Sau. Sangita Ashok Patil vs Returning Officer and Residential Deputy Collector, The Latur District Central C-operative Bank, Latur & Ors.

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by the consent of the parties.

By way of this Writ Petition, challenge is raised to the order passed by Respondent no. 1 – Returning Officer and Residential Deputy Collector, for the elections of the Latur District Central Co-operative Bank (for short ‘the LDCC Bank’), dated 19.10.2026, rejecting the objection raised by the Petitioner to the nomination of Respondent no. 2 – Arvind Dilip Patil.

Heard the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Khandare for the Petitioner, learned Advocate Mr. Dighe, for Respondent no. 1, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Sapkal for Respondent no. 2 and learned Advocate Mr. Advant for Respondent no. 4.

Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Khandare, for the Petitioner submitted that, the Petitioner is contesting the elections of Board of Directors of the LDCC Bank. The Petitioner has raised objection to the nomination of Respondent no. 2, before Respondent no. 1 on the ground that he is not holding the requisite qualification for being elected as a Director of LDCC Bank. Therefore, acceptance of his nomination is bad in law and unsustainable. He has raised the following grounds are raised :

According to him, in the present case, the NMSCS, is undoubtedly a defaulter of the loan availed by them from the bank for which a notice has been issued for making payment of the unpaid installments. Such notice has been issued on 02.07.2026, calling upon the Society to make payment of arrear of dues of the loan amount, failing which, the Society will be declared as a defaulter and coercive steps will have to be taken against the Society as provided under Section 101 and Section 98 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act (for short ‘the MCS, Act’). He submits that in view of the notice dated 02.07.2026, it is evident that the Society is a defaulter of the bank / Respondent no. 4. He submits that even though this ground has been raised by the Petitioner but Respondent no. 1 while passing the order has not even considered the grounds raised by the Petitioner by answering the issue.

He submits that since Society itself is a defaulter, it would be disqualified to participate in the elections of Respondent no. 4 / Bank in the light of Section 73(CA)(1)(f)(ii) and (iv). He submits that particularly clause (iv) is the provision which was invoked by the Petitioner seeking disqualification of Respondent no. 2. In case of District Central Co-operative Bank or the State Co-operative Bank, a member, if he has incurred any disqualification under this Act or the Rules made thereunder which includes Bye-laws of a Society, the member is disqualified from contesting the elections. In the present case, on account of the Bye-law no. 35 (i) read with 5 (15). It is evident that Respondent no. 2 as a representative of a defaulter Society cannot be allowed to fill in nomination form for the post of Director of Respondent no. 4 / Bank. In support of his submissions that the Bye-laws are also equally binding to decide the eligibility for nomination of the elections to Respondent no. 4 / Bank. The Petitioner has relied on the following decisions of this Court, more particularly, on the observations made in the following judgment in case of Sambha Versus The State of Maharashtra and Others, in Writ Petition no. 5177, 5178 and 5180 of 1995, reported in 1996 (2) Bom CR 700, wherein this Court has taken a view that even the Bye-laws have a binding force. He has also relied on the decision in Writ Petition nos. 14991, 14993 and 14998 of 2021, in case of Kishor Gangadhar Patil Versus The State of Maharashtra and Others, with connected Writ Petitions, reported in 2022(3) ALL MR 106, in which a similar view has been taken by this Court.

In support of his submission that the Bye-laws have a binding force, if it is approved by the statute, he would rely on decision of this Court in Writ Petition no. 2652/2003 in Shivshankar Dudh Vyavsayek Va Utpadak Sanstha Maryadit and Others Versus State of Maharashtra and Others, 2004 (1) Mh.L.J. 779. He has relied on few other judgments where a similar view has been taken by this Court. He, therefore, submitted that considering the binding force of the Bye-laws even in the present case, the Returning Officer should have taken into consideration the applicable Bye-laws in the instant case which is held to be one of the grounds for disqualification under Section 73(CA)(1)(f)(ii).

He further submitted that although defence is taken by Respondent no. 2 that the State Government has issued a government resolution staying the recovery from the persons affected by the drought. Pursuant to the government resolution issued on 10.10.2025, granting stay to the loans that are sanctioned for agricultural allied activities for a period of one year, no such instructions have been issued by the government to the bank. Therefore, according to him, the Society continues to be a defaulter and even assuming that any directions are issued granting stay to the loans disbursed to the agricultural related business, it does not clear all the dues of the Society or any of the individuals, only the recovery of the amount is defered. Hence, the Society continues to be a defaulter.

