Santarpal And Others vs State Of Uttar Pradesh And Another

Ram Krishna Gautam, J

The applicants, by means of this application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court with prayer to quash the entire proceeding as well as impugned summoning order dated 19.04.2019, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, Baghpat in Complaint Case No. 544 of 2019 (Netrapal Versus Santarpal and others), under Sections 323, 504, 506 I.P.C., Police Station Singhawali Aheer, District Baghpat and all the consequential proceedings thereon.

Heard learned counsel for the applicants and learned A.G.A. representing the State.

Learned counsel for applicants argued that Santarpal and Netrapal are real brothers. Civil suit is pending in between. Many cases were filed by Netrapal against Santarpal, which ended either in form of final report or in acquittal. The list of same has been filed at page no. 54 of this paper book. The present case was a malicious prosecution in furtherance of misuse of process of law. Hence, this application with above prayer.

Learned A.G.A. has vehemently opposed the application.

At the stage of Section 204 Cr.P.C., for passing any summoning order, Magistrate is to make application of its judicial mind and to find as to whether there is existence of prima facie case for summoning of accused persons for offences made out in it or not. No detailed and meticulous reasoned order is expected at this stage. Both sides are real brothers. They are inimical to each other. Litigation are pending. This may be a motive for commission of this offence or for false implication, but in both cases, it is a question of fact to be seen by Magistrate during trial.

The complainant had reiterated the contention of complaint in its statement recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. that on 24.02.2019 at about 5 P.M. when complainant along with his family was working at his field Sattarpal, Rajeev and Rajkumar, armed with lathi and Tamancha, did assault over them and abused. They chased complainant, who tried to hide himself in a room of tube-well, but they did criminal tress-pass thereat and assaulted him there too. Seema too was assaulted by them. A threat of dire consequences was extended. This matter was reported at police station and ultimately this complaint was filed. The same contention is of Seema and other witness enquired under section 202 Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for applicants argued that there is no medico legal report, but for an offence punishable under Section 323 I.P.C. i.e simple hurt, there need not be a compulsory presence of medico legal report because for a simple hurt even one slap will be sufficient, having no medical injury.

Moreso, saving of inherent power of High Court, as given under Section 482 Cr.P.C, provides that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Meaning thereby this inherent power is with High Court (I) to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any other order under this Code (II) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court (III) or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gaurishetty Mahesh, JT 2010 (6) SC 588: (2010) 6 SCALE 767: 2010 Cr. LJ 3844 has propounded that "While exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable apprehension of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge/Court". In another subsequent Hamida v. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474, hon'ble Apex Court propounded that "Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is spent in hearing those appeals rather than entertaining petitions under Section 482 at an interlocutory stage which after filed with some oblique motive in order to circumvent the prescribed procedure, or to delay the trial which enable to win over the witness or may disinterested in giving evidence, ultimately resulting in miscarriage of Justice". In again another subsequent Monica Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 8 SCC 781, the Apex Court has propounded "Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself." While interpreting this jurisdiction of High Court Apex Court in Popular Muthiah v. State, Represented by Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296 has propounded "High Court can exercise jurisdiction suo motu in the interest of justice. It can do so while exercising other jurisdictions such as appellate or revisional jurisdiction. No formal application for invoking inherent jurisdiction is necessary. Inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of substantive as well as procedural matters. It can as well be exercised in respect of incidental or supplemental power irrespective of nature of proceedings".

Regarding prevention of abuse of process of Court, Apex Court in Dhanlakshmi v. R.Prasana Kumar, (1990) Cr LJ 320 (DB): AIR 1990 SC 494 has propounded "To prevent abuse of the process of the Court, High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482 could quash the proceedings but there would be justification for interference only when the complaint did not disclose any offence or was frivolous vexatious or oppressive" as well as in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1989) Cr LJ 1005: AIR 1989 SC 1, Apex Court propounded "In exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 High Court would not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not".

Meaning thereby, exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is within the limits, propounded as above.

The prayer for quashing summoning order as well as proceeding of the aforesaid criminal case is refused.

However, in the interest of justice, it is provided that if the applicants appear and surrender before the court below within four weeks from today and apply for bail, then the bail application of the applicants be considered and decided in view of the settled law laid by this Court in the case of Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2004 (57) ALR 290 as well as judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC) Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P.

For a period of four weeks from today or till the disposal of the application for grant of bail whichever is earlier, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicants.

However, in case, the applicants do not appear before the Court below within the aforesaid period, coercive action shall be taken against them.

With the aforesaid directions, this application is finally disposed of.