AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Harpreet Singh Brar, J.
The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to decide representations (Annexure P2 to P5) submitted by the petitioner with regard to (i) Removal of anomaly; (ii) Payment of Suspension period; (iii) Payment of interest upon late payment of retiral benefits; and (iv) Payment of incentive for increased deposit in Provident Fund Matching Contribution Scheme-1983 (01.07.1983 to 31.03.1990).
Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contends that the petitioner joined in the respondent-Department as Electrician Instructor on 27.06.1962 and after rendering more than 35 years of service, he retired on 31.07.1997 on attaining the age of superannuation. Learned counsel submits that another employee, namely, Sh. Puran Chand Yadav joined as Draftsman Civil Instructor on 20.06.1963, which is almost one year later to the joining of the petitioner and, thus, he was junior to the petitioner. It is submitted that although Sh. Puran Chand Yadav belonged to Backward Class category, he did not claim the benefit of reservation in service. Nevertheless, the respondent-department considered him as a General Category employee similar to the petitioner. Moreover, Sh. Puran Chand Yadav did not produce his caste certificate nor was there any entry in his service book in this regard. Despite this, since 1973, the respondent-department has been recording him as Backward Class, whereas his caste was brought in the ambit of Backward Class vide notification dated 07.06.1995, much later to the joining of the said Sh. Puran Chand Yadav in the year 1963, as such the respondent-department started treating him belonging to the category of Backward Class even prior to the issuance of the notification dated 07.06.1995.
Learned counsel further submits that Sh. Puran Chand Yadav earned promotions and he was lastly promoted to the post of Principal vide order dated 17.07.1997. Sh. Puran Chand Yadav retired from service on 28.02.1998 later than the retirement of the petitioner. The petitioner was senior to him during his entire service career. In these circumstances, the petitioner claims entitlement to promotion and pay fixation upon promotion from the same dates on which Sh. Puran Chand Yadav was granted promotions to the post of Group Instructor w.e.f. 01.08.1980; to the post of Vice-Principal w.e.f. 26.10.1993 and to the post of Principal w.e.f. 17.07.1997. The petitioner further asserts that he is entitled to interest on the consequential financial benefits. The petitioner made a representation on 22.07.2018 as discernible from Annexure P2 and also submitted several documents in support of his claim alongwith the same. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a detailed representation once again on 30.07.2018 (Annexure P3) and also claimed full leave encashment of 300 days providing the earned leave during the suspension period alongwith interest from 24.08.1990 till the date of actual payment. He contended that the respondent-department had forcibly extracted work during the suspension period from the petitioner by giving fabricated reinstatement order dated 31.10.1991 which was served upon him only on 14.05.1992. The petitioner submitted another representation on 08.08.2018 to the respondent-department claiming the amount to the tune of ₹2,30,731/- alongwith interest on the delayed payment of pensionary benefits. Additionally, the Union Bank of India has refused to provide any calculation regarding the payment and deduction made by them. Accordingly, the petitioner seeks removal of anomaly; payment for the suspension period; payment of interest upon late payment of retiral benefits and payment of incentive for increased deposit in provident fund from 01.07.1983 to 31.03.1990 and other benefits as claimed in the present writ petition.
Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the prayer made by the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner under the garb of this writ petition is seeking removal of pay anomaly and fixation of pay after about 22 years from his retirement. Further, according to the pleadings, Sh. Puran Chand Yadav was first appointed as Instructor in the year 1980, as Vice-Principal in the year 1993 and as Principal in the year 1997. Learned State counsel submits that it is a trite law that except the pensionary benefits, no other benefits can be claimed in case claim raised suffers from the vires of delay and laches.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after perusal of the record, it transpires that the petitioner retired from service on 31.07.1997. His primary grievance is regarding the promotion of Sh. Puran Chand Yadav, who according to the petitioner never sought the benefit of Backward Class candidate. However, the department on its own has been granting him the benefits due to the employee belonging to Backward Class category. Admittedly, Sh. Puran Chand Yadav earned promotion to the post of Group Instructor on 01.08.1980, thereafter promoted to the post of Vice-Principal on 26.10.1993 and finally promoted to the post of Principal on 17.07.1997. All claims of the petitioner regarding removal of pay anomaly, payment of suspension period and payment of incentive of increased deposit of provident fund from 01.07.1983 to 31.03.1990 are not the financial benefits, which are recurring to the statutory retiral benefits. As such there is no recurring cause of action after the retirement of the petitioner.
