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Judgment
O R D E R
By Justice Rajiv Joshi, Member (Judicial)
Heard Shri Ashok Kumar Shukla, learned counsel for the applicant and Shri Vinod Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the respondents.
The applicant has filed the present Original Application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 seeking the following main relief(s):-
“(i)to direct the respondents to cross the Efficiency Bar from the due date, which he was working as postman.
(ii)to direct the respondents to refix the pay of the applicant in the cadre of postal assistant w.e.f. the date he was promoted notionally i.e. 14.11.1982.
(iii)to pay the arrears of salary, representing the difference between the pay of postal assistant and postman to the entire period from the date of notional promotion i.e. 14.11.1982 until his actual joining on the promoted post along with interest at the rate deemed fit by this Hon’ble Tribunal.
(iv)to direct the respondents to calculate and revise the pension and all pensionary benefits (including gratuity and communication) of the applicant based on the refixed pay and grant the arrears thereof with interest.
(v)to direct the respondents to refix the pay of the applicant also in accordance with time to time pay commission occurred.”
The brief facts of the case, as borne out from the record, are that the applicant was initially appointed as a Group-D Packer in the Department of Posts in the year 1965 and thereafter, after qualifying the departmental Central Administrative Tribunalexamination, was appointed as Postman in the year 1970. He subsequently appeared in the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) and was declared successful on 22.08.1980. After completing the prescribed training at PTC, Shahjahanpur and practical training at Nawabganj HPO, Kanpur, he was required to be posted as Postal Assistant. However, during the intervening period, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him in connection with irregular payment of a Money Order while he was working as Postman. The said disciplinary proceeding continued for a considerable period and ultimately resulted in imposition of a penalty, which was subsequently reduced by the Appellate Authority.
Thereafter, the applicant preferred a further petition before the Member (Personnel), Postal Service Board, which was decided on 12.02.1988. By the said order, the earlier punishment was set aside and the applicant was directed to be declared promoted as Postal Assistant with effect from 14.11.1982. Pursuant thereto, the department issued an order dated 28.06.1988 declaring the applicant as Postal Assistant with effect from 14.11.1982. The applicant thereafter joined as Postal Assistant on 02.07.1988.
The applicant claims that despite his having been declared promoted as Postal Assistant with effect from 14.11.1982, his pay and other consequential benefits were not fixed accordingly. He further claims that the Efficiency Bar was also not crossed from the due date and that his seniority and pay in the Postal Assistant cadre were not correctly fixed. In this regard, the applicant submitted representations, including those dated 10.04.1990, 15.11.1990 and 24.11.1990, seeking correction of his pay and seniority and grant of consequential benefits.
The applicant subsequently superannuated from service on 31.01.2003. According to the applicant, the aforesaid grievances relating to fixation of pay and the consequential effect thereof on his pension and other pensionary benefits remained unresolved. He has, therefore, filed the present Original Application seeking the relief as mentioned above.
Since the present Original Application has been filed in the year 2026 in respect of the aforesaid grievance, the applicant has also filed a separate Misc. Application (MA No.3231/2026) supported by an affidavit seeking condonation of delay in filing the Original Application.
Learned counsel for the applicant, in support of the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the Original Application, has made the following submissions:
The delay in approaching this Tribunal was neither deliberate nor intentional, but occurred due to circumstances beyond the control of the applicant. The applicant is presently aged about 84 years and, owing to his advanced age, was not in a position to effectively pursue his grievance before the appropriate forum within the prescribed period. During the intervening period, the applicant also faced various personal and family circumstances. His brother was murdered on 31.12.2017, which caused serious mental and personal hardship to the applicant and his family. His wife died on 12.03.2018 after prolonged illness, during which period the applicant remained occupied with her treatment and, thereafter, with the consequences arising from her death.
The aforesaid circumstances were followed by the COVID-19 pandemic, which materially affected the normal functioning of courts and offices and the ability of individuals to pursue their legal remedies. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon the orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020, whereby the period affected by the COVID-19 pandemic was directed to be excluded while computing the period of limitation in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. The said period, therefore, deserves to be excluded while considering the delay in filing the present Original Application.
Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar and Others vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, decided on 27.04.2000, in support of the prayer for condonation of delay. Reliance has particularly been placed upon the principle that the expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal and justice-oriented interpretation and where substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves preference. The said judgment has also been relied upon for the proposition that there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or mala fides.
