Sardar Jogindra Singh vs Government of Madhya Pradesh and others

G.P. Singh, J.—By this petition the petitioner challenges a notification (Annexure D) dated 17th September 1975 issued u/s 43 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, containing directions regarding new fares for stage carriage. These directions substitute new Clauses (i) and (ii) in an earlier notification issued on the same subject on 6th November 1973. The object of the change is to increase the fares.

Before the issue of the impugned notification, the draft directions were published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette dated 29th July 1975 as required by the proviso to section 43 (1) of the Act. The notice publishing the draft directions is Annexure A to the petition and in so far as relevant reads as follows:

No. 7-10-75- A-2-11. The following draft of the direction which the State Government, in exercise of the powers conferrd by sub-section (1) of section 43 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), and having regard to the provisions of Clauses (a) to (d) of the said sub-section and in partial modification of the directions referred to in the notification No. 7-32-73-A-2-11, dated the 6th November 1973 issued in this respect proposes to issue to the State Transport Authority regarding the fixing of fares for stage carriages, is published as required by the proviso to the said sub-section for the information of all persons likely to be affected thereby and notice is hereby given that the said draft will be taken to consideration on the expiry of one month from the date of publication of this notice in the ''Madhya Pradesh Gazette'';

Any objection or suggestion which may be received by the Special Secretary to the Government, Madhya Pradesh, Home Department, Bhopal from any person with respect to the said draft before the expiry of the period specified above will be considered by the State Government.

The petitioner belongs to Chhatarpur district and carries on road transport business. The petitioner holds a number of stage carriage permits granted to him by the transport authorities. It appears that the petitioner and other operators in Chhatarpur district have formed an association which is known as the Chhatarpur District Transport Operators Association. This association submitted a representation to the Special Secretary, Government of Madhya Pradesh, on 25th August 1973, objecting to the proposed increase in fares. A Copy of this representation is Annexure-B. The representation is signed by the President of the Association as also by 24 members of the association including the petitioner. On 7th September 1975 the petitioner submitted another representation to the Chief Minister. Copies of this representation were sent to a number of authorities including the Chief Secretary and the Special Secretary. In this representation the petitioner apart from many other matters submitted that the consideration of the proposal for increase of fares be postponed and that it should be finalised only after considering the petitioner''s representation. It was also submitted that the Chhatarpur District Transport Operators Association had opposed the proposal for increase of the fares and that it was hoped that the association would be given a hearing before the proposal was finalised. No hearing was given either to the Association or to its members before the proposal to increase the fares was finalised and published in the form of the impugned notification.

The petitioner challenges the validity of the notification on the ground of non-compliance of the proviso to section 43 (1) of the Act. The relevant part of section 43 (1) reads as follows:

43 (1). A State Government, having regard to--

(a) the advantages offered to the public, trade and industry by the development of motor transport, and

(b) the desirability of co-ordinating road and rail transport, and

(c) the desirability of preventing the deterioration of the road system, and

(d) the desirability of preventing uneconomic competition among motor vehicles, may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, issue directions to the State Transport Authority--

(i) regarding the fixing of fares and freights (including the maximum and minimum in respect thereof) for stage carriages, contract carriages and public carriers;

... ... ...

... ... ...

Provided that no such notification shall be issued unless a draft of the proposed directions is published in the official Gazette, specifying therein a date being no less than one month after such publication, on or after which the draft will be taken into consideration and any objection or suggestion which may be received, has, in consultation with the State Transport Authority, been considered after giving the representatives of the interests affected an opportunity of being heard.

I have earlier quoted the notice (Annexure A) containing the draft directions for increase of fares. The notice informs the persons concerned that the draft "will be taken into consideration on the expiry of one month from the date of publication of this notice in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette." The notice further informs that "any objection or suggestion which may be received by the Special Secretary to the Government, Madhya Pradesh, Home Department, Bhopal, from any person with respect to the said draft before the expiry of the period specified above will be considered by the State Government." The notice does not in terms specify any date for hearing the representatives of the interests affected. It also does not name of the officer who will bear the representatives on behalf of the Government. As earlier stated, after the issue of this notice no information was sent either to the Association or to its members fixing any date of hearing. The petitioner on these facts submits that the impugned notification containing the final directions was invalid as it was issued "without giving the representatives of the interests affected an opportunity of being heard" as required by the proviso to section 43 (1).

