Sat Pal Sabharwal vs The Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation and Others

R.S. Pathak, C.J.—The facts have already been given by my learned brother in his judgment. He has dealt with the merits of the case at length, and has found that the petitions must fail. I am also of a opinion that the writ petitions must be dismissed, but I rest my decision on the ground that the Petitioner is not entitled to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution in these cases.

By the writ petitions the Petitioner seeks relief against the Constitution of the Board of Directors and the appointment of the Managing Director and other officers of the Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation, and also challenges certain orders made by them including the order removing him from service. The question is whether the impugned appointments and orders are amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The State Financial Corporation Act, 1951, is an Act to provide for the establishment of State Financial Corporations. The Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation has been established u/s 3(1) of the Act. Section 3(2) of the Act declares that it will be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to sue and be sued by its name. It is an autonomous body, and not a department of Government. By virtue of Section 4 of the Act, its funds are derived from capital invested by the State Government, the Reserve Bank and Scheduled Banks, insurance companies, investment trusts, co-operative banks and other financial institutions as well as by other parties. Being a body corporate, it cannot be indentified with those who subscribe to its capital. They are merely shareholders of the Corporation. Section 5 of the Act imposes a restriction on the transfer of its shares. The Act makes provision for gurantee of the shares by the State Government and for borrowing money from the Reserve Bank as well as for accepting deposits. None of those provisions detract from the separate and independent existence of the Corporation. Its separate identity is emphasised by the provision in Section 9 which vests the general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs and business of the Corporation in a Board of Directors. It is true that by Section 10 the Board includes three Directors nominated by the State Government and that the Managing Director is appointed by the State Government. Nonetheless , a number of Directors on the Board are nominated or elected by autonomous bodies and independent interests. With such governance , it can truly be said of the Corporation that the State Government does not enjoy absolute control over it. Section 13 empowers the State Government to remove a Director from office, but the removal can be effected only if, as the statute requires, the Director has become subject to the disqualifications mentioned in Section 12 or has been absent without leave from three consecutive meetings of the Board. Section 15 entitles the State Government to nominate the Chairman of the Board, but when doing so the State Government is required to consider the recommendations of the Board. The Managing Director, although appointed by the State Government, must, by virtue of Section 17 of the Act, be a whole-time officer of the Corporation . It is the Board, and not the State Government, which determines the duties of the Managing Director, and his salary and allowances . Although he can be removed from office by the State Government , the Board must be consulted in the matter. In the Executive Committee constituted by Section 18 of the Act, only one Director is a person nominated by the State Government. It is amply clear that the Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation enjoys an existence independent of the State Government, and within the structural pattern framed by the Act its independence of action suffers few limitations.

In deciding whether the Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation , its authorities and officers and the orders made by them are subject to the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution , a consideration of material importance is the nature of the powers and duties vested in them by the statute. Section 24 of the Act declares that the Board shall act on business principles, with due regard to the interest of industry, commerce and the general public. Section 25 details the business which may be transacted by the Corporation such business includes the guaranteeing of loans and deferred payments by industrial concerns, under-writing the issue of stock, shares, bonds, or debentures, acting as an agent of the Central or State Government, the Industrial Finance Corporation or any other notified financial institution in the transaction of business with an industrial concern, receiving commission for services rendered and soon. All of these are functions commonly discharged by commercial organisations, be they statutory bodies or created by private endeavour. None of them can be said to partake of a Governmental function. When regard is had to the other provisions of the Act which provide for the manner in which the business of the Corporation will be carried on, its funds invested, and its accounts maintained and audited, it will be apparent that there is no material departure from the broad pattern of control which commercial organisations today have become subject to under the statutory law. Such departure as exists is accounted for by policy considerations underlying the object and purpose of creating State Financial Corporations. The State Government has been empowered to guide the Corporation on questions of policy, but that circumstance in no way deprives the Corporation of its character as a commerical organisation. Indeed, the area covered by serveral provisions of the Act approximates to that covered by the Memorandum and Articles of Association of a commercial organisation. I am of opinion that the Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation can be identified in its essential nature as a commercial organisation. As a body corporate, it is [entirely distinct from the Government, and cannot be treated as ''part of it. By reason of the character of its functions, it cannot be (regarded as an agent of the Government. In Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar and Others, the Supreme Court was concerned with a company whose entire capital had been contributed by the Central Government, and under its Memorandum and Articles of Association the Central Government had been given power to issue directions regarding the functioning of the company. The Directors were, moreover, appointed by the President of India. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the Corporation was not carried on directly by the Central Government or by one of its departments and that as an incorporated company it had a separate existence. The Court also observed that a Corporation performing commercial functions and not Governmental functions could not be considered an agent of the Government.

The primary grievance of the Petitioner is that he has been removed from office in breach of the statute. Now Section 23 of the Act confers powers on the Financial Corporation to appoint such officers, advisers and employees as it considers necessary, to determine by regulations their conditions of appointment and service and the remuneration payable to them. Nowhere does the Act itself lay down the terms and conditions of appointment and service. The officers, advisers and employees of the Corporation have not been given statutory status. The Petitioner has been removed from service by Shri Govind Sahai, as Managing Director. I have been unable to discover any provision of the Act which sets out the conditions in which an officer of the Corporation may be removed. Nor does the Act specify who will be the authority for making such an order. The (Staff) Regulations, 1961, do contain provisions governing the appointment, probation and termination of service, for the record of service, seniority and promotion, and for conduct, discipline and appeals, of the staff of the Corporation, but the Regulations although made u/s 48 of the Act do not have statutory force and are merely concerned with the internal management of the Corporation''s affairs. There is no provision of the Act which determines what those Regulations should specifically lay down nor the limits within which the power conferred under the Regulations shall be exercised. Our attention has been drawn to the scheme for the reorganisation of the Punjab Financial Corporation, from which arises the Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation, prepared u/s 69 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966. Nothing in the Scheme is pertinent to the matter before us.