The applicant has not deliberately or knowingly remained inactive in pursuing his grievance and the delay occurred on account of the aforesaid circumstances. The applicant, being an aged retired employee, should not be denied an opportunity to have his grievance examined merely on account of the delay, particularly when the application for condonation of delay is supported by an affidavit explaining the circumstances which prevented him from approaching the Tribunal earlier. The delay may, therefore, be condoned in the interest of justice and the Original Application may be considered on its merits.
Learned counsel for the respondents, opposing the application seeking condonation of delay, has filed his objection on 03.08.2026 and made the following submissions:
The present Original Application has been filed challenging the order dated 03.12.1987, after an extraordinary delay of more than 39 years. The applicant has failed to furnish any cogent, satisfactory or convincing explanation for such prolonged delay.
Under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, an Original Application is required to be filed within the prescribed period of limitation. The applicant, having approached this Tribunal after expiry of the prescribed period, is required to establish sufficient cause for such delay under Section 21(3), which has not been satisfactorily demonstrated in the present case.
The applicant has also failed to explain the prolonged period of inaction and has not furnished any satisfactory explanation for the delay in approaching the Tribunal. Mere filing of representations from time to time cannot extend the statutory period of limitation or revive a stale cause of action. The Original Application is, therefore, highly barred by limitation and suffers from gross delay and laches.
Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Surjeet Singh Sahni vs. State of U.P. and Others , SLP (C) No.3008 of 2022, decided on 28.02.2022, wherein it was reiterated that a mere representation does not extend the period of limitation and that an aggrieved person is required to approach the Court expeditiously and within a reasonable time.
Reliance has further been placed upon the order of this Tribunal in Mohammad Liyaqat Ali @ Shanu vs. Union of India and Others, decided on 09.02.2024, wherein the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Another vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, relating to delay and laches were considered. It was emphasised that an extraordinary and unexplained delay cannot be lightly ignored, particularly where entertaining a stale claim may affect rights which have attained finality.
In view of the aforesaid facts and legal position, the application for condonation of delay does not disclose sufficient cause for the extraordinary delay in filing the Original Application. The prayer for condonation of delay may, therefore, be rejected and, consequently, the Original Application may also be dismissed on the ground of limitation and delay and laches.
We have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record, including the Original Application, the application seeking condonation of delay, the affidavit filed in support thereof, the objection filed by the respondents and the documents placed on record by the applicant.
At the outset, it is necessary to notice the nature of the grievance raised in the present Original Application and the chronology of events. The applicant's grievance has its origin in the departmental proceedings and the consequential service-related issues arising in the years 1987-1988. The order dated 03.12.1987, which has been challenged in the present Original Application, is admittedly an old order. Subsequently, however, the matter was considered by the Member (Personnel), Postal Services Board and by order dated 12.02.1988, the earlier punishment was set aside and the applicant was directed to be declared promoted as Postal Assistant with effect from 14.11.1982. The said direction was thereafter implemented by the department vide order dated 28.06.1988, and the applicant joined as Postal Assistant on 02.07.1988.
It is equally relevant that the applicant was not unaware of the alleged non-grant of consequential benefits. The record placed before us contains representations made by the applicant, including those dated 10.04.1990, 15.11.1990 and 24.11.1990, relating to his grievance regarding pay fixation, seniority and consequential benefits. Thus, the applicant was conscious of the alleged deficiency in implementation of the benefit flowing from his retrospective promotion at a much earlier point of time.
The applicant thereafter continued in service and ultimately superannuated on 31.01.2003. The present Original Application, however, has been instituted only in the year 2026. Thus, even if the applicant's grievance regarding pay fixation and consequential pensionary benefits is considered independently of the original order dated 03.12.1987, the record demonstrates that such grievance was known to the applicant several decades before the institution of the present proceedings.
The applicant seeks condonation of delay by relying upon his advanced age, certain personal and family circumstances and the period covered by the COVID-19 pandemic.
We have given due consideration to the explanation furnished in the affidavit. There can be no doubt that the personal circumstances referred to by the applicant, including the unfortunate death of his brother on 31.12.2017 and the death of his wife on 12.03.2018 after prolonged illness, deserve due consideration. Likewise, the period covered by the orders passed by the Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 is required to be dealt with in accordance with the directions contained therein.
However, the question before us is whether the aforesaid circumstances satisfactorily explain the entire and extraordinary period of delay in approaching this Tribunal. In our considered view, they do not. The personal circumstances relied upon by the applicant arose in the years 2017-2018, whereas the grievance sought to be agitated has its roots in the period from 1987-1988 and the applicant had already raised representations in 1989-1990. Similarly, the COVID-19 period occurred much later and cannot, by itself, account for the substantial period which had already elapsed before the pandemic.