The learned Advocate General on the other hand contends that the notice that the draft will be taken into consideration "on the expiry of one month from the date of publication" of the notice had the effect of impliedly fixing a date for hearing the objections, if any, filed within that period and that if the petitioner wanted to be heard he should have appeared before the Special Secretary "on the expiry of one month from the date of publication" of the notice. It is also submitted that though the notice does not name the officer who is to hear the objections, it is implicit that the Special Secretary who was authorised to receive the objections was impliedly authorised to hear the objections.

The proviso which is worded in negative terms prescribes the procedure for exercising the power of issuing directions conferred on the State Government by section 43 (1). The requirements of the proviso are: (1) The draft directions must be published in the official Gazette; (2) The notice must specify a date on or after which the draft will betaken into consideration; (3) Objections and suggestions received in respect of the draft directions must be considered; (4) The consideration of the objections must be in consultation with the State Transport Authority; and (5) The consideration of the objections must be after giving the representatives of the interests affected an opportunity of being heard. The words of the proviso "no such notification shall be issued unless"-make it clear that the taking of the procedural steps prescribed by the proviso before a notification in the exercise of the power u/s 43 (1) is issued, is mandatory. Consideration of the draft directions and the objections as also hearing of the representatives of the interests affected has to be by the State Government on whom is conferred the power to issue the final directions by a notification. All these functions of the State Government have necessarily to be performed in accordance with the rules of business made by the Governor under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. The proviso provides for ''opportunity of being heard" in addition to the consideration of the written objections or suggestions lodged in pursuance of the notice. It, therefore, clearly follows that "opportunity of being heard" means opportunity of personal hearing which implies fixation of a date for hearing and authorisation of some officer under the rules of business to afford the hearing and intimation of both these matters to the persons to be heard.

The duty to fix a date for hearing, in our opinion, cannot be taken to the properly discharged by intimating in the notice that the draft shall be considered "on the expiry of one month" from the date of publication of the notice. When a Court has to fix a date for hearing, the particular date fixed is to be in terms specified in the notice, (see Order 5, rule 1 and Order 41, rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure.) We find no reason why a different rule should apply in the field of administrative law. Any authority or Tribunal on whom is laid the duty to afford personal hearing must fix a date for hearing in unambiguous terms and give intimation of that date to the persons to be heard. The date for hearing cannot be taken to be fixed by use of such ambiguous words that the case shall be heard on expiry of one month from service or publication of notice. Such a fixation of date involves two ambiguities: First, it leaves the party to calculate as to when one month expires from service of notice; and secondly, it is likely to mislead that the hearing may take place not on the date immediately following the expiry of one month but on any date thereafter. A period within which a statute requires certain act to be done has of necessity to be delimited by a terminus a quo and terminus ad quern. A volume of case law has developed for reckoning of such periods. It is always a matter of construction whether both the terminal days or one of them or none of them should be included in the reckoning. The hardship, if any, in miscalculation of the date when a period of limitation expires is mitigated by the fact that the person concerned need not wait till the last date for doing the act for which the period is prescribed and the act can be performed on any date during that period. The considerations relevant to fixing a period of limitation have no bearing while fixing a date for hearing which must be specifically and unequivocally specified in the notice. The learned Advocate-General referred to section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and argued that just as a notice terminating a tenancy need not in terms state as to when the tenancy month or year expires, a notice fixing a date for hearing need not in terms state the date fixed for hearing. I am unable to appreciate this argument. There is no analogy between a notice terminating a tenancy and a notice fixing a date for hearing. The requirement of section 106 is that the notice terminating a tenancy must expire with the end of a month or year of tenancy. The parties to this contract know what is the tenancy month or year. A notice terminating the tenancy from the end of the current month or year of tenancy involves no hardship and has the merit of avoiding any technical dispute as to the date when a month or year of the tenancy ends as the tenant can vacate on the day on which according to his case the tenancy ends. These considerations are entirely out of place in issuing a notice fixing a date for hearing of a case where definiteness of the date is of the very essence of the notice. One of the purposes of a notice issued under the proviso is the purpose of providing the period (not less than one month) within which the objections or suggestions should be lodged. The same notice may also fix the date for consideration of the draft directions and hearing of the objections. If the same notice is intended to serve both these purposes, the particular date fixed for hearing must be in terms specified in the notice. The notice Annexure A did not in terms specify any particular date for consideration of the draft directions and for hearing the objectors. Such a notice cannot be said to have afforded opportunity of hearing to the objectors.