In my opinion, the appointments and orders impugned in the writ petitions are not open to examination by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The authorities and officers constituted under the Act are not public officers. They do not perform any Governmental function nor do they discharge public duties. They are concerned essentially with functions commonly arising out of, and associated with, the management of a commercial organisation. The alleged breach of the Petitioner''s rights do not involve a contravention of the statute for which a remedy can be said to lie under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even when the State Government appoints the Managing Director the right of appointment, although vested by statute, is involved merely in the internal structuring of a commercial organisation; in making such appointment the State Government does not discharge a Governmental or executive function . A writ in the nature of mandamus, it is well accepted, concerns itself with the breach of a statutory duty or obligation. A writ in the nature of certiorari issues to quash a judicial or quasi-judicial order of a statutory authority discharging public functions. A writ in the nature of prohibition issues in relation to simila jurisdiction. A writ i i the nature of quo-warranto can be granted only if the usurpation a public office occurs. None of these tests are satisfied in the case of the appointments and orders challenged by the Petitioner.

It will be appropriate at this stage to refer to some of the cases decided by the courts. In Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee and Others, the Respondent, who was an employee of an insurance company when it was taken over by the Life Ins rance Corporation of India, was served with an order terminating his services. The order was quashed by the High Court, and an appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court proceeded on the view that the order was inconsistent with Section 11 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, which specifically provided for the terms and conditions of service of such employees. The case was distinguished on that ground by the Supreme Court in Executive Committee, U.P. Warehousing Corporation Vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, In that case the Warehousing Corporation of the State of Uttar Pradesh was established under the Agricultural Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporation Act, 1956. Section 54 of the Act gave power to Warehousing C orporations to make Regulations not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules made thereunder. The Respondent, a warehouse man in the employment of the Warehousing Corporation, as dismissed from se; vice. Nothing was provided by the Act in the matter of disciplinary proceedings. The regulations framed u/s 54 contained such provisions. The Supreme Court observed that the case was different from Sunil Kumar Mukherjee (supra) and pointed out that although the regulations were made under the powers reserved to the Corporation u/s 54 of the Act and they laid down the terms and conditions of relationship between the Corporation and its employees, an order made in breach of the regulations though contrary to such terms and conditions would not be in breach of any statutory obligation. It was pointed out that the Act did not guarantee any statutory status. Accordingly, it was held that the order of dismissal if wrongful could only make the Warehousing Corporation liable for damages. The next case is Indian Airlines Corporation Vs. Sukhdeo Rai, The Indian Airlines Corporation has been constituted under the Air Corporation Act, 1953 The Respondent, an employee of the Indian Airlines Corporation, was dismissed. The Supreme Court, after considering U.P. State Warehousing Corporation (supra) and Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra) pointed out hat by Section 8(2) and 20 of the Act the Corporation has been given the power to employ its own officers and other employees to the extent it thought necessary on terms and conditions provided by it in regulations made u/s 45. The court observed that although the regulations were made under . the power conferred by the statute, they merely embodied the terms and conditions of service in the Corporation and do not constitute a statutory restriction as to the kind of contracts whi ch the Corporation can make with its servants o.'' the grounds on which it can terminate '' them. The court laid down that the dismissal of the Respondent was within the jurisdiction of the Corporation and although it was wrong- ful in the sense of its being in breach of the terms and conditions governing the relationship between the Corporation and the Respondent it was a case in which the Respondent could be entitled to damages only and not to a declaration that his dismissal was null and void. The case of Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur Vs. Mohan Lal and Others, was distinguished on the ground that the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, contained provisions which empowered the State Electricity Board to issue directions, the disobedience of which was punishable as a penal offence. Reference may be made here to Shri Vidya Ram Misra Vs. Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain College, where the Supreme Court laid down the principle that in the matter of a contract of service, unless the terms of the statute not only provided for such contracts but also incorporated in itself the terms and conditions of service as statutory conditions having statutory force, a breach of such terms and conditions would not constitute a breach of the statute. In such a case, the court observed, the remedy was to file a suit for damages and not to apply under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court distinguished its decision in S.R. Tewari Vs. District Board Agra and Another, which was a case of the breach of a statutory provision. The status enjoyed by regulations, albeit made under statute, in contrast to that enjoyed by an Act was brought out by the Bombay High Court in Madhav Sakharam Jondhale v. Saugamner Municipality ILR 1973(1) 33, where it held that the breach of a mere regulation, as distinguished from the breach of an Act, would entitle a dismissed employee to damages only. The Delhi High Court in Dr. Mohd. Khan Durranayanva v. The Principal 1971(2) S.L.R. 377 observed that a breach of the regulations which merely formulate or standardise the conditions of service contracts cannot be placed on the same footing as a breach of the statute, and for a breach of the regulations the remedy was by way of a suit for damages rather than by a writ in the nature of mandamus. It was pointed out that in the heirarchy of subordinate legislation, regulations made under a statute usually stand below the rules. It was observed that if the statute itself was silent and did not confer any security of tenure on the employees, a breach of the terms and conditions of service set out in the regulations would not entitle an aggrieved employee to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution. Reliance was placed by the Petitioner on Sirsi Municipality by its President Sirsi Vs. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, where the Supreme Court held void the dismissal of the Respondent on the ground that the dismissal was in violation of a mandatory obligation imposed by statutory rules. It will be noticed that the question did not arise upon a breach of any regulations. The case was decided on the basis that there was a breach of statutory obligation. Besides, the case arose out of a declaratory suit; it was not a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Our attention has been invited to the decision by a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court in K. Chelliah Vs. Chairman Industrial Finance Corporation of India and Another, It was held in that case that if the Board of Directors of the Industrial Finance Corporation fails to observe the principles of natural justice in applying its regulations dealing with the conditions of service it is amenable to the writ jurisdiction. The learned Judge took the view that the Industrial Finance Corporation was a quasi-governmental institution and therefore a public authority. With great respect, upon the considerations mentioned above I find it difficult to agree with that view.

It is urged by the Petitioner that as there is no validly constituted Board of Directors nor validly appointed Managing Director his removal from service is void. As I have pointed out, this contention cannot be raised in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, when it is clear that the Financial Corporation is not concerned with the exercise of Governmental functions or public duties but is essentially a commercial organisation. The Petitioner has also relied on Muavvala Narasimha Rao v. Works Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport 1972 S L.R. 683 . The State Road Transport Corporation, constituted under the Road Transport Act, was held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court to be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution. The court relied on Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur (supra) but it will be remembered that that was a case where non-compliance with the directions of the State Electricity Board were punishable as a criminal offence. The Petitioner-then invites our attention to Umesh Chandra Sinha Vs. V.N. Singh and Others, . This was a case where a University was held to be a ''State'' within Article 12 of the Constitution. It may be observed that a number of cases have been cited by the Petitioner and learned Counsel for the Respondents on the interpretation of the expression ''the State'' in Article 12. In my opinion, it is not necessary to consider those cases for the purpose of examining the applicability of Article 226 of the Constitution, which is a matter to be determined on the tests particular to the writs, orders or directions which can be made thereunder. Whether the considerations involved in Article 12 coincide with those involved in Article 226 is a matter which need not be entered into here. The Petitioner also refers us to Chini Mazdoor Sangh and Others Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, There the Patna High Court was concerned with the expression affairs of State'' in Article 309, in a case where persons were employed in a factory belonging to the State of Bihar. The Court held that such persons were entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution. The case is distinguishable because the present writ petitions are concerned with a body corporate which is not a part of the State Government. Finally the Petitioner places before us Godde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, but the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable.

In my judgment, the Petitioner is not entitled to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution for redress of the grievances contained in these writ petitions.

The Respondents have raised a number of other preliminary objections, but having regard to the view expressed above it is not necessary to enter into them.

Before closing, it may be mentioned that the Petitioner has challenged the authority of counsel who appear for the Respondents on the ground that they have been appointed by Shri Govind Sahai in his capacity as Managing Director of the Financial Corporation. It is urged that as his appointment to that office is under challenge they cannot be heard. It seems to me that as counsel have been appointed by Shri Govind Sahai under colour of his office, there can be no valid objection in the present proceedings to their assisting the court in deciding these petitions.

This and the connected writ petitions are dismissed but in the circumstances there is no order as to costs.

Chet Ram Thakur, J.

These writ petitions have been filed by Shri S. P. Sabharwal, who prior to 1-11-1966 was working as Assistant in the Punjab Financial Corporation, constituted under the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act of 1951). In pursuance of Section 69 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966, the Central Government sanctioned the scheme for the re-organisation of the Punjab Financial Corporation, w.e.f. 1st April, 1967. Under that scheme the staff of the erstwhile Punjab Financial Corporation was allocated to and absatfoed by the Punjab Financial Corporation itself, Haryana, Delhi and Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporations. The scheme provided that the Staff Regulations governing the conditions of service of the staff shall continue to be the staff Regulations of the aforesaid four Financial Coporations created under the re-organisation scheme. Consequently, the Himachal Pradesh Government in exercise of the power conferred by Section 3(1) of the Act, 1951, issued the notification , dated 31st March, 1967, constituting the Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) w.e.f. 1-4-1967. By another notification of the same date, the Governor notified the first constitution of the Board of Directors of the Corporation.

The Petitioner was also allocated to the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh under the scheme of re-organisation. He represented to the Central Government for his allocation to Punjab or Haryana but his representations were not accepted. However, due to his long illness he could not report for duty to the Corporation before 8-3-1968. The Corporation did not permit him to join on the ground that he was not an employee of the Corporation. The Petitioner moved the Central Government and ultimately he was permitted to join w.e.f. 10-6-1968. Sometime thereafter disciplinary action was taken against the Petitioner resulting in his removal from service by an order made by Shri Govind Sahai, Managing Director of the Corporation . After the removal of the Petitioner from service, some promotions were made as Assistant Accountant, Accountant and Senior Accountant in the Corporation.

The Petitioner by writ petition No. 87/69 has prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari ordering the quashing of Annexures B, C, H and T. By Annexure B, the first constitution of the Board of Directors of the Corporation was notified. The Petitioner challenged the constitution of the Board of Directors on the ground that the notification was not in accordance with Section 10 of the Act of 1951. By Annexure C, Shri Gobind Sahai was notified to be the first Managing Director of the Corporation, w.e.f. 1-4-1967 on ad hoc basis in addition to his own duties. His appointment was challenged on the ground that he was a whole time Government servant and his appointment was in contravention of the provisions of Section 17 of the Act of 1951. Annexure H purports to be an order of removal of the Petitioner from the service of the Corporation. Annexure T is an order, whereby the appeals made by Shri Sabharwal to the Board of Directors were rejected.

The further prayer was for issue of a direction in the nature of quo-warranto to Respondent No. 2 (Shri Gobind Sahai) requiring him to show cause by what authority he was holding the office of the Managing Director of the Corporation. Further, he prayed for a direction to be issued to Respondents 3 and 4 (Accountant and the Assistant Accountant) to show cause by virtue of what authority they were acting as Accountant and Assistant Accountant of the Corporation. The Petitioner further prayed for a direction to release the arrears of salary from 1-4-1967 to 8-10-1968, and to grant annual increments to him after 19-6-1967 and also prayed for a direction to make the payment of the salary from 1-5-1969 onwards.

By writ petition No. 98/70, the Petitioner prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the appointment of Respondent No. 3 (Shri Romesh Chand Sood) as Senior Accountant and also prayed for a writ of quo-warranto against Respondent No. 3 requiring him to show cause by what authority he was working as Senior Accountant. Further) he prayed for a writ of mandamus to be issued to Respondent No. 1 compelling it to perform its duties and to consider whether having regard to seniority and fitness, the Petitioner should have been promoted on the relevant dates as Assistant Accountant, Accountant and Senior Accountant and also prayed for a direction to be issued to Respondent No. 1 for payment of higher emoluments which would have been earned by the Petitioner had he been promoted on the relevant dates.

By the last writ petition No. 75/71, he prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the notification, dated 30-3-1971. (Annexure C) whereby in pursuance of provisions of Section 17 of the Act of 1951, the Governor of Himachal Pradesh in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India appointed Shri Gobind Sahai, Deputy Director of Industries, Himachal Pradesh, as Managing Director of the Corporation for a period of three years in the first instance subject to the terms and conditions as contained therein. He prayed for issue of a writ of quo-warranto for ousting Shri Gobind Sahai from the office of the Managing Director and required him to state under what authority he was holding the office of the Managing Director of the Corporation. Further, he prayed for issue of a writ of mandamus against Respondent No. 1 calling upon it to do its duties enjoined on it by law and appoint the Managing Director and constitute the Board of Directors as well in accordance with law. Further, he prayed for a direction to be issued to Respondent No. 1 to advertise the post and the conditions of service of the Managing Director and consider the application of the Petitioner for appointment as Managing Director on merits, if eligible, according to the conditions of appointment.

The Petitioner has challenged the constitution of the Board, Annexure B, on the ground that the Managing Director, as required u/s 10(1) of the Act, had not been appointed in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India. Further that u/s 17(1)(a) of the Act the Managing Director is to be a whole time officer but Shri Gobind Sahai was appointed on ad hoc basis in addition to his own duties as Deputy Director (Industries). To this the reply of the Respondents is that the notifications B and C are both legal and valid. In fact Section 10 of the Act deals with the constitution of the Board of Directors and vide Clause (f) thereto it includes also the Managing Director on the said Board of Directors. Clause (f) of Section 10 does not by itself deal with the appointment of the Managing Director which is governed u/s 17 of the Act. Moreover this is not a mandatory provision. In the very notification appointing Shri Gobind Sahai as the Managing Director on ad hoc basis it is provided that when a regular appointment is made the Reserve Bank of India shall be consulted. Respondents have further averred that the Government had consulted the Reserve Bank in making regular appointment of Shri Gobind Sahai as Managing Director with effect from 1-4-1971. It has been stated that the provision regarding the appointment of the Managing Director as a whole time officer is also directory and the non-compliance will not render the appointment illegal. The exigency of the situation required that the Corporation should start functioning. Consequently Shri Gobind Sahai was appointed as a Managing Director on ad hoc basis till the regular appointment was made.

I have considered the matter. The Board, according to Section 10, shall consist of-

(a) ....

(b) ....

(c) ....

(d) ....

(e) ....

(f) . . . . the Managing Director appointed in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India. The attack on the constitution of the Board is that the Managing Director has not been appointed in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India. Therefore, the Board is not properly constituted. But it may be stated that the consultation is only of a recommendatory nature and it is not mandatory. The non-consultation with the Reserve Bank of India will not render the appointment of the Managing Director invalid. If that is so, then the Board cannot be said to be invalidly constituted. Therefore, this attack on the Constitution of the Board does not contain any substance.

Next is the question whether the appointment of Shri Gobind Sahai was not in conformity with Section 17(1)(a) of the Act, inasmuch as Shri Gobind Sahai was not appointed as a whole time officer. It is admitted by the Respondents that Shri Gobind Sahai was appointed as ad hoc but they have explained the circumstances in paragraph 7 of their return that there was not too much work-load so as to employ a whole time officer. Moreover, the decision to constitute the Board was taken only on 3rd March, 1967, and, therefore, there was no time left to make appointment of a whole time officer. The provision appears to be quite mandatory whatever the circumstances may have been. The Respondents have also tried to canvass that a scheme had been framed in pursuance of Section 69 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, whereunder the Punjab Financial Corporation was carved out into four and the assets, rights and liabilities of the existing Corporation of Punjab had been transferred to the other Financial Corporations to be formed in Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Delhi. The Corporation in Himachal Pradesh was constituted with effect from 1-4-1967 and, therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the Respondents the provisions of the Act stood superseded by the scheme and if Shri Gobind Sahai had been appointed as ad hoc in addition to his own duties it did not render his appointment invalid. But I do not find myself in agreement with the submission of the learned Counsel especially when no such plea had been taken in the return. Moreover, the scheme which was framed could not over-ride the provisions of the Statute. Therefore, this submission of the learned Counsel for the Respondents does not appear to be correct and the submission of the Petitioner that Shri Gobind Sahai was not a whole time officer, as contemplated u/s 17(1)(a) of the Act, is correct.

The Petitioner, admittedly, joined the Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation in October, 1968 although he had been allocated immediately after the scheme was drawn up and the Punjab Financial Corporation was split up into four Corporations. He submitted to the jurisdiction of Shri Gobind Sahai as Managing Director and had been in service till 9th May, 1969, when he was removed from service after having been charge-sheeted.

In fact the Petitioner came to the Court only after he had been removed from service and his appeals against the order of removal had been dismissed and then in those proceedings he has challenged the constitution of the Board as also the appointment of the Managing Director and, therefore, in these collateral proceedings the Petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the constitution of the Board as also the appointment of the Managing Director of the Corporation. Moreover, it would appear from his appeals, copies of which are Annexures R and S, that he had not taken any such grounds in those appeals that Shri Gobind Sahai was not validly appointed nor the Board was validly constituted. Therefore, this is an afterthought and he cannot be permitted to take this ground to question the validity, of the Board as also the appointment of the Managing Director. This disposes of his challenge to the constitution of the Board and the appointment of Shri Govind Sahai, vide Annexure B and C respectively.

Now we are left with the quashing of the order of removal, Annexure H, and the order, Annexure T. The Petitioner contends that the order of his removal does not give any reasons and is in violation of the mandatory provisions of the (Staff) Regulations, 1961 (shortly called the Regulations of 1961). He had taken the same grounds that the Managing Director was not validly appointed nor the Board was validly constituted and as such they were not competent to pass the impugned orders H and T. Further, the impugned order contravened the provisions of the Regulations of 1961, particularly Regulation No. 41 (2), inasmuch as no enquiry was conducted into the charges. Further, no opportunity was afforded to the Petitioner to give his defence. The impugned order was violative of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the order of removal was based on no material, and then he has alleged mala fides against Shri Gobind Sahai. According to the reply of the Respondents the removal order was rightly passed. There was no contravention of any regulation. He had been afforded adequate opportunity as required under the Regulations . The allegations of mala fide were also refuted.

In so far as the validity of the constitution of the Board as also the appointment of Shri Gobind Sahai, Respondent No. 2, are concerned, I have already dealt with the same. The Petitioner''s contention is that Regulation 41 provides that in case an employee commits a breach of the regulations of the Corporation or displays negligence, or indolence, or knowingly does anything detrimental to the interest or prestige of the Corporation or is guilty of misconduct, etc. shall be liable to penalties-(a) to (d) . ... (e) removal or dismissal. Under Regulation 41(2) it is provided that no employee after the enforcement of these regulations shall be subject to the penalties (b), (c), (d) or (e) of sub-regulation (1) except by an order in writing signed by the Managing Director, and no such order shall be passed without the charge or charges being formulated in writing and given to the said employee so that he shall have reasonable opportunity to answer them in writing or in person, as he prefers, and in the latter case his defence shall be taken down in writing and read to him, provided, that the requirement of the sub-regulation may be waived if the facts on the basis of which action is to be taken have been established in a Court of Law or Court or where the employee has absconded or where it is for any other reason impracticable to communicate with him ... In case where all or any of the requirement in the said regulations are waived the reasons for so doing shall be recorded in writing. In the instant case, a charge had been framed as is admitted in sub-para (a) of (ii) of para 15 of the petition under the heading - ''Reasons''. Under the signatures of the Managing Director the charges were given to the Petitioner. What he contends by sub-para (a) of (ii) of para 15 is that while issuing the show cause notice and passing the impugned order the Respondent No. 2 had taken into account extraneous matters, i.e. issues for which no regular charge was framed against the Petitioner. The averments of the Petitioner have been denied by the Respondents in their reply that they had taken into consideration any extraneous matters in the show cause notice. Therefore , this submission also stands rebutted.

The further submission was that no reasons for dispensing with the enquiry were given. But it would be apparent after reading sub-regulation (2) of regulation 41 that the Managing Director had already given the charge-sheet and had given him an opportunity to submit answer to the charge-sheet. The Petitioner has also not denied the service of the charge-sheet as also the submission of his defence thereto in writing as is envisaged under this sub-regulation (2). Therefore , there was no question of dispensing with the requirement of this sub-regulation. These requirements are to be dispensed with only when the facts on the basis of which action is to be taken have been established in a Court of Law or where the employees has absconded or where it is for any other reason impracticable to communicate with him or where there is difficulty in observing them that the requirements can be waived without injustice to the employee. This proviso does not come into play in this case because it is admitted that the charge-sheet had been served, reply had been submitted and this was the only requirement which had been specified. So, the Petitioner cannot have any grouse that there was violation of Regulation 41(2) of the Regulations of 1961. The penalty of removal from service, therefore, was quite in consonance with requirement of the Regulations of 1961.

The Petitioner has also assailed the Annexure, "T", whereby his appeals had been rejected by the Board on the ground that it contained no reasons. But this submission of his does not appear to be correct. The Board was not bound to give detailed reasons when it affirmed and agreed with the findings of the Managing Director, who had passed the impugned order, Annexure ''H''.

Learned Counsel for the Respondents has contended that the breach of regulations does not give the Petitioner any right to come to the Court. Regulations are meant only for the internal management of the Corporation. Hence if any remedy is available to an employee wrongfully dismissed by the Corporation then the same is by way of a suit for damages and not by a suit for declaration and reinstatement. He has drawn our attention to the various provisions of the Act as also the Regulations of 1961. Section 23 of the Act provides for appointment of officers, advisers and employees by the Corporation for the efficient performace of its functions and determination by regulations their conditions of appointment and service and remunerations payable to them. This section does not make it obligatory on the Corporation to make any regulations governing the conditions of appointment and service and remunerations payable to the employees of the Corporation. Section 48 gives powers to the Board for making regulations not inconsistent with the Act and the regulations made thereunder to provide for all matters for which provision is necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provision of the Act. It is Clause (g) of Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act which provides for regulations for governing the duties and conduct of officers, other employees, advisers and agents of the Corporation. So it does not provide for making of regulations governing the terms and conditions of services. The Board has framed regulations in exercise of its powers u/s 48 of the Act and it makes provisions with regard to the appointment, probation and termination of services and, therefore, it would follow that these regulations are not statutory in character, inasmuch as Clause (g) of Sub-section (2) of Section 48 does not mention the terms and conditions of service. It talks of only about the duties and conduct of the officers, other employees, advisers and agents of the Corporation. Therefore, these regulations in so far as the conditions and terms of the services are concerned are not statutory in character and any breach of the same docs not give any right to an employee dismissed by the Board for a declaration for wrongful dismissal and reinstatement. The employee in fact does not hold any statutory office,

In the Indian Airlines Corporation Vs. Sukhdeo Rai, the Respondent was suspended on certain charges and was found guilty of those charges in the enquiry. He was dismissed. He filed a suit that the enquiry had been conducted in breach of the procedure laid down by Regulations made by the Corporation u/s 45 of the Act, and, therefore, his dismissal was wrong. The High Court held that the Corporation was under a statutory obligation to observe the procedure laid down in the regulations and granted declaration. On appeal to the Supreme Court the same was set aside holding that the Act did not cast any obligation upon the Indian Airlines Corporation to appoint employees under particular type of contract or to terminate them on specific grounds, and as such even though the employee is dismissed in contravention of regulations made under the Act his dismissal cannot be declared null and void.

Similarly in Dr. S.L. Agarwal Vs. The General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., where the services of the Appellant as Assistant Surgeon in the Hindustan Steel Ltd., Ranchi were terminated purportedly in terms of his contract of employment. On a petition filed by Shri Aggarwal questioning the termination by way of punishment complaining the breach of Article 311 of the Constitution it was held that the protection of Article 311(2) is available to the categories of persons mentioned in Clauses (a),"(b) and (c) of Article 311(2). The Appellant did not fall in the categories mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b). He did hold a civil post as opposed to a military post but Clause (c) further required that it must be under the Union or a State, and their Lordships, therefore, held that Shri Aggarwal was an employee of the Hindustan Steel Ltd., did not answer the description of a holder of ''a civil post under the Union'' as stated in Article 311. In the instant case the Petitioner who is complaining of a breach of the regulations does not hold a civil post under the State, rather he is holding a post under a Corporation which may be an authority or a local body for the purposes of Article 12. Therefore , in these circumstances, the remedy by way of writ or for declaration is not available to the Petitioner.

Similarly it has been held in Executive Committee, U.P. Warehousing Corporation Vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, that an order made in breach of regulations was not any breach of statutory obligation. The relevant Act did not guarantee any statutory status to Shri Tyagi nor did it impose any statutory duty on the Warehousing Corporation in the matter of dismissal. The breach of Regulation 16(3) was only of terms and conditions of relationship between the master and servant and the master was liable for damages for wrongful dismissal. In the instant case also there is no violation of any statutory obligation on the part of the Corporation.

In the Industrial Finance Corporation of India, New Delhi v. Delhi Administration and Ors. 1973 (2) S.L.R. (Delhi) 462 a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court had held while dealing whether the Industrial Financial Corporation is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, that the workmen or employees of the Corporation or the Employees ''Association were not entitled'' to raise a plea of discrimination on the basis of the provisions in Article 16(1) of the Constitution in matters of impugned promotions. On that basis the learned Counsel for the Respondents has rightly argued that in the case in hand also an employee of the Corporation cannot complain of any discrimination or have any right for a declaration in respect of wrongful dismissal from service as the Corporation is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226. It is also not denied that the Central Civil Services Rules are not applicable to the employees of the Corporation so as to say that they are entitled to a declaration with regard to heir dismissal or termination of services and that they can claim re-instatement.

