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Judgment
Date : 29-08-2026 Heard the parties.
The present quashing petition has been preferred to quash the order dated 19-01-2018 as passed by learned ACJM XII, Bhagalpur by which learned Magistrate took cognizance for the offences under section 302, 120(B) of I.P.C., against petitioners.
As per prosecution case on 09.07.2015 at 7 P.M in the evening the husband of the complainant namely, Dhruv Narayan Prasad (now deceased) went to village temple with the petitioner no. 3 and after sometime an alarm was raised that her husband fell down in the well. The dead body was taken out from well and postmortem was done. The complainant raised suspicion against above-named petitioners, that they killed her husband for property.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the post-mortem material relied upon by the petitioners records death on account of asphyxia and shock due to drowning. It is, therefore, urged that the subsequent complaint, alleging commission of murder and criminal conspiracy, presents a version fundamentally inconsistent with the earlier materials. The petitioners contend that the Court must examine the chronology as a whole and not permit the subsequent criminal proceeding to survive merely because allegations of a grave nature have subsequently been made.
It is further submitted that the petitioners have specifically pleaded that the prosecution has emerged from family and property disputes. Reference is made to the circumstances surrounding the parties, the subsequent partition relied upon by the petitioners and the materials generated before the institution of the complaint. The submission is that the criminal process has been invoked after the lapse of considerable time as an instrument for giving a criminal color to an essentially personal and family dispute.
Learned counsel further contends that the earlier enquiry material does not support the subsequent accusation in the manner alleged. The petitioners urge that the learned Magistrate failed to give due weight to the earlier circumstances, the medical material and the explanation consistently advanced on behalf of the accused. According to learned counsel, the impugned order is therefore liable to be interfered with because the basic factual foundation of the accusation itself is rendered doubtful by the documents and circumstances relied upon in the petition.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the circumstances relating to the LIC policy also lend support to the petitioners' contention that the subsequent complaint is an afterthought and has been instituted with an ulterior motive. It is submitted that the LIC policy and the documents connected therewith constitute an important circumstance in relation to the events following the death of the deceased and ought to be considered along with the contemporaneous U.D. proceeding and medical material. According to the petitioners, the LIC-related material, when considered in the overall chronology, creates a serious doubt regarding the subsequent allegations of murder and criminal conspiracy and supports the contention that continuation of the criminal proceeding would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the allegation of a complete and unexplained silence for nearly two years is also not borne out from the record, inasmuch as opposite party no. 2 had addressed a letter to the Superintendent of Police about 25 days after the death of her husband, wherein the occurrence and the allegation of commission of an offence in relation to his death were brought to the notice of the police. It is submitted that this circumstance assumes significance because the allegation of an offence was thus raised substantially earlier than the institution of the complaint case on 28.04.2017. The petitioners contend that the said communication, read with the LIC-related circumstances, the U.D. proceeding, the medical material and the surrounding disputes, materially supports their submission that the later complaint was an afterthought and that the delay is indicative of mala fides.
On the question of delay, learned counsel has
placed reliance upon paragraphs nos. 19, 20 and 21 of Anita Maurya & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. which read as:-
19.Delay in setting the criminal law in motion, when it is deliberate and unexplained, is a circumstance that may itself justify the quashing of the proceeding. In Kishan Singh (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. Gurpal Singh5, this Court observed:
“22.In cases where there is a delay in lodging an FIR, the court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In the absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured version of events. In such cases the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the civil court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
20.This principle has been applied by this Court very recently in Nazibul Rahim Khan v. State of U.P.6, where, this Court while setting aside an order of the same High Court, held that although civil and criminal remedies may co-exist upon the same cause of action, there ought not to be an unreasonable or inordinate gap between the institution of the two, the time-factor being an indicator of whether the criminal proceeding is genuine and bona fide or a mere pressure tactic, and that the complainant is obliged to satisfactorily explain the delay. This Court there expressly approved and applied Kishan Singh (supra).
21.A complaint that suppresses a pre-existing FIR lodged by the accused in respect of the same incident, and that is instituted after such report has ripened into a charge-sheet, bears the hallmark of a retaliatory counterblast. In Anukul Singh v. State of U.P.7, this Court quashed the proceedings, holding that the plea that the case was a retaliatory counter-blast to the proceedings legitimately initiated by the accused carried substantial weight, that a proceeding so maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive falls within categories (1) and (7) of Bhajan Lal (supra), and that the suppression of a material antecedent proceeding is itself indicative of the want of bona fides.
