High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 09 P&H CK 0517

Sanjeev Kumar vs State of Haryana

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 7 September 2026 · Citation: 2026:PHHC:125188

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sumeet Goel, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
CRM-M-50384-2026

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Judgment

30 paragraphs · 2,684 words

SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)

1.

The present petition is the second attempt under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the BNSS’) for grant of pre-arrest/anticipatory bail to the petitioner in case FIR No.153 dated 08.04.2026, registered under Sections 115, 3(5), 333 & 351(2) of BNS, 2023 at Police Station Shahabad, District Kurukshetra.

The petitioner alongwith co-accused had earlier applied for grant of pre-arrest/anticipatory bail before this Court which stands dismissed as withdrawn on 06.07.2026 qua him. The relevant part of said order reads as under:-

“2.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, at the outset, seeks to withdraw the petition in hand qua petitioner No.1- Sanjeev Kumar.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx

To clarify, the petition in hand stands dismissed as withdrawn qua petitioner No.1 – Sanjeev Kumar.”

2.

The gravamen of the allegations, as reflectable from the FIR in question, is that on 06.04.2026, the complainant – Sahil was returning home with fodder for his cattle. On the way, the petitioner (herein) and co-accused Sonu met him and started abusing him and stated that they would teach him a lesson that day. Thereafter, when the complainant reached his house, the petitioner and co-accused Sonu allegedly came there in a vehicle, entered the house while carrying sticks in their hands and attacked the complainant and his family members. In the alleged occurrence, the finger of the grandfather’s hand of the complainant got broken and when his grandmother tried to intervene, she was also attacked, due to which her hand got fractured. On these set of allegations, the FIR in question came to be registered and investigation ensued.

3.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated into the FIR in question and the allegations levelled in the FIR are wholly concocted and motivated by prior enmity between the parties. Learned counsel has further iterated that the occurrence was the result of a sudden altercation between persons belonging to the same village. According to learned counsel, in the alleged occurrence, the petitioner has also suffered injuries but his version has not recorded by the police. It has been further contended that the complainant has deliberately suppressed the true and material facts and has falsely implicated the petitioner as the sole aggressor. It has been further contended that there was a delay of 02 days in lodging the FIR, which itself creates serious doubt regarding the prosecution version. It has been further submitted that no recovery is to be effected from the petitioner and, therefore, the custodial interrogation is not required in the factual milieu of the case in hand. Furthermore, the petitioner has clean antecedents; has deep roots in society and there is no likelihood of the petitioner fleeing from justice or tampering with the prosecution evidence. Moreover, the petitioner is ready to join the investigation and hence no useful purpose would be served by sending him behind the bars. On the strength of these submissions, a prayer for grant of anticipatory bail is entreated for.

4.

In oppugnation, learned State counsel (on the strength of advance notice) has vehemently opposed the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner by arguing that the present petition is not maintainable as it is the second petition for grant of anticipatory bail and there exists no substantial change in circumstances. On merits, learned State counsel has opposed the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner by arguing that the petitioner is the main accused as the injuries attributed to him has been subsequently declared grievous in nature. Furthermore, the petitioner has been specifically named in the FIR with clear and direct allegations of having assaulted the complainant and another injured persons with a stick (lathi). Learned State counsel has further iterated that the nature and manner of the occurrence clearly reflects that the petitioner was the main aggressor, who was armed with a lathi with an intention to cause serious injury. Furthermore, the medical evidence on record corroborates the ocular version and reflects multiple injuries, one of which has been declared as grievous in nature. It has been further contended that, weapon of offence in question is yet to be recovered and, therefore, the custodial interrogation of the petitioner is necessary for effective investigation and for unearthing the complete chain of events. Considering the gravity of the offence and the manner in which it was committed, the dismissal of the petition in hand is prayed for.

5.

I have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and have gone through the available record of the case.

6.

It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by this Court in a case titled as Bhisham Singh vs. State of Haryana, 2024(3) RCR(Criminal) 65, relevant whereof reads as under:-

“11.

As an epilogue to the above rumination, the following principles emerge:

I Second/successive anticipatory bail petition(s) filed under Section 438 of Cr.P.C., 1973 is maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.

II Such second/successive anticipatory bail petition(s) is maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.

III For the second/successive anticipatory bail petition(s) to succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice.

IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Accordingly, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such second/successive anticipatory bail petition(s).

V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive anticipatory bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly decipherable from the said order passed.

VI Once a plea for anticipatory bail has been dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution or dismissed on merits by the High Court, no second/successive anticipatory bail petition(s) shall be entertained by a Sessions Court.”

7.

At the outset, it deserves to be noted herein that the earlier order dated 06.07.2026 passed by this Court clearly reflects that the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner(s) had sought permission to withdraw the petition qua petitioner - Sanjeev Kumar, whereas the petition was pressed qua co-accused Sonu. The said statement was recorded in the aforesaid order and the petition was dismissed as withdrawn qua petitioner (herein) accordingly. The instant petition is, therefore, a second attempt to seek the same relief for grant of anticipatory bail. As per the case put forth in the FIR in question, indubitably, serious allegations have been levelled against the petitioner. The allegations in the present case discloses a grave and heinous offence, wherein the petitioner is alleged to have entered the house of the complainant armed with sticks and attacked the grandfather of the complainant on account of which one of the fingers of his hand had broken whereas when the grandmother of the complainant tried to intervene, she was also attacked, causing simple and grievous injuries to both of them. The petitioner has been attributed a direct and active role in the commission of the offence. The allegations are not general or omnibus in nature but discloses a specific act of assault. The plea with regard to the existence of a version and cross-version is a matter that may be examined during the course of trial, however, the same cannot be made a sole ground for grant of anticipatory bail when there are specific and grave allegations. The medical evidence on record corroborates and prima facie establishes that the grandparents of the complainant have suffered grievous injuries and lends support to the prosecution version. The manner in which the alleged assault was carried out demonstrates the violent and aggressive conduct of the petitioner. No cause nay plausible cause has been shown, at this stage, from which it can be deciphered that the petitioner has been falsely implicated into the present FIR. Indubitably, the first petition (for grant of anticipatory bail) preferred by the petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn on 06.07.2026 after considering the material placed on record. Since the dismissal of the earlier petition by this Court, no substantial change in circumstances has been established. Thereafter, in the instant petition i.e. second petition (for grant of anticipatory bail), the petitioner has only reiterated the grounds previously taken (at the time of rejection of the first petition on 06.07.2026). It is well settled that a successive petition for anticipatory bail would be maintainable only if there is a substantial change in circumstances or if substantial new grounds have arisen after the dismissal of the earlier petition. In the present case, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any such material change in circumstances which would justify reconsideration of the matter. A second petition can be considered only if there is a substantial and material change in circumstances after the disposal of the earlier petition.

