Sannarangappa vs Land Tribunal Pavagada and Another

The petitioner claimed occupancy right over land Survey No. 57 of C.K. Pura, Pavagada Taluk, before the Land Tribunal, Pavagada Taluk. The Land Tribunal by its order dt. 24-10-75 (copy of which is at Ext.A), in Case No. LRM.5/74-75, rejected the claim only on the ground that the entry in the pahani column viz., 12(2) of the record of rights, had been tampered to include the name of the petitioner, as it appeared to the Tribunal that that entry was in a different ink.

Ext.A itself narrates that the owner viz, respondent-2 had sent a letter to the Tribunal that the petitioner had cultivated the land as a tenant and he had no objection to register the name of the petitioner as an occupant. It is further seen from Ext.A that the petitioner and respondent-2 were absent on 24-10-1975.

The aforementioned facts show that on 24-10-1975 the Tribunal looked into the matter by itself in order to find out whether the claim of the petitioner was to be accepted or rejected. Therefore, the Tribunal has to follow the procedure prescribed by Sec. 48A(4) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act). It had to verify what had been submitted by the petitioner in Form-7 in the manner deemed just by it. It has been held that such verification necessarily includes looking into the pahani columns of the record of rights and drawing presumption in law as prescribed by Sec. 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (to be hereinafter referred to as the KLR Act, 1964). The impugned order does not make out whether the Tribunal looked into the extract of the record of rights or original record of rights. If it had looked into an extract of the record of rights and had found an entry in column 12(2) in a different ink, its duty was to send for the original from the Tahsildar''s Office and find out whether the extract had been correctly prepared or not. It has failed to do so.

In case it had looked into the original record of rights, then it is to be seen whether it had power to hold that a particular entry was genuine or non-genuine. Sec. 112 of the Act prescribes the powers to be exercised by a Land Tribunal, and such a power is not found enumerated in it. Sec. 127 of the KLR Act, 1964 lays down what are the record of rights and what should be the contents of record of rights. S. 128 of the KLR Act 1964 provides for acquisition of rights to be reported. When such an acquisition is reported, an entry is made in the register of mutation-as is clear from Sec. 129 of the KLR Act 1964. Sec. 129 further provides for entering the disputed cases and deciding the disputes. Sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 129 lays down that after the disputes are decided and final entries are made in the register of mutation, the same should be transferred to the record of rights in the prescribed manner. Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 129 states that a prescribed officer has to deal with disputed entries in the mutation register. Who is the prescribed officer, is settled by Rule 43 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Rules 1966 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 1966). By the said Rule, a Sheristedar or any other officer of the Revenue Dept equal or superior in rank to him, is a prescribed officer empowered to decide such questions. These provisions leave no doubt in my mind that the exclusive jurisdiction and power to decide whether an entry in the mutation register is genuine or not or it is to be changed or not to be changed, is vested in the prescribed officer. Sec. 136(2) of the KLR Act, 1964, provides for an appeal as against the decision of the prescribed officer. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 43 of the Rules, 1966, lays down that such an appeal should lie to the Asst Commr-in-charge of the Sub-Division, and the decision of the Asst Commr shall be final. What is the mode of enquiry when such entries are disputed, is also prescribed by the very Rule. Therefore, it is manifest that a machinery is set up by the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, to go into such questions in regard to entries in the mutation register and consequently in regard to entries in the record of rights. As against this the Land Reforms Tribunal cannot assume power to go into these questions. If it does so, the right of appeal that is available to the aggrieved party by virtue of the KLR Act, 1964, would be lost. All these aspects have been ignored by the Land Tribunal in question.

Moreover, it is to be particularly noticed that there was no dispute in regard to the entry in Column 12(2) of the pahani columns of record of rights because the only person to dispute namely respondent-2 had sent a letter to the Tribunal stating that the petitioner had cultivated the land as a tenant and he had no objection for the registration of occupancy right in favour of the petitioner.

In view of the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. The Tribunal is directed to hold a fresh enquiry into the claim of the petitioner and dispose of the same according to law.

No order as to costs.

Sri Venkatachaliah, Govt Pleader, is permitted to file memo, of appearance within two weeks from this day. [1978](1)kar.l.j. 302

Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act (11 of 1959), Sec. 14A - Constitutionality - Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1)(c), (g), 31(1) & (2) - Amalagamation of societies under Sec. 14A - Principle of audi alteram partem, if applies - Validity of order.

Per Curiam: Section 14A of the Act providing for amalgamation of Co-operative Societies is within the competence of the State Legislature under Entry 32 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution.

The most liberal construction must be given to words conferring legislative power.

Co-operative society formed by the process of compulsory amalgamation would not be outside the legislative entry.

Sec. 14A of the Act is not void as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. Sec. 14A has not conferred discretionary power, unguided and uncontrolled. The section not only lays down the policy but also provides safeguards to ensure that the cooperative societies are not dismantled unnecessarily.

The guiding principles provided under Sec. 14A(1) equally govern the action of the Deputy Registrar while constituting the first committee under Sec. 14A(2).

Held that the orders of the Deputy Register directing amalgamation of cooperative societies under Sec. 14A were void:

per Minority: as the principle of aude alteram partem had not been followed.

per Minority: because the same had been made by the Deputy Registrar in a mechanical manner without applying his mind.

per Majority (Jagannatha Shetty, Bopanna & Venkatachala, JJ.) Sec. 14A is not void as offending Art. 19(1)(c) Constitution.

Art. 19(1)(c) guarantees rights to the citizens as such and not to corporate bodies or associations. The Act provides no compulsion for anybody to form a cooperative society nor does it preclude one from going out of his co-operative society. When these two rights are not restricted by the Act it cannot be said that the right under Art. 19(1)(c) has been impaired or infringed.

The process of amalgamation and division or reorganisation of cooperative societies relate only to structural alterations in the corporate bodies and cannot be construed as a restriction on the right under Art. 19(1)(c).

The freedom to form an association under Art. 19(1)(c) does not include the freedom to achieve any object of the association. Amalgamation, compulsive or consensual, pertains to the right of the latter category.

When a co-operative society is compulsorily amalgamated, the entire corporate body is disintegrated and the officers cease to hold their offices. When such serious consequences result from the order of compulsory amalgamation, it is not reasonable to assume that the Legislature in enacting S. 14A has impliedly intended to deny requirements of natural justice.

Such inference cannot be drawn merely from the history of the legislation (by the deletion of the provision for opportunity by Amendment Act 70 of 1976).

Per Malimath & Srinivasa Iyengar, JJ: Merely because an opportunity to the affected person to file his objection is not given and there is no provision for appeal it cannot be said that Sec. 14A is violative of Art. 14 Constitution.

The principle of audi alterm par em has been excluded by the Legislature by necessary implication. The Legislature which had made express provision in this behalf by Act 39 of 1975 has by omitting this provision subsequently by Act 70 of 1976, has expressed its intention to exclude opportunity of hearing being given to the affected societies. Hence the orders made without hearing are not void on that ground.

But an exercise of power arbitrarily can be struck down.

Though some of the guidelines for exercise of power of issuing directions under Sec. 30B may be similar to the guidelines given in Sec. 14A the two provisions operate in two different fields. Therefore it cannot be held that Sec. 14A is violative of Art. 14 Constitution on the ground of dealing with similar situation as under Sec. 30B with different consequences.

Sec. 14A offends Art. 19(1)(c) and is void.

Sec. 14A does not offend Art. 31(1) and (2) Constitution.