Admittedly, the petitioner for the first time submitted his representation on 22.07.2018 (Annexure P2) almost after 21 years of his retirement. It is trite law that delay in approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be condoned if sufficient cause is indicated or a reasonable explanation is provided for the same. However, the facts of the matter at hand indicate otherwise. Learned counsel petitioner has failed to specify any compelling or extenuating circumstance which prevented him from approaching this Court for such a long time. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chairman /Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Limited and Others vs. Ram Gopal (2021) 13 SCC 225, wherein, the following was held:
“16.Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence- sitters cannot be allowed to barge into Courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu v. State of Kerala, this Court observed thus:
“17.It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". .... It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment.” (emphasis added)
Further, in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and others 2024 AIR SC 2717, Hon’ble the Supreme Court has categorically observed that the High Courts must factor in the delay, while exercising its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was further opined that undue and unexplained delay may be reason enough to dismiss a petition as indolent litigants ought not to be encouraged by writ Courts. Reliance can also be placed on the judgment rendered by a Division bench of this Court in Kartar Singh v. Managing Director, HVPNL and others, CWP No.26962 of 2015 decided on 04.04.2018 as well as a coordinate Bench of this Court in Jai Narain Rohilla v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd in CWP-1167 of 2025 decided on 17.01.2025.
In State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, while considering the issue regarding delay and laches and referring to earlier judgments on the issue, a Two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court opined that repeated representations made will not keep the issues alive. A stale or a dead issue/dispute cannot be got revived even if such a representation has either been decided by the authority or got decided by getting a direction from the court as the issue regarding delay and laches is to be decided with reference to original cause of action and not with reference to any such order passed. Delay and laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India, in a situation of that nature, will not be attracted as it is well settled that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.
Moreover, with regards to issues regarding fixation of pay, the position of law has been settled by a two-Judge Bench Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1995) 5 SCC 628 and has been reaffirmed by a full bench decision of this Court in Saroj Kumari v. State of Punjab, 1998(3) SCT 664. Accordingly, so long as an employee is in service, a petition claiming refixation of pay is not barred by limitation or the doctrine of laches, as the denial of benefit occurs every month when the salary is paid, thereby giving rise to a fresh cause of action, based on continuing wrong. Such a case is not a case of one time action like the case of termination or dismissal from service. However, payment of arrears can be restricted to a reasonable period. Three years and two months has been considered to be a reasonable period as that is the period for which a person can ask for the payment of arrears before a Civil Court. However, once an employee ceases to be in service, the wrong fixation of pay can no longer be treated as a continuing wrong. Consequently, a petition seeking such fixation, if instituted after cessation of service and with substantial delay, is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Reliance can be placed on the judgement of the co-ordinate bench of this Court in Prem Nath v. State of Punjab, 2018(2) SCT 687, wherein the petitioners approached this Court seeking correct fixation of pay much subsequent to their superannuation. While dismissing the petition on the ground of delay and laches, the Court held as follows:
“10.The reliance placed by counsel upon the judgment in Saroj Kumar's case, is wholly misplaced. The observations and aspect of delay in Saroj Kumar's case, were in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta v. Union of India and others, 1996(1) S.C.T 8 : 1995(4) RSJ 502. In M.R. Gupta's case (supra), it had been categorically held that so long as an employee "is in service" a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is getting his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong calculation made contrary to rules. It was further held that the claim to be awarded the correct salary on the basis of a proper pay fixation "is a right which subsists during the entire tenure of service"
11.In the present case, however, the petitioners choose not to agitate their claim while in service. It is much subsequent to their superannuation that they have woken up and seek to gain impetus from certain decisions that may have been rendered in the case of similarly situated employees.” (emphasis supplied)
In view of the discussion herein above, this Court does not find it appropriate to invoke its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed.