Satish Kumar vs Reserve Bank of India and Ors.

T.S. Doabia, J.—The petitioner was found guilty of having committed an act of gross misconduct. This was found to be covered under

Regulation 47 of the RBI (Staff) Regulations 1948. As per the respondents, not only a proper enquiry was held, but the petitioner had admitted his

lapse. It was in these circumstances, that order dated 9.8.1998 is said to have been passed. The petitioner stands dismissed from service.

The petitioner submits that he was working as a clerkcumnote examiner GradeI, Rural Planning Department, Reserve Bank of India, Jammu.

The petitioner submits that he has been fighting for the cause of others against the highhandedness of the Officers of the Bank. On account of these

activities the Officers of the Bank were feeling aggrieved. They were out to harm him. It is on account of this factor, he has been punished. The

order of punishment is being challenged on the following grounds :

I) It is perverse;

II) It was passed for ulterior motives;

III) That the plea put across by the petitioner has not been taken note of;

IV) That the respondents were bent upon punishing the petitioner;

V) That the Inquiry Officer did not take notice of the plea put across by the petitioner;

VI) That some allegations were made by the petitioner against his Officers. These were not looked into;

VII) The pleas taken in paragraph ""4"" of the impugned order are vague and should have been ignored for this reason alone.

Perusal of the file, however, makes the things clear. The charges against the petitioner were :

I) That at about 4.P.M. on 31.3.1997 the petitioner went to the table of one Prem Lal Assistant General Manager and asked him about the fate of

his application for reimbursement of computer course fees. He was informed that the matter has been referred to the higher authorities and the

decision is awaited. At that point of time, he was satisfied with the explanation given, but after a gap of about ten minutes the petitioner came back

with a ""steal stool"" in his hand and tried to assault.

Prem Lal. He was, accordingly, charged for having committed an act of gross misconduct. He was served with a charge sheet in terms of

Regulation 47 of the said Rules. An Inquiry Officer was appointed. The Inquiry Officer has come to the conclusion that the charge as framed

against the petitioner, stands fully proved. The enquiry report was considered by the General Manager. He was served with a provisional order

dated 15.4.1998. He was called upon the show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. Petitioner represented his case in

person. His contention was that during the enquiry proceedings, he was asked to indicate as to whether he was interested in closing the case and

that he has said ""I have no objection"". That instead of taking the case as closed, the Inquiry Officer dragged on with the matter. It was submitted

by him that the words ""I have no objection"" has been mis read. The Displinary authority further came to the conclusion that the petitioner vide his

letter dated 8.7.1997 had admitted his lapse. Taking note of this, the final order was passed on 9.6.1998. The petitioner has preferred an appeal.

This is annexure ""B"" to the petition.

So far as the merits of the controversy are concerned, a finding of fact has been recorded. This is based on the report of the Inquiry Officer.

This Court has limited jurisdiction to interfere with the finding so recorded. The petitioner was given opportunity to associated himself with the

enquiry. He did not attend the enquiry proceedings on 4th and 6th of November, 1997. The petitioner was advised to be present on 7.11.1997.

The petitioner did not appear. With regard to the appeal said to have been preferred by the petitioner, it is stated that the same was rejected on

16.11.1998. It is, however, not mentioned as to whether the copy of the order was made available to the petitioner or not and also as to whether

the petitioner was heard in the matter. This is one aspect of the matter. The petitioner had preferred an appeal. As per the respondents, this appeal

was decided on 16.10.1998. As to whether this appeal was decided after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner or as to whether it

contains process of reasoning, nothing is clear. In the case reported as Union of India v. Ram Chander, AIR 1988 SC 1173, the view expressed

by the Supreme Court is that while deciding the appeal, opportunity of hearing should be given to the appellant, and the resultant order should be a

speaking one. As a matter of fact, in case M.S. Chauhan v. State Bank of India, (1985) 1 SLR 684, while dealing with State Bank of India

Supervisory Staff Service Rules of 1975 a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court expressed an opinion that the appellate authority is

under an obligation to indicate reasons.

However, there is another aspect of the matter, which cannot be ignored. The Competent authority who passed the order on 9.6.1998 has not

only taken note of the enquiry report but also petitioner's past record and his ""perceptions"". The past record which appears to have been taken

into consideration, has been elaborated in paragraph 2(c) of the order impugned. It is stated :

I) that on 6.11.1992 the petitioner attempted to assault one Pritam Singh Officer GradeI. The petitioner was penalized;

II) On 13.11.1992 during the period of petitioner's suspension, he threatened aforementioned Pritam Singh. A charge sheet was framed against the

petitioner and he was penalized;

III) On 7.1.1993, the petitioner attacked one B.B. Mohanty. An FIR was lodged. Punishment of reversion to lower grade was imposed on the

petitioner.

In the reply it is also stated that petitioner used very strong expressions. These are adverted to in para 2(d) of the reply. So far as this aspect of

the matter i.e. taking note of past record of the petitioner and then imposing the punishment is concerned, this is a matter on which the Supreme

Court has expressed an opinion. The Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. Manche Gouda, AIR 1964 SC 507 has observed that in case past

record is to be taken into consideration, then this should be brought to the notice of the delinquent. If this is not done, then the order would be bad.

What is said in paragraph (8) of the judgment is quoted below:

(8) Before we close, it would be necessary to make one point clear. It is suggested that the past record of a Government servant, if it is intended

to be relied upon for imposing a punishment, should be made specific charge in the first stage of the enquiry itself and if it is not so done, it cannot

be relied upon after the enquiry is closed and the report is submitted to the authority entitled to impose the punishment. An enquiry against a

Government servant is one continuous process, though for convenience it is done in two stages. The report submitted by the Enquiry Officer is only

recommendatory in nature and the final authority which scrutinizes it and imposes punishment is the authority empowered to impose the same.

Whether a particular person has a reasonable opportunity or not depends, to some extent, upon the nature of the subject matter of the enquiry. But

it is not necessary in this case to decide whether such previous record can be made the subject matter of charges at the first stage of the enquiry.

But, nothing in law prevents the punishing authority from taking that fact into consideration during the second stage of the enquiry, for essentially, it

relates more to the domain of punishment rather than to that of guilt. But what is essential is that the Government servant shall be given a reasonable

opportunity to know that fact and meet the same.

In view of the above pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the final order of termination in which past conduct of the petitioner has been taken

into consideration while imposing punishment on him, cannot be sustained. Even, the appellate order does not satisfy the requirement of law, as

indicated in Ram Chander's case as also in M.S. Chauhan's case (supra). Therefore, the original order of punishment as also the appellate order

are hereby quashed, reserving liberty to the respondents to pass afresh order in accordance with law. The petitioner shall stand reinstated.

Disposed of accordingly.