AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Ross, J.—An application for execution was made on 24th April 1925 and dismissed on 8fch August 1925. The next application was made on 8th August 1928. The learned District Judge has decided that it is within title under Article 182, of the Schedule to the Limitation Act as amended by Act 9 of 1927.
Two points are taken in appeal first that the amending Act is not retrospective and secondly that if it is retrospective the amended portion of the article does not apply to this case.
(1) The amendment will not disturb vested rights. The Act cams into operation on 1st January 1928 and on that date the decree-holder was still within time under the old Act. The application made after 1st January 1928 was necessarily governed by the amended Act and as no right had vested by 1st January 1928 there was nothing to impede the operation of the amending Act. There is therefore no force in the first argument.
(2) As to the construction of the amended article the language is plain. The time limited is three years from the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution of to take some step-in-aid of execution of the decree or order. Now this application is within three years from the date of the final order passed on the application of 24fch April 1925. It is said that the words cannot mean what they say because then the subsequent portion of the article, or to take some step-in aid of execution of the decree or order becomes meaningless as that stage must necessarily precede the final order in the execution case, and it is suggested that the period limited by the amendment is three years from the final order in cases in which no steps are taken, and, in cases where steps are taken, three years from the last step-in-aid of execution. This in my opinion does violence to the language which is plain in itself. It cannot be said that the last part of the article is meaningless. It is not inconceivable that a case might arise in which it would be necessary to have recourse to the last clause. This theoretical question is not a sufficient ground for not construing the language according to its plain meaning. In my opinion neither of the points has any substance and the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
Scroope. J.
I agree.