicant’s service conditions nor results in any permanent displacement. It is submitted that the applicant is holding a transferable post and has no vested or enforceable right to continue at a particular station. Learned counsel further submits that the allegation of mala fide is vague and unsupported by any cogent material and the officer against whom such allegations have been levelled has also not been impleaded as a party. It is further submitted that the impugned order is the culmination of a series of administrative proceedings and complaints concerning the applicant’s conduct, including caution memoranda, disciplinary proceedings and other instances noticed in the official record, and cannot be characterised as a punitive transfer merely because disciplinary proceedings are pending against him. The applicant’s earlier transfer having subsequently been withdrawn also does not confer upon him any right to remain posted at Kanpur indefinitely. As regards the applicant’s plea based upon the posting of his wife, it is submitted that spouse-ground guidelines are only directory and do not confer any legally enforceable right to seek posting at a station of one’s choice. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that no statutory rule has been shown to have been violated and no case of mala fide or want of competence has been established so as to warrant interference by this Tribunal.

In the counter affidavit, it has been stated that the impugned transfer was not founded upon any solitary incident or solely upon the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant. It has been stated that, after considering the applicant’s conduct and the cumulative administrative record, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Kanpur, submitted a detailed report dated 24.06.2026 recommending, inter alia, transfer of the applicant from the present station in the interest of office discipline and smooth functioning of the Organisation. It has further been stated that the competent authority considered the said report along with the relevant record and, in exercise of the power under paragraph 9.5 of the EPFO Group-C Transfer Policy, 2025, passed the impugned order dated 17.07.2026 transferring the applicant for a period of 120 days. Thus, according to the respondents, the impugned transfer was an administrative measure based upon the overall service record and administrative exigency and was not intended to operate as a substitute for disciplinary punishment.

Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that he does not wish to file any rejoinder affidavit.

Learned counsel for the respondents, in support of his submissions, has placed reliance upon the settled law that transfer is an incidence of service and that the choice of posting is primarily within the domain of the competent administrative authority. Reliance has been placed upon Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357, para 7, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that unless an order of transfer is vitiated by mala fide or is made in violation of a statutory provision, the Court cannot interfere, and that Central Administrative Tribunal^{transfer guidelines do not confer a legally enforceable right} upon an employee. Reliance has also been placed upon Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) v. State of Bihar, 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 659, para 4, and N.K. Singh v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 98, para 18, in support of the proposition that a Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place and that, in the absence of suspicious circumstances or cogent material establishing mala fide, judicial interference with an order of transfer is not warranted. The principle regarding spouse posting has also been referred to with reliance upon Bank of India v. Jagjit Singh Mehta, (1992) 1 SCC 306, as noticed in S.L. Abbas (supra), wherein it was held that although husband and wife should, as far as practicable, be posted at the same station, such guideline does not confer an absolute right to claim posting at a particular station when administrative requirements do not permit it.

Learned counsel for the applicant, in his written arguments, submitted that the applicant had earlier been transferred from Kanpur to Gorakhpur vide order dated 03.03.2023, which was challenged before this Tribunal in O.A. No. 250 of 2023, and during the pendency of the said O.A., the respondents withdrew the said transfer order vide order dated 23.11.2023 and permitted the applicant to join at Kanpur. It was further submitted that, prior to issuance of the impugned transfer order, a major penalty charge-sheet dated 04.06.2026 had been issued against the applicant under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, to which he submitted his reply dated 15.06.2026. Learned counsel contended that the applicant is the General Secretary of the EPF Staff Union and that the used to prejudice him. It was further submitted that the impugned transfer order dated 17.07.2026 was issued during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings and, although termed as a temporary transfer for 120 days, the applicant apprehends that the same is intended to operate as a punitive measure. Learned counsel also submitted that the respondents have changed the headquarters of the applicant from Kanpur to Gorakhpur and that the impugned transfer has been effected without following the applicable transfer policy and without recommendation of the Placement Committee. On these grounds, it was submitted that the impugned transfer order is punitive, arbitrary and actuated by mala fide and, therefore, liable to be quashed.

Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the judgments relied upon by the applicant are clearly distinguishable on their own facts and do not lay down any absolute proposition that an employee cannot be transferred merely because disciplinary proceedings are pending against him. It was submitted that the impugned order dated 17.07.2026 has been passed by the competent authority in administrative interest for a limited period of 120 days and is not a punishment imposed upon the applicant; the pendency of disciplinary proceedings, by itself, does not convert an otherwise valid administrative transfer into a punitive action. The allegation of mala fide is wholly vague and unsupported by any cogent material, and the applicant has failed to implead the person against whom such allegation is sought to be made. The respondents further submitted that the applicant holds a transferable post and has no vested right to or the provisions relating to spouse posting are merely administrative guidelines and do not confer an enforceable right to claim posting at a station of choice. The reliance placed by the applicant upon Sombesh Tiwari v. Union of India, (2009) 2 SCC 592, is misplaced, as the Hon’ble Supreme Court interfered therein upon finding, on the facts of that case, that the transfer was founded upon allegations constituting the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings and amounted to a colourable exercise of power; no such exceptional circumstances have been established in the present case. Likewise, the decisions in Rajendra Chaubey, T.L. Gupta and P. Ramakrishna turn upon their respective factual circumstances and cannot be read as laying down a general prohibition against transfer during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings. On the contrary, the settled principles in Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) v. State of Bihar, 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 659, Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357, and N.K. Singh v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 98, make it clear that transfer is an incidence of service and interference is warranted only where the order is shown to be vitiated by mala fide or violation of a statutory provision. The respondents therefore submitted that the applicant has failed to demonstrate either mala fide, colourable exercise of power, violation of any mandatory statutory provision, or absence of administrative exigency, and consequently no ground is made out for judicial interference with the impugned transfer order.

I have heard Mr. Rakesh Kumar Dixit, learned counsel for the applicant, and Mr. Chakrapani Vatsyayan and Mr. Satyajit Mukherji, learned counsel for the respondents, at length and have carefully perused the pleadings, documents and material available on record.

The principal issue which arises for consideration is whether the impugned Office Order dated 17.07.2026, whereby the applicant has been temporarily transferred from Regional Office, Kanpur to Regional Office, Gorakhpur for a period of 120 days, is liable to be interfered with on the grounds that the same is punitive in nature, actuated by mala fides, or issued in violation of the applicable transfer policy. It is well settled that transfer is an incidence of service and an employee holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at a particular place. The scope of judicial review in matters relating to transfer is extremely limited and interference is warranted only where the order is shown to have been passed by an incompetent authority, in violation of a statutory provision, or is vitiated by mala fides or colourable exercise of power. In Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357, State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, (2004) 11 SCC 402, and Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2009) 15 SCC 178, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently reiterated the aforesaid principles. The same position has subsequently been reiterated in Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Others, (2024) 12 SCC 292.

The principal grievance of the applicant is that the impugned transfer, having been made during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings, is punitive in nature. The contention, however, cannot be accepted merely on account of the pendency of such proceedings. In service jurisprudence, transfer may be made for various genuine administrative reasons, including public interest, vacancy management, staff rationalization, workload distribution, organisational restructuring, operational requirements, deployment of specialised skills, implementation of rotation policy, avoidance of conflict of interest, non-punitive disciplinary vigilance, security or law-and-order considerations, and continuity of essential public services. The mere fact that an employee is facing disciplinary proceedings or an inquiry does not, by itself, render an otherwise administrative transfer punitive, provided the transfer is not intended to operate as a punishment or as a substitute for disciplinary action. The question has, therefore, to be examined with reference to the nature and effect of the impugned order and the circumstances in which it has been passed.

In the present case, the impugned order has been passed by the competent authority and transfers the applicant for a limited period of 120 days. No punishment has been imposed upon the applicant by the impugned order, nor has his pay, rank, seniority or service status been reduced or otherwise altered. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Registrar General, High Court of Madras v. R. Perachi & Another, Civil Appeal No. 7303 of 2011, decided on 15.09.2011, observed as under:-

The aforesaid principle is attracted to the facts of the present case. The applicant has not demonstrated that the impugned order entails any reduction in his pay, rank, seniority or service status. The mere fact that disciplinary proceedings are pending against him cannot, by itself, convert an otherwise administrative transfer into a punitive order. The applicant has also failed to establish that the impugned transfer is a substitute for any disciplinary punishment or that the competent authority has exercised its power for a collateral or extraneous purpose.