8.

Furthermore, the plea of version and cross-version is a disputed question of fact which cannot be adjudicated upon while considering a petition for grant of anticipatory bail. It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 BNS, the Court must consider the nature and gravity of the accusation, the role attributed to the accused, the likelihood of fleeing from justice and the possibility of tampering with evidence of influencing witnesses. The scope of consideration of evidence/material at the stage of anticipatory bail is limited and the Court cannot go into the detailed appreciation of evidence or determine its admissibility, which is a matter to be decided during the course of trial. At this stage, there is no material on record to hold that prima facie case is not made out against the petitioner. The plea of false implication on account of previous enmity is vague and unsubstantiated. No material has been placed on record to show existence of any such enmity or motive for false implication. Bald assertions without supporting evidence cannot be made the basis for grant of anticipatory bail. The material which has come on record, including the medical evidence and preliminary investigation, appear to be established a reasonable basis for the accusations. Thus, it is not appropriate to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner, as it would necessarily cause impediment in effective investigation. In State v. Anil Sharma, (1997) 7 SCC 187 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1039], the Supreme Court held as under : (SCC p. 189, para 6)

“6.

We find force in the submission of CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect who is well-ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this, effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful informations and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for, such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible police officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offenders.”

9.

There is another aspect nay vital aspect of the matter which deserves to be addressed by this Court.

The sanctity of the judicial process is predicated upon the principle of finality of judicial orders. While there is no express statutory embargo against the filing of successive applications for anticipatory bail, such a right is not an absolute charter for procedural adventurism. A litigant who approaches the same Court for the same relief, absent any material change in circumstances engages in a stratagem of attrition that is less a pursuit of justice and more an exercise of testing the waters. Such a practice constitutes a classic case of forum shopping, wherein the litigant treats the halls of justice as a laboratory for speculative litigation. By repeatedly knocking on the same door without a fresh cause of action, such a litigant attempt to circumvent the hierarchy of the courts, ignoring the well-settled principle that a party aggrieved by an order must ascend the judicial ladder rather than move horizontally in hopes of a more favourable wind.

9.1

Pertinently, this hit and try methodology is a malady that must be detested by this Court, as it strikes at the very root of judicial propriety. To permit a litigant to treat the dismissal of a prior petition as a mere interlocutory suggestion, rather than an authoritative pronouncement, is to invite judicial anarchy. When a Court is invited to re-evaluate the same facts and the same law previously adjudicated upon, it creates a perilous risk of conflicting orders, thereby eroding the public faith in the consistency and majesty of the law. The judicial time is a precious public resource, and its diversion into the redundant channels of repetitive pleas is a vexatious abuse of process. There is no gainsaying that if there is material change in circumstances the second/subsequent plea ought to be considered on merits thereof, however, if such a second/subsequent plea is based on similar factual milieu, the same ought to be nipped in the bud with an iron hand. Pertinently, such vexatious and virulent attempt(s) by unscrupulous elements, aimed at misusing the process of law and Courts, ought to be detested. The sanctity of the judicial process will be seriously eroded if such attempt(s) is not responded with firmness. A litigant who misuses the process of law or take liberties with the procedural concession should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should be discouraged not to venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency or indulgence. Exemplary costs, in such a situation are inevitable and necessary, so as to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is rather practiced in our Country, there is no premium on such a misplaced adventurism. Accordingly, costs, which ought to be veritable and real time in nature, to be imposed upon the petitioner.

10.

In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:

(i)

The petition in hand is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed with costs of ₹10,000/-, which shall be deposited by the petitioner with Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Kurukshetra within four weeks from today. In case such costs are deposited; CJM, Kurukshetra shall have the same remitted to Haryana State Legal Services Authority, Panchkula. In case, the said costs are not deposited by the petitioner as directed for; the CJM, Kurukshetra is directed to intimate the Deputy Commissioner, Kurukshetra who shall have such costs recovered from the petitioner as the arrears of land revenue and upon realization thereof, the Deputy Commissioner, Kurukshetra shall have the same submitted to CJM, Kurukshetra, for further remittance thereof to Haryana State Legal Services Authority, Panchkula. A compliance report be sent by CJM, Kurukshetra as also Deputy Commissioner, Kurukshetra to this Court accordingly.

(ii)

Registry is directed to transmit a copy of this judgment to CJM, Kurukshetra as also Deputy Commissioner, Kurukshetra for requisite compliance.

(iii)

Any observations made and/or submissions noted hereinabove shall not have any effect on merits of the case and the investigating agency as also the trial Court shall proceed further, in accordance with law, without being influenced with this order.

(iv)

Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.