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Judgment
L. Narasimha Reddy, J
The applicant is an IAS officer of the AGMUT cadre. The controlling authority of that cadre is separately constituted under Section 3(1) of the All India Services Act, 1951, read with rule 4(1) of the All India Services (Joint Cadre) Rules, 1972. Such an authority was constituted for AGMUT cadre on 25.04.1995.
Proceedings were initiated against the applicant by CBI in the year 2015. He was arrested on 08.12.2015 and was in police custody for a period, exceeding 48 hours. Therefore, he was placed under suspension by the competent authority on 22.12.2015 under sub-rules (2) and (3) of rule 3 of the All India Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1969. The suspension was extended twice on 04.03.2016 and 02.09.2016. At that stage, the applicant filed an appeal before the DoP&T. The appeal was not accepted and the suspension was extended for third time through order dated 02.03.2017. The appeal preferred in this regard for the second time was rejected on 06.06.2017. Thereupon, the applicant filed OA No.2320/2017 challenging the order of suspension, as well as rejection of the appeal.
During pendency of OA No.2320/2017, the disciplinary authority of the applicant issued charge-sheet dated 10.11.2017. Shortly thereafter, an order compulsorily retiring the applicant, in exercise of powers under ruled 16 (3) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 (for short, DCRB Rules), was passed on 17.01.2018. OA No.324/2018 is filed against the said order.
The applicant contends that whatever may have been the justification in placing him under suspension on 22.12.2015, there was absolutely no basis for continuing the same beyond 180 days. He contends that whether one goes by the principle underlying the provisions of Cr.PC in the context of filing charge-sheet, or the ones governing phenomenon of suspension of a Government employee, extension for such a long time was totally unjustified. He placed reliance upon certain decided cases on this aspect.
As regards the order of compulsory retirement, the applicant contends that the procedure prescribed under the DCRB Rules for this purpose was not followed. He contends that once the disciplinary proceedings were initiated, they ought to have been taken to their logical conclusion, and taking recourse to the procedure under the DCRB Rules was uncalled for. He further contends that the Joint Cadre Authority (for short, JCA) and the Review Committee were not constituted in accordance with rules, and thereby the entire proceedings leading to the order of compulsory retirement are vitiated. It is also stated that the exercise undertaken by the Review Committee is contrary to law and facts.
The respondents filed detailed counter affidavits in both the OAs. It is stated that when the applicant was functioning as Principal Secretary, Department of Welfare of SC/ST/OBC/Minorities Commission, Government of NCT of Delhi, himself and his PA Mr. Ramesh demanded bribe of Rs.1.10 lakhs for clearing the bills of 55 guards put on duty by M/s Bishwas Security Services, on outsourcing basis for each month, and a complaint in this behalf was received from the agency on 07.12.2015. It is also stated that after complying with all the procedural requirements, CBI laid a trap on 08.12.2015, in which the applicant was caught red-handed accepting a bribe of Rs.2.20 lakhs, and that in turn resulted in arrest of the applicant. The respondents contend that the suspension had to be extended from time to time on account of pendency of the criminal case, and the gravity of the charge, and the appointing authority did not feel it appropriate to reinstate the applicant. It is stated that the order passed by the authority rejecting the appeal is in accordance with law.
In the counter affidavit filed in OA No.324/2018, it is stated that a well considered decision was taken to invoke the provisions of the DCRB Rules, having regard to the background of the applicant, and the order of compulsory retirement was passed. It is also stated that the allegation that the JCA and the Review Committee were not properly constituted is incorrect. The respondents contend that the fact that the applicant was involved in a case of criminal misconduct under the Prevention of Corruption Act, and several objectionable acts on the part of the applicant were taken into account, and other vigilance cases that were initiated against him, were taken note of.
The applicant filed rejoinder disputing the contents of the counter affidavit on many aspects.
Arguments on behalf of the applicant were advanced by the learned Senior Counsel Shri U. K. Uniyal. He contends that though the order of suspension was passed in view of the arrest of the applicant, the respondents were not justified in extending it repeatedly, and that the same is opposed to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in several judgments. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that at a time when OA No.2320/2017 was about to be taken up for hearing, the respondents suddenly took recourse to the procedure under rule 16 of the DCRB Rules, compulsorily retiring the applicant from service. He contends that since the applicant belongs to AGMUT cadre, consultation was required to be made with the JCA, and in the instant case such an Authority was constituted in contravention of the prescribed procedure. It is also his case that the illegality that had occurred in the process of constitution of the JCA, has crept into formation of the Review Committee also, and the entire proceedings are vitiated. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the exercise undertaken by the Review Committee is contrary to the stipulated procedure and decided cases, and that several factors which were not immediately relevant, were taken into account while forming the opinion. He placed reliance upon certain precedents.