Reliance has also been placed upon para no. 29 and 32 of Manoj Kumar Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh [(2016) 9 SCC 1] to contend that delay assumes legal significance when it forms part of a larger factual matrix pointing towards mala fides, retaliation or abuse of process. Learned counsel submits that the present matter must be tested on that cumulative basis and not by treating the delay as an isolated circumstance.
On the aforesaid premises, it is submitted that continuation of the proceeding would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and that the impugned cognizance order deserves to be quashed.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State and learned counsel appearing for opposite party no. 2 have opposed the application. Their principal submission is that the petitioners seek to convert a proceeding under the quashing jurisdiction into an adjudication upon disputed facts. It is submitted that the Court is being invited to compare the earlier Unnatural Death (hereinafter referred to as U.D.) materials, medical opinion, the defence version and the subsequent complaint and thereafter to record a conclusion as to which version is truthful. Such an exercise, according to the opposite parties, lies beyond the permissible limits of jurisdiction at the stage of cognizance.
It is specifically pointed out that the impugned order itself records that the learned Magistrate considered the solemn affirmation of the complainant and the statements of four enquiry witnesses, namely, Dhiraj Kumar, Niraj Kumar, Richa Kumari and Anil Kumar. After such consideration, learned Magistrate recorded his satisfaction that a prima-facie case was made out under Sections 302 and 120B of IPC. It is, therefore, submitted that this is not a case in which process has been issued mechanically or without reference to the statutory material produced before the Court.
Learned counsel for O.P. No. 2 has placed reliance upon para no. 18 of Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 795], to submit that mere delay in lodging a complaint cannot, by itself, furnish a ground for quashing a criminal proceeding. The significance of delay depends upon the factual setting, and where its explanation or consequences require examination of disputed facts, the High Court should not prematurely terminate the proceeding.
Reliance is further placed upon para no. 37 of Punit Beriwala v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors. [2025 SCC OnLine SC 983], which read as:-
37.It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 795 has held, “The mere delay on the part of the third respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents…..”
It would be appropriate to reproduce the Para Nos. 11, 12, 13 and 15 of State of Karnataka v. Prabhu Shankar & Ors. [2026 SCC OnLine SC 1446], which reads as under:-
11.It is settled law that the power to quash an FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be exercised sparingly and not as a matter of routine. Moreover, when a High Court is entertaining a petition for quashing of FIR, it is to refrain from entering into roving and fishing enquiry about the investigative material. What has to be seen is whether, prima facie, the contents of the FIR disclose any commission of a cognizable offence or not. At this initial stage, a ‘mini-trial’ cannot be conducted by the High Court.
12.In the considered view of this Court, the High Court vide the impugned orders has traversed beyond the contours of consideration of a petition under Section 482, CrPC. There were two material aspects which weighed with the High Court, the delay in lodging of the FIR and no evidence of demand/recovery of money. In our view, there cannot be any doubt that these aspects would have to be established through evidence in the criminal trial or may warrant consideration for discharge. Absence of proof as to demand of illegal gratification and recovery thereof, may become a ground for discharge and/or ultimate acquittal in the trial; however, they cannot become grounds for quashing of the FIR.
13.For this, we advert to the recent exposition of this Court in State v. K. Rangayya11, wherein while setting aside the order of the High Court quashing the FIR, it was observed:
“16.The power to quash an FIR vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”) is an extraordinary and discretionary power, which must be exercised sparingly and with great circumspection. This Court has consistently held that at the stage of considering a petition for quashing an FIR, the Court is not required to examine the merits of the allegations or to evaluate the evidence that may ultimately be led at trial. The sole and limited inquiry at this threshold stage is whether the allegations set out in the FIR, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety as true, prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence against the accused. It is not permissible for the Court to conduct what amounts to a mini-trial by sifting through the evidence, assessing probabilities, or weighing the credibility of witnesses, for these are functions exclusively reserved for the court of trial.