Further, the notice Annexure A does not specify the officer authorised to consider the draft directions and objections and hear the objectors. All that the notice says is that "any objection or suggestion received by the Special Secretary to the Government, Madhya Pradesh, Home Department, Bhopal, from any person with respect to the said draft before expiry of the period specified above will be considered by the State Government." As earlier stated, consideration of draft directions and objections and hearing of objectors are functions which the State Government has to perform in accordance with the rules of business. For affording real opportunity of being heard personally, the persons to be heard must be told as to who is the officer authorised to hear them on behalf of the Government so that they may appear before him on the date of hearing. The notice only mentions the Special Secretary as the officer designated to receive the objections or suggestions. It does not either expressly or impliedly state that he is the officer also authorised to hear and consider the objections on behalf of the Government. The notice only says that objections "received by the Special Secretary will be considered by the State Government" which indicates that the Special Secretary is merely to receive the objections. This also shows that the notice Annexure A was not intended to give any opportunity of hearing.

The reply of the State Government in paras 8 and 11 of the return clearly supports the conclusion that by notice Annexure A the Government did not intend to afford opportunity for personal hearing. The stand of the Government in the return is that no personal hearing need be given to each and every objector and that as the petitioner did not in his personal capacity as of for personal hearing, the Government did not think it proper to give opportunity of personal hearing to such person. The stand of the Advocate-General that the notice Annexure A had the effect of impliedly fixing a date for hearing on which persons desirous of being heard ought to have appeared before the Special Secretary is not even hinted in the return.

It was also contended by the learned Advocate-General that the objection to the draft directions was filed by the Chhatarpur District Transport Operators Association of which the petitioner is a member and not by the petitioner individually, hence the petitioner has no locus stand to file the present petition. We are not impressed by this argument either. The association is an association of the operators of Chhatarpur district to represent them in matters of common interest. The association holds no permit and is not directly affected by the increase in fares. It is the permit holders who are members of the association that are concerned with the fares. The representation containing the objections to the proposed increase in fares submitted by the association is signed by the petitioner and other members. The representation must be deemed to have been collectively made by the Association on behalf at least of those members who signed the representation. It cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioner did not object to the draft directions for increase of fares and, therefore, he has no locus stand to file the petition. It is to be noticed that opportunity of hearing has to be afforded to "the representatives of the interests affected". The interests affected by the increase in fares are interests of the operators and the travelling public. As the hearing to each individual operator or member of the public may consume a lot of time, the proviso provides for hearing the representatives. The association was a representative of the operators who were its members and opportunity of hearing should have been afforded to the association, as representing the petitioner and other members. The association, however, has no interest of its own as distinct from its members. The persons affected are the petitioner and other operators and it is they alone who can file the petition under Article 226 and not the association which has no interest of its own. The petitioner, therefore, is competent to file the petition to challenge the final directions relating to the increase in fares. It was also argued that an operator''s interests are not adversely affected by increase in fares, for the increase is likely to bring him more profit and, therefore, an operator cannot be allowed to challenge a notification increasing the fares. It cannot be, however, assumed that increase in fares must necessarily result in increase of profit to an operator. The increase may adversely affect the volume of traffic and thereby lower the margin of profit to an operator and may even make his business un-economical. It is for the Government to decide after hearing the objectors as to how far the proposal for increase is justified having regard to the considerations mentioned in causes (a) to (d) of section 43 (1). It cannot, therefore, be said that an operator cannot challenge a proposal for increase in fares.

