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Judgment
Deepak Gupta, J.—These contempt proceedings were initiated against the Respondent vide order dated 30th November, 2004 passed in CMPMO No. 26 of 2004 alongwith LPA Nos. 39 and 40 of 2004. Relevant portion of the order reads as follows:
Our attention has been drawn to a judgment dated 4.12.2003 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 579 of 2003 in which the Division Bench had made certain adverse comments and observations against one Shri Jawahar Sharma, who at one time was functioning as the Principal of Respondent No. 3, Himachal Adarsh Sanskrit Maha Vidayalaya, Jangla. While making adverse observations and comments against Shri Jawahar Sharma, the Division Bench had taken note of the judgment passed by this Court on 27th June, 1996 in CWP No. 451 of 1992 in which this Court had clearly quashed and set-aside his appointment as the Principal of Respondent No. 3 institution and had also held that his appointment was absolutely illegal and invalid. The judgment dated 27th June, 1996 passed by this Court in CWP No. 451 of 1992 has been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Division Bench in the judgment dated 4th December, 2003(supra) after noticing the fact regarding the passing of the judgment by this Court on 27th June, 1996 also took note of the fact that thereafter Shri Jawahar Sharma filed a suit in the court of Sub Judge, Rohru praying for the relief of declaration that he had been legally appointed as a Principal of Respondent No. 3 institution.
In that suit, Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan and Respondent No. 2, who originally had been impleaded as Respondents were deleted later on from the array of parties, apparently and ostensively with a view to obtain an agreed order, which apparently might have been a device designed by the said Shri Jawahar Sharma to hoodwink the process of law by creating a situation in the court of Sub Judge, Rohru wherein he managed to obtain a favourable order about himself with respect to his appointment as Principal of Respondent No. 3 institution in spite of a clear and categoric finding by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid judgment dated 27th June, 1996 to the effect that his appointment as Principal was unconstitutional and illegal.
We prima facie feel that the said Shri Jawahar Sharma has committed contempt of this Court by adopting the aforesaid means ostensibly and apparently to hoodwink the process of law. We hereby issue a rule against him and direct him to appear in this Court in person and to show cause as to why he should not be punished for committing contempt of this Court.
It would be pertinent to mention that the appointment of the contemnor herein as Principal of the Sanskrit Maha Vidayalaya, Jangla, Tehsil Chirgaon, District Shimla, was quashed vide judgment of this Court dated 27th June, 1996 passed in CWP No. 451 of 1992. The Petitioner challenged the order of this Court before the Apex Court and the SLP filed by him was dismissed with the following observation:
Upon hearing counsel the Court made the following Order. The SLP is dismissed.
Thereafter the Petitioner filed a suit in the Court of the learned Sub Judge, Rohru, District Shimla wherein he made the following allegations:
That against the decision rendered in Civil Writ Petition No. 451 of 1992, the Plaintiff moved the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India by way of civil appeal (SLP) but the same was withdrawn by the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff did not challenge the judgment rendered in aforesaid civil writ petition No. 19 of 1991. Then again Plaintiff filed appeal (SLP) against both the aforesaid judgments before the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India which was registered as S.L.P.(Civil) No. 158 of 1997 titled as Dr. Jawaharlal Sharma v. Union of India.
That during the pendency of the above mentioned SLP before the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India, the subsequent development took place in the High Court of H.P. Five Judges bench of the Hon''ble High Court delivered a judgment on 16.12.1996 in the case Arti Gupta v. State of H.P. and Ors. and came to the conclusion that High Court is having no jurisdiction to deal with or decide services matters. On 29.10.1996 another judgment was delivered by a Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court in case Tazi Ram v. State of H.P. and Ors. in CMP No. 1159/96. On the basis of the Supreme Court judgments the Hon''ble High Court came to the conclusion:
It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up wherever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relished upon, even at the stage of execution and even in co-lateral proceeding. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes the every authority of the court to pass any decree, and such defect cannot be cured even by consent of the parties.
That the Plaintiff brought these subsequent judgments to the notice of the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India, hence the appeal of the Plaintiff was dismissed, as there was no need to peruse it in view of the subsequent law laid down by the Hon''ble High Court as submitted above. Therefore, the net result is that the judgment delivered in civil writ petition Nos. 19 of 1991 and 851 of 1992 are nullity and without jurisdiction. Consequently the Plaintiff remained regularly appointed principal of the institution and is working as such till today. Meaning thereby the post of the Principal is only filled in.
This suit was finally compromised between the parties and a decree was passed that the Petitioner was duly appointed as Principal of the Sanskrit Maha Vidayalaya, Jangla. It would be pertinent to mention that notice to the Presiding Officer who had passed the decree was issued by a Division Bench of this Court on 7th June, 2000 calling for his explanation and the Presiding Judge submitted an explanation and apologized for the lapse. We are of the considered view that the Respondent tried to mislead the Civil Court. He tried to give an impression that he had withdrawn his appeal before the Apex Court whereas in fact the same had been dismissed on merits. It may be true that this Court in certain matters had taken the view that the jurisdiction to decide the disputes relating to the employees of the Sanskrit Maha Vidayalaya lay with the Tribunal but as far as the Respondent is concerned in his case the Court had quashed his appointment. The Respondent contemnor could not take benefit of the orders passed in other proceedings. The contemnor was obviously tried to misuse the process of the Court while filing the suit. In fact the decree flies in the face of the judgment of this Court and accordingly the same is held to be null and void. It has already been held that the Petitioner is not entitled to be the Principal of the institute and we need not say anything further in the matter.
However, as far as contempt proceeding are concerned a preliminary objection has been raised that these proceedings have not been initiated within the time prescribed by law. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 reads as follows:
Limitation for actions for contempt. - No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.
This section clearly provides that no proceedings for contempt shall be initiated after the expiry of one year from the date on which the contempt was committed. Even if we take this date from the date of knowledge it is clear that notice to the Presiding Officer was issued on 7th June, 2000. The present notice was issued in 2004 almost after four years.
The Apex Court in Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and Others, has held as follows:
Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the court''s own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.
In the present case, the proceedings have not been commenced within one year of the date of commission of contempt or even from the date of knowledge and as such, the notice issued to the contemnor is discharged on this short ground only. It is, however, made clear that the contemnor will not be entitled to any benefit under the decree which was against the judgment of this Court and hence null and void.