Per contra, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sapkal, for Respondent no. 2 submitted that eligibility for the elections of the District Central Co-operative Bank or the State Co-operative Bank is governed by Section 73(CA)(1)(f) and the sub-clause (i) to (v) provided under the MCS, Act. According to him, Section 73(CA)(1)(f)(ii) would be the relevant provision that would govern the Society. Mr. Sapkal, submits that disqualification for being a member of a committee is provided under Section 73(CA)(1), since the present case is related to District Central Co-operative Bank, the disqualification in relation to bank is provided under sub-clause (f)(ii) which provides that in case a person who is a defaulter of Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society i.e. a person in his personal capacity is a defaulter of Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society becomes a defaulter and thus, ineligible. Similarly, even if an officer bearer of a defaulting Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society, such Society becomes ineligible for being nominated, elected, opted, etc., of a committee.

In the present case, Respondent no. 2 is undoubtedly not a defaulter of the Society. Similarly, he is also not a office bearer of a defaulting Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society, which can be supported from the documents placed by the Petitioner on record, which contains the audit report of the Society, wherein a resolution has been passed accepting the resignation of Respondent no. 2 in its meeting dated 12.12.2025. In resolution no. 2 of the Society, the resignation tendered by Respondent no. 2 dated 02.12.2025, has been accepted. Thus, he is no more a Director of the Society to whom he is representing. He continues being a member of that Society. Hence, Respondent no. 2 does not incur disqualification as provided under Section 73(CA)(1)(f)(ii).

According to him, except the conditions mentioned for the aforementioned provisions no other disqualification can be alleged to incur by Respondent no. 2. In response to the submissions of the Petitioner that Bye-law no. 35.1.2.A.1 disqualifies Respondent no. 2 from contesting the elections of the bank. He submits that the Society is undoubtedly member of Respondent no. 4 / Bank and Respondent no. 2 is the member of the Society. Therefore, there is no disqualification on account of Bye-law no. 35.1.2.A.1. With reference to Bye-law no. 5(15) referred by the Petitioner to invoke disqualification of Respondent no. 2, he would submit that Bye-law no. 15.A.3.5 governs the eligibility of a valid voter. So far as the inclusion of Respondent no. 2 in the voters’ list is concerned, the same is not objected by the Petitioner, in fact in the objection itself it is clearly stated by the Petitioner that according to Section 27(3) of the MCS, Act, Respondent no. 2 is eligible only as a voter to represent the Society and he is not eligible to file nomination for the post of Director of the Bank, in view of the disqualification incurred by him under Section 73(CA)(f)(ii) and (iii). Hence, according to him, Bye-law no. 5 (15) does not relate to eligibility for nomination to the committee of the bank. The only disqualification for nomination to the Committee is provided under Section 73(CA)(f) of the MCS, Act.

Learned Advocate Mr. Advant for Respondent no. 4 / Bank, supports the Petitioner and submits that Respondent no. 2 is the Director of the NMSCS who has availed the financial assistance from Respondent no. 4 / Bank and has defaulted in repayment thereof, for which, the demand notice dated 02.07.2026, is already issued to the Society, to pay arrears of 67,15,198/- that was the amount due as on 30.06.2026. He submits that a harmonious reading of Bye-law no. 35.1.2.A.1 and 35.1.B.3 of Respondent no. 4/ Bank, obligates a person who is a member of Society or a borrowing Society, who commits default in repayment of subsisting liability towards Respondent no. 4 would not be eligible to contest the election of the bank. He further submits that in view of Bye-law no. 35.1.B.3, it is necessary that the bank account of the member Society should be regular and in operation. However, in the instant case, the account of NMSCS is in default. Therefore, Respondent no. 2 is not eligible to contest the election of Respondent no. 4 / Bank.

He would submit that the Bye-laws of Respondent no. 4 / Bank operates within the statutory framework, to regulate Society specific aspects of governance, including qualifications, representation, rights and duties of members, and norms in relation to participation in the affairs of Respondent no. 4 / Bank. It is, therefore, submitted that the Act of 1960, expressly provides that elections of the management shall be conducted not only in accordance with the Act and Rules, but also in accordance with the Bye-laws. He submits that right to vote is not a fundamental right but a statutory right with reasonable restrictions governing eligibility.

Learned Advocate Mr. Dighe, for Respondent no. 1, submits that the order passed by Respondent no. 1 is in consonance with the powers conferred on Respondent no. 1. The powers of Respondent no. 1 are governed by Rule 25 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Society (Election to Committee) Rules, 2014 (for short ‘the Election Rules of 2014). Respondent no. 1 has rightly held that the grounds of disqualification invoked are not applicable to the facts of the present case. So far as the resignation is concerned, according to him, the document placed on record discloses that Respondent no. 2 has already given his resignation on 02.12.2025. Thus, he does not incur disqualification on account of being Director / member of managing committee of the Society. Hence, he does not incur disqualification under Section 73(CA) of the MCS, Act. He submits that even otherwise the election programme has already commenced and it is at the stage of withdrawal of nominations which is permitted from 21.10.2026 to 04.11.2026, this being an intermediate stage of elections, any interference by the Court is not warranted. If at all the Petitioner has any greivance, he has a remedy of filing election dispute after the elections are conducted.