The next question is as to what relief should be granted to the petitioner. A notification u/s 43 (1) fixing fares has to be given effect to by an operator for as provided in action 59 (3) (c) it is the condition of every permit that any prohibition or restriction imposed and any fares or freights fixed by notification made u/s 43 shall be observed. section 59 (3) (c), however, postulates observance of a valid notification and not a notification which is invalid for non-observance of a mandatory requirement. Failure to afford opportunity of hearing as contemplated by the proviso to section 43 (1) is non-observance of a mandatory requirement making the notification invalid. The other operators who collectively objected to the draft directions have, however, not come forward to challenge the notification. It would, therefore, not be proper to declare the notification invalid and inoperative against all. The petitioner''s interest would be served if it is declared inoperative as against him.

The petition is allowed. The respondents 1, 2 and 3 are restrained from enforcing the notification Annexure D against the petitioner. It would be open to the State Government to confirm the said notification and enforce it against the petitioner after giving opportunity of heading to the or his representative. There shall be no order as to costs of this petition. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner.

OPINION

Shiv Dayal C.J.

Section 43 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act empowers the State Government to issue, from time to time, directions to the State Transport Authority regarding fixation of fares and freights (including the maximum and the minimum in respect thereof) for stage carriages, contract carriages and public carriers. In doing so, the State Government has to have regard to the four considerations enumerated in the section. The directions have to be issued by notification in the Official Gazette. The proviso to the aforesaid section 43 (1) reads as follows:--

Provided that no such notification shall be issued unless (1) a draft of the proposed directions is published in the Official Gazette, (2) specifying therein a date being not less than one month after such publication, on or afar which the draft will be taken into consideration and (3) any objection or suggestion which road be received has, in consultation with the State Transport Authority, been considered (4) after giving the representatives of the interests affected an opportunity of being heard." (Figures within brackets inserted for facility.)

Thus dissected, the proviso requires:--

(1) that the proposed directions must be published in the Official Gazette;

(2) that in the notification a date must be specified on which or after which the draft wilt be taken into consideration; and such date must be not less than one month after such publication;

(3) that any objection or suggestion which may be received must be considered; and such consideration must be in consultation with the State Transport Authority; and

(4) that such objection or suggestion must be considered alter giving the representatives of the interests affected an opportunity of being heard.

Opportunity of being heard has to be given to the "representatives of the interests affected". It is not the requirement of the proviso that every person from whom any objection or suggestion has been received, must be given an opportunity of being heard.

The word "interests" means "a body of persons exerting influence on and often financially involved in a given enterprise, industry or sphers of activity". (Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 1975 Edn. page 694), A "representative" is "a person that represents another or others; an agent or deputy". (Random House Dictionary, 1975 Edn. page 1120); "a person who represents or stands for a number or class of persons; who represents or is in the place of another; one being or acting as the agent or substitute for another especially through delegated authority; one who represents others or another in special capacity; an agent, deputy or substitute; one who exercises powers derived from another". (77 C.J. Section 262). A person can represent a body of persons of which he is a member, but to be a representative of body, he must be authorised by that body to represent that body.

The representation (Annexure ''B'') dated August 15, 1975 in response to the notification dated July 28, 1975, was from "Chhatarpur District Transport Operators Association, Motor Stand, Chhatarpur", and it was addressed by its President (Surendra Mohan Chourasia), to the Special Secretary, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Heme Department, Bhopal. Although at the bottom, 24 names are written, including that of the petitioner, yet has not been described as its representative. Even in this petition, the petitioner has not described himself as a representative of the Association.

I am of the opinion that the petitioner has no locus standi to claim a writ--

(i) The petitioner did not file any representation or objection in his individual capacity.

(ii) The association which filed the representation did not pursue it with the Government. It did not approach this Court for writ with any grievance that opportunity of being heard was not given to it.

(iii) The petitioner has not filed this petition as a representative of the association; nor has he stated any where that he was appointed by the association as its representative.