17.In the present case, the High Court, in our considered opinion, has traversed beyond the permissible limits of its jurisdiction under Article 226 in exercising the power under Section 482 CrPC. Rather than confining itself ascertaining as to whether any prima facie case has been made out of commission of offence on the basis of the contents of the FIR, the High Court proceeded to examine the outcome of the trap proceedings, the absence of personal recovery from Respondent No. 1, the result of the phenolphthalein test, and the findings of a departmental enquiry against some of the accused, all of which are matters of evidence to be evaluated at the stage of trial. By undertaking such a detailed examination, the High Court has in effect conducted a mini-trial, which is fundamentally contrary to the settled principles governing the exercise of the quashing jurisdiction. … …
27.Mere demand or solicitation, therefore, by a public servant may amount to commission of an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. The word ‘attempt’ is to imply no more than a mere solicitation, which, again, may be made as effectually in implicit or in explicit terms. This Court further observed therein that “actual exchange of a bribe is not an essential requirement to be prosecuted under this law” and that those public servants who do not take a bribe directly but through middlemen are equally made liable under the provisions of the PC Act, 1988. These observations, though rendered in the context of grant of anticipatory bail in a case involving offence under Section 7 of the PC act, firmly reflect the legislative policy pervading the PC Act that an attempt to obtain undue advantage whether for oneself or for another, and whether directly or through intermediaries is equally culpable under Section 7 read with Explanation 2 of the Act. The Respondent No. 1's implicit yet unmistakable direction to the Complainant to provide illegal gratification to his subordinate police officials as disclosed in the records thus falls squarely within the scope of “attempt to obtain” an “undue advantage” “for another person,” as contemplated by Explanation 2(i) to Section 7 of the PC Act. The fact that the Respondent No. 1 may not personally have received or even intended to receive any part of the illegal gratification is entirely immaterial to the establishment of the offence at the stage of prima facie inquiry, by reason of the express statutory language of Explanation 2 to Section 7 of the PC Act.” (emphasis supplied)
15.Similarly, on the aspect of delay in lodging of the FIR, this Court in Punit Beriwala v. State of NCT of Delhi12 observed:
“37.It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 795 : (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 294 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 709 has held, “The mere delay on the part of the third respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents…..”
Learned counsel has also referred to Deo Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2026 SCC OnLine SC 1339], particularly para nos. 51, 55, 60, 63 and 64 which read as:-
51.More recently, in Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala23, this Court reiterated that prompt transmission of the FIR to the jurisdictional Magistrate is not a mere procedural formality but a vital safeguard intended to ensure fairness and transparency in the investigative process. The Court observed that the FIR is the document which sets the criminal law in motion and constitutes a valuable piece of evidence for corroborating the prosecution version. Prompt forwarding thereof to the Magistrate serves the salutary purpose of eliminating the possibility of ante-dating, ante-timing, embellishment or subsequent interpolation of facts and enables the Magistrate to effectively exercise the supervisory jurisdiction contemplated under the CrPC. It was further held that although mere delay in forwarding the FIR is not, by itself, fatal to the prosecution case, such delay assumes significance where the surrounding circumstances indicate the possibility of manipulation, deliberation, consultation or introduction of a coloured version of events. In such cases, the effect of the delay has to be assessed cumulatively along with the other attendant circumstances appearing on record. Relevant extract from the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:—
“28.The jurisdictional Magistrate plays a pivotal role during the investigation process. It is meant to make the investigation just and fair. The investigating officer is to keep the Magistrate in the loop of his ongoing investigation. The object is to avoid a possible foul play. The Magistrate has a role to play under Section 159 CrPC.
29.The first information report in a criminal case starts the process of investigation by letting the criminal law into motion. It is certainly a vital and valuable aspect of evidence to corroborate the oral evidence. Therefore, it is imperative that such an information is expected to reach the jurisdictional Magistrate at the earliest point of time to avoid any possible ante-dating or ante-timing leading to the insertion of materials meant to convict the accused contrary to the truth and on account of such a delay may also not only get bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, there is also a danger creeping in by the introduction of a coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. However, a mere delay by itself cannot be a sole factor in rejecting the prosecution's case arrived at after due investigation. Ultimately, it is for the court concerned to take a call. Such a view is expected to be taken after considering the relevant materials.”
