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Judgment
MANISHA BATRA, J.(Oral)
The petitioner-complainant has filed this petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’) for setting aside the order dated 09.07.2026 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Court of learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Sirsa in Criminal Revision No.25 of 2025 as well as the order dated 09.01.2025 (Annexure P-3) passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sirsa, whereby his complaint filed under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC was dismissed under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’).
Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner filed the aforementioned private complaint dated 22.05.2019 (Annexure P-4) against the respondent for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC. The complaint was registered as Complaint No.COMI-68 of 2019 before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sirsa.
The petitioner pleaded in the complaint that he works as a broker in money transactions between parties. His firm Garg Trading Company, which dealt in pesticides and seeds, was closed by him on 01.07.2017 and the bank account of the firm with Central Bank of India was closed on 28.11.2018. Two cheques bearing Nos.088533 and 088534 carrying his signatures were misplaced on 03.08.2017. He lodged a missing report with the Haryana Police on the same day vide application No.13238065173298 and also informed the Branch Manager of the bank by a letter of the same date with a request to stop payment of the cheques.
As per the further allegations, the respondent had stolen the abovementioned two cheques, filled them up as per his own choice by inserting a huge amount and presented them through his banker as if they had been issued by the petitioner in discharge of a pre-existing legal liability. On coming to know of the misuse, he moved an application dated 22.03.2019 before Police Post J.J. Colony, Sirsa. The police called both the parties but took no action as the respondent is an influential person. The respondent then got a legal notice dated 10.04.2019 issued through his counsel claiming the cheques to have been issued in discharge of a pre-existing liability. The petitioner replied to it on 20.04.2019 denying the liability and alleging that the cheques had been stolen and filled up by the respondent.
In preliminary evidence the petitioner examined himself as PW1 and Prem Chand, Manager of Central Bank of India as PW2. He also produced documents Ex.P1 to Ex.P12 which include the application for closure of the account, the application regarding the missing cheques, the application for stop payment, the application to Police Post J.J. Colony, the reports and statements recorded by the police, the cancellation report, the legal notice with its reply, the account statement and a copy of the judgment passed in the complaint filed by the respondent against him under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘NI Act’). The petitioner closed his preliminary evidence on 03.02.2024. A report under Section 202 Cr.P.C. was also called for. As per the report, no transaction between the parties was found and the cheques were also not found to have been stolen by the respondent.
The learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C. vide order dated 09.01.2025 (Annexure P-3). It was noticed that the complaint of the respondent under Section 138 of the NI Act, being Complaint No.632 of 2019 titled Krishan Lal v. Sanjay Garg, had been dismissed on 20.11.2023 not on the ground that the cheques were not issued but because the respondent had failed to establish his legal liability. Para 19 of that judgment, which the petitioner himself had produced as Ex.P12, recorded that the petitioner had admitted handing over the cheques to the respondent. The learned Magistrate also summoned the original record of that case and found the same admission in the transcription of the video recording Ex.C-13. It was, therefore, held that the allegation of misuse of lost cheques stood falsified and there was no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent. Reliance was placed upon Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749.
The revision preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by the Court of learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Sirsa vide order dated 09.07.2026 (Annexure P-1). The learned Revisional Court noticed that the NI Act complaint had failed for want of proof of liability and not because misuse of the cheques was established. It also noticed the admission of the petitioner about handing over the cheques as recorded in Ex.P12. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner has filed this petition.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed both the orders mainly on the ground that the Courts concerned exceeded the limited scope of inquiry at the stage of issuance of process. It is argued that the statements of PW1 and PW2 read with Ex.P1 to Ex.P12 made out a prima facie case against the respondent. The missing report and the stop payment request dated 03.08.2017 had been lodged long before the cheques were presented and the dispute arose. The report under Section 202 Cr.P.C. itself found no transaction between the parties and the respondent had not produced any material to show a pre-existing liability. The observation in the same report that the cheques were not found to have been stolen could not conclusively decide the question of their unauthorised completion and use, which was the real allegation in the complaint.