In Banchhanidhi Rath Vs. The State of Orissa and Others, it had been held that a contract of employment cannot be enforced in an application under Article 226. There is no right to remain in service. If such a right is claimed in terms of a contract or out of a custom, it cannot be enforced in a writ application. Thus if the Government under its uniform policy retires a teacher of an aided school under its control, on attaining the age of 58 years, the order cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. In the present case also it is quite apparent after a close perusal of the provisions of the Act as also the regulations that the former does not provide for the terms and conditions of the employees of the Corporation and it has been left ito be determined under the regulations to be made. u/s 48(g) there is no such provision which may govern the terms and [conditions of the employees of the Corporation and, therefore, it ''was merely a contract of employment between the Corporation and the Petitioner and the regulation, which provides for the terms and jConditions of the sevices of the employees of the Corporation, is not statutory the breach of which can be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution or by a suit for declaration, and, the only remedy open for such an employee of the Corporation is by way of a suit for damages especially when no fault has been found with the dismissal which is quite in consonance with the provisions of regulation 41 (1) and (2).

There is a single Bench authority P.V. Nayudu v. The Andhra Pradesh Mining Corporation, Ltd. and Ors. 1974 (2) S.L.R. 66 (A.P.) in which it has also been laid down that though the rules and regulations are made by the Corporation under the powers conferred upon it by the statute, they merely embody the terms and conditions of service and no restrictions are placed upon the Corporation as to the nature or the kind of contracts which it can enter into with its servants or the grounds on which the contract of service can be put an end to. Even if it be assumed that the termination of the services of the Petitioners was wrongful, even then the Petitioners are only entitled to damages and not to a declaration that the termination of their services was illegal and void.

The Petitioner has in order to support his view point that the dismissal is wrong and that he has a right for issue of a writ in the matter of his removal from service firstly relied on K. Chelliah v. Chairman Industrial Financial Corporation of India and Anr. AIR 1973 Mad 122, wherein it had been held by a single Bench of that High Court that the Industrial Finance Corporation of India being a quasi-governmental institution is a public authority and the board functioning under it is amenable to writ jurisdiction. The second authority is Muavvala Narasimha Rao v. Works Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. 1972 S.L.R. 683 (A.P.). In this case Section 45(2)(c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, under which the Corporation had been constituted required regulations to be made regulating the conditions of appointment and service and the pay scale of officers and servants of the Corporation. In accordance therewith certain rules had been adopted by the Corporation prescribing the manner in which the conditions of service of its employees should be regulated. Those rules had been contravened and violated and it was in view of this that it was held that the Corporati ns and bodies constituted under law and imposed with duties and functions come within the purview of Article 226. But in the case before us there is no such thing either in the Act which enjoins that the egulations shall be framed in respect of the terms and conditions, etc. of the employees of the Corporation. The third authority is Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur Vs. Mohan Lal and Others, This authority is also distinguishable, inasmuch as there are provisions in the Electricity (Supply) Act, which clearly show that the power conferred on the Board included the power to give direction, the disobedience of which is punishable as criminal offence and which power is wanting in the case in hand. Further authority is Sirsi Municipality by its President Sirsi Vs. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, This wasa case of an employee working in a municipal hospital accused of negligence towards a patient admitted in the maternity section. After an enquiry into the conduct of the employee, she was dismissed. Thereafter, she filed a suit for a declaration to the effect that her dismissal was contrary to Rule 143 of the rules framed under the Bombay District Municipalities Act, 1901, which required the municipality to give an employee reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges. The defence of the municipality was that the rules were for the guidance of the municipality and were not mandatory. When the matter went up to the High Court, the High Court held that the municipal committee violated the rule and gave a declaration that the employee must be deemed to have continued in service throughout. Before the Supreme Court in an appeal filed by the municipality it was contended that even if the dismissal was wrongful the remedy was not to seek a declaration, but to claim damages. But their Lordships of the Supreme Court repelled this contention holding that the dismissal by the municipality without reasonable opportunity for defence hearing is void. Employees is entitled to a declaration. The rule imposes mandatory obligation. Dismissal could be only by written or after recording written statement which could have been tendered. The municipality is undoubtedly a local body which comes within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution . It may be stated that there was a breach of the rules but in the instant case there had been no such breach of the rules and the order of removal had been made after full compliance with the requirement of the regulations. The submission of the Petitioner was that the Board was not properly constituted nor the Managing Director had validly been appointed and as such they were not competent to pass any order of termination. But it may be stated that this act is protected under Sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act which says that no act or proceedings of the Board shall be questioned on the ground merely of the existence of any vacancy in or any defect in the constitution of the Board. No doubt the order had been made by the Managing Director, who according to the Petitioner was not a whole-time officer, but the order was challenged In appeal before the Board. The Board affirmed the order of the Managing Director and, therefore, that order merged into the order of the Board, and as such any defect in the Board because of any vacancy o in its not properly constituted cannot be questioned as the same is protected. There has been full compliance with the requirement of the provision of regulation 41, as such the Petitioner cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court for breach of the regulation, if at all there was any.

The further authority relied upon by the Petitioner is Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar and Others, In fact this Heavy Engineering Corporation was a Government Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, and its entire share capital was contributed by the Central Government. The Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company conferred powers on the Central Government to give directions as regards function of the Company, and the Directors were appointed by the President of India. Certain disputes having arisen between the Company and its workmen the State Government of Bihar referred questions as to number of festival holidays and ''off'' on second Staturday in a month to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The Mazdoor Union objected to the reference on the ground that ''appropriate Government'' u/s 10 was the Central Government and that the questions referred were pending before the ''certifying authority'' under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and, therefore, were not industrial disputes to be referred to adjudication. Both these contentions were negatived by the High Court and the Supreme Court also upheld the decision arrived at by the High Court. Therefore, in view of these circumstances this authority has got no bearing.

