Satnam Singh vs State of Punjab and ors

Deepak Gupta, J

By way of this peon filed under Arcles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, peoner prays for issuance of a writ in the nature of cerorari for quashing the selecon dated 18.09.201 5 (Annexure P.12), vide which respondents No.3 to 15 have been selected for the post of Smith duly adversed by the respondent on contract basis.

2 It is contended that pursuant to the adversement Annexure P.1, peoner applied for the post of Smith and was iss ued identy card. He appeared in the wrien examinaon and passed the same. He was put in the selected roll numbers as per Annexure P5. The eligible candidates were then called for the examinaon of physical / p raccal test but name of

the peoner did not figure therein as per Annexure P6. As peoner came to know about the said fact, he approached the respondents but they did not give any sasfactory reply. Peoner approache d this Court by filing CWP No.12395/2015, which was allowed on 12.06.2015 vide Annexure P.7, whereby respondents were directed to permit the pe oner to appear in the physical test to be held on 15.06.2015 but making it clear that it will not confer any right to claim appointment. It is contended that peoner then parcipated in the physical test but was held to be not entled for selecon, as he had passed diploma of ITI in the tr ade of Carpenter, whereas the requisite qualificaon was diploma in IT I in the trade of Motor Vehicle Body Builder. The selecon list was finalise d and respondents No.32024:PHHC:101909 to 15 were selected. Learned counsel contends that he has been held to be not suitable only for passing ITI in different trade.

On advance noce, Mr. Surya Kumar, AAG, Punjab, a ppears on behalf of the respondent- State.

As rightly pointed out by learned State Counsel that peoner is assailing the selecon dated 18.09.2015 by appro aching this Court by way of this peon filed in April, 2024 i.e. aer more t han 08 years.

Learned counsel for the peoner is unable to exp lain this inordinate delay in approaching the Court so as to challenge the selecon of respondents No.3 to 15.

Thus, peon is evidently hit by the principles o f long delay and latches. For filing of a writ peon under Arcl es 226 of the Indian Constuon, there is no strict statute of limitaon . However, this does not mean that delays are enrely overlooked. The courts apply the principles of delay and latches to determine the reasonableness of the delay in filing such a peon. In this regard, courts have significa nt discreon to decide whether a delay is unreasonable. They consider factors such as the jusficaon for the delay, potenal prejudice to the opposing party, and the public interest involved. Delays are more likely to be overlooked if the issue pertains to public interest or affects a large number of people. If the delay is deemed unreasonable and causes prejudice to the other party, or if the peoner has acquiesced to the situaon, the court may dismiss the peon.

In P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs The State Of Tamil Nadu AIR 1974 SC 2271, Hon’ble Supreme Court, observed as under:

“A person aggrieved by an order of promong a junio r over his bead should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promoon. It is not that 'here is any perio d of limitaon for the Courts to exercise their powers under Arcle 226 no r is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a maer aer the passage of a certain length of me. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discreon for the Courts to refuse to e xercise their extra- ordinary powers under Arcle 226 in the case of per sons who do not approach it expediously for relief and who stand b y and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to

unsele seled maers. The peoner's peon should , therefore have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such peons is a waste of me of the court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the court in considering legimate grievances as also its nor mal work. We consider that the High court was right in dismissing the appellant's peon as well as the appeal.”

Hon'ble Supreme Court has recently held in Mrinmoy Maity Vs Chhanda Koley and others, 2024 SCC Online SC 551, as under:-

“9. Having heard rival contenons raised and on per usal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ peoner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ peon ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An Applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of me, w akes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts.

This Court me and again has held that delay defeat s equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discreonary powers under Arcle 226 of the Constuon of India. In a given case, the High Cour t may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of acon to dri away a nd aempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of acon.

The discreon to be exercised would be with car e and cauon. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesng party that f or all mes to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdicon and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathemacal precision. The ulmate discreon to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have traveled.

For filing of a writ peon, there is no doubt t hat no fixed period of limitaon is prescribed. However, when the extraord inary jurisdicon of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable me same has been invoked and even submi ng of memorials would not revive the dead cause of acon or resurre ct the cause of acon

which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ peoner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the peon on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in perming such indolent ligant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discreonary jurisdicon under Arcle 226 , the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideraon the delay and la tches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court.

It is thus clear that High Court should not entertain the writ peon and should dismiss the same on the ground of delay and latches, when there is no explanaon of delay. The applican t who approaches the Court belatedly or sleeps over his rights for considerable period, does not deserve to be granted the extra-ordinary relief by invoking the writ

jurisdicon of the Court. It is seled proposion of law that delay defeats equity. High Court will be well within its jurisdicon to refuse to invoke its writ powers, if there is laxity on behalf of the applicant, as the said laxity allows the cause of acon to dri away and aempts to rekindle the lapse cause of acon. Even the delayed mulple communica ons cannot create cause of acon.

In the present case also, there is absolutely no explanaon for delay of more than 08 years in approaching the court. The contenon that

the peoner can approach the court at any point of me because of recurring cause, has no merit, as by his act and conduct, peoner acquiesced in the acon of the respondents and, the refore, at this belated stage, peoner cannot be allowed to put forth his grievance.

As such, the present peon is hereby dismissed being badly hit by the doctrine of delay and latches, as this Court does not find it appropriate to invoke its extra-ordinary writ jurisdicon.