Now, assuming for a moment, though not holding, that the 4th requirement aforesaid was not complied with, the question is to what relief the petitioner is entitled. I have had the advantage of carefully perusing the opinion of my learned brother and the ultimate conclusion reached by him that it would not be proper to declare the notification invalid and inoperative against all, but that the petitioner''s interest would be served, if it is declared inoperative as against him; and the operative part of his order. Mandamus is a discretionary writ. Even when any irregularity is committed by a public authority, it is not incumbent on this Court to issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, if the ends of justice require otherwise. The Court shall issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution only in the interests of justice and equity and not merely for enforcing the technicalities of law. To have jurisdiction is one thing; to exercise jurisdiction is another thing. The very vastness of the powers conferred on the High Court imposes on it the responsibility to use them with circumspection. In the General Engineering Employees'' Union v. Bhagwath (1966) I L L J 568, the Bombay High Court observed:--

However, the main consideration is as to whether after nearly 99.5 per cent workmen of respondent 2 Company having accepted the said settlement it would be proper for this Court to exercise its powers under writ jurisdiction to interfere with the said settlement, which in my view, would lead to breach of industrial peace rather than achieve the same. In the circumstances, I feel that the prayers for issue of writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari should be rejected.

In A.M. Allison Vs. B.L. Sen, their Lordships observed:--

Proceedings by way of certiorari are ''not of course''. (Vide Hals''s Law of England'' Hailsham Edition, Vol. 9, paras 1480 and 1481, pp. 877-878).

The High Court of Assam had the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there was no failure of justice, and in these appeals which are directed against the orders of the High Court in application under Article 226, we would refuse to interfere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the case requires it. But we are not so satisfied....

It is stated in Judicial Review of Administrative Action by Prof. S.A. De Smith (3rd Edition) at page 500:--

The Court will also refuse an application for mandamus if it is of the opinion that no conceivable benefit will accrue to the applicant, as where mandamus is sought to secure the hearing of the applicant by a tribunal, a reference to arbitration or statement of a case and, on and facts disclosed to the Court, there is no possibility that any subsequent proceedings will terminate in the applicant''s favour.

See also Harkartar Kaur v. Lt. Governor A I R 1971 Del 195 (198); and H. S. M. Ltd. v. D.C. Kheri 1969 All. L J 909 (911). A writ will issue to remedy a wrong and not where it is likely to work a public or private mischief.

The peculiarities of the present case are:--

(1) The impugned proposals were given effect to by the final notification dated September 17, 1975, and, consequently, since then the increased fares have been charged.

(2) The objections which were filed in pursuance of the notification, came from Chhatarpur District Transport Operators Association only but from no one else. And, that Association too has not come up before us, either as a body or through any representative. It is the petitioner who has, in his individual capacity, filed this writ petition.

(3) Prima facie, the petitioner is not adversely affected because the fares that he is entitled to charge under impugned notification are higher. In the natural course of business a person stands to gain where the rate is higher. The petitioner has not shown anything to rebut this presumption. Although it was faintly argued that because of the increase in fares, the petitioner would attract a lesser number of passengers, this appears to be a mere argument for argument sake. The increased fares have been in vogue for about 9 months but, neither with the petition nor at the hearing nor until today, there is any affidavit or statement from the petitioner to satisfy the Court that the number of passengers he has been carrying from the date of the enforcement of the impugned notification, has been less on the average than that in the corresponding period previous to the notification.

(4) It will be anomalous that whereas all other Bus operators throughout the State of Madhya Pradesh will charge the increased fares as notified in the impugned notification, those fares will not apply to the petitioner alone and he will be permitted to ply his Buses at the lower rates.

The petition is dismissed. No order for costs.

By the Court-- We have differed on the following questions:--

(i) Whether the petitioner has locus standi to claim a writ?

(ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case respondents 1, 2 and 3 should be restrained from enforcing the notification Annexure ''D'' against the petitioner, leaving it open to the State Government to confirm the said notification and enforce it against the petitioner after giving opportunity of hearing him or his representative. Let the case be placed before the Chief Justice for nominating a third Judge.

OPINION

Lodha J.

The following points have been referred to me on account of difference of opinion between the learned Chief Justice and Singh J., constituting the Division Bench, which heard the case:--

(i) Whether the petitioner has locus standi to claim a writ?

(ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case respondents 1, 2 and 3 should be restrained from enforcing the notification Annexure ''D'' against the petitioner, leaving it open to the State Government to confirm the said notification and enforce it against the petitioner after giving opportunity of hearing him or his representative?

Before I proceed to record my opinion on the above points, it would be proper to state a few facts giving rise to this petition.