The further authority is Godde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, This authority as a matter of fact does not support the Petitioner. It was held in this authority that the High Court was right in refusing to exercise its extraordinary discretionary powers under Article 226, in the circumstances of the case, even though the order made by the Government was bad. In this case the question was whether the Appellant had a right to file the petition. The Appellant was a President of the Panchayat Samiti of a village and the villagers formed a committee with the Appellant as President for the purpose of collecting contribution from the villagers for setting up a Primary Health Centre. The said Committee collected some amount and deposited the same with the Block Development Officer. The Appellant represented the village in all its dealings with the Block Development Committee of the Panchayat Samiti in the matter of location of the Primary Health Centre in the village. In the first instance the Primary Health Centre was located in the village of the Appellant but later on under an order of the Government which was impugned by the Appellant, the centre was shifted to some other village on the ground that the resolution passed previously locating the centre at the village of the Appellant was not a valid one and was in violation of the rules. It was, therefore, held that the Appellant was a representative of the committee which was in law the trustees of the amounts collected by it from the villagers for a public purpose and that the Appellant had the right to maintain the application under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Reliance is also placed on S.R. Tewari Vs. District Board Agra and Another, in which the services of the Appellant who held the office of an Engineer under District Board, Agra, were terminated by a resolution of the Board after giving salary for three months in lieu of notice. His appeal to the Government of U.P. against the order was also dismissed. He submitted a petition to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the resolution passed by the Board and the order of the State of U.P. dismissing the appeal, and a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the Board and the State of U.P. to treat him as the lawfully appointed Engineer of the District Board and not to give effect to the resolution terminating the services of the Appellant passed by the Board. The State of U.P. submitted that the services of the Appellant were terminated in accordance with Rule 3A (iv) of the District Board Manual and that no appeal lay against the resolution terminating the services of the Appellant under the said rule. The High Court dismissed the petition holding that under the fourth proviso to Section 82 of the District Board Act, 1922, the Board had the power to appoint and to determine the employment of an Engineer of the Board and unless the determination was by way of punishment it could be made in the manner provided by Rule 3A clause [iv) after giving notice of three months or a sum equal to salary for three months in lieu of notice. Against that order, an appeal was preferred by the Appellant to the Supreme Court. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the Appellant not being a member of the civil service of the State was not entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution and the relief claimed by him being in substance one for an order restoring him to the service of the Board from which he was dismissed, the jurisdiction of the High Court even under Article 226 of the Constitution was restricted by Section 21(4) of the Specific Relief Act and that the relief claimed by him cannot in any event be given, the remedy, if any, of the Appellant being to claim damages by suit for wrongful termination of employment and not a petition for a writ declaring the termination of employment unlawful, and a consequential order for restoration in service. Repelling this argument their Lordships held that under the common law the Court will not ordinarily force an employer to retain the services of an employee whom he no longer wishes to employ. But this rule is subject to certain well recognised exceptions. It is open to the courts in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant, who is dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 continues to remain in service, even though by so doing the State is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant whom it does not desire to employ. Similarly under the industrial law, jurisdiction of the labour and industrial tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker, whom he does not desire to employ, is recognised. The Courts are also invested with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute, even if by making the declaration the body is compelled to do something which it does not desire to do. It was further held that the powers of a statutory body are always subject to the statute which has constituted it, and must be exercised consistently with the statute, and the Courts have, in appropriate cases, the power to declare an action of the body illegal or ultra vires, even if the action relates to determination of employment of a servant. Finally, it was held that the jurisdiction to declare the decision of the Board as ultra vires exists, though it may be exercised only when the Court is satisfied that departure is called for from the rule that a contract of service will not ordinarily be specifically enforced. In the instant case there is no breach of the regulation. However, if it may be assumed that there is a breach of the regulation the only remedy available to the Petitioner is by enforcing his right by way of a suit for damages and not for a declaration because it was a breach of the regulation which provided for the terms and conditions of service of the Petitioner .

The further authority is Umesh Chandra Sinha Vs. V.N. Singh and Others, In this case the question was whether the Patna University is a State as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution. It was held that an public authority created by the statute on whom powers are conferred by law must be held to be a State irrespective of whether the functions of that authority are sovereign functions or non-sovereign functions, such as spreading of education, etc. Therefore, this authority has got no bearing.

Consequently it follows that if there is no breach of statutory provision then no writ can issue against a Corporation, and if the Corporation has been given the power to employ its own officers and employees to the extent as it think necessary on terms and conditions provided in its own regulations which govern the relationship between (the Corporation and its employees then in that case the only remedy available to the employee is a suit for damages and not a suit for declaration or a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. In fact in the instant case the regulations are made by the Corporation under the powers conferred by the statute. They do not embody the terms and conditions of service nor any restrictions are placed upon the Corporation as to the nature or the kind of contracts which it can enter into with its servants or the grounds on which the contract of service can be put an end to. The Corporation has made its own appointments and has its own regulations in regard to conditions of service of the staff. Therefore, this would necessarily imply that relationship of master and servant subsists between the Petitioner and the Corporation under the terms of the contract and any breach of the regulations, therefore, would not entitle the Petitioner or the dismissed employee, even though wrongful, for a declaration. It may also be stated that the Petitioner, who may have wrongfully been dismissed, cannot question the constitution of the Board or the appointment of the Managing Director.

The petitioer had prayed for issue of a direction in the nature of quo-warranto to Respondent 2 requiring him to show cause by what authority he was holding the office of the Managing Director of the Corporation. He had also asked for a similar direction in the nature of quo-warranto to be issued against Respondents 3 and 4 as to by what authority they were acting as Accountant and Assistant Accountant in the Corporation. Learned Counsel for the Respondents contended that no writ in the nature of quo-warranto can be issued in a case where the office held by the Managing Director is not a public office. For a public office the payment is to be made from the Consolidated Fund of India or the State. The person holding the office is also entitled to certain rights. In the instant case it cannot be denied that Shri Gobind Sahai and for the matter of that the other Respondents, Ramesh Chand and N. N. Dewan are also employees of the Corporation and their emoluments are not drawn from the Consolidated Fund of India or the State. Therefore, they can not be said to hold any public office..