Shri Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that continuance of the suspension of the applicant beyond 180 days was warranted on account of the gravity of the allegation, and the crime in which he figures as accused. He contends that the Central Government is conferred with the power under the DCRB Rules to compulsorily retire an officer, if circumstances so warrant. According to the learned counsel, the JCA was constituted strictly in accordance with the relevant rules, and the Review Committee was also formed as per the prescribed procedure. By making reference to the minutes of the Review Committee, the learned counsel submits that relevant factors alone were taken into consideration, and on an objective assessment, it was decided to compulsorily retire the applicant.
OA No.2320/2017 filed against the order of suspension is earlier in point of time. However, in view of the fact that the applicant has been compulsorily retired during the pendency of the OA, and instituted separate OA No.324/2018 challenging the order of compulsory retirement, we feel it appropriate to undertake discussion in the second OA.
The applicant has been compulsorily retired by invoking rule 16(3) of the DCRG Rules, through order dated 17.01.2018. By itself, the order does not spell out any reasons. It refers to the relevant provisions which were invoked in this behalf. The order reads as under:
"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule 3 of Rule 16 of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1958, the President in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs hereby requires Shri Sanjay Pratap Singh, IAS (AGMUT:84), a member of the Indian Administrative Service, borne on the cadre of AGMUT (AGMU:84) who has completed 25 years of service and already attained 50 years of age, to retire from service in public interest, with immediate effect by giving three months matters pay and allowances in lieu of notice.
A cheque for a sum approximate to the aggregate amount of his pay and allowances for a period of three months is enclosed.
By order and in the name of the President."
In effect, three grounds are urged by the applicant in his challenge to the said order. The first is that it was passed at a time when the OA filed challenging the order of suspension was about to be taken up for hearing. The second ground is that the consultation process, which is required to be undertaken before taking recourse to rule 16(3) of the DCRB Rules, is totally defective, inasmuch as the constitution of the JCA was not as per the relevant provisions of law. The third ground of attack is that the constitution of the Review Committee was not proper, and the exercise undertaken by it cannot be supported either on facts or in law. Here itself, it needs to be mentioned that grounds 2 and 3 have separate facets of their own.
We proceed to examine the first ground. As long as the power of the Central Government to invoke rule 16(3) of the DCRB Rules is not disputed, the mere fact that the order was passed at a time when the OA challenging the order of suspension was pending, does not make much of difference. As a matter of fact, both the aspects are separate and independent. When rule 16(3) of the said Rules can be invoked against an officer who is not even facing any disciplinary proceedings, it is incomprehensible to assume that steps of that nature cannot be taken when disciplinary proceedings are pending, or when the OA in which the order of suspension is challenged, is pending.
The second ground is about the consultation process, which, in turn, is traceable to the very constitution of the JCA. Rule 16(3) of the DCRB Rules reads as under:
"16(3) The Central Government may, in consultation with the State Government concerned, require a member of the service to retire from service in public interest after giving such Member at least three month's previous notice in writing or three month's pay and allowances in lieu of such notice, -
(i) after the review when such Member completes 15 years of qualifying Service; or
(ii) after the review when such Member completes 25 years of qualifying Service or attains the age of 50 years, as the case may be, or
(iii) If the review referred to in (i) or (ii) above has not been conducted after the review of any other time as the Central Government deems fit in respect of such Member." For taking a decision under this rule, the participation of the Central Government as well as the State Government becomes necessary. For the AGMUT cadre, it is the JCA which replaces the State Government. This is evident from rule 2(1)(m) of the said Rules, which reads as under:
"2(1)(m) "State Government" means the State Government on whose cadre the member of the Service was borne immediately before retirement or death and in relation to a member of an All India Service borne on a joint cadre, the joint cadre Authority."
The manner in which the JCA is to be constituted is dealt with under Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951, read with rule 4(1) of the All India Services (Joint Cadre) Rules, 1972. Gazette notification dated 25.04.1995 was issued by the Government of India, Department of Personnel and Training in this behalf. For the sake of convenience, the notification is reproduced hereunder:
"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951 (61 of 1951), read with sub-rule (1) of rule 4 of the All India Services (Joint Cadre) Rules, 1972, the Central Government in consultation with the Government of States concerned hereby constitutes the Joint Cadre Authority for the Indian Administrative Service, Indian Police Service and Indian Forest Service Joint Cadres of Arunachal Pradesh-Goa-Mizoram-Union Territories, as below:-
Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs (representing Union Territories in respect of the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service)
Chief Secretary, Arunachal Pradesh
Chief Secretary, Goa
Chief Secretary, Mizoram
Chief Secretary, Delhi
Inspector General of Forests, Ministry of Environment and Forests (representing Union Territories in respect of the Indian Forest Service).