In exercise of its powers u/s 43 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, Act No. 4 of 1939 (which for the sake of shortness will be hereinafter referred to as the ''Act'') the Government of Madhya Pradesh published the following draft of the proposed directions regarding fitting of fares of stage carriages in the M.P. Gazette dated 29-7-1975.

No. 7-10-75-A-2-11. The following draft of the directions which the State Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 43 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), and having regard to the provisions of Clauses (a) to (d) of the said sub-section and in partial modification of the direction referred to in the notification No. 7-32-73-A-2-11, dated the 6th November 1973 issued in this respect proposes to issue to the State Transport Authority regarding the fixing of fares for stage carriages, is published as required by the proviso to the said sub-section for the information of all persons likely to be affected thereby and notice is hereby given that the said draft will be taken into consideration on the expiry of one month from the date of publication of this notice in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette:

Any objection or suggestion which may be received by the Special Secretary to the Government, Madhya Pradesh, Home Department, Bhopal from any person with respect to (he said draft before the expiry of the period specified above will be considered by the Stale Government.

In response to the notice ''Chhatarpur District Transport Operator''s Association'' of which the petitioner is also a member submitted an objection on 25-8-75 to the Special Secretary, Government of M.P. It was signed by Surerdra Mohan Chcurasia as President of the Association and also by 24 other operators including the petitioner. It further appears that in continuation of the above objection the petitioner submitted another application dated 7-9-75 to the Chief Minister, Government of M.P. asking for an opportunity to be heard before finally issuing the notification. A copy of this application was also sent to the Special Secretary (Home) Government of Madhya Pradesh.

The petitioner''s grievance is that no authority was named by the Government of M.P. for deciding the objection, nor was he given an opportunity of being heard, but the Government issued the final notification on 18-9-75. It was submitted that the notification has been issued in violation of the proviso to section 43 (1) of the Act and is consequently void and liable to be quashed.

The petition was opposed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh inter alia on the ground that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the petition. The opposite party has also contended that the provisions of section 43(1) of the Act had been duly complied with and that in any view of the matter, the petitioner was not entitled to any relief in the circumstances of the present case. Singh J. held that the draft of the proposed direction (reproduced above) did not specify any date for hearing of the representatives of the interests affected and that it also did not name the officer who was to hear the representatives of the interests affected. In this connection he further held that "opportunity of being heard means opportunity of personal hearing which implies fixation of a date for hearing and authorisation of some officer under the rules of business to afford the hearing." He went on to observe that the duty to fix a date for hearing cannot be taken to be properly discharged by intimating in the notice that the draft shall be considered on the expiry of one month from the date of publication of the notice. Thus, he came to the conclusion that "notice (Annexure A) was not intended to give any opportunity of hearing." The learned Chief Justice did not discuss this point and proceeded to decide the case on the assumption that the State Government did not give the "representatives of the interests affected" an opportunity of being heard.

On the first point referred to me viz whether the petitioner has locus standi to claim a writ, Singh J. held that the petitioner had signed the objection, that he was a person affected and that, since, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to the association on whose behalf the objection had been filed, he was competent to file the petition to challenge the final direction relating to the increase in fares. He also held that the increase in fares may adversely affect the volume of traffic and thereby lower the margin of his profit and even make his business uneconomical.

On the other hand, the learned Chief Justice observed that since the petitioner had not filed any representation or objection in his individual capacity and the association which filed the objection did not pursue it, nor approached this Court for issue of writ and further that since the petitioner had not filed this petition as a representative of the association, nor had asserted anywhere that he was appointed by the association as its representative, he has no locus standi to file the petition.

Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Chhatarpur District Transport Association on whose behalf the objection was filed before the State Government is an unregistered association, not being a legal entity, and, therefore, no relief could have been granted to it as an association under Article 226 of the Constitution, and, therefore, the association did not approach this Court by way of writ. It is urged by him that even though the objection was filed on behalf of the association, yet any individual operator, who is interested in arid is affected by the increase in fares is entitled to maintain the petition. In support of his contention he has relied on Jagjit Singh and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, , Radha Shyam Datta and Others Vs. Patna Municipal Corporation, , Bhanwarlal Vs. Rajasthan State and Others, and Government Press Employee''s Assn. Bangalore v. Government of Mysore A I R 1962 Mys. 25.