I have heard the respective Advocates for the parties and perused the documents on record with their assistance.

The Petitioner has raised various grounds in the Writ Petition as recorded in submission of learned Advocate for the Petitioner. However, during the course of arguments, the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Khandare, submitted that since some of the grounds raised by him, would amount to disputed question of fact. He would not insist on those grounds, but the grounds about the applicability of the Bye-laws of the Society, which make Respondent no. 2 ineligible would still survive. Consequently, the challenge in the Writ Petition is now the limited only to the extent of applicability of the Bye-laws, to the facts of the present case. Bye-laws of the LDCC Bank are placed on record. Bye-law no. 9 is regarding membership of the bank. Bye-law no. 15.A.3 governs the eligibility for being a valid voter of the bank, under clause no. 5 of Bye-law no. 15.A.3, it is provided that the affiliated member of Co-operative Society, should not be in arrears of the bank or any other Society. This clause has been relied upon by the Petitioner for seeking disqualification of Respondent no. 2.

According to the Petitioner, since the Society to whom Respondent no. 2 represents is in arrears of the loan, it is not eligible as a valid voter. So far as this contention is concerned, the Petitioner in his written objection raised before Respondent no. 1, has already conceded to the position that though Respondent no. 2 is eligible as a voter under Section 27(3) of the MCS, Act, he is not be eligible to contest the elections as a member of the managing committee, in view of the disqualification incurred by him under Section 73(CA)(1)(f)(ii) and (iii) of the MCS Act and Bye-law no. 35.1.2.A.1 and 35.1.B.3 of the bank. On perusal of Section 73(CA)(1)(f) it provides for disqualification of Committee and its members. In relation to District Central Co-operative Bank, disqualification is provided under clause (f). The relevant provision is reproduced here under which reads thus :

The Petitioner has relied upon (ii) and (iii) of Clause (f). Sub-clause (ii) provides that the person who is a defaulter of a Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society is disqualified. Since Respondent no. 2 is not a defaulter of the Society, the first part of the aforementioned clause will not be attracted. So far as the second part is concerned, it disqualifies the office bearer of defaulting office Society. Although it was claimed that the Petitioner is one of the Director of the Society, on perusal of the documents on record which forms part of the audit report, prima facie, do not support the case of the Petitioner. Since Respondent no. 2 appears to have tendered his resignation on 02.12.2025, which was accepted by way of a resolution of the Society on 12.12.2025. Even otherwise, the Petitioner has already given up the challenge to the validity of the resignation given by Respondent no. 2. Therefore, the grounds mentioned in item no. 2 of the clause (f) will not be applicable in the instant case, although it is claimed in the objections raised before Respondent no. 1 that in case of Respondent no. 2, sub-clause (iii) will be a ground for disqualification of Respondent no. 2. Upon reading of the same, even that ground is not attracted since the managing committee of the Society is not superseded.

Now turning to the only ground which is insisted by the Petitioner is the disqualification provided under Section 73 (CA)(1)(f) (iv). It is provides that, any disqualification incurred by a member under this Act or Rules or Bye-laws of the Society would be a ground for disqualification of a member. This is the only ground on which the challenge to the nomination of Respondent no. 2 has now been insisted upon by the Petitioner. According to Bye-law no. 35.1.2.A.1, the member Society who proposes to contest the elections to the managing committee, should be a member of Society of the bank as provided under Bye-law no. 5(15) and its representative should be a member of that Society. In the instant case, Respondent no. 2 is undoubtedly a member of the Society, to whom, he represents and the Society is a member of Respondent no. 4 / Bank. Thus, both the conditions as stated in Bye-law no. 35.1.2.A.1 stand fulfilled.

Similarly, the other ground raised by the Petitioner relying on Bye-law no. 35.1.B.3 is that, the Society, who a nominates representative, the account of such Society should be regular. In case the account of the affiliated member Society remains non-operative for one year prior to the elections, such Society would be disqualified from contesting the elections. On perusal of the account statement of the NMSCS annexed to the reply affidavit filed by Respondent no. 4, it appears that there are transaction in the account. Though arrears of Rs.62,59,283/- are shown, it is bereft of details about the period for which the loan was sanctioned, and when the account has gone in default. Even otherwise to prove the default of the Society would require evidence, interpretation of the MCS, Act, the Rules of 2014 and the applicable Bye-laws of the Society. It is not within the powers of Respondent no. 1 to decide the disqualification of Respondent no. 2 with the available record and by interpreting the Bye-laws without leading any evidence in support thereof, more particularly, in absence of the Society who is not been made a party to the Writ Petition, who is the affected party, since its right of representation in the election of the bank are under challenge. Any order passed in the Writ Petition would be causing prejudice to the Society who would be deprived of its right to contest the elections of Respondent no. 4 / Bank. Thus, on that ground also the challenge raised in the present Writ Petition cannot be sustained.