55.If these circumstances are cumulatively considered, two possibilities emerge. The first possibility is that the assault on the deceased-and occurred at a later point of time. The second possibility is that, even if the occurrence did take place on 28th June, 1977, none of the so-called eye-witnesses were present at the place of occurrence when the deceased-victim was assaulted, and the incident came to light only subsequently, upon the discovery of the dead body lying at the scene on the following day.
60.Once a reasonable doubt arises regarding the presence of the alleged eye-witnesses and the truthfulness of the prosecution version regarding the genesis and timing of the occurrence, the very substratum of the prosecution case stands eroded. The entire edifice of the prosecution story, being founded upon the testimony of these witnesses, stands breached and cannot be sustained. The trial Court as well as the High Court fell in error in overlooking these vital infirmities and in relying upon the highly doubtful testimony of the so-called eye-witnesses to affirm the guilt of the accused-appellants. Consequently, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt and they are entitled to the benefit thereof.
63.63. Resultantly, Criminal Appeal No. 239 of 2013, to the extent it relates to appellant-Accused No. 6 (Subedar), Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 2013 and Criminal Appeal No. 236 of 2013, are allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 3rd June, 1981 passed by the trial Court, as affirmed by the judgment dated 20th November, 2011 passed by the High Court are hereby set aside.
64.The surviving accused-appellants, i.e., Accused No. 2 (Hira Lal), Accused No. 3 (Raj Bux) and Accused No. 6 (Subedar) are acquitted of all charges. Since appellant-Accused No. 3 (Raj Bux) and appellant-Accused No. 6 (Subedar) are already on bail, their bail bonds shall stand discharged and they shall not be required to surrender. Insofar as appellant-Accused No. 2 (Hira Lal) is concerned, he has already been released pursuant to remission granted by the competent authority and, therefore, no further directions are calle
It is further submitted by learned counsel for O.P. No. 2 that the chronology cannot be treated as a case of complete inaction. Specific reliance is placed upon paragraph 6 of the Supplementary Counter Affidavit, wherein it is stated that, at the material time, opposite party no. 2 was in a state of nervous shock and unconsciousness and had lost her frame of mind, and was not in a position voluntarily to submit any petition either to the police or to the Branch Manager, LIC, Branch No. 2, on 09.07.2015. It is further stated that, taking advantage of her condition, her elder son and cousin obtained her signature on a blank paper on the assurance that appropriate action would be taken, which was thereafter alleged learned counsel for opposite party no. 2, in reply to the contention regarding the alleged two-year delay, utilized for presenting a different version of the death and for registration of the U.D. case. So far as the letter to the Superintendent of Police, stated by the petitioners to have been made about 25 days after the death, is concerned, learned counsel submits that the existence, contents and evidentiary significance of such communication cannot by themselves conclude the factual controversy as to the circumstances in which the subsequent complaint came to be instituted. So far as the LIC policy is concerned, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 has specifically controverted the reliance placed by the petitioners upon the LIC documents. Attention of the Court is drawn to paragraph 7 of the Supplementary Counter Affidavit, wherein it is stated that the document forming part of Annexure-4 series, said to contain the application of opposite party no. 2, does not reflect any date and, further, that the LIC status relating to the policy number is different from the policy which has been mentioned in the application. It is, therefore, submitted that the LIC documents themselves disclose discrepancies and that the questions relating to the identity of the policy, the alleged application, its date and authenticity, and the circumstances in which the document came into existence are matters requiring factual examination and cannot furnish a ground for quashing the criminal proceeding at the threshold.
Having considered the rival submissions, this Court is required to examine the challenge in its proper legal setting. The petitioners challenge an order of cognizance. The Court is not called upon, at this stage, to determine whether the petitioners are guilty or innocent, nor is it called upon to determine whether the prosecution will ultimately be able to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The narrower, though important, question is whether the materials which were available before the learned Magistrate were such that the continuation of the proceeding can be said to be a patent abuse of process, or whether the case discloses a prima-facie foundation requiring adjudication in accordance with law.
Criminal jurisprudence recognizes a distinction between the different stages of the criminal process. At the stage of cognizance or issuance of process, the Court does not conduct a final trial upon the accusation. The law requires a threshold judicial satisfaction that sufficient ground exists to proceed. The standard applicable at that stage cannot be equated with the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, which governs a final determination of guilt.
