Sanjay Kumar Shrivastava vs The State of Jharkhand

Amareshwar Sahay, J.—Heard the parties.

This is the second attempt of the petitioner for grant of anticipatory bail in connection with Sadar (Town) P.S. Case No. 372 of 1997, which has been registered under Sections 498A, 323 & 504, IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. From the FIR, it appears that the Informant, wife of the accused petitioner herein, alleged that her husband and her in-laws named in the FIR started torturing her due to non-fulfillment of their demand of dowry.

The petitioner filed application before this Court for grant of anticipatory bail vide A.B.A No. 5410 of 2001 after the prayer was refused by the Sessions Judge, Palamau on 18.10.2001. Admittedly, the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner was refused by this Court after considering the same on its merit vide order dated 4.12.2001. However, the other accused persons were allowed anticipatory bail.

It appears that after the prayer for anticipatory bail was refused by this Court to the petitioner, he alongwith other co-accused filed an application u/s 482, Cr PC before this Court for quashing the entire criminal prosecution mainly on the ground that the present petitioner i.e. the husband had already filed a divorce suit before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sonebhadra against his wife and the said divorce suit was decreed ex parte in favour of the husband even before lodging of the present FIR by the wife and, therefore, the present case was nothing but an outcome of mala fide action on the part of the wife with a view to harass-and humiliate the petitioner and other accused persons. This Court by order dated 26.3.2004 in Cr. M.P. No. 68 of 2002 dismissed the said application for quashing of the entire criminal prosecution, giving liberty to raise all the points at an appropriate stage including the stage of framing of charge.

It appears that having failed to get the favorable result from this Court in the aforesaid application for quashing of the proceeding, the present application has been filed by the petitioner for grant of anticipatory bail though it was refused earlier on merit by this Court. In other words, the petitioner has prayed for reconsideration of his prayer for anticipatory bail.

In my view, the second application for anticipatory bail should not be entertained for reconsideration on merit, if it has been rejected earlier either on merit or the application is earlier withdrawn unless some new fact/facts emerges, that also due to any subsequent event after the application u/s 438, Cr PC was rejected by the Court or withdrawn earlier, if without emergence of new fact/facts due to any subsequent event, the prayer for anticipatory bail is again reconsidered either by the Sessions Judge or by the High Court. In my view, it would amount to review of the earlier orders, which is not permissible under the law because there is no provision for review in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Now coming to the present case, nothing has been stated in the present application for anticipatory bail, from which this Court can come to the conclusion that any new fact has emerged due to any subsequent event after it was rejected earlier on merit and, therefore, no case for reconsideration of the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner is made out. Even the observation made by this Court while dismissing the application u/s 482, Cr PC filed by the petitioner for quashing of the entire criminal prosecution, liberty was given to raise all the points at an appropriate stage including at the stage of framing of charge. That observation cannot and does not mean that the petitioner was given liberty to file a second application for anticipatory bail for reconsideration on its merit without any fresh ground.

Accordingly, I find no merit in this application and, as such, this anticipatory bail application of the petitioner is rejected. Bail application rejected.