I do not consider it necessary to examine the question whether the association could have filed the present petition as that question does not directly arise in the case. For the purposes of the present case, I have only to see whether the petitioner is competent to maintain the petition.

It may be pointed out that the right of hearing can be claimed only by the representatives of the interests affected. The petitioner has nowhere asserted that he was a representative of the interests affected. He has claimed an opportunity of being heard as an individual. A bare perusal of the language of the proviso to section 43 (1) of the Act (extracted below) would show that an opportunity of being heard is to be given only to the "representatives of the interests affected" and not to every individual affected.

Provided that no such notification shall be issued unless a draft of the proposed directions is published in the Official Gazette specifying therein a date being not less than one month after such publication, on or after which the draft will be taken into consideration and any objection or suggestion which may be received has, in consultation with the State Transport Authority, been considered after giving the representatives of the interests affected an opportunity of being heard.

In order to succeed, the petitioner has, therefore, to show that he was a representative of the interests affected and was not given an opportunity of being heard. A perusal of the petition, however, shows that no such ground has been taken. I am, therefore, of opinion that the petitioner has no locus standi to file this petition, inasmuch as no legal right of his has been infringed. Even the authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this connection viz Jagjit Singh and others. v. State of Rajasthan lays down that every individual operator is not entitled to get an opportunity of hearing under the proviso to section 43 (1) of the Act. Consequently, I answer question No. 1 in the negative.

The second question requires examination of the case on merits. It has been alleged by the petitioner that the State Government failed to give any notice of hearing by fixing the date, time and place and that the petitioner was never informed as to who was the officer authorized to give the hearing and, therefore, the State Government had no jurisdiction to issue the directions by notification ''Ex. D''. The petitioner nowhere says that he was "the representative of the interests affected". As already observed above, the petitioner as an individual was not entitled to be given an opportunity of being heard. It is cot the petitioner''s case that the President of the Association was the representative of the interests affected. No affidavit of the President has been submitted that he wanted to be heard, but was afforded no such opportunity. There is force in the contention raised by the learned Advocate General that if a body of persons affected by the proposed increase of fares wanted to be heard, the Government should have been apprised as to who was to act as their representative. The petitioner cannot claim the right to be heard in his individual capacity as the requirement of law is that opportunity of hearing is to be granted only to the "representatives of the interests affected." In the case of an unregistered association like the Chhatarpur District Transport Operators Association there is no statutory provision for recognizing a particular individual as a person representing the association as we have in the case of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act or under the Co-operative Societies Act, so forth and so on. Assuming that the person who had signed the representation as President of the Association was the representative of the association, then it is he who was entitled to be heard and he should have come forward with the grievance that he had not been afforded an opportunity of being heard. As stated above, there is no such assertion in the petition much less any proof in support of it. I am, therefore, of opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief.

There is yet another aspect of the matter which tilts the scales against the petitioner on point No. 2. Even Singh J. has come to the conclusion that the impugned notification cannot be struck down as whole, but that it may be declared inoperative as against the petitioner only. A serious question then arises whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, such a limited relief should be granted. It is trite, as pointed out by the learned Chief Justice that even where any irregularity is committed by the public authority, it is not incumbent on this Court to issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the ends of justice require otherwise, and the Court shall issue a writ only in the interests of justice and equity and not merely for enforcing the technicalities of law. The Rajasthan case Bhatwarlal v. Rajasthan State relied upon by the petitioner is distinguishable on facts as it was a case of levy and collection of tax without authority of law in contravention of the provisions of Article 265 of the Constitution. Besides that, to declare the impugned notification in-operative as against the petitioner, would create an anomaly inasmuch as the notification would apply to all other operators who would charge increased fare from the passengers, but not the petitioner. In my opinion, the present is not a case where the notification should be struck down as against the petitioner only. I am, therefore, of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief.

The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

Let this case be now laid before the Division Bench which had heard it for proceeding according to law.

Order per Shiv Dayal C.J. and G.P. Singh J.--

In accordance with the opinion of the third Judge (Lodha J.), this petition is dismissed. There shall be no order for costs.