Satyapal vs State Of Uttarakhand & Another

Vipin Sanghi, CJ

1) The present special appeal is directed against the order dated 14.09.2023, passed by the learned Single Judge, in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 1720 of 2023. By the impugned order, the said writ petition preferred by the appellant has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge.

2) The appellant had preferred the writ petition to assail the order dated 26.07.2021, whereby the claim of regularization made by the appellant had been rejected by the respondents. The appellant sought a mandamus to the respondents to regularize his services since 21.11.2011.

3) The appellant had been working as a muster role employee since 01.05.1986. His services were terminated on 04.01.1998, on the ground that he was named in an FIR, and arrested. The appellant, after obtaining bail in said criminal case, sought reinstatement, and when that was not done, preferred an industrial dispute. An industrial award followed. The operative part of the award is contained in Para 14 thereof which has been set out in the impugned order. The same reads as follows :

4) On the basis of the aforesaid award, the appellant sought regularization under the Rules of 2011. That claim has been rejected by the learned Single Judge, on the basis that he was a muster role employee, and the award merely directed re-employment as a muster role employee, or on equivalent post. Since the appellant had not continuously served, and was out of employment since the date of his retrenchment / termination, i.e. 04.01.1998 till March 2017, he was not entitled to regularization.

5) Mr. Miglani submits that the appellant had been granted reinstatement under the award, with full back-wages, and, therefore, he was entitled to be treated in a continuous muster role service. He submits that the appellant was entitled to regularization under the 2011 Rules.

6) We have heard Mr. Miglani, and perused the award, as well as the impugned order.

7) In our view, the award itself was patently laconic, inasmuch as, merely on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice, the appellant was directed to be re-appointed on muster role, or on equivalent post. Breach of principles of natural justice, by itself, was not sufficient to invite such a direction. The Labour Court should have examined – as to what was the prejudice that was caused to the appellant. The appellant does not dispute the fact that he was indeed involved in a criminal case resulting in registration of an FIR, and that he was arrested. It is apparent from the record that the appellant was arrested on 05.01.1998, he was enlarged on bail on 27.07.1998, and he moved the application for being taken back in service on 06.08.1998.

8) The action of the respondent-employer in terminating / retrenching the appellant had to be seen in the light of the situation as it existed when the said retrenchment / termination took place. On that date, the appellant was involved in a criminal case, and had been arrested. It could not be said that the retrenchment / termination of the appellant, was either mala fide, or arbitrary. It was for a good reason. Merely because the appellant was later on released on bail, did not entitle him to assail his retrenchment / termination, since he was only a muster role employee, and serving on contractual basis.

9) Even if the Labour Court was of the view that principles of natural justice were not followed before the appellant’s retrenchment, the direction should have been to the respondent-employer to grant a hearing to him and take a decision afresh, without being influenced by the earlier retrenchment / termination. In any event, since the award by the Labour Court was accepted by the respondent-employer, we are not interfering with the same in these proceedings. At the same time, considering the fact that we are exercising discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we cannot permit the undue benefit that the appellant has already derived, to be further exploited by him by staking a claim for regularization which, in any event, in terms of the award of the Labour Court was not made out. In our view, the learned Single Judge has rightly construed the relief granted to the appellant by the Labour Court, and the appellant was, therefore, not entitled to seek regularization under the aforesaid rules.

10) The Special Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.