In order to disqualify Respondent no. 2, based on the Bye-law nos. 35.1.2.A.1 and 35.B.1.3 would require evidence, since various disputed questions have been raised by the Petitioner. On one hand the Petitioner is claiming that the Society who is not before this Court is in default of the payment of arrears of loan, on the other hand it is submitted by Respondent no. 2 that the State Government has issued government resolution on 10.10.2025, granting benefits to the affected persons who incurred heavy loss due to the rains in the year 2025. The government resolution has granted stay for a period of one year to the recovery of loans that have been disbursed for agriculture related operations for a period of one year. Thus, the effect of this government resolution was in operation till 10.10.2026. The Nilanga Tahsil of the Latur District is covered under the annexure of the government resolution. A circular is also is issued by the Co-operation Marketing and Textile Department, granting similar stay to the recovery of loan disbursed for the agricultural operations due to the excess rains. The questions; whether the account of the Society is in default? whether it is regular or inoperative ? The effect of the stay granted to the recovery of loan and its consequences on the recovery of the loan granted by the bank to the Society, are all the questions that can be decided only by leading appropriate evidence, which cannot be decided in the present Writ Petition, that too in absence of the Society, who is the affected party.

Considering the stage of the elections, I do not find that, case for patent illegality warranting any interference of the Court at this stage is made out by the Petitioner. In a similar challenge raised before the Kolhapur Bench of this Court in Writ Petition no. 5261/2026 in case of Vikramsinha Balasaheb Sawant and Another Versus State of Maharashtra, Thr. Dept. of Co-operation and Others, decided 13.10.2026, this Court relying upon the qualification prescribed under the Bye-laws had taken a view that the Returning Officer should have been alert about the violation of the said Bye-laws and has caused interference in the election process, by setting aside the order passed by the Returning Officer and declared the Respondent therein ineligible to participate in the election process. Upon raising challenge to the aforesaid order before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) no. 37235/2026, it is held that the High court has overstepped its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Returning a categorical finding with respect to the eligibility of Appellant to contest election. The said issue appears to be a contestable matter, which requires some evidence as well as an adequate opportunity of being heard to both the sides. Consequently, the Appeal was allowed and the judgment and order of this Court is set aside and the Appellant is permitted to contest the election.

In my view, the law with regard to the interference in the elections for cancellation of nomination, that has been already accepted is no more res integra. This Court as well as the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken a consistent view that against the rejection of nomination, there is a remedy provided under Section 152-A of the MCS, Act, since it takes away right of an individual to contest elections. Thus, to test the veracity of decision of rejection, the same is made amenable to the writ jurisdiction in limited circumstances. So far as challenge to the nominations, that are accepted, no such remedy is provided under the MCS, Act itself. This absence of any remedy against the acceptance of the nomination, appears to be intentionally not provided by the legislature, so as to minimize the interference in the elections process. The legislature while providing a remedy against rejection of nomination has intentionally refrained from providing any remedy against the acceptance of nomination paper since all the grounds are permissible to be raised in the election petition filed after entire process is over. The observations made by this Court relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Shrikant Bhimraoji Gawande Versus The District Co-operative Election Officer and Divisional Joint Registrar Co-operative Society, Amravati and Others, in Writ Petition no. 3493/2026, decided on 17.09.2021, are reproduced herein under which reads thus :

Thus, at this stage, considering the ground raised by the Petitioner, which is not capable of being decided with the limited jurisdiction conferred on the Returning Officer, I do not find any infirmity in the order passed by Respondent no. 1.

To cause interference in the election programme which is at the stage of withdrawal of nomination, the Petitioner has to demonstrate that the order passed by the Returning Officer is patently illegal and arbitrary on the face of record. In the instant case, the order passed by Respondent no. 1 is well within the powers conferred on him and it is not within his powers to interpret the provisions of Act, 1960, its Bye-laws of 2014 and the Bye-laws of the Society and its interplay. Thus, I do not find any case for interference is made out by the Petitioner. Consequently the challenge fails and Writ Petition is dismissed.

However, it is made clear that all the observations made by this Court while deciding the present Writ Petition are the prima facie and does not preclude the petitioner from raising an election dispute, if he so desires and if such election dispute is raised, the same may be decided by the appropriate Court without being influenced by any of the observations made by this Court in the present Writ Petition.

Rule is discharged.