According to B.L. Bhatia v. Indian Standards Institution and Ors. 1973 (2) S.L.R. 694, wherein the question before the Division Bench was whether a person holds a civil post under the Government or not, it was held that one of the tests to determine whether a person holds a civil post under the Government was whether his salary is paid i ut of State funds and is chargeable upon the Consolidated Fund of a State. Merely because the Government makes a grant to the Institution cannot lead to the conclusion that the salary of the members of its staff are paid from the Consolidated Fund of India. Therefore, in the present case the Respondents 3 and 4 including the Managing Director who is an officer of the Corporation cannot be said to hold civil posts or public offices, which is one of the necessary ingredients for issue of a direction in the nature of quo-warranto requiring the persons concerned to show the authority by which they are holding their offices.

Further, it has been held by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Hari Shankar Prasad Gupta Vs. Sukhdeo Prasad and Another, that the Court will not grant a quo- warranto in a case where a mere irregularity can be cured. In the instant case it would be noticed that Shri Gobind Sahai has been appointed as a whole-time officer by Annexure ''C in CPW 75/71 with effect from 30-3-1971. Similarly the other two Respondents have been regularly appointed. In view of this the learned Counsel for the Respondents has also rightly contended that where the writ will become futile a direction in the nature of quo-warranto cannot be issued nor it can be issued if the defect was subsequently cured by re-appointing by a later notification.

In Niranjan Kumar Goenka Vs. The University of Bihar and Others, it has been held by a Full Bench of the that Court that a writ of quo-warranto cannot issued in a case where the person is not holding a public office. Similarly, in Durga Chand and Another Vs. Administrator and Others, a Division Bench held that the Petitioner claiming writ must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without any legal authority. It has also been made clear in The The University of Mysore and Another Vs. C.D. Govinda Rao and Another, that under what circumstances and for what purposes a writ of quo-warranto will issue, and it has been observed that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo-warranto, he must satisfy the Court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority.

Moreover, the Petitioner has challenged the appointment of Shri Gobind Sahai as Managing Director and other two persons as Accountant and Senior Accountant in this collateral proceedings, although he had previously been working in the Corporation under Shri Gobind Sahai and the other two Respondents against whom he seeks a direction in the nature of quo-warranto were also working there and he had acquiesced in the authority of Shri Gobind Sahai. Therefore, in these circumstances he is precluded from challenging the authority of Shri Gobind Sahai by a writ of quo-warranto, nor he can question the appointment of other two persons. The Petitioner had previously filed a writ petition first before the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh, but the same was withdrawn by him. Later on he filed a writ petition in the Himachal Pradesh High Court, which too he had withdrawn. Therefore, all these facts clearly go to indicate that the Petitioner by his own act and conduct acquiesced in the continuance of Shri Gobind Sahai as Managing Director and in the constitution of the Board. Moreover, Shri Gobind Sahai Respondent had been appointed as a whole-time officer in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India in the year 1971 as admitted by the Petitioner and he also amended his petition after the regular appointment of Shri Gobind Sahai as the Managing Director of the Corporation. Therefore, in these circumstances, when the defect, if any, had been cured at a later stage, his appointment cannot be challenged by a direction in the nature of quo-warranio.

The Petitioner has also challenged the appointment of Romesh Chand and N. N. Diwan, as stated before. Shri Romesh Chand was holding the post of Extension Officer in the Industries Department prior to his being taken on deputation in the Corporation on 1-5-67 for one year but subsequently that period was extended. Respondent No. 3 resigned from the post of Extension Officer from 24-3-1971, and thereafter he was reappointed as a regular employee in the Corporation. The petition was filed in the year 1970. In that petition he had questioned the appointment of Shri Romesh Chand Respondent No. 3, on deputation as Assistant Accountant and then Accountant. But, later on he amended the petition and prayed for quashing the appointment of Shri Romesh Chand on regular basis in the year 1971. He had also questioned the appointment of Sh. N. N. Diwan. Regulation 7 of the Regulations of 1961 deals with the appointments and it says that the permanent staff of the Corporation, shall be grouped as (1) Class-A Officer, (2) Class-B Supervising and clerical staff, and (3) Class-C Subordinate staff. Regulation 8 gives powers to the Managing Director to employ staff in Classes B and C on a temporary basis, whenever the circumstances so required. Regulation 9 also gives powers to the Managing Director to make appointment to the service of the Corporation subject, in the case of officers, to the prior approval of the Board. In the instant case the question about the deputation in view of the withdrawal of the objection by the Petitioner himself does not require any consideration . The Petitioner contends that the posts should have been advertised so that he could also apply and otherwise also he was entitled for consideration for promotion to these posts along with Romesh Chand and N. N. Diwan. After having perused the regulations. I find that it is entirely at the discretion of Managing Director to appoint the staff in any manner that he may choose. In respect of the promotions there is Regulation 23 which says that all appointments and promotions shall be made at the discretion of the Corporation and notwithstanding his seniority in a grade, no employee shall have a right to be appointed or promoted to any particular post or grade. Therefore, this particular regulation clinches the matter and the Petitioner has got no right even of consideration for promotion vis a vis the two Respondents, nor the appointments to the posts of Assistant Accountant and Accountant and-Senior Accountant can be challenged. It is also provided in Regulation 22 that an employee confirmed in the Corporation''s service shall rank for seniority in his grade according to his date of confirmation in the grade, and an employee on probation according to the length of his probationary service; provided that a person who, in view of his qualifications and previous experience, is granted initial increments in a grade at the time of his appointment, may, at the discretion ofthe Managing Director be granted seniority for a period upto one year for every two increments granted to him in the grade to which he is appointed. Therefore, on this account merely on the basis of seniority the Petitioner cannot claim promotion as against the two Respondents. Moreover, when these two persons were permanently taken into the service the Petitioner was no more in the service ofthe Corporation. The Petitioner has not been able to show how it was necessary for the Corporation to have issued advertisement inviting applications for selection and consideration for appointment to the posts of Assistant Accountant, Accountant and Senior Accountant in the Corporation. Therefore, the Petitioner can have no claim for consideration as against these two Respondents .

Since the petitions fail on merits, therefore, it will not be necessary to deal with the objection about delay in filing the same.

Summing up, therefore, it is manifest that the Petitioner was an employee of the Corporation and there was the relationship of master and servant. There was no breach of any provisions of the regulations and, therefore, he has got no right for issue of a writ under Article 226 for declaration and reinstatement. Hence the petitions fail and are dismissed.

However, in view of the fact that the Petitioner has been pursuing his case consistently by himself, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.

BY THE COURT

For the reasons set out in our respective judgments this and the connected writ petitions are dismissed, but there is no order as to costs.