This distinction has a constitutional dimension as well. The liberty of an individual is of fundamental importance and the criminal process cannot be permitted to become an instrument of oppression, vengeance or harassment. The jurisdiction to quash exists precisely to ensure that a prosecution which is plainly without legal foundation, demonstrably mala fide or otherwise amounting to abuse of process does not continue merely because formal allegations have been made. At the same time, the constitutional commitment to the rule of law requires that a criminal accusation supported by prima-facie material should not be prematurely extinguished by converting the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court into a substitute for the statutory process of adjudication.
The balance is therefore delicate. Protection of the accused against arbitrary prosecution is an essential facet of criminal justice. Equally, the presumption of innocence cannot be understood as creating a presumption that every accusation is false until the accused has been required to face the process prescribed by law. The presumption protects against punishment without proof; it does not eliminate the lawful stages through which a criminal allegation must be examined where sufficient prima-facie material exists.
It is in this background that the submission relating to delay has to be examined. There can be no dispute that delay in setting the criminal law in motion may be relevant. Delay may, depending upon the facts, cast doubt upon the spontaneity or genuineness of the accusation. In an appropriate case, where the delay is wholly unexplained and the undisputed chronology unmistakably reveals a retaliatory or malafide institution such circumstance may assume considerable significance.
The petitioners have relied upon Anita Maurya case (supra). The principle emerging from the submission founded on that decision is that the Court is not required to close its eyes to an extraordinary and unexplained chronology merely because a criminal complaint contains allegations constituting an offence. Where the facts themselves unmistakably demonstrate abuse, the power of quashing remains available.
However, the applicability of that principle depends upon the factual matrix before the Court. The law cannot be understood to mean that every complaint filed after lapse of time is necessarily an abuse of process. Delay is a circumstance; its legal consequence depends upon the explanation, the surrounding facts, the nature of the allegations and the stage at which the Court is required to examine the controversy.
The proposition relied upon by O.P. no. 2 Skoda Auto Volkswagen case (supra) is, therefore, equally material. Mere delay, standing by itself, does not provide a universal ground for quashing. The legal inquiry is more nuanced: whether the delay, together with the material which can legitimately be examined at the threshold, demonstrates such patent abuse that continuation of the proceeding would itself be unjust.
The question of delay also cannot be considered by ignoring the circumstance, relied upon by the petitioners, that opposite party no. 2 addressed a letter to the Superintendent of Police about 25 days after the death of her husband, wherein the occurrence and the allegation of commission of an offence in relation to his death were brought to the notice of the police. The said circumstance is relevant while examining the petitioners' contention that the accusation was raised only after an unexplained lapse of nearly two years. The fact that an allegation of an offence was communicated to the police within about 25 days of the death is a circumstance which cannot be wholly brushed aside while considering whether the later complaint was an entirely belated invention.
At the same time, the evidentiary effect of the aforesaid letter and the circumstances in which it came to be made have to be assessed in the light of the specific stand taken by opposite party no. 2 in paragraph 6 of the Supplementary Counter Affidavit. Thus, the record discloses a factual controversy: on the one hand, the petitioners rely upon the earlier communication to the Superintendent of Police to contend that the allegation of an offence was raised much before the complaint of 2017; on the other hand, opposite party no. 2 disputes having voluntarily submitted any petition to the police on 09.07.2015 and explains her condition immediately after the death by referring to nervous shock and unconsciousness. Such rival assertions, rather than establishing a patent abuse on the face of the record, make the question of delay and the subsequent development of the prosecution version matters requiring appropriate evidentiary adjudication.
Thus, there is no irreconcilable conflict between the authorities relied upon by the respective sides. Anita Maurya case (supra) and Manoj Kumar Sharma case (supra) emphasis that delay may assume decisive importance where it forms part of circumstances demonstrating mala-fides or abuse. Skoda Auto Volkswagen case (supra), Punit Beriwala case (supra) and Prabhu Shankar case (supra) emphasize that the High Court cannot treat delay as a mechanical ground for quashing or use quashing jurisdiction for deciding disputed questions which require evidentiary examination.
The present case has to be located on that legal spectrum. The petitioners ask this Court to rely upon the earlier U.D. proceeding, the medical material, the alleged enquiry report and the surrounding family circumstances to conclude that the subsequent complaint is necessarily false. O.P. no. 2, on the other hand, relies upon the complaint, solemn affirmation and enquiry witness statements which were considered by the learned Magistrate. The Court is thus faced with competing factual narratives.
