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Judgment
This second appeal is directed against the judgement and decree dated 29th July, 2016 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court at Contai, Purba Medinipur in Title Appeal No. 22 of 2011 affirming the judgement and decree dated 8th July, 2011 passed by the Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 2nd Court at Contai in Title Suit No. 67 of 2009, at the instance of the plaintiffs/appellants.
Let us now consider as to whether any substantial question of law is involved in this appeal for which the appeal is required to be admitted under the provision of Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or not.
Apart from the other grounds of challenge on merit of the suit, we find that both the courts below concurrently held that the present suit is barred by limitation. Bar of limitation takes away the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate on the issues involved in the suit.
As such, before entering into the other aspects of the dispute, let us now consider as to whether the courts below were justified in holding that the suit is barred by limitation or not.
The predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs who filed the suit claimed that at the time when three disputed sale deeds were executed, the plaintiff was minor. The disputed sale deeds were marked as Ext. 10, 11 and 13. All those three sale deeds were registered on 11th June, 1964. The Ext. 4 shows that the date of birth of the appellant was recorded therein as 29th November, 1947. Thus, as on the date of execution of those sale deeds, he was 16 years 6 months and 12 days. He attained the age of majority within six months thereafter i.e. sometime in 1965. The instant suit was filed to avoid these three sale deeds on 26th July, 2007. Thus, the instant suit was filed long after the period of limitation expired. Since he was minor, he was required to file such a suit for avoiding those sales within three years from the date of attaining the age of his majority. Since he attained the age of majority in 1965, he was required to file the said suit within the year of 1968. Even the exercise of fraud by the transferee upon the transferor in the process of execution of those deeds and the discovery of the fraud by the plaintiff as alleged by him in the suit, cannot be believed as it is rightly held by both the courts below that the plaintiff was impleaded as defendant in an earlier suit, wherein the legality of the very three sale deeds was challenged at the instance of the plaintiffs therein.
Though the said suit was initially decreed by the learned Trial Judge but the same was challenged in appeal before the learned first appellate court and the said appeal ultimately ended with compromise without however joining the plaintiff herein as a party to the terms of settlement. The decree which was passed by the learned Trial Judge setting aside the said three deeds, was not maintained in the ultimate decree passed by the learned Appeal Court which ended in compromise.
Though it is rightly contended by Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned advocate appearing for the appellants that since his client was not a party to the compromise petition, the said compromise decree is not binding upon him but having regard to the fact that he was a party to the said suit and/or the appeal arising out therefrom, he had the knowledge about the execution of those three sale deeds by predecessor-in-interest.
As such, even assuming that those deeds were created by fraud and the fraud was discovered when the earlier suit was filed, still then we find that the plaintiff did not file the suit within the period of limitation as the compromise decree was passed sometime in the year 1987 and the instant suit was filed on 26th July, 2007 which is beyond three years from the date of discovery of fraud.
As such, we hold that the plaintiff?s suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. We fully agree with the findings of both the courts below that the suit is barred by limitation.
Accordingly, we feel that no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal for which the appeal is required to be admitted under the provision of Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, we decline to admit this appeal.
The appeal is, thus, dismissed.
Since the appeal is disposed of in the manner as aforesaid, no further order need be passed on the stay application.
The application for stay being CAN 9992 of 2016 is thus, deemed to be disposed of.
Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the Learned advocates for the parties immediately.