Joint Secretary (Union Territories Division) Ministry of Home Affairs (Convener in respect of the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service)/Joint Secretary (in charge of Indian Forest Service Cadre Management), Ministry of Environment and Forests (Convener in respect of Indian Forest Service)."
Though the applicant contends that the constitution of the JCA was not proper, he is not able to demonstrate as to in what manner it is vitiated. However, a vague allegation is made to the effect that the consultation as required under the relevant provisions of law did not taken place between the Central Government and the JCA.
The decision to undertake an intensive review of the service records of certain IAS officers in the AGMUT cadre was taken by the Central Government in consultation with the JCA. The Review Committee was also constituted under notification dated 03.02.2016 issued by the DoP&T. It reads as under:
"Subject: All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 - Rule 16(3) - Guidelines for intensive review of records.
Sir,
In continuation of this Department's letter of even number dated 28th June, 2012 in the "ANNEXURE TO DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL & TRAINING", under the Head V. Procedure for Review, the following is included:
The composition of the Review Committee for the IAS and IPS of AGMUT cadre shall be as follows:
Composition of the Review Committee for the IAS of AGMUT Cadre Home Secretary, Government of Chairman India Chief Secretary, GNCTD Member Secretary, Border Management Member Principal Secretary, AGMUT Member cadre representing SC/ST Community Joint Secretary, UT Member Secretary Composition of the Review Committee for the IPS of AGMUT Cadre Home Secretary, Government of Chairman India Secretary, Border Management Member DG, Central Armed Police Forces Member Principal Secretary, AGMUT Member cadre representing SC/ST Community Commissioner of Police, Delhi Member Joint Secretary, UT Member Secretary
This issues with the approval of the Competent Authority."
Therefore, the plea that there was defect in constitution of the JCA or the Review Committee cannot be accepted.
The first part of the third contention, in a way, stands answered in the discussion undertaken above. The applicant is not able to point out as to how the Review Committee in the instant case did not accord with the notification dated 03.02.2016. The office memorandum, constituting the Review Committee in terms of the notification dated 03.02.2016 was issued on 31.03.2016, with the following composition:
"(i) Sh. Rajiv Mehrishi, Home Secretary : Chairman
(ii) Sh. Anoop Kumar Srivastava, Secetary (BM) : Member
(iii) Sh. K. K. Sharma, Chief Secretary, GNCTD : Member
(iv) Sh. Janak Digal, CMD, DFC/GNCTD : Member
(v) Sh. Hitesh Kumar S. Makwana, Joint Secretary (UT), MHA : Member" This completely accords with the said notification.
Now comes the question as to whether the procedure adopted by the Review Committee in the case of the applicant, is proper. The contention of the applicant is that he had a meritorious record and was promoted to several positions, and that being the case, there was no basis for compulsorily retiring him by invoking the provision under rule 16(3) of the DCRB Rules. An attempt is also made to support this plea by referring to various facets of rule 16(3). Before discussing this plea at length, we feel it appropriate to refer to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on this very issue.
In Baikuntha Nath Das and another v Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another [(1992) 2 SCC 299], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to its earlier judgments in Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v State of Punjab [(1987) 2 SCC 188), and Union of India v M. E. Reddy [(1980) 2 SCC 15], summed up the law relating to the compulsory retirement as under:
"34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion:
(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour.
(ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government.
(iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this OA-2320/2017 Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary - in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be perverse order.
(iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter - of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority.
(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interfere. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above."
This was followed in several judgments which were rendered thereafter, and the same principle continues to hold the field. Since the interference with the orders of compulsory retirement is permissible only in cases of the third ground, i.e., (a) the order of compulsory retirement is passed mala fide; (b) the same is based on no evidence; and (c) it is arbitrary, we need to focus our attention to that.
The applicant did not attribute mala fides to any particular authority, much less any such authority is made party in these proceedings in person. Therefore, such a plea is not available to the applicant at all.