The difficulty with the petitioners' submission is that acceptance of their contention would require this Court to do more than examine the legal sufficiency of the complaint. It would require the Court to hold that the defence explanation regarding accidental drowning is correct and that the later allegations cannot be true. It would further require an evaluation of the evidentiary effect of the post-mortem material vis-à-vis the oral allegations and statements recorded in the complaint enquiry.
Such a comparative exercise is not ordinarily permissible at the stage of quashing. A document or circumstance relied upon by an accused may undoubtedly be relevant at the appropriate stage. Yet the mere existence of an alternative explanation cannot, without more, result in the prosecution version being judicially declared false at the threshold. The quashing Court does not sit as a trial court to decide which of two competing versions is more probable.
The impugned cognizance order assumes significance in this context. It specifically records consideration of the solemn affirmation of the complainant and the statements of four enquiry witnesses. The learned Magistrate thereafter recorded a prima-facie satisfaction regarding the commission of offences under Sections 302 and 120B IPC. The order may not contain an elaborate judgment on evidence, nor is such a judgment required at the stage of cognizance; but the record, as reflected in the order, demonstrates that the statutory material was considered before process was directed to be issued.
This Court is not persuaded that the impugned order can be characterized as mechanical merely because the petitioners rely upon materials which, according to them, lead to a different conclusion. A judicial order at the cognizance stage is not rendered vulnerable simply because the accused can point to circumstances requiring further examination. The question is whether the material before the Magistrate was capable of giving rise to a prima-facie satisfaction. On the present record, it cannot be said that the answer is plainly in the negative.
The submission concerning the post-mortem report also cannot be accepted in the absolute form urged by the petitioners. Medical evidence is an important component of criminal adjudication, but its ultimate evidentiary value is ordinarily assessed in the context of the entire body of evidence. Whether the medical opinion supports, contradicts or leaves room for the prosecution version is a matter which may require a fuller evidentiary assessment. This Court cannot, in the present jurisdiction, isolate the medical material and treat it as conclusively determining all the factual issues raised by the complaint.
The same principle applies to the earlier U.D. proceeding and the enquiry material relied upon by the petitioners. The fact that an earlier proceeding or enquiry proceeded on a particular factual understanding does not automatically render a later complaint non est. Whether the earlier and later materials can be reconciled, whether a material fact emerged subsequently, whether the witnesses are credible, and which version deserves acceptance are matters that may involve examination of evidence.
This is precisely where the distinction between suspicion sufficient to initiate a lawful process and proof sufficient to sustain conviction becomes relevant. At the stage of final adjudication, the prosecution must discharge the burden required by criminal law. The petitioners are entitled to test the prosecution evidence in accordance with law. They may challenge the credibility of witnesses, the consistency of their statements, the effect of medical evidence and the allegation of conspiracy. But those rights are not defeated merely because the proceeding is allowed to continue; rather, they are exercised through the procedural safeguards built into the criminal process.
The reliance upon Punit Beriwala case (supra) and Prabhu Shankar case (supra) is therefore apposite to the limited extent that this Court must resist an invitation to undertake a mini-trial. The extraordinary jurisdiction is not intended to decide the reliability of witnesses, weigh the strength of medical evidence against oral testimony, or pronounce upon disputed allegations of motive and mala fides where those questions are not capable of resolution solely from undisputed material.
Manoj Kumar Sharma case (supra) does not compel a contrary conclusion. The relevance of delay must be assessed with reference to the entire factual setting of the case in which the Court is asked to exercise jurisdiction. A precedent where delay, together with the particular circumstances of that case, was considered sufficient to disclose abuse cannot be applied by removing the proposition from its factual foundation.
Similarly, the principle relied upon from Anita Maurya case (supra) is not to be diluted; this Court remains conscious that quashing jurisdiction must be exercised where the record itself demonstrates that the criminal law is being used for a purpose foreign to the administration of justice. However, the present record does not permit such a definitive conclusion without first deciding disputed factual questions. The allegation of family and property dispute is itself part of the defence narrative which requires factual examination in the context of the allegations made by the complainant.
The contention relating to the LIC policy also cannot be conclusively determined in the present jurisdiction. The petitioners seek to rely upon the LIC-related documents as a circumstance supporting their version regarding the events immediately following the death. Opposite party no. 2, however, has specifically disputed the documents relied upon and, in paragraph 7 of the Supplementary Counter Affidavit, has pointed out that the document forming part of Annexure-4 series, stated to contain her application, does not reflect any date and that the LIC status relating to the policy number is different from the policy number mentioned in the application. These rival assertions disclose a factual dispute concerning the identity of the policy, the date and nature of the alleged application and the evidentiary significance of the LIC records. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction for quashing of the criminal proceeding, cannot undertake an enquiry into the authenticity, correctness or evidentiary worth of such disputed documents. The LIC material may be tested at the appropriate stage in accordance with law; the alleged discrepancy, however, cannot at this stage be treated as conclusively demolishing the prosecution case.
The submissions founded on Deo Prasad case (supra) likewise require delay to be assessed contextually. The Court cannot adopt either of two extremes. It would be erroneous to say that delay is always immaterial; it would be equally erroneous to say that a particular period of delay automatically nullifies the criminal process. The judicial task is to determine whether, at the stage and on the materials available, delay demonstrates patent abuse. In the present matter, that conclusion cannot be reached without an impermissible adjudication upon disputed facts.
The cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances also deserves consideration. The letter addressed by opposite party no. 2 to the Superintendent of Police about 25 days after the death, as relied upon by the petitioners, is a circumstance bearing upon the question whether the allegation of an offence was raised only in the complaint of 2017. Equally, the LIC documents relied upon by the petitioners are specifically disputed by opposite party no. 2 in paragraph 7 of the Supplementary Counter Affidavit on the grounds that the document forming part of Annexure-4 series is undated and that the LIC status relating to the policy number is different from the policy number mentioned in the application. These circumstances, when read with the explanation contained in paragraph 6 of the Supplementary Counter Affidavit regarding the condition of opposite party no. 2 immediately after the death and the alleged obtaining of her signature on a blank paper, demonstrate that the chronology and the documents relied upon by the respective sides raise disputed questions of fact. Such circumstances cannot be converted into a definitive finding either that the prosecution is an afterthought or that the defence version is conclusively established. Rather, they reinforce the conclusion that the matter requires adjudication in accordance with law and that the extraordinary jurisdiction ought not to be invoked for conducting a mini-trial.
The fact that the allegation concerns an offence under Section 302 IPC also does not alter the legal standard in favour of either side. The seriousness of the accusation cannot be used as a reason to deny relief where the proceeding is demonstrably abusive. Conversely, the seriousness of the charge does not disappear from the legal landscape merely because the accused disputes the factual foundation. The same controlling question remains: whether a prima-facie case exists and whether the case falls within the exceptional category requiring interference at the threshold.
On an overall consideration of the material, this Court is unable to hold that the petitioners have demonstrated a case of patent illegality, manifest mala fide or abuse of process which would justify quashing the cognizance order. The contentions regarding delay, accidental death, the earlier U.D. proceeding, the medical material and family dispute constitute matters which may have substantial relevance during further proceedings. Their relevance, however, cannot be transformed into a conclusive adjudication in favour of the petitioners at this stage.
The learned Magistrate considered the solemn affirmation and the statements of enquiry witnesses before recording prima-facie satisfaction. This Court does not find from the impugned order and the material presently available that the cognizance order suffers from such patent perversity, legal infirmity or non-application of mind as would warrant interference in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction.
It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the ultimate truth of the allegations. Equally, no observation made herein shall be treated as curtailing the right of the petitioners to raise all legally permissible objections and defences before the court of competent jurisdiction at the appropriate stage. The trial court, if the matter proceeds to that stage, shall examine the evidence independently and uninfluenced by any observation contained in the present Judgment. The petitioners shall, however, remain at liberty to raise all such contentions, including those relating to the delay, the letter addressed to the Superintendent of Police, and the LIC policy documents, at the appropriate stage of the proceedings, including at the time of consideration of discharge, before the concerned court, in accordance with law.
For the reasons aforesaid, this Court finds no merit in the present application. There is no occasion to interfere with impugned order dated 19.01.2018.
Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed.
Let the copy of judgment be communicated to the learned trial court forthwith, with TCR, if any.