Learned counsel has further argued that physical delivery of a signed cheque and authority to fill it up against a particular liability are two distinct matters. The admission about handing over the cheques therefore did not by itself show that the respondent was authorised to insert any amount or to present them against a non-existent liability. The complete contents of the transcription Ex.C-13 were not reproduced or analysed by the Courts concerned and the dismissal of the NI Act complaint did not conclude the question of cheating or forgery. The ingredients of each of the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC were not separately examined and the disputed questions of liability and dishonest intention could be determined only after evidence. Learned counsel has, accordingly, prayed for setting aside the impugned orders and summoning of the respondent or in the alternative for remitting the matter to the learned Magistrate for fresh consideration.
This Court has heard the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable length, besides going through the material placed on record.
At the outset it needs to be noticed that the petitioner has already availed the remedy of revision before the learned Additional Sessions Judge against the order of the Magistrate. The present petition is, thus, a second challenge to the same order by the same person, which ordinarily amounts to circumvention of the bar contained in sub-section (3) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 438(3) BNSS). The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Krishnan and another v. Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 SCC 241 that the inherent power of the High Court is nevertheless not wholly taken away and can be exercised sparingly to prevent grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of Court. It was observed as under:-
“So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue.”
Keeping these limits in view, this Court has examined whether the concurrent orders suffer from any patent illegality or perversity so as to call for interference. For the reasons recorded hereinafter, this Court finds that they do not.
The law regarding the scope of inquiry at the stage of Sections 200 to 203 Cr.P.C. is well settled. In Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, 2024 INSC 626 the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the Magistrate at the stage of issuing process has only to see whether a prima facie case exists on the allegations in the complaint and the evidence led by the complainant and need not go into the probability of conviction. It was also clarified that where the essential ingredients of the offence are absent or the dispute is only of a civil nature the complaint is liable to be dismissed at that stage itself. The relevant observations are as under:-
“If, however, a bare perusal of a complaint or the evidence led in support of it shows essential ingredients of the offences alleged are absent or that the dispute is only of a civil nature or that there are such patent absurdities in evidence produced that it would be a waste of time to proceed further, then of course, the complaint is liable to be dismissed at that stage only. What the Magistrate has to determine at the stage of issue of process is not the correctness or the probability or improbability of individual items of evidence on disputable grounds, but the existence or otherwise of a prima facie case on the assumption that what is stated can be true unless the prosecution allegations are so fantastic that they cannot reasonably be held to be true.”
***
“It is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations but there appears to be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him.”
The learned Magistrate has also rightly kept in view the principle laid down in Pepsi Foods’s case (supra) that summoning of an accused is a serious matter and criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. The order of the Magistrate must reflect that he has applied his mind to the nature of the allegations and the evidence led in support of them.
The principal offence alleged is cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC (Section 318(4) BNS). The essential ingredients of this offence were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Md. Ibrahim and others v. State of Bihar and another, (2009) 8 SCC 751 in the following words:-
“The essential ingredients of the offence of ‘cheating’ are as follows:
(i)deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or by any other act or omission;
(ii)fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to either deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and
(iii)such act or omission causing or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.
To constitute an offence under section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived (i) to deliver any property to any person, or (ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security).”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held in Delhi Race Club’s case (supra) that mens rea in the form of dishonest intention must be present in the offence of cheating and it must be there from the very beginning or inception. The same view was taken in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma and others v. State of Bihar and another, (2000) 4 SCC 168, wherein it was held that the intention of the accused at the time of inducement is the gist of the offence of cheating and a fraudulent or dishonest intention cannot be presumed merely from a subsequent turn of events.
Tested on this touchstone, this Court finds that even if the allegations in the complaint and the statements of PW1 and PW2 are taken at their face value, the ingredients of Section 420 IPC are not made out at all.
A bare reading of the complaint would show that it does not disclose any deception practised upon any person or any dishonest inducement of a person to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy a valuable security. The case of the petitioner from the very beginning is that the two cheques were misplaced and thereafter stolen by the respondent. A person from whose possession a document is stolen is not deceived into parting with it. The petitioner does not claim to have delivered anything to the respondent on account of any representation made by him. It is also not the case of the petitioner that any banker or any other person was induced by the respondent to part with any property. Nothing has been pointed out from the complaint or the evidence to show that any amount was actually paid out of the account of the petitioner against these cheques. The recourse taken by the respondent to Section 138 of the NI Act shows that the cheques were presented and not honoured.
