Sanju vs State Of Kerala & Anr.

A. Badharudeen, J.

The sole accused in S.C.No.826/2018 on the files of the Special Court for the trial of offences under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (as amended in 2018) (hereinafter referred to as the 'SC/ST(POA) Act' for short), has filed this appeal under Section 14A of the SC/ST(POA) Act, challenging order dated 03.07.2026 in CMP.No.5/2025 in the above case, whereby the regular bail plea at the instance of the appellant was dismissed by the learned Special Judge.

Heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Public Prosecutor in detail. Also heard the learned counsel appearing for the defacto complainant.

Here the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 326A, 307 and 153 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC' for short) and Section 3(2) (v) of the SC/ST(POA) Act, by the appellant/accused.

The prosecution case is that, the appellant/accused, who doesn't belong to either Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community, poured acid on the neck and chest of the defacto complainant, a member of the Scheduled Caste community, at 6 a.m on 07.06.2017, with intention to commit murder of the defacto complainant. Though the defacto complainant survived, he had sustained serious burn injuries.

Before addressing the contentions raised by the respective counsel, it is relevant to note that the order under challenge is one passed in the second application for regular bail filed by the appellant/accused before the Special Court. Earlier also, the appellant/accused filed application, before the Special Court seeking regular bail, which was dismissed. Challenging the same, Crl.Appeal No.2001/2025 was filed before this Court and as per judgment dated 27.11.2025, this Court confirmed the order of the Special Court denying bail. The relevant observations of this Court while dismissing the appeal, set out in paragraphs 6 and 7 are extracted hereunder:

The appellant herein preferred SLP(Crl).No.21188/2025 before the Hon’ble Apex Court challenging the judgment in Crl.Appeal No.2001/2025 and as per order passed by the Apex Court dated 23.04.2026, the SLP also was dismissed. It was thereafter, the second application, which led to passing of the impugned order, was filed before the Special Court.

While assailing the order impugned, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there is change in circumstance to consider the appellant's application for regular bail for the second time. He has pointed out that as per the endorsement in Annexure-Al, copy of his passport, he had departed from CSI Airport, Mumbai, on the date of occurrence itself, and, therefore, he could not commit the crime, as alleged by the prosecution, at 6 p.m on 07.06.2017. It is pertinent to note that, when this Court analysed the prosecution records and the copy of wound certificate, which would show the medical examination of the defacto complainant, at 6.45 a.m and the time of occurrence alleged by the prosecution as in between 5.50 and 6.00 hours, i.e, 5.50 a.m and 6.00 a.m, the learned counsel for the appellant/accused understood the time of occurrence as in between 5.50 a.m and 6.00 a.m and thereby he withdrew the said contention. Then his submission is that, the delay in trial, resulting in incarceration for an indefinite period, would violate the right of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, he has placed decisions of the Apex Court reported in [(2012) 4 SCC 134], Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another and [(2024) 9 SCC 813], Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra and another. According to him, non framing of charge, violation of speedy trial and probability of conclusion of trial in near future are factors that cannot be overlooked while considering the grant of bail to a person who has been in custody for a long period.

The learned Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed these contentions, highlighting the dismissal of the earlier bail application and its confirmation by this Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court to contend that, no change in circumstance could be found. It is pointed out that, the ratio in Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta's case (supra) and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh's case (supra) have no application in this case. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, after filing of the final report, a further investigation was conducted and the report thereof had already been filed. Therefore, the trial would be expedited. According to him, the appellant/accused has been in custody from 08.10.2025 onwards and he has been in custody only for ten months. It is specifically pointed out that, the accused is a person, who had absconded after committing the crime for a period of about 5 years, and having criminal antecedents. It is also pointed out that, when the accused, who had been absconding for about five years after committing the crime, was apprehended in connection with another crime, his arrest in the present crime was recorded by issuance of production warrant. Therefore, if he would be released on bail, he would definitely flee from trial and, that apart, no change in circumstance to be found, to consider his second bail application, particularly after the dismissal of his earlier bail application, which was confirmed by this Court as well as by the Apex Court.

The learned counsel for the defacto complainant submitted that, when the illicit relationship between the appellant/accused and the wife of the defacto complainant was questioned, the accused committed this heinous crime by pouring acid on his neck and chest of the de facto complainant, thereby causing severe trauma and injuries. She submitted further that the defacto complainant has been suffering from the trauma and his condition after the occurrence is so pathetic. Therefore, the learned counsel for the defacto complainant zealously opposed grant of bail to the accused contending that, in order to ensure fair and timely trial, he must be detained in custody during the period of trial, otherwise the life of the defacto complainant would also be in peril, as the accused in all probability would assault and vanish him with a view to screen the vital evidence from his mouth.

Going through the history espoused hereinabove, in fact, the change in circumstance on the premise that the accused departed from the CSI Airport, Mumbai, on 07.06.2017, after committing the crime at 6 p.m on the same day, is an impossibility, when the learned counsel for the appellant was convinced of the fact that the crime was committed in between 5.50 a.m and 6.00 a.m, he himself withdrew the said contention. Apart from that, he has pointed out the above said decisions of the Apex Court to seek bail pointing out the delay in framing charge and the delay in trial. Here, as pointed out by both sides, after filing the final report, prosecution sought permission to conduct further investigation and that was granted by the Special Court. Thereafter, further investigation was conducted; as of now supplementary final report also was filed before the Special Court and now the Special Court is at liberty to frame charges and effectuate the trial.

Here the accused is a person, who committed a crime in between 5.50 a.m and 6.00 a.m on 07.06.2017 and left for foreign country on the same day and absconded for a period of 5 years, stalling proper investigation and trial of the case. The prosecution records would show that he has criminal antecedents and in one among the said crimes, he was arrested and during this period, by issuing production warrant his arrest was recorded and has been detained in custody from 08.10.2025 and he is in custody for the last ten months.

If the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the defacto complainant to the effect that, the accused, who had illicit relationship with the wife of the defacto complainant, assaulted the defacto complainant by pouring acid on his neck and chest, with a view to do away him, though the said attempt was not fully succeeded, as the defacto complainant survived, the likelyhood of damage to the defacto complainant is very much there. That apart, he had absconded for a period of 5 years to screen himself from the process of law. In such a case, if the accused would be released from jail, he would flee from trial. Most importantly, no change in circumstance forthcoming to consider his second bail application. As far as the decision pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, the ratio therein are the general principles governing grant of bail. But the general principles must have exceptions in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case. When considering the bail plea of an absconding accused, who absconded for a period of 5 years after committing serious crime and having criminal antecedents, general principles would not stand in the way of denying bail, where the paramount consideration is whether the accused’s presence for trial could be ensured in the event of release of the accused on bail. On analysing the facts and circumstances of the case, where the accused subjected the defacto complainant with acid attack and thereby caused serious burn injuries, this case is one which would surmount out of the general principles, to avoid the accused from escaping trial and to ensure that no further harm would be caused to the defacto complainant, a victim of acid assault (offence under Section 326A of IPC).

In such view of the matter, the bail plea raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused for the second time, without any change of circumstances, could not be considered and thus the order impugned is liable to be confirmed.

Accordingly, the Appeal stands dismissed.

Registry is directed to forward a copy of this appeal to the Special Court, Mannarkkad, for information.