Next is the question as to whether the order of compulsory retirement is based on no evidence. Had it been a case where the Review Committee simply recommended the compulsory retirement of the applicant, and the impugned order, which is indeed bereft of any reasons, is issued, the plea of the applicant would have gained acceptability. The record, however, shows that a careful and extensive examination of the case of the applicant was undertaken. The minutes of the Review Committee are made part of the record. In relation to the applicant, the discussion is spread over seven closely printed pages. A perusal of the same reveals that the performance of the applicant ever since he joined the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration, Mussorrie, till the date of consideration of his case by the Review Committee, was taken into account. The ACRs of the years 1986-87 to 2014-15 were extracted and thoroughly analysed. The manner in which the career of the applicant started when he moved out of the training institute, was exemplified by the remarks made by the Director of the Academy. They read as under:
"From whatever I have seen of the Probationer, I would tend to agree with the Reporting Officer's assessment. Evidently, the faculty, the Course Director and his associates and others also seems to share the reporting officer's misgivings about this probationer. Altogether, his performance during the phase-II training was poor.
The observations of the Reporting Officer bring out flaws in character and attitudes. It seems necessarily to keep him under close supervision, because a considered decision can be taken about his continuance in public service."
In 1987 the reporting officer summed up the attributes of the applicant as under:
"...His energy seems to be directed not towards bettering his performance but frivolous childish pursuits. I will not be able to certify his integrity."
In paras 8.8.2 and 8.8.3 of its minutes, the Review Committee took note of the disciplinary proceedings that were initiated against the applicant. The same reads as under:
"8.8.2 Disciplinary proceedings: A major penalty proceedings were initiated against Shri S. P. Singh, IAS (AGMUT:1984) under Rule 8 of All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969 vide MHA's Memorandum dated 2nd Feb.2006 on the following charges:-
(i) While functioning as Project Director, Urban Basic Services (UBS) in the Urban Development Department of the Govt. of NCT of Delhi, he purchased a Tata Sumo
No. DL-6CA-8591 on 30.11.1997 unauthorisedly without the approval of the Competent Authority. He unauthorisedly brought the said Tata Sumo alongwith him when he was transferred out of the Urban Development Department and posted as Special Commissioner (Transport) and Director, Delhi Energy Development agency in 1998 and he kept the said vehicle for his personal use till November, 1998 i.e. for one year. He also had not got any History Sheet and Log Book prepared for the said Tata Sumo as a result of which the expenditure incurred on it towards POL and maintenance could not be recorded. On enquiry, he fabricated a back dated letter to show that the vehicle was sent to Election Department.
(ii) While functioning as Director DEDA, Sh. S.P. Singh purchased a Maruti Car DL-3CJ-8262 unauthorisedly without obtaining the prior approval of the Competent Authority and he used this vehicle for his personal use.
(iii) While functioning as Director DEDA, he created a fake File No.PA/MD/1998-99/IITF to favour M/s Mandali, R-72, Khirki Extension, Malviya Nagar, New Delhi to award the work of preparing a concept for designing and supervision of DEDA stall in Indian International Trade Fair, 1998.
(iv) Inquiry Officer CDI/CVC submitted his report on 4.10.2013 holding the charges as not proved since there is no oral or documentary evidence to prove that the Charged Officer has misused the Government vehicle. Delhi Govt. has failed to provide supporting documents. Regarding creation of fake file and awarding the work of preparing a concept of designing and supervision of DEDA stall in Indian International Trade Fair, 1999, IA concluded that despite summons, no witnesses appeared during the Regular Headings from either M/s Taaq or M/s Stress Lab for sustaining the genuineness of their claim letters.
8.8.3 The MHA after getting Second Stage Advice dated 4.10.2013 from the CVC exonerated Sh. S.P. Singh, IAS vide order dated 30.4.2014. The Committee felt however that technicalities apart, the whole episode does not speak well of the officer, whose conduct is not at all like officer."
Though in the subsequent paragraph, the gist of the complaints available in the personal file of the applicant was mentioned, we feel it appropriate to make reference to a couple of them. They read:
"(iv) Sh. S.P. Singh made a trip to Bombay with his family in Sept. 1990 and stayed at Hotel Sea-Rock under the assumed name of Mrs & Mr, Gonsalves at the expense of Society.
(v) Sh. S. P. Singh got his wife appointed as Chairperson in the Red Cross Blood Bank at a monthly Salary of Rs.3500/- + perks."
In para 8.11 of the minutes, under the heading "Recommendations", the Committee made reference to various ACRs and instances. The discussion was summed up in the following sentences:
"...Having gone through the entire Service Records of Sh. S.P. Singh (excluding 2.6.86 to 31.3.87) carefully, the Review Committee concludes that integrity of Sh. S.P. Singh is doubtful and Sh. S.P. Singh in inefficient, ineffective and is no longer useful for public service. The Committee considered the ongoing criminal/disciplinary proceedings against the officer and felt that, these proceedings should not come in the way of retiring officer under 16
(3). The criminal/disciplinary proceedings can continue, even after retiring the officer, and an appropriate penalty can be imposed on his terminal benefits on officer after retirement. Shri S.P. Singh has proved to be deadwood. Therefore, the Committee recommends to retire Shri S.P. Singh, IAS (1984) permanently under Rule 16(3) of All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 read with DoPT OM No.25013/02/2005-AIS II dated 28.06.2012."