We are conscious that an application for condonation of delay is not required to be examined with a hyper-technical insistence upon explaining each and every day's delay. The expression “sufficient cause” is required to receive a reasonable and justice-oriented consideration. At the same time, such liberal approach cannot mean that an applicant is entitled to revive a stale claim after an extraordinary lapse of time without satisfactorily explaining the prolonged period of inaction. The discretion to condone delay under Section 21(3) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 has to be exercised on the facts and circumstances of each case.
In the present case, the difficulty faced by the applicant is not merely the absence of a day-to-day explanation. The more fundamental difficulty is the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the long intervening period after the applicant became aware of his grievance. The representations made by him in 1989 and 1990 themselves demonstrate that the applicant was conscious of the issue concerning his pay and seniority. Thereafter, he continued in service and retired on 31.01.2003. Yet, the present proceedings were initiated only in 2026. No satisfactory explanation covering this prolonged period has been brought on record.
The applicant has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Bihar and Others vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh in support of a liberal approach to condonation of delay. We have no quarrel with the settled principle that substantial justice should ordinarily be preferred over a purely technical approach. However, the same principle does not confer an unrestricted right upon a litigant to approach the Court or Tribunal at any point of time. The applicant must still demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay. In the present case, having regard to the extraordinary length of delay and the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the substantial intervening period, the said judgment does not advance the applicant's case sufficiently to warrant condonation of such delay.
Likewise, the reliance placed upon the orders passed by the Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 does not assist the applicant in explaining the entire delay. Those orders were passed in the Central Administrative Tribunalextraordinary circumstances arising from the COVID-19 pandemic and the period directed to be excluded has to be given its due effect. However, such exclusion cannot erase or satisfactorily explain the delay which had accrued several decades before the pandemic.
The applicant has also relied upon the principle of recurring cause of action in relation to fixation of pay. It is true that an erroneous fixation of pay may, in appropriate circumstances, have recurring financial consequences. However, the plea of recurring cause of action cannot be used to reopen, after an unreasonable and unexplained lapse of several decades, the foundational service claim from which the alleged financial consequences flow. In the present case, the applicant's entitlement to retrospective promotion had already been dealt with by the departmental order dated 12.02.1988 and was implemented on 28.06.1988. The applicant was also aware, as demonstrated by his representations in 1989-1990, of his alleged grievance regarding consequential benefits.
We also find substance in the respondents' reliance upon the principle that a mere representation does not extend the period of limitation. The judgment in Surjeet Singh Sahni vs. State of U.P. and Others, SLP (C) No.3008 of 2022, decided on 28.02.2022, reiterates that mere representation does not extend limitation and that a person aggrieved by an order is required to approach the Court within a reasonable period.
The principle of delay and laches is also relevant in the present matter. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Another vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, the Apex Court emphasised that the Court is required to scrutinize the explanation for delay and consider whether a belated claim deserves to be entertained, particularly when such delay may affect rights which have otherwise attained finality. The said principles were also noticed by this Tribunal in Mohammad Liyaqat Ali @ Shanu vs. Union of India and Others, decided Central Administrative Tribunalon 09.02.2024.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, we are of the considered view that the applicant has failed to establish sufficient cause for the extraordinary delay in approaching this Tribunal. The record does not disclose any satisfactory explanation for the prolonged period between the applicant's representations in 1989-1990, his retirement in 2003 and the filing of the present Original Application in 2026. The circumstances relied upon in the delay condonation application, though deserving of sympathy, do not adequately explain this entire intervening period.
It is also significant that the applicant is not seeking adjudication of a grievance which was wholly unknown to him until recently. The retrospective promotion with effect from 14.11.1982 had already been granted by the competent departmental authority in 1988. The subsequent claim for consequential pay, seniority and pensionary benefits was also within his knowledge, as is evident from his contemporaneous representations. Thus, the present proceedings cannot be treated as a case where the cause of action has arisen for the first time shortly before the filing of the Original Application.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we are not satisfied that the applicant has shown sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 21(3) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 for condoning the extraordinary delay in filing the present Original Application. The application seeking condonation of delay is, accordingly, rejected. Consequently, the Original Application, registered as Diary No.4279/2026 is also dismissed being barred by limitation.
There shall be no order as to costs.
All pending M.As, if any, shall be treated as disposed of.