The foundation of the complaint is the allegation that the cheques were stolen by the respondent and thereafter misused. The complaint gives no particulars as to when or how the respondent got hold of the cheques. The inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. revealed that the cheques were not found to have been stolen by him. More importantly, the petitioner had himself admitted in the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act that he had handed over the cheques to the respondent. This admission finds mention in para 19 of the judgment Ex.P12, which was produced by the petitioner himself. It is also there in the transcription of the video recording Ex.C-13, which the learned Magistrate noticed in the original record. The learned Magistrate, thus, did not rely upon any defence set up by the respondent. Rather, he relied upon an exhibit of the petitioner himself and upon the petitioner’s own statement recorded in judicial proceedings. In view of the law laid down in Delhi Race Club’s case (supra), the Magistrate was entitled to take into consideration such inherent improbability appearing in the evidence led by the complainant. Once the plea of loss and theft stands belied by the petitioner’s own admission, no dishonest intention at the inception can be inferred against the respondent.
It is argued that the complete context of Ex.C-13 was not reproduced by the Courts concerned. Neither the judgment Ex.P12 nor the transcription Ex.C-13 has been placed on record of this petition to show that the finding regarding the admission is incorrect or has been taken out of context. The grounds taken in the petition also do not deny that the petitioner had handed over the cheques. The only contention is that such delivery did not amount to authority to fill them up against a non-existent liability.
The distinction sought to be drawn between delivery of a signed cheque and authority to complete it is of no help to the petitioner on the case set up by him. His case in the complaint was not that he had handed over signed cheques to the respondent for a limited purpose which were then filled up for a different amount. His case was of loss and theft and it is this case which has been found to be unsustainable at the threshold. In the context of Section 139 of the NI Act the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, 2019 INSC 149 as under:-
“If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque.”
Whether the amount inserted corresponded to a legally enforceable liability was a matter for adjudication in the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act. The complaint of the respondent failed there for want of proof of liability. That failure does not by itself make the respondent guilty of cheating. The report that no transaction between the parties was found is likewise only a negative finding on the existence of liability. It does not establish deception or dishonest intention on his part. A dispute whether any liability existed or whether the amount inserted in the cheques was correct is essentially of a civil nature and the criminal law cannot be set in motion to resolve it.
This Court is not holding that dismissal of a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act operates as a bar to a prosecution under the IPC. The complaint of the petitioner fails because on his own submissions and the material produced by him, the ingredients of the offences alleged are not made out.
So far as the offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC (Sections 338, 336(3) and 340(2) BNS) are concerned the position is even weaker. The condition precedent for each of them is forgery which in turn requires the making of a false document as defined in Section 464 IPC. In Md. Ibrahim’s case (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
“In short, a person is said to have made a ‘false document’, if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practicing deception, or from a person not in control of his senses.” ***
“If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither section 467 nor section 471 of the Code are attracted.”
The signatures on the cheques are admittedly those of the petitioner. His only grievance is that the cheques were filled up without his authority. The cheques were handed over by the petitioner himself and the plea of theft has not found support. Illustration (c) to Section 464 IPC deals with a person who picks up a signed cheque and fraudulently fills it up but its factual premise is missing in the present case. There is no prima facie material to show that the cheques were made or completed by the respondent without authority. No false document can, therefore, be said to have been made. Without forgery, the offences under Sections 467 and 471 IPC cannot survive. Section 468 IPC additionally requires that the forgery be committed for the purpose of cheating which stands excluded for the reasons already recorded.
The learned Revisional Court has also rightly kept in view the scope of its power. The revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decision under challenge is grossly erroneous or there is no compliance with the provisions of law or the finding recorded is based on no evidence or material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. None of these defects has been shown in the orders under challenge. The learned Magistrate has not applied any standard higher than what is required at the stage of issuing process. He has considered the complaint and the evidence led by the petitioner together with the report under Section 202 Cr.P.C. and has recorded reasons for finding no sufficient ground to proceed. The Revisional Court has affirmed that view after examining the record.
This Court is of the considered opinion that the concurrent orders passed by the Courts concerned do not suffer from any illegality or perversity. No case of miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of Court is made out to warrant interference in exercise of the powers under Section 528 BNSS.
Resultantly the petition is dismissed. Pending application(s) if any shall also stand disposed of. The observations made hereinabove are confined to the disposal of the present petition.