I also find no substance in the allegation of mala fides. The applicant has made a general allegation that the transfer has been effected with an intention to punish and harass him, but no specific or convincing material has been placed on record to establish personal bias, extraneous consideration or colourable exercise of power. Significantly, the person against whom the allegation of mala fide is sought to be attributed has not been impleaded as a party. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Others, (2024) 12 SCC 292, while reiterating the settled principles governing judicial review in transfer matters, observed as under:-

Applying the aforesaid principles, the applicant has failed to establish any circumstance warranting judicial interference. Mere inconvenience or hardship arising from the transfer cannot, in the absence of a legally sustainable ground, render an otherwise valid transfer order mala fide or arbitrary.

The applicant has also questioned the impugned transfer on the ground that the same was not preceded by a recommendation of the Placement Committee and is contrary to the applicable transfer policy. This contention also does not merit acceptance. The material available on record shows that the impugned transfer has been issued in exercise of the power contemplated under the notified Group-C Transfer Policy, 2025. In particular, the respondents have relied upon paragraphs 1.4, 1.9 and 9.5 of the said policy, which permit transfer of officials in the cadre of SSSA/SSA within the State in accordance with administrative requirements and vest the competent authority with the power to effect such transfer. The applicant has not been able to point out any provision of the said policy having statutory force which makes recommendation of the Placement Committee a mandatory condition precedent for Central Administrative Tribunal^{exercise of such power. Therefore, merely because the} transfer was allegedly not preceded by a recommendation of the Placement Committee, the impugned order cannot, on that ground alone, be held invalid. It is equally well settled that executive instructions or transfer guidelines, unless having statutory force, do not confer an enforceable right upon an employee. The applicant’s plea based upon the posting of his wife also cannot confer an absolute or indefeasible right to remain posted at Kanpur, as spouse-posting instructions operate subject to administrative exigencies. Likewise, the earlier withdrawal of the applicant’s transfer order does not create any vested right in his favour to continue at Kanpur indefinitely. 16. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant, particularly Sombesh Tiwari v. Union of India, (2009) 2 SCC 592, do not advance the applicant’s case. The said judgment was rendered in the peculiar factual circumstances of that case, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the transfer was founded upon allegations which were themselves the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings and that the exercise of power was vitiated by arbitrariness and colourable exercise. The other judgments relied upon by the applicant, namely Rajendra Chaubey, T.L. Gupta, P. Ramakrishna and CE & CE Gazetted Executive Officers Association, also turn upon their respective factual circumstances and cannot be construed as laying down an absolute proposition that an employee cannot be transferred during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings. In the present case, no material has been placed before me to establish that the impugned transfer is intended to operate as Central Administrative Tribunal^{a punishment or that the competent authority has acted for} any collateral or extraneous purpose. On the contrary, the respondents have consistently maintained that the transfer has been made in administrative interest and for a limited period of 120 days. The applicant, therefore, cannot derive any assistance from the aforesaid decisions. 17. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find that the applicant has failed to establish mala fides, colourable exercise of power, violation of any mandatory statutory provision, incompetence of the authority issuing the impugned order, or any other legally sustainable ground warranting interference with the administrative decision of transfer. The applicant, being a holder of a transferable post, has no vested right to remain posted at Kanpur merely on the ground of personal hardship, spouse posting, earlier posting at the same station or pendency of disciplinary proceedings. This Tribunal cannot substitute its own view for that of the competent administrative authority regarding the place where an employee should be posted, particularly when no statutory infirmity has been demonstrated. The consequential relieving order dated 17.07.2026, being merely consequential to the impugned transfer order, also calls for no interference.

Accordingly, the Original Application is dismissed at the admission stage itself. There shall be no order as to costs.

All pending Miscellaneous Applications, if any, stand disposed of.