When such is the dispassionate, objective and elaborate assessment, it is just unthinkable to treat the exercise as bereft of any evidence.
The last limb of the third ground happens to be the one of arbitrariness. The question of arbitrariness would arise if only the authorities acted in a whimsical, unreasonable and high-handed manner. Such instances would arise if only the action taken by the authorities cannot be supported even by the material on record. If there exists adequate material, the occasion to take the plea of arbitrariness does not arise. If one takes into account the material that weighed with the Committee, hardly there exists a scope for any second opinion.
An attempt is made to impress us that once the applicant has crossed the limits of the tenure and age as mentioned under rule 16(3), the review was impermissible. However, the instructions that are issued by the DoP&T from time to time make this plea unacceptable. In its letter dated 28.06.2012 addressed to all the Chief Secretaries, the DoP&T framed elaborate guidelines in the context of the review under rule 16 of the DCRB Rules. Anticipating that officers may press into service the plea that they have crossed certain years of qualifying period of service or age, or that the review is impermissible, the DoP&T mentioned in paras 6 and 7 as under:
"6. A member of the All-India Service who has completed 15 years of qualifying service or has completed 25 years of qualifying service or attained the age of 50 years will, invariably, be found to occupy a senior administrative post. It would not be acceptable to find that such a member has become a mere passenger in the senior level in which he/she is placed. One must always guard against the operation of the 'Peter Principle'
Nevertheless, it is sometimes found that a few members of the All-India Services do tend to become mere passengers in the post or at the level in which a member is placed for the time being. They become either stale or listless; they do not exhibit any creativity or innovativeness; and they do not achieve results. In some other cases, information may be available which casts grave doubt upon the integrity of a member. The form or the Annual Confidential Report/Performance Appraisal Report is designed in order to bring out, as far as possible, these tendencies or traits, which would alert Government to take suitable action under the rules."
By referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v Umedbhai M. Patel [(2001) 3 SCC 314], it is pleaded on behalf of the applicant that the procedure prescribed under rule 16(3) is resorted to as a short-cut to the departmental inquiry, which is already pending. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court summed up the law in this behalf as under:
"11. The law relating to compulsory retirement has now crystallised into definite principles, which could be broadly summarised thus:
(i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest.
(ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution.
(iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer.
(iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order.
(v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration.
(vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable.
(vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer.
(viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure."
The emphasis is on clause (vi) referred to above. The occasion to invoke that clause would arise if only the order of compulsory retirement is passed at a time when disciplinary proceedings are pending against an officer, and the record is otherwise clean, and his utility is not doubted, i.e., he is not a deadwood. In the instant case, the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant are in relation to a trap case. It is difficult to assume that the respondents have taken recourse to rule 16(3) of the DCRB Rules, being apprehensive that they may not be able to prove the misconduct of the applicant. The extracts made in the preceding paragraphs disclose that even if the pending disciplinary proceedings are to be ignored, there is sufficient material to invoke rule 16(3).
Reliance is also placed upon an order dated 05.04.2018 passed by this Tribunal in OA No.2208/2017 - Babulal Agrawal v Union of India. We perused the said order in detail. That was also a case of compulsory retirement of an IAS officer. We, however, find that it was decided mostly on facts, and no principle of law, which may apply to the facts of the present case, as such, was enunciated.
The discussion undertaken by us in the preceding paragraphs would clearly demonstrate that the order of compulsory retirement passed against the applicant is supported by relevant facts, and is strictly in accordance with law.
Once the order of compulsory retirement passed against the applicant is upheld, the issue pertaining to suspension virtually pales into insignificance. Even otherwise, we do not find any illegality in the successive extensions of the suspension. It was occasioned on account of the arrest of the applicant on his being caught red-handed in a trap case. Though the effort of the court as well as the administration is to ensure that the order of suspension pending inquiry does not continue beyond a particular length of time, there always exist exceptions for cases of this nature. It is not in the hands of the respondents to conclude the proceedings that started with the arrest of the applicant. The court in which the case is pending has to dispose of the same after recording evidence and hearing the parties. The reinstatement of an officer with such a background would not only send a wrong message to the public at large, but also would adversely affect the image of the administration.
We, therefore, dismiss both the OAs